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The thesis empirically analyses the short- and long-term impact of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial), established in 1946, on post-war 
Japan, in order to critically examine current understanding and the operation and 
strategy of international war crimes tribunals. The UN Security Council created the ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTs) with 
understanding that international war crimes tribunals would contribute to the 
transformation of conflicts and post-conflict societies, where peace should not only be 
`restored', but also 'maintained'. The experience of the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg significantly informed their creation, strategic purpose and the 
engagement of those building the ICTs. However, the experience of the Tokyo Trial and 
post-war Japan offers a different interpretation of the impact of international war crimes 
tribunals. 
The thesis analyses the impact of Tokyo Trial by focusing on the Japanese 
perception of the Trial from the 1940s to 2003, based on detailed historical, cultural and 
social research. In so doing, it questions what international criminal justice can 
realistically be expected to achieve, and what outsiders can and cannot do to transform a 
war-torn society and promote reconciliation within it. The experience of the Tokyo Trial 
and post-war Japan demonstrates that the impact of international war crimes tribunals 
and their two principal devices - individualisation of responsibility and the creation of 
an authoritative historical record - are not necessarily wholly positive, nor are they 
straightforward. The thesis suggests a need to re-calibrate the strategic purpose of the 
ICTs and to challenge the assumed positive impact of international war crimes tribunals 
held by advocates of international tribunals based on the `Nuremberg legacy'. 
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In 1945, the Allies, on the initiative of the United States, established the International 
Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals (the Nuremberg 
Tribunal) to prosecute and punish top leaders of Nazi Germany for war crimes 
conducted during the Second World War. Almost half a century later, the United Nations, 
with the United States again playing a leading role, created the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTs). The ICTs, both in their 
creation and operation, are strongly based on and influenced by the experience and 
`lessons' of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The historical, legal, and political precedent of the 
`Nuremberg legacy' was explicitly invoked with the creation of the ICTs and subsequent 
discourse surrounding them. At the Opening of the Commemoration of `50 years after 
Nuremberg', in October 1995, US President Bill Clinton declared: 
We have an obligation to carry forward the lessons of Nuremberg. That is 
why we strongly support the United Nations War Crimes Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. ' 
However, Nuremberg is not the only precedent to which the ICTs can refer. 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial) was also created in 
the aftermath of the Second World War to prosecute major Japanese war criminals. This 
tribunal is often neglected in the literature on war crimes tribunals and some argue that it 
`achieved nothing whatever, as far as Japan was directly concerned. '2 This comment, 
' Remarks by the President at the Opening of the Commemoration of `50 years after Nuremberg: Human 
rights and the rule of law', 15 October 1995: 
http: //ciinton6. nara. gov/1995/10/1995-10-15-president-at-50-Years-after-nuremberg-symposium. html, 5 
January 2004. 
2 Judith Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 180. 
Introduction 
while not based on extensive research, nonetheless reflects a commonly shared view of 
the Tokyo Trial. The aim of this thesis is to interrogate this claim; to ascertain, through 
empirical research, the experience and legacy of the Tokyo Trial and its impact on 
post-war Japan. Crucially, it addresses the extent to which the Japanese experience 
challenges or strengthens the `Nuremberg legacy', and thus our current understanding of 
the utility of international war crimes trials. 
In order to do so, it is necessary first to consider the purpose, strategy and 
impact of international war crimes prosecutions as understood by those who supported 
the establishment of the ICTs. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established on 25 May 1993 by the United Nations Security 
Council (Resolution 827). It was established on an ad hoc basis with a mandate to 
prosecute those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed during the war in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards. The following 
year, in November 1994, the Security Council established a second ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). As of March 2005, the ICTY had publicly 
indicted 153 people, out of whom 109 accused had appeared in proceedings before the 
Tribunal. Of the thirty-three persons who had received their final sentence, 28 were 
found guilty. Fifty-one accused were in custody at the Detention Unit. One of the most 
high profile accused, the former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Slobodan Milosevic, is currently on trial. 3 The ICTR has completed 23 cases including 
that of the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, who was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. As of March 2005, there were 63 detainees, including several former 
senior cabinet ministers in the Interim Government of Rwanda of 1994, former military 
3 Key Figures of ICTY Case, http: //www. un. org/icty/glance/index. htin, 9 March 2005. 
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commanders, political leaders, journalists and senior businessmen. 4 
The impact of the creation and operation of the ICTs is not limited to the 
individuals on trial, nor indeed to the two regions. Their creation has had a slow but 
steady normative impact on international relations by reinforcing a norm of 
accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and the principle 
of `universal jurisdiction' over such crimes. Subsequent developments appeared to 
reinforce these trends, including the British government's decision in 1998 to allow 
extradition hearings to proceed with regard to the former Chilean President Augusto 
Pinochet, who was indicted by a Spanish judge for crimes against humanity and crimes 
of torture committed while in office, 5 and the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone on the basis of an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone and other `hybrid' mechanisms, involving international and domestic law 
and personnel in Kosovo, East Timor and Cambodia. 6 Meanwhile, during the Iraq War, 
the United States, while opposed to the form of international criminal justice espoused 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC), appeared to favour prosecuting Saddam 
Hussein over summary execution. 7 Although the Iraqi Special Tribunal eventually took 
the form of a domestic court, there were elements of international involvement in the 
process. Finally, of course, the ICTs were a direct driving force for the establishment of 
the ICC with the adoption of the Rome Statute in July 1998 and its coming into force 
4 ICTR Detainees - Status on 1 March 2005, http: //Nvw. ictr. org/defau. lt. htm, 9 March 2005. 
5 See Marc Weller, `On the Hazards of Foreign Travel for Dictators and Other International Criminals', 
International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3 (1999), pp. 599-617. The extradition of Pinochet was not realised as 
the Home Secretary decided in March 2000 that the General was not fit for the trial due to his medical 
condition. 
6 See James Rae, `War Crimes Accountability: Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia and East Timor? ', 
Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2003). 
See the comment of White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer at Press Briefing on 11 October, 2002, 
http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021011-5. html, 12 December 2003. 
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four years later. 
It seems that, since the creation of the ICTY, some form of international 
criminal justice mechanism is seen by the United Nations and the international 
community as a necessary pre-requisite to tackling the aftermath of armed conflicts and 
violence. At the same time, these developments were enthusiastically studied by 
international lawyers and human rights scholars and activists; and the effects and 
impacts of the ICTs were intensively discussed in the past decade. 8 What tends to be 
ignored in existing research and arguments on the effectiveness and success of 
international tribunals, however, is thorough examination of what exactly is achieved by 
`prosecuting' `individuals' suspected of committing `war crimes' in an `international' 
tribunal. 9 This is a critical question that requires thorough examination of political as 
well as legal issues. In the first place, assessment of the tribunal is not possible without 
clarifying what it is trying to achieve. The debate over the effectiveness and success of 
such tribunals remains unproductive without a common understanding of the expected 
purpose; that is, what the Tribunal is actually for. The success of the ICTs matters not 
only in their own terms but also within the broader context of international criminal 
justice, in which the experience of the ICTs has been given significant weight. 
$ Symposium on `The ICTY 10 Years On: The view from Inside' in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2004) is a good collection of papers discussing and analysing the theoretical and 
practical achievements and flaws of the ICTY, contributed to by those with first-hand experience in the 
Tribunal as Judges, prosecutors, or staff members, as well as diplomats and journalists. An analysis of the 
approach of existing research on the ICTs is conducted in Chapter 1. 
9 Some papers in Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2004) show awareness of the 
multiple goals and expectation attached to the ICTY and their significance to the assessment of the 
Tribunal. See Minna Schrag, `Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience', pp. 427-434; Claude Jorda, `The 
Major Hurdles and Accomplishments of the ICTY: What the ICC Can Learn from Them, ' pp. 572-584. 
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The Strategic Purpose of the ICTs and International Peace and Security 
The ICTY and ICTR were both created as UN Security Council Chapter VII 
enforcement measures. The effect of this was that all member states had a binding 
obligation to cooperate with the Tribunals. The legal basis for invoking Chapter VII to 
establish international criminal tribunals was that the serious and widespread violations 
occurring in the former Yugoslavia were `threats to international peace and security' 
Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), which established the ICTY, set out the `sole 
purpose' of the Tribunal as `prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia'. 10 
Yet, prosecution per se was not the aim for which the Tribunal was established: it was a 
means to achieve broader aims; the creation of the ICTY was a measure taken by the 
Security Council to fulfil its `primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security'. " Resolution 827 states that the Tribunal would contribute to `the 
restoration and maintenance of peace'. 12 Resolution 955, establishing the ICTR, echoed 
this by also declaring that the Tribunal would contribute to `the restoration and 
maintenance of peace'. 13 The key to assessing the work of the ICTs, therefore, is 
whether the creation and operation of the Tribunal are `appropriate and effective for the 
purpose of the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. ' 14 The 
understanding of this broader aim, the strategic purpose of war crimes prosecution, is 
U. N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993, para. 11 (2). 
Article 24 (1) of the U. N. Charter. 
1' U. N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), para. 6. 
13 U. N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994. Resolution 955 stated that the Tribunal was for `the 
sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide 
and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 
31 December 1994'. 
`a Rachel Kerr, `International Judicial Intervention: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia', International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2000), p. 17. 
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indispensable in assessing the ICTs. 
The analysis should go one step further, however, because there is no shared 
understanding of precisely in what ways international war crimes prosecution 
contributes to the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. The 
pros and cons of the ICTs, and of other approaches to post-conflict justice, continue to be 
debated and discussed from various different perspectives of the goal. 15 For some, the 
ICTs are burdened with all possible `good' - many and too diverse roles, some of which 
are not even asked of domestic criminal justice. These overly diverse roles bring about 
confusion in analysis and a tendency to lump together means, ends, and impacts, each of 
which should be examined at a different level. For example, Paul Williams and Michael 
Scharf raise five issues as `the function of justice' : establishing individual responsibility; 
dismantling institutions and discrediting leaders responsible for atrocities; establishing 
an accurate historical record; victim catharsis; and deterrence. The first and the third are 
justice as a `means', which can bring `impacts' such as the second, fourth and fifth. 
They need, therefore, to be analysed at a different conceptual level. 16 
Either way, the assessment and analysis of the effectiveness and success of the 
ICTs becomes muddled, hindering productive arguments among different views. What 
15 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, for example, identify three different approaches to international war 
crimes tribunals: the logic of appropriateness, the logic of consequence, and the logic of emotion. They 
argue, through empirical research, that the logic of appropriateness, which is held by many promoters of 
the ICTs, is unworkable for the prevention of mass atrocities, in the short term, and the establishment of 
the rule of law or democracy, in the long term, which Snyder and Vinjamuri believe to be the goal of the 
war crimes prosecution. However, the goals set out by each approach are not necessarily identical. As the 
authors themselves recognise, the focus of the logic of appropriateness is strengthening norms to change 
state behaviour, and the logic of emotion focuses on the role of international criminal justice as the 
emotional theatre of reconciliation. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, `Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice', International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), pp. 5-44. 
16 Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf, Peace with Justice?: War Crimes and Accountability in the 
Former Yugoslavia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 16-22. 
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is lacking in the current research on international war crimes tribunals is a theoretical 
and conceptual framework within which to assess the effectiveness of international war 
crimes prosecutions based on their strategic purpose. 
In order further to clarify the strategic purposes of the ICTs, it is necessary to 
examine what the `restoration' and `maintenance' of peace means. Within the United 
Nations security system, Article 1 of the UN Charter declares that `the maintenance of 
international peace and security' is the primary goal of the United Nations. It does not 
refer to `the restoration of peace' in this context. The Charter seems to assume the 
existence of international peace and security to start with. If there is no peace, it is not 
possible to maintain it. `To "maintain" international peace means to prevent a breach of 
the peace', argues Hans Kelsen: `If the peace has been broken, it cannot be maintained, 
but only restored. ' 17 The United Nations was established in the aftermath of the Second 
World War in order to protect the peace regained and `to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind'. 18 The Charter reflects the assumption, and hope, of the founders of the 
organisation that the post-Second World War international system would be essentially 
static-19 The primary goal of the United Nations, therefore, is the `maintenance' of a 
status quo, and when it is disturbed by `aggressors', then a measure of `restoration' is 
required. This point is reinforced in Article 39 of the Charter, which states that measures 
taken by the Security Council are `to maintain or restore', not `to restore or maintain'. 
17 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems - with 
Bound in Supplement (London: Stevens and Sons, 1951), p. 13. 
18 Preamble, para. 1 of the UN Charter. 
19 Michael Howard, `The Historical Development of the UN's Role in International Security' in Adam 
Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds. ), United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International 
Relations, 2"d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 64-65. 
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The phrase `maintain or restore international peace and security' signifies that 
the two measures are regarded as independent or different from each other. The act of 
`restoring' peace implies the non-existence of peace and relates to the removal of an 
immediate threat, or the achievement of a cease-fire; thus it is a short-term and 
consequence-oriented approach to a threat. 20 Maintenance, on the other hand, is a 
long-term and process-oriented project to create long-lasting peace and, in a general 
sense, an action that follows restoration, as maintenance presumes the existence of peace 
to be maintained. In other words, restoration is strongly related to the pursuit of `peace', 
traditionally understood in terms of the absence of armed hostilities and order among 
states, and maintenance to the pursuit of `justice', which tends to be related to the 
remedy for the non-military sources of instability. 21 In the past, measures taken by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII were merely assigned either to `restore' or 
`maintain', or `restore or maintain', international peace and security. However, the 
phrasing of Resolution 827 signifies that the ICTY, a Chapter VII enforcement measure, 
was formally expected to contribute both to `restoration' and `maintenance' of peace. 
This is the first such case in the history of the Security Council. 22 
It is here that a conventional 'peace-vs. -justice' argument was raised in the 
context of the ICTY. The incompatibility of `restoration' and `maintenance', or peace 
and justice, was discussed in terms of theory, practice, timing, and moral implications. 
The pursuit of peace in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was to achieve a cease-fire 
20 Inger Österdahl connects the restoration to breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, and the 
maintenance to a response to threats to the peace. Inger Österdahl, Threat to the Peace. The Interpretation 
by the Security Council ofArticle 39 of the UN Charter (Uppsala: lustus Forlag, 1998), P. 52. 
21 See Chapter 1 for the further analysis of peace, justice and international security. 
22 Regarding Chapter VII enforcement measures, the phrasing the `restoration and maintenance' of peace 
reappeared in Resolution 955 (1994), which established the ICTR, and is ever since repeated only in those 
resolutions with regard to the ICTs. For example, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1165 (1998), 30 April 1998; U. N. 
Doc. S/RES/l 166 (1998), 13 May 1998; U. N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000), 5 December 2000. 
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and implement a peace process. Having been created in the midst of the conflict, the 
ICTY, in its first stages, was expected to contribute, through its existence and operation, 
to the deterrence of further violence in the ongoing conflict. 23 Critics of the ICTY 
argued that indictments and prosecutions were not only ineffective but were also 
counter-productive for restoring peace in the region. 24 In order to stop the fighting, it 
was claimed that it was necessary to negotiate with political and military leaders with 
supreme responsibility for the conduct of war, and, thus the prime targets presumably of 
the Tribunal. `Is it realistic, ' Anthony D'Amato asked, `to expect them to agree to a 
peace settlement in Bosnia if, directly following the agreement, they may find 
themselves in the dock? '25 There was a concern that the attempt to prosecute war 
criminals might prolong the war. An anonymous contributor to Human Rights 
Quarterly, in 1996, argued from a peace negotiator's point of view that the pursuit of 
criminals was incompatible with the pursuit of peace and that it was the latter that 
needed to be prioritised: `The quest for justice for yesterday's victims of atrocities 
should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes today's living the dead of 
tomorrow. '26 
D'Amato saw the situation as `the apparently novel dilemma' of attempting to 
23 The expectation is reflected in the statements of several diplomats at the UN Security Council. See, for 
example, the statement of UK Ambassador to the UN, Sir David Hannay in U. N. Doc. S/PV 3217 (1993), 
25 May 1993. 
24 How great a deterrent effect the ICTY actually had on the ground is arguable. The one thing that can be 
said, however, is that the massacre in Srebrenica conducted by the Serbs against more than 7,000 Muslims 
occurred in July 1995, when the ICTY had already started issuing indictments. 
25 Anthony D'Amato, `Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia', The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994), p. 500. 




achieve peace and justice at the same time. 27 This dilemma was recognised also by some 
media at the time. 28 In contrast, some supported the Tribunal from a realist point of view, 
emphasising the significance of the elimination of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic 
from the Dayton Peace Process as a result of their indictment in July 1995. The Peace 
Agreement, it was argued, could not have been concluded if these two figures had been 
at the table. 29 
The incompatibility of peace and justice has been argued also from a moral 
viewpoint. Oliver Schuett points out the direct involvement of the President of Croatia, 
Franjo Tudjman, and the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan 
Milosevic, in concluding the Peace Agreement in December 1995, in spite of the fact 
that both of them were the potential indictees at the time. Schuett argues that peace 
superseded justice under the Dayton Agreement: `Bringing peace to the region through 
the [General Framework Agreement], and doing justice through the tribunal, are 
therefore contradictory. '30 The argument of `peace versus accountability, '31 although in 
27 D'Amato, `Peace', pp. 500-501. He attempts to solve this dilemma theoretically by `put[ting] the 
tribunal in play as an explicit bargaining chip in the peace negotiation'. Ibid., pp. 503-504. 
28 See, for example, Adrian Hamilton, `Tangled up in Trials and Error', The Observer, 28 May 1995. 
29 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modem Library, 1999), p. 338; Rachel Kerr, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law Politics and Diplomacy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 187. 
30 Oliver Schuett, `The International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Dayton 
Peace Agreement: Peace versus Justice? ', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No2, Summer (1997), pl 10. 
31 For a detailed analysis on the role of `institutions of justice' in the process of peace negotiations and the 
conflicting relations between the two, see Williams and Scharf, Peace with Justice?. They argue that the 
relatively limited impact of the ICTY on the peace process was due to `a lack of genuine commitment to 
the norm of justice by some of the most important peace builders'. They also point out that the ICTY, 
especially the Office of Prosecutor, failed to take into consideration the delicate political context for which 
the Tribunal was created. Ibid., p. 135. In sum, the problem existed not in the role of norms and the 
institution of justice per se but in the misapplication of those institutions by actors. 
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itself is important, has gradually lost significance since the cease-fire in 1995; instead, 
the long-term contribution of the ICTY to the region came to be the focus of attention. 3` 
Some commentators raise a more fundamental objection to the ICTY, arguing 
that its creation was contrary to the structure of the international legal and political order 
based on state sovereignty. 33 International criminal tribunals do challenge state 
sovereignty by `intrud[ing] on one of the most sacred areas of state sovereignty: criminal 
jurisdiction. ' 34 This is even more so because both the ICTY and ICTR were given 
primacy over domestic courts regarding prosecution of war crimes. 35 In that sense, the 
ICTs, as some authors rightly put, constitute a form of intervention. 36 In a similar vein to 
arguments over humanitarian intervention, what makes realist theorists and some 
diplomats concerned is the possibility that justice might be pursued at the expense of 
peace, understood in terms of order among states based on the mutual respect of 
sovereignty. 37 
Regarding the tension between peace and justice noted above, it is important to 
go back to Resolution 827 (1993) to examine the expected role of the ICTY in 
32 Payam Akhavan, `Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United 
Nations War Crimes Tribunal', Human Rights Quarterly, Vo. 20, No. 4 (1998), p. 744. 
33 Alfred Rubin, for example, argues that attempts at international criminal tribunals are not based on a 
realistic understanding of the international legal order, which is confused by supporters of tribunals with 
moral order. He is also concerned about international tribunals seeking the meaning of `justice', on which 
there is no universal agreement. Alfred P. Rubin, `The International Criminal Court: A Skeptical 
Analysis', in Michael N. Schmitt (ed. ), International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Essays in 
Honour of Professor L. C. Green on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday (Newport, R. I: Naval War 
College, 2000), pp. 421-438. 
34 Antonio Cassese, `On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), p. 11. 
3s Article 9 (2) of the ICTY Statute and Article 8 (2) of the ICTR Statute. 
36 David Scheffer, `International Judicial Intervention', Foreign Policy, No. 102 (1996), PP. 34-5 1; Kerr, 
`International'. 
37 See Chapter 2. 
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international peace and justice. What does `the restoration and maintenance of peace' 
mean in this context? Aurelien Colson sees in the creation of the ICTs `an intention to 
transcend traditional notions of peace and justice. '38 This is well-reflected in the words 
of Carl August Fleischhauer, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, 
who regarded the fundamental goals of the ICTY as `ending war crimes, bringing the 
perpetrators to justice and breaking an endless cycle of ethnic violence and 
retribution'. 39 In other words, the Tribunal was expected to restore peace, achieve 
justice, and maintain long-term peace, all of which were regarded as neither independent 
nor conflicting, but mutually supportive within the overall project of `the restoration and 
maintenance of peace'. 40 The vital question in the context of the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda is not merely `how war ends' but also `how peace starts'; in other words, `the 
establishment of a long-lasting peace, ' by deterring the recurrence of violence. It is for 
this `critical juncture' of the transition from war to peace that peace needs to be both 
`restored' and `maintained', and the logic of peace and the logic of justice are both 
needed to be followed . 
41 The point about the ICTs is that justice is endorsed for the sake 
of peace by justice as a means: `the enforcement of the criminal law through judicial 
proceedings ... 
[dealing] mainly with the contents of so-called humanitarian law and 
with the prosecution of war criminals. '42 It is here that the idea of `peace through 
38 Aurelien Colson, `The Logic of Peace and the Logic of Justice', International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(2000), p. 51. 
39 Quoted in Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis: Volume 1 
(Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1995), p. 334. 
40 Resolution 827 (1993) expresses the determination `to put an end to such crimes and to take effective 
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them'. U. N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 
para. 5. 
41 Colson, `Logic', p. 51. 
42 Ibid., p. 52. 
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justice' is expected to play a significant role in the region and thus to contribute, in turn, 
to overall international peace and security. 43 
Assessment of the ICTY and the `Nuremberg Legacy' 
The idea of `peace through justice' is not the invention of the ICTs. In a 
number of significant respects, the ICTs drew on `an essential historical, legal and 
judiciary basis' from their predecessors: the International Military Tribunal for the Trial 
of Major German War Criminals (the Nuremberg Tribunal) and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial). 44 Nuremberg was the first public 
international war crimes tribunal to be created in the aftermath of World War II, at which 
German major war criminals, including top leaders, were tried for having committed 
`crimes against peace', war crimes, and `crimes against humanity'. The influence of 
Nuremberg over the ICTs is obvious; the creation and operation of the ICTY has been 
largely viewed through the prism of 'Nuremberg'. 45 Human rights advocates welcomed 
the establishment of the ICTY for having formulated and given credibility to principles 
set out by Nuremberg. Even after its establishment, the ICTY was haunted by the 
shadow of Nuremberg: Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf noted early on in the life of 
the ICTY that, `As the first international criminal jurisdiction, the Nuremberg Tribunal 
provides the benchmark for assessing the International Tribunal and its prospects for 
success. ' 
46 
Besides their purported contribution to reinforcing norms of accountability, 
supporters of the `peace through justice' project emphasised the Tribunals' role in 
43 See Chapter 1 for the further analysis of the idea of `peace through justice'. 
as Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 49. 
as Details of the `Nuremberg analogy' applied to the ICTY is examined in Chapter 1. 
46 Morris and Scharf, Insider's, p. 332, emphasis added. 
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promoting the transformation of war-torn society and reconciliation in it, in order to 
prevent the recurrence of mass violence. 47 The experience of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
and its effect on post-war Germany were regarded, within this context, as a positive 
model. Nuremberg was seen as to have demonstrated that war crimes prosecutions can 
achieve the broader ends of re-educating and transforming a society: from Nazi-led to 
denazified Germany. In addition, it was seen to have proved that international 
prosecution was both feasible and desirable. This is how the international community in 
the 1990s generally interpreted the lessons of Nuremberg: the Nuremberg legacy. 
Regarded as the universal model for transforming war-torn societies, the Nuremberg 
legacy became the basis for the operation and assessment of the ICTY and ICTR. Just as 
Nuremberg was seen as `the last act of the war and first act of the peace', 48 the ICTs were 
created for their potential contribution at a critical juncture, the transition from war to 
peace. 
The Nuremberg Legacy Re-Examined 
Several factors, however, make universalisation of the Nuremberg legacy 
problematic. The legacy is based solely on the experience of Nuremberg and post-war 
Germany. The Nuremberg Trial was conducted in the context of the Allies' occupation 
policy towards post-war Germany, the main focus of which was de-Nazification. This is 
a different context to the transformation of post-conflict ethnically divided societies. 
The Nuremberg legacy cannot be imported wholesale into a wholly different set of 
circumstances. In addition, the general impact of war crimes prosecution on long-lasting 
peace in a war-torn society has not been empirically analysed by those who specialise in 
47 See, for example, Richard J. Goldstone, `Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals', International Law and Politics, Vol. 28 (1996), pp. 485-503. 
48 Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill, The Ethics of War (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 266. 
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international criminal justice. This fact makes the `decontextualised' application of the 
Nuremberg experience even more problematic. Furthermore, rather than stressing 
domestic impact, the proponents of the Nuremberg Trial originally stressed the 
Tribunal's contribution to establishing post-WWII international peace by creating a 
legal order based on the deterrent effect of international law. It should also be noted that 
the Nuremberg legacy itself is not necessarily positive with regard to jus ad bellum; 
Nuremberg, which was to be the Trial to end all wars, did not have such a deterrent 
impact on post-WWII international relations, in which wars were far from eliminated. 49 
Finally, Nuremberg was a military trial and the ICTs are criminal trials. The former 
pursue military justice, which gives more limited rights to the defendant. 
In spite of these problems, however, the Nuremberg legacy is taken as a 
universal model for post-conflict social transformation and reconciliation, and strongly 
connected to the strategic purpose of the ICTs. Re-examination of the Nuremberg 
legacy, therefore, is vital for the assessment of the strategy and success of the ICTs, as 
well as the project of international war crimes prosecution. 
There are several options open for re-examining the Nuremberg legacy. We 
could look at the Nuremberg experience itself, by empirically studying the impact of the 
International Military Tribunal on German society. Research of this kind has already 
been conducted by some historians. 50 However, what matters here is not whether the 
49 See Chapter 2. A direct deterrent effect of something is difficult to assess as it is only when the 
deterrence failed that it can be recognised that the deterrence had been working. Still, it can be argued that 
Nuremberg may have reduced potential violations of jus in Bello, by endorsing the development of the 
laws of war and enhancing the better understanding of the constraints on the method of warfare. And, 
surely, Nuremberg as well as the Tokyo Trial had a deterrent effect on post-war Germany and Japan, 
turning them away from war. As for post-war Japan, see Chapters 5 and 6. 
so See for example Peter H. Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001); John H. Herz, `Denazification and Related Policies' in John H. Herz (ed. ), From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies ofAuthoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, 
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German experience is authentic or not; what matters is the fact that the legacy is 
currently interpreted in a certain way to support international war crimes prosecutions 
and the idea of `peace through justice'. Another way to tackle the Nuremberg legacy is 
to examine directly the impact of the ICTs on societies in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. 5 1 However, such research will necessarily be limited in scope because of its 
time span. After all, it is only ten years since the establishment of the ICTs, which is 
rather short for examining social transformation and reconciliation. What is more, the 
work of the ICTs is far from complete. One of the most important trials at the ICTY, that 
of Slobodan Milosevic, is still under way, at the time of writing. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, at this point to make an assessment of the impact and effect of the tribunal on 
societies in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as on international peace and 
security as a whole. 
The approach taken in this thesis is to re-examine the Nuremberg legacy as a 
notion, and the idea of `peace through justice', based on a different case: the Tokyo Trial. 
The Tokyo Trial was created at around the same time, for the same purposes, as 
Nuremberg: to prosecute and punish the vanquished of World War II for having 
conducted `crimes against peace', war crimes, and `crimes against humanity'. This 
thesis will re-examine the Nuremberg legacy by analysing the Tokyo Trial and its impact 
on post-war Japan. Has the Tokyo Trial contributed to the transformation and 
reconciliation of post-war Japanese society? If so then does it operate in the manner that 
the Nuremberg legacy claims? These questions are addressed through empirical 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 15-38. Herz examines the effect of the international military 
tribunal and following trials within the context of de-Nazification policy. 
51 See for example Jose E. Alvarez, `Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment', 96 Michigan Law 
Review (1998), pp. 2031-2112. Through analysing the ICTY's Tadic Judgment and its attempt to provide 
an authentic account of the history of the region, Alvarez argues that the Nuremberg-inspired model of 
closure is both flawed and counter-productive. See also his article on Rwanda, `Crimes of States/Crimes 
of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda', Yale Journal of International Law 24 (1999), pp, 365-483. 
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research on the Japanese perception of the Tokyo Trial: how the Japanese themselves 
recognised and discussed the Tokyo Trial since its establishment in 1946.52 
Japanese attitudes towards the Tokyo Trial are often characterised in terms of 
passivity or lack of interest. Some scholars attributed this to Japanese culture. For 
example, Judith Shklar states that `it is doubtful whether a trial as a legal drama could 
have had any great political effect in a non-European country so lacking in legalistic 
traditions. ' 53 B. V. A. Röling, the Dutch justice at the Tokyo Trial, points out the 
uniqueness of Japanese culture and its influence from Zen Buddhism, which he sensed 
from the attitude of the defendants at the Tribunal. 54 Certainly, cultural and 
philosophical backgrounds are important and cannot be ignored in assessing Japanese 
perceptions of the Tokyo Trial. However, this thesis seeks to avoid the conclusion that 
the `international tribunal worked differently - or did not work at all - because of the 
Japanese non-western, or unique, cultural background'; a conclusion that has been 
vaunted by some to excuse their not taking the Tokyo Trial seriously. 55 It will be argued 
here that the experience of the Tokyo Trial is too important to be dismissed in this way, 
52 The Tokyo Trial, as Philip Piccigallo argues, was `a constituent part of the entire Allied Eastern war 
crimes operation', and thus it is important not to ignore other minor war crimes trials held in Yokohama 
and other places outside Japan by each member of the Allies and their impact on Japan. Philip R. 
Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 32. However, the present thesis is limited to the Tokyo Trial, i. e. an 
international military tribunal, because of its symbolism; as such it had a `symbolic' impact on people. 
53 Shklar, Legalism, p. 179. The influence of Ruth Benedict's work cannot be ignored. She argues that 
Japanese culture is based on Confucian `shame culture', which is different from Christian `guilt culture'. 
Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1947). 
sa B. V. A. Röling, edited and with an introduction by Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: 
Reflections of a Peacemonger (London: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 35-36. 
ss John Dower, a scholar of Japanese history, points out: `Although all peoples and cultures set themselves 
apart (and are set apart by others) by stressing differences, this tends to be carried to an extreme where 
Japan is concerned. ' John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II 
(Penguin Books, 2000), P. 29. 
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because the Japanese attitude towards the Tokyo Trial indicates other possible impacts 
that an international tribunal might have on society, which may not correspond to the 
perceived Nuremberg legacy. If we were to emphasise the impact of international 
criminal tribunals on a non-Western societies, the Tokyo Trial becomes even more 
important, given the fact that international or internationalised courts are currently 
operating for non-Western societies such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor or 
Cambodia. 
Ian Buruma compares and contrasts the attitude of the Germans and the 
Japanese towards the Second World War on the basis of intensive research in both 
countries, and concludes that the ambivalence in the Japanese attitude towards the Tokyo 
Trial `has less to do with the lack of a legal tradition, or with nationalist 
bloody-mindedness, than with the nature of the trial itself. '56 The nature of the trial 
derives partly from the nature of international military tribunals in general and partly 
from the nature of the Tokyo Trial in particular, which was strongly influenced by a 
different geopolitical context to that of post-war Germany. It is often argued that the 
Tokyo Trial was far more politicised or unfair than Nuremberg; the Japanese attitude can 
be attributed to such a defect per se. In this thesis, I would not wish to ignore the unique 
nature of the Tokyo Trial. However, the aim here is to go beyond emphasising the 
`uniqueness' of the case and investigate whether there is any general lesson to be learned 
from Japan's experience with the international war crimes tribunal. For this reason, the 
thesis analyses the Japanese perception related to two devices of international war 
crimes prosecution: the individualisation of responsibility and the preparation of an 
historical record through legal procedures, whose positive impact has been emphasised 
by the advocates of the Nuremberg legacy. Through the examination of Japanese 
56 Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan, paperback edition (London: 
Phoenix, 2002), p. 164. 
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perceptions and attitudes, the present study examines the impact of these two devices. In 
this way, the core of the Nuremberg legacy and current understandings of the strategic 
purpose of the ICTs can be re-examined, and general lessons to be learned for other cases 
of international criminal justice can be inferred. 
A number of scholars downgraded the impact of the Tokyo Trial on post-war 
Japan. 57 They may have been right when we consider `positive' or `visible' effects. 
However, no positive effect does not mean no effect at all, and no visible impact does not 
deny a subtle impact buried deep. On the contrary, the passive and ambivalent attitude 
of the Japanese towards their past and the Tokyo Trial itself illustrates different, 
potentially negative effects that international tribunals can have on society, especially 
when it comes to social transformation and reconciliation. The silence of the Japanese 
people about the Tokyo Trial and the war crimes legacy is vocal in its own sense. The 
Tokyo Trial has not been erased from Japanese national memory; rather it persistently 
haunts society whenever people try to face the past, war, defeat, and the issues of war 
responsibility and reconciliation. This is stark in relations between Japan and its former 
victim countries in Asia, where tension is continuously raised, even sixty years after the 
end of the war, over issues such as comfort women, history textbooks, and government 
officials' visiting the Yasukuni shrine, the origin of all of which can be traced back to 
who was prosecuted for what and how the war was depicted in the Trial. The Tokyo 
Trial, in this sense, cast a shadow over Japanese reconciliation with the victims of its war, 
as well as with its own past. This potentially negative aspect of the impact of the Tokyo 
Trial is as important as its positive aspects for analysing the impact of international war 
crimes trials on post-conflict society. 
57 See, for example, Shklar, Legalism, p. 180. 
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Existing Research on the Tokyo Trial 
What is important, but often ignored, is the fact that Tokyo is the only 
international tribunal, other than Nuremberg, since the end of World War II prior to the 
creation of the ICTY, and it is one of the four `pure' international tribunals that have 
actually conducted the prosecution and punishment of individual war criminals. This 
signifies the importance of Tokyo as a precedent for international war crimes tribunals. 
Nonetheless, there is a general lack of interest in the Tokyo Trial, even among those who 
study war crimes prosecutions and international criminal justice. This is a curious but 
serious defect when the Nuremberg experience is regarded as the legacy of war crimes 
tribunals in general. 
John Pritchard states: `In scope and in implications for the post-war world, the 
Tokyo Trial may exceed the importance of its Nuremberg counterpart. '58 However, 
compared with the Nuremberg Trial, there is very little written in English on the Tokyo 
Trial. Some of the exceptions are Richard Minear's Victor's Justice and B. V. A. Röling 
and Antonio Cassese's The Tokyo Trial and Beyond. 59 Even among those who conduct 
58 R. John Pritchard, `Preface' in R John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua. Zaide (eds. ) and Project Director: 
Donald Cameron Watt, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Comprehensive Index and Guide to the 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Five Volumes, Vol. 1 (New York and 
London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1987), p. xxxi. 
59 Richard H. Minear, Victor's Justice: the Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University 
Press, 1971) examines problems in international law applied, in legal procedure, and in the historical 
account of the Tokyo Trial, and concludes that the Trial was victor's justice. Röling and Cassese, The 
Tokyo Trial and Beyond is based on an interview conducted in 1977 by Antonio Cassese with Bernard 
Röling, the Dutch Judge at the Tokyo Tribunal. A paper by Solis Horwitz, a member of the prosecution 
staff at the Tribunal, traces the course and delineates the issues of the Trial in detail. Horwitz, `The Tokyo 
Trial', International Conciliation, No. 465 (November 1950), pp. 473-584. Arnold C. Brackman, The 
Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (New York: William Morrow & 
Company, Inc., 1987) provides a chronological reconstruction of the Trial based on the diary and 
publications of the indicted and Brackman's own notes taken during his attendance as a journalist to the 
Trial. Philip Piccigallo examines the Tokyo Trial together with a series of minor war crimes trials 
conducted by the Allied countries within the overall war crimes policy. Piccigallo, Japanese. The title of 
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research on war crimes prosecutions, the Tokyo Trial is generally lumped together with 
the Nuremberg Trial, but by simply focusing on the latter. 60 In the worst cases, the 
`Tokyo Tribunal' or `International Military Tribunal for the Far East' are altogether 
absent from the indexes of literatures on war crimes tribunals. 61 
There are several reasons for the scarcity of research on the Tokyo Trial. First, 
there is a general belief that Nuremberg and Tokyo are identical in their appearance, 
procedure, and, therefore, effects. Tokyo is a sister institution, nothing more. Second, 
Timothy Maga's Judgement at Tokyo: the Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington, KY: University Press 
of Kentucky, 2000) is rather misleading as this examines the Tokyo Trial together with other minor war 
crimes trials held by the US in Guam and Yokohama. Some scholars examine the Tokyo Trial within the 
context of the US occupation of Japan. John Dower's Embracing Defeat, illustrating how the Japanese 
people perceived and accepted the American occupation following the defeat, spends two chapters 
analysing the reactions and perceptions of the Japanese at the time towards the Tokyo Trial and the issue of 
war guilt. Dower, Embracing, pp. 443-521. See also Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: the 
Demilitarisation of Japan (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987); Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: the Allied 
Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (New York, London: Continuum, 2002). Jeanie M. Welch's The 
Tokyo Trial: A Bibliographic Guide to English-Language Sources (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001) 
covers English-written sources ranging from primary sources regarding the Trial procedures and US 
policy, media reports, and academic works on the Trial, its impact and the Defendants, Judges, Prosecutors, 
and Defense Counsel. It also contains a list of primary and secondary sources on Class B/C War Crimes 
Trials and Japan's war crimes. 
60 Only a few studies have a similar focus on Tokyo and Nuremberg. See for example Beigbeder, Judging; 
Howard Ball, Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: the Twentieth-Century Experience (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1999); Roger S. Clark, `Nuremberg and Tokyo in Contemporary Perspective' 
in Timothy L. H. McCormack and Gerry J. Simpson (eds. ), The Law of War Crimes: National and 
International Approaches (Boston, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 171-187. An exception is 
the trial of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, which can be found in many studies on this topic as an 
archetype for war crimes prosecution and principle of superior responsibility. See for example Michael 
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic 
Books, 1992), pp. 319-322. Although it is often dealt with under the heading of the Tokyo Trial, the case 
involved traditional military justice. General Yamashita was tried by an American court martial in Manila, 
well before the Tokyo Tribunal was established. 
61 The title of Scharf s book, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial 
Since Nuremberg is misleading but symbolic in this sense. Strictly speaking, the ICTY is the second trial 
since Nuremberg, or the first international trial since Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
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for many, the atrocities perpetrated by Nazis appear to overshadow the inhumane 
campaigns conducted by Japanese army towards POWs and civilians. Gerry Simpson 
states: 
The metaphorical equation of war crimes with Nazis is inscribed on the 
culture. Most of the war crimes trials held since 1945 has been a 
restatement of this relationship. The Nazi regime remains the epitome of 
absolute evil in Western culture and each successive war crimes trial owes 
as much to this doctrine as to the tenacious efforts of Nazi hunters .... 
62 
Third, there is the fact that the participants at Nuremberg, both the prosecutor and judges, 
and the defendant, were far better known to the world than those at Tokyo. 63 Fourth, 
some degrade the Tokyo Trial's value as `a historical example of international justice', 
pointing out that several key figures and war crimes were exempted from the Trial. 64 
Fifth, linguistic barriers cannot be ignored. More researchers can read both German and 
English than can work in Japanese and English; yet knowledge of both languages are 
indispensable to gaining a full picture of the trial. In addition, while German 
publications can easily be introduced, with or without translation, to the 
English-speaking academic world, research conducted in Japanese cannot be introduced 
without translation, which does not happen very often. 65 In addition, the scarcity of 
62 Gerry J. Simpson, `War Crimes: A Critical Introduction' in McCormack and Simpson, Law, pp. 8-9. 
63 B. V. A. Röling, `Introduction' in Chihiro Hosoya [et al. ] (eds. ), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An 
International Symposium (Tokyo: Kodansha; New York, N. Y.: Distributed in the U. S. by Kodansha 
International through Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 16-17. 
64 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2"d Ed. (London: 
Penguin Books, 2002), p. 240. 
65 One of the exceptions is Hosoya (eds. ), Tokyo, the record of an International Symposium on the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial held in Tokyo on 28-29 May 1983. 
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research can be attributed simply to a lack of general interest within English-speaking 
academia regarding the Trial in the `Far East'. Whatever the reason, as early as in 1950, 
Telford Taylor wrote: 
Nuremberg has become a synonym for war crimes trials and has received 
the lion's share of attention from both journalists and jurists. Unhappily, 
public indifference to the Tokyo Trial has been matched by an apparent 
lack of interest on the part of the sponsoring governments themselves. 66 
From a practical point of view, the scarcity of research on the Tokyo Trial is 
also a result of the unavailability of the trial records. 67 In the case of Nuremberg, 
stenographic records were published soon after the trial in four different languages, and 
the proceedings of the trials and all documentation given in evidence were published in 
1947 in forty-two volumes together with detailed indexes. However, in the case of 
Tokyo, there was little effort to publish, or even to preserve, the records of the Trial. An 
enormous amount of the record relating to the Tokyo Trial was removed from Japan by 
the Foreign Documents branch of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, the 
US government did not attempt to publish the record soon after the Trial and make it 
available to a larger public, as they had done for Nuremberg. The documentation and 
records of the Tokyo Trial remained in `the hectographed form in which they had been 
circulated during the trial'. 68 Donald Watt depicts the situation: 
66 Telford Taylor, `Preface' in Horwitz, `Tokyo', p. 473. 
6' Awaya Kentarö, Tokyo Saiban Ron (Tokyo: Ötsuki Shoten, 1989), pp. 274-275. 
68 Donald Cameron Watt, `Historical Introduction' in Prichard and Zaide (eds. ), Tokyo, p. viii. The 
complete volumes of hectographed transcripts of proceedings, Record of Proceedings of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East are held by Bodleian Japanese Library at University of Oxford, together 
with Daily Index of Motions, Arguments, Decisions, Objections in Open Court (3 volumes), Proceedings 
in Chambers (2 volumes), Index of Exhibits (2 volumes), Narrative Summary of Record (11 volumes) and 
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The various sets of papers, records, indexes, transcripts, and so forth were 
scattered over the globe, disappearing into archives and repositories to 
surface years later in imperfect form in the public and university collections 
of some of the eleven participating countries. The complete files of the 
prosecution, comprising working papers, minutes, secretarial papers, and so 
on, and of its national components, if any such existed (and it is difficult to 
believe they did not exist in some form or other), seem to have disappeared 
from sight entirely. 69 
In 1957, the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan published A 
Functional Index to the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East. 70 This covers some fifty thousand pages of subject material in the proceedings of 
the Trial but does not include `[r]ejected documents, and documents not read into the 
record, the judgements, and Proceedings in Chamber'. 71 This index, according to 
Donald Watt, is `very limited [in scale] compared with the two volumes of indexes to the 
Nuremburg [sic. ] documents, and the references were confined to the pages of the 
transcripts. ' 72 It was not until 1975 that the US National Archives and Records 
Administration opened many of the classified documents from International Prosecution 
Section. According to Awaya Kentarö, the leading Japanese scholar of the Tokyo Trial, 
Analysis of Documentary Evidence (10 volumes). The British Library of Political and Economic Science 
in London also holds most, but not all, volumes of hectographed transcripts of proceedings, Trial of the 
Major Japanese War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East held at Tokyo. 
69 Watt, `Historical', p. xx. 
70 Paul S. Dull and Michael T. Umemura, The Tokyo Trials: A Functional Index to the Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957). 
71 Ibid., Tokyo, p. v. 
72 Watt, `Historical', p. viii. 
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most of those documents were left unexamined until around the mid-1980s. 73 It was not 
until 1977 that the judgment of the Tribunal, the separate, dissenting and concurring 
opinions, and the majority judgment, were first published in toto by the University of 
Amsterdam; 74 and the stenographic record of the trial in English was not published until 
1981. On publishing The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: the Complete Transcripts of the 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty-two 
volume in 1981, John Pritchard stated: `To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time 
anyone has tried to assemble a comprehensive collection of [the] records [of the 
Proceeding in Chambers of the Tokyo Trial]'. 75 
The unavailability of primary source material is not very different for 
documents written in Japanese. The Tokyo Tribunal published the stenographic record 
of the trial in Japanese; however this record seems to have been not widely circulated. It 
is the reproduction of this record, which was published in 1968, that can be more easily 
accessed now. 76 At the time of the trial, there was no official publication of the record. 
Instead, it was the court staff of the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper who reported a full 
picture of the Trial and published nine volumes of records between 1946 and 1948 as the 
trial took place. According to the press corps, it was very difficult to take any printed 
matter or written papers out of the court. And it was not known whether this was due to 
73 Awaya, Tökyo, p. 12. 
74 B. V. A. Röling and C. F. Röter (eds. ), The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE), 29 April 1946 - 12 November 1948 (Amsterdam: University Press Amsterdam, 1977). 
75 Pritchard, `Preface', p. xxxviii. Since 1998, a new edition of the complete transcripts of the Tokyo Trial, 
consisting of 114 volumes of transcripts and 10 guide volumes, has been published. The Tokyo Major War 
Crimes Trial: the Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with an Authoritative 
Commentary and Comprehensive Guide: a collection in 124 volumes (Lewiston, N. Y.: Edwin Mellen 
Press for the Robert M. W. Kempner Collegium, 1998- ) is annotated, compiled and edited by R. John 
Pritchard, and contains expanded supporting materials, essays, corrected errata, and indexes. 
76 Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saibansho (ed. ), Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku [The Stenographic 
Record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East] (Tokyo: Yushodo Shoten, 1968). 
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the court's policy or the Military Police. 77 In 1962, the press corps of the Asahi 
republished its nine volumes of trial report, pointing out that those volumes had been the 
only record, except for the stenographic records, that depicted the whole Trial but that 
they were now impossible to get even at second-hand bookstores. 78 It was only in 1995, 
about half a century after the Trial, that the enormous number of the defence documents 
that had been rejected, not submitted, or withdrawn, was collected and published in 
Japan. 79 
From the paucity of the trial record alone, the difference in the Allies' attitude 
towards Tokyo to Nuremberg can be seen. When asked about the unavailability of the 
trial record, the Dutch justice of the Tokyo Tribunal, Bernard Röling answered: 
I suppose that [the British and the Americans] were perhaps a bit ashamed 
of what happened there .... I suspect that they didn't want the Tokyo Trial 
to become very well known.... It's just a strange thing that the `biggest 
trial in recorded history', as it has been called, was so over-looked. 80 
John Dower takes the view that the fact that the Tokyo Tribunal did not officially publish 
its record as symbolising the cynicism of the Tribunal staff, who by 1948, because of the 
development of the Cold War, did not believe that Tokyo, as well as Nuremberg, could 
77 Distribution of English stenographic records to news agencies was stopped during the Trial on the 
grounds of reducing the burden of the US taxpayers, who had been paying for paper used for the trial. 
Asahi Shimbunsha Chösa Kenkyüshitsu (ed), Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kiroku: Mokuroku oyobi 
Sakuin (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Chösa Kenkyii-shitsu, 1953), p. 3. 
'8 Asahi Shimbun H6tei Kishadan, Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo: Tokyo Saiban Kankökai, 1962), p. 2. This 
1962-version was published in three volumes. 
79 Tokyo Saiban Shiryö Kankökai (ed. ), Tokyo Saiban Kyakka Miteishutsu Bengogawa Shiryö, in 8 
volumes (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankökai, 1995). 
80 Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 81. 
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contribute to a post-war peace based on international law and justice. 8' Awaya 
acknowledges that the materials of the Tokyo Trial are `a historical treasure house' but 
argues: `The fact that these documents have not yet been exploited is closely related to 
the manner in which the trial was concluded. ' 82 These comments suggest that 
Nuremberg and Tokyo were not identical but have several differences in their structure 
and procedures and thus, probable impacts afterwards. 
The fact that the reaction in Japan and Germany to the Tokyo and Nuremberg 
Trials was different indicates the flaws in `universalising' the Nuremberg experience. 
Whilst in Germany, Nuremberg and the crimes for which their leaders were punished 
have been widely debated, in Japan, discussion of the Tokyo Trial is rarely heard. 
Moreover, academic research on the Tokyo Trial has not been enthusiastically conducted 
even by the Japanese, on whom the Trial had direct impact and who therefore might be 
supposed to be most interested in the Trial. It was not until the late 1970s that substantial 
research, as well as general publishing, came to the fore in Japan. In 1998, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs disclosed all material it possessed on the Tokyo Trial, but the Ministry 
of Justice, which collected the material from the Tokyo Trial, as well as other minor war 
crimes trials and created a catalogue, still does not make these collections open to the 
public. 83 
It seems that the general attitude of Japanese officials and people towards the 
Tokyo Trial has been very passive, close to ignorance and apathy. To what extent does 
this Japanese attitude show the impact on Japanese society of the Trial? It is difficult to 
81 Dower, Embracing, p. 453-454. 
82 Commented by Awaya Kentarö in Hosoya (eds. ), Tokyo, p. 116. 
83 Awaya Kentarö, `Tökyö Saiban wo Kangaeru' in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai (ed), Toinaosu Tokyo 
Saiban (Tokyo: Ryokuu Shuppan, 1995), p. 23; Comment by Yoshida Yutaka in `Tokyo Saiban to Sensö 
Sekinin', Sekai (January 2003), p. 278. As the result, Yoshida argues, the Japanese government's attitude 
and policy regarding the Tokyo Trial have not yet wholly elucidated. Ibid. 
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illustrate a clear causal effect between the Tokyo Trial and post-war transformation of 
society and people. Nonetheless, people's perceptions of and attitudes towards the Trial 
is one barometer, which becomes especially important when the Trial's impact on 
post-war social transformation in psychological terms is examined. 
Compared to English language literature, there has been more academic work 
done on the Tokyo Trial in Japanese. 84 However, most of it analysed the Trial in 
historical context or focused on legal aspects of the Trial. Not many of these texts 
examined, academically, its significance from contemporary and interdisciplinary points 
of view. 85 Even those who sought to identify its significance from a contemporary 
standpoint mostly did so within a national context and did not extract general lessons. 
This thesis will contribute to research on the Tokyo Trial in Japan by presenting the 
wider and deeper significance of the Trial with regard to contemporary international 
peace and security. 
Methodology 
The thesis is interdisciplinary in its theoretical framework, content and 
methodology. The theoretical framework is set in the context of post-Cold War 
84 According to the National Diet Library's database, 174 books, appeared under key words either `Tokyo 
Saiban [the Tokyo Trial]' or `Kokusai Gunji Saiban [the International Military Tribunal]' excluding 
Nuremberg, were published between 1946 and 2003. See Chapter 4 for details of the content of these 
publications. For an examination of the general features of the Tokyo Trial, Awaya Kentarö has been 
working intensively on the topic based on primary sources. See Awaya, Tokyo; Awaya and NHK 
Shuzai-han, Tokyo Saiban he no Michi: NHK Supesharu (Tokyo: Nihon H6s6 Shuppan Kyökai, 1994). 
As for more recent work, Higurashi Yoshinobu examined the intersection of law and politics in the Tokyo 
Trial and international environment at the time. Higurashi Yoshinobu, Tokyo Saiban no Kokusai Kankei: 
Kokusai Seei-ni okeru Kenryoku to Kihan (Tokyo: Bokutaku-sha, 2002). 
85 The International Symposium on the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, held in Tokyo in 1983, was the first 
occasion for public academic discussion on the multi-faceted significance of the Tribunal. The record of 
the symposium is available in English as Hosoya (eds. ), Tokyo. 
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international peace and security and the creation and operation of international war 
crimes tribunals. The empirical analysis of the main body of the thesis is focused on the 
Japanese perception of the Tokyo Trial from the 1940s to 2003, and is based on detailed 
historical, cultural and social research conducted through a range of sources, including: 
newspapers, books and articles written by Japanese authors, and public discourse. 
In addition, a number of semi-structured intensive interviews and focus 
groups were conducted by the author with people from different generations during the 
autumn and winter of 2003. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
twenty-one individuals, ages ranging from 24 (born in 1979) to 68 (born in 1935) at the 
time of interviews: six in their twenties (one male and five female), three in their thirties 
(one male and two females), four in their forties (three males and one female), three in 
their fifties (three females) and five in their sixties (four males and one female). 86 One 
weakness in the sample of interviewees is that it does not include people in their 
seventies and beyond, who were already grown-ups during the war. This weakness can 
be mitigated by relying on newspaper opinion surveys, existing secondary sources, such 
as research on the Japanese perception during the occupation, and literatures and 
personal memoirs written by non-academic wartime generations, in which the authors' 
view of the Trial is expressed. Focus groups were conducted with five groups of 
students and alumni from Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. Two were conducted 
with postgraduate students in their mid-twenties (consisting of three and four people), 
two with undergraduate students in their early twenties (consisting of four and eight 
people), and one with three businessmen in their forties. 
The selection of interviewees and focus group participants was designed to 
include a range of background, ages, experience and social group. The selection process 
began with people known to the author and expanded, from them, to include people not 
86 See Appendix A for details of each interview. 
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previously know to the author. None were familiar with the precise scope and content of 
the author's research, except for two academics, who were interviewed, but did not 
participate in the focus groups. The advantage of selecting in this manner was that 
interviewees were made to feel comfortable in participating interviews and focus groups 
without prior knowledge or expectation about what they were going to be asked. A 
sense of comfortableness and some degree of trust in the author were important, given 
the potential sensitivity of the topic. What is more, the lack of prior knowledge was 
crucial for observing a more spontaneous and lively response and discussion than might 
otherwise have been the case. Most of the interviewees were happy to have their name 
quoted in the thesis, but the author felt that because of the sensitivity of the topic and the 
fact that some requested anonymity, the identity of all interviewees would be kept 
confidential. 
Interviews were conducted with three basic questions in mind. First, what did 
people know about the Tokyo Trial and how they learned of it? This question was to 
check the extent of knowledge and test the common assumption that Japanese people 
know very little about the Trial. In addition to `knowledge', interviews also investigated 
`images' of the Trial among the interviewees. The second set of questions was to test 
their understanding about war crimes conducted during the war. They were asked how 
they regarded the allegations that Japan conducted aggressive war and committed war 
crimes and how they regarded neo-nationalist denials of these allegations. The last set of 
questions was regarding individual and collective responsibility for the past war and war 
crimes. Interviewees were asked questions relating to the textbook row, the issue of 
`comfort women' and of politicians' visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Interviewees were 
also asked how people perceive criticisms made by other Asian countries and to what 
extent people accept blame on the nation as well as the government. 
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These interviews and focus groups were valuable for gauging qualitatively the 
attitudes, beliefs and values of `ordinary' people, which rarely come to the fore. What is 
more, they are a unique source as there is no data on private and contemporary Japanese 
perception of the Tokyo Trial. Given the fact that the Tokyo Trial is the topic often 
debated with strong pros and cons, focus groups are useful to examine the interaction of 
different opinions, points of consensus and divergence. On the other hand, 
semi-structured intensive interviews were useful to get hold of people's subtle and 
nuanced attitudes towards and perceptions of an issue which is delicate in nature. Both 
forms of interview are an important source to clarify the complex and delicate 
perception and, thus, impact of the international war crimes trial on contemporary Japan. 
The Thesis 
Before examining the Nuremberg legacy in the light of the experience of the 
Tokyo Trial, Chapter 1 discusses the significance of the ICTs in post-Cold War 
international peace and security, through examining how international war crimes 
prosecutions became both `possible' and `necessary' in the new security environment. 
By illustrating the interaction of law and politics and the co-existence of the logic of 
peace and justice in the creation and operation of the ICTs, the chapter argues that to 
understand the ICTs' strategic purpose, an interdisciplinary approach and non-static 
theoretical framework are necessary. They are necessary because war crimes and 
international criminal justice have implications not only for international lawyers and 
human rights theorists but also for theorists of international politics and security studies. 
The chapter also focuses on the Nuremberg and Holocaust analogy made with regard to 
the international reaction to war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and illustrates how a 
Nuremberg-like institution came to be established for that conflict. 
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Chapter 2 examines the meaning of the `Nuremberg legacy' and analyses why 
that legacy was revived in the form of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals nearly 
half a century after the Nuremberg Judgment. The legacy is often mentioned but its 
meaning has never been coherent, changing from time to time, and context to context. 
The first part of the chapter examines how the Nuremberg legacy was understood during 
the Cold War, focusing on the development of international law since Nuremberg, the 
claim of `victor's justice', and post-war international relations and state practices. It 
clarifies the background to international reluctance to follow the Nuremberg precedent 
during this period. It also shows that in spite of this states' attitude, the Nuremberg 
legacy started to acquire broader significance through human rights movements and the 
pursuit of `transitional justice' from the 1980s onward. The second part of the chapter 
demonstrates that the post-Cold War understanding of the Nuremberg legacy is different 
from that in the previous period because of the new international security environment. 
The chapter argues that two points - the pursuit of individual responsibility and the 
creation of an historical record through legal procedures - are the lessons that the 
promoters of the ICTs specifically derived from Nuremberg, and illustrates how they 
have been adopted in the context of post-Cold War international war crimes 
prosecutions. Examination, in the following chapters, of the Nuremberg legacy through 
the Tokyo Trial is based on the effect of these two devices of war crimes prosecution. 
In Chapter 3, an overview of the Tokyo Trial is offered. After a brief 
examination of the structure and procedures of the Tokyo Trial, the chapter analyses the 
Allies' strategic purpose in holding the Trial and the intention of both pursuing 
individual responsibility and creating an historical record. Despite this strategic purpose 
and the two devices, which are identical to the Nuremberg Trial, the chapter points to 
several significant differences between the two trials, which derive from the different 
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degree of initiative taken by the United States. These differences are important for 
understanding the impact of the Tokyo Trial on post-war Japan. 
Chapter 4 analyses the general character of Japanese perceptions of the Tokyo 
Trial from 1946 to 2003 chronologically. Research is based on examination of Japanese 
publications, both academic and non-academic, on the Trial, focusing both on quality - 
the nature of the arguments - and quantity - the fluctuating research output in each 
decade. The chapter also looks at events related to the Tokyo Trial, for example, the 
release of two films in 1983 and 1998, the so-called `textbook row', the issue of `comfort 
women', politicians' words and deeds regarding the Trial, and how society has reacted 
to each of these. From these public discussions of the Trial, the chapter examines 
whether, and in what way, the Japanese are passive and ignorant regarding the Tokyo 
Trial, and whether there has been a change and/or greater coherence in Japanese 
attitudes, values and beliefs. 
In the following two chapters, the general Japanese perception illustrated in 
Chapter 4 will be examined in more detail through the two devices of war crimes 
prosecution identified: the individualisation of responsibility and the historical record 
prepared by the Tribunal. In addition to sources used in Chapter 4, examination and 
analysis in these two chapters are also based on intensive interviews and focus groups, 
which explore contemporary and private Japanese perceptions. The aim of Chapters 5 
and 6 is to analyse the short-term and long-term impact and effects on post-war Japan of 
the two devices of the International Tribunal. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the impact of the Tokyo Tribunal's historical record of 
the war. The Tribunal's record of the war has become the focus of strong criticism by 
nationalists and some revisionists, and of neo-nationalism in the 1990s. The chapter 
analyses the nationalist frustration with the `Tokyo Trial view of history', together with 
the general reaction of the Japanese to the Tribunal's historical record, which is 
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examined through primary and secondary sources, and intensive and focus-group 
interviews focusing on: what the current generation knows about the Tokyo Trial and the 
Tribunal's account of war, how they perceive the Tokyo Trial, and how they regard the 
revisionist and neo-nationalist views of history and the Tokyo Trial. The chapter also 
investigates, through interviews, the nature of the Japanese `silence' over the Tokyo 
Trial and whether the `silence' has something to do with the Tribunal's historical record. 
Based on this examination, the chapter analyses whether, and to what extent, Japanese 
historical perceptions of the war and the awareness of war crimes are influenced by the 
Tokyo Trial's record of the war and judgment, and how they have affected Japanese 
attempts at reconciliation with its Asian neighbours as well as with its past. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the impact of the Tokyo Trial's pursuit of individual 
criminal responsibility of Japan's wartime leaders. The chapter analyses the impact of 
and limits to the individualisation of responsibility by examining how people at the time 
understood the individual responsibility of their leaders, on the one hand, and perceived 
their own war responsibility, on the other. The chapter also looks at the view of `victor's 
justice' held by the Japanese, and examines whether and how this view clouds the legacy 
of the Tokyo Trial. Given the inseparable relationship between the international trial 
and `victor's justice', the feasibility and desirability of holding domestic trials soon after 
the war are also examined. The aim is to see whether, and to what extent, people's sense 
of war guilt has been influenced by their leaders having been prosecuted by means of the 
Tokyo Trial. The chapter concludes with an analysis of how the current Japanese sense 
of war guilt and responsibility, observed from their perception of the Tokyo Trial, 
influences Japan's reconciliation with its victims as well as its own past 
Through the foregoing examination and analysis, the dissertation investigates 
the impact of the Tokyo Trial on post-war Japan, both in the short and long term, and 
relates this examination to analysis of the strategic purpose of international tribunals. 
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Empirical analysis of the Tokyo Trial may seem, at first glance, irrelevant to the 
examination of strategic purpose of the ICTs, as the contexts in which the Tokyo Trial 
and the ICTs were established are very different, much more so than Nuremberg and the 
ICTs. 87 However, as I show in presenting this research, it enhances understanding of the 
strategy and impact of the ICTs because they are expected to produce a positive impact 
on a post-conflict society through the individualisation of responsibility and the creation 
of a historical record, which were also applied to the Tokyo Trial and may have caused a 
different impact from what is assumed by the `Nuremberg legacy'. Based on empirical 
research about the Tokyo Trial and its impact on post-war Japan, the dissertation 
concludes that critical assessment of the Nuremberg legacy suggests a need to 
re-calibrate the strategic purpose of the ICTs and to question the understanding held by 
advocates of international tribunals regarding what international criminal justice can 
necessarily achieve, and what outsiders can and cannot do to transform a war-torn 
society and promote reconciliation within it. The experience of the Tokyo Trial and 
post-war Japan, I conclude, demonstrates that the impact and effect of international war 
crimes tribunals and their two principal devices - individualisation of responsibility and 
the creation of an authoritative historical record - are not necessarily wholly positive, 
nor are they straightforward. 
The Tokyo Trial is an important case with which to test the `Nuremberg 
legacy'. Whether vindicating or criticising the Nuremberg idea of international war 
crimes prosecution, examination of the Tokyo experience is indispensable in order to 
understand more thoroughly the multi-faceted impact of international war crimes 
tribunals on post-conflict societies. 
87 One such differences is that Japanese society after the Second World War faced very little need to 
achieve reconciliation among people in the society, as most of alleged war crimes of the Japanese army 
were conducted outside Japan, against non-Japanese. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
In spite of the amount of research on the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
(ICTs) undertaken in the past decade, little has been examined about the ICTs' 
strategic purpose and their significance to international peace and security. 
This is because of a disciplinary boundary between international politics and 
international law and a philosophical boundary between Realism and Liberalism 
that exist in international studies. This chapter illustrates how these boundaries 
have been obstacles to a holistic approach to international war crimes tribunals, 
and points out the importance of breaking these boundaries, through examining a 
new understanding of post-Cold War international peace and security and the 
relationship between law and politics, and peace and justice. The chapter also 
illustrates how the international reaction to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
led to the establishment of a Nuremberg-like institution. 
1. Law and Politics in the International Criminal Tribunals: Beyond the 
Disciplinary Boundary 
That the strategic purpose of the ICTs is not fully examined in existing research is 
related to the fact that the ICTs, as well as international war crimes prosecution, 
have been studied, until very recently, mostly by international lawyers and human 
rights scholars, and that very few empirical approaches have been taken to 
examine the means and ends of international criminal justice. The question `what 
do the ICTs aim to achieve? ' is highly political in nature, the significance of which 
is traditionally either ignored or dismissed by legal scholars. For international 
1 See Introduction for the concept of `strategic purpose'. 
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political theorists or the scholars of international security, on the other hand, the 
ICTs and international criminal justice are regarded as not in their sphere of 
interest. It is this disciplinary boundary between international politics and 
international law, not only in terms of their interest but also in their methodology, 
that has been an obstacle to understanding the significance of the ICTs in 
international peace and security. 2 
International political theorists were relatively quiet about the creation of 
the ICTs, and their lack of interest in the topic remained at least until the late 
1990s. International political scholars are traditionally cynical or ignorant of the 
role of law in international relations due to the influence of the Hobbesian view of 
the world: without a superordinate authority over states, international politics is a 
self-help arena, in which `[e]ach state pursues its own interests, however defined, 
in ways it judges best. ' 3 In such an arena, there is little place for international 
law to play a significant role. While accepting its existence, Hans Morgenthau 
argues that international law is `a primitive type of law' because of the absence of 
central government and law-enforcement institutions: 
Wherever an attempt has been made to give international law the 
effectiveness of a centralized legal system, reservations, 
qualifications, and the general political conditions under which 
nations must act in the modern state system have nullified the legal 
Z The academic interest in crossing the disciplinary boundary between international law and 
international politics has been increasing recently and several works have been conducted on the 
role of international law in international politics, and their relations in the international arenas. 
See the following volumes: Michael Byers (ed. ), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays 
in International Relations and International Law (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001); Christian Reus-Smit (ed. ), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), p. 238. 
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obligations entered into for the purpose of establishing centralized 
functions. 4 
Some international political theorists, especially neo-liberals, take into account 
international rules and norms, namely `international regimes', for theorising states 
cooperation and the problem of cheating. 5 However, even in this case, 
international law is merely given supplemental and instrumental roles. States 
care about international law for the sake of maximising their interests, and 
institutions and regimes cease to exist when states see no utility in maintaining 
them: `Treaties are inherently temporary, and their observance is inherently 
conditional on their continuing to serve the vital interests of the state. ' 6 Norms, 
rules, or laws are seen as mere reflections of state interests and power, and as such 
they have little significance at least in comparison to the domestic arena. 
Reflecting such views on international law, many diplomats and 
international political theorists viewed the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cynically as no more than a 
`fig leaf' to cover up failure to have taken immediate and decisive action in 
Bosnia. 7 The great powers, especially the United States, were reluctant militarily 
to intervene in the situation. At the same time, even reluctant government 
leaders could no longer ignore the public moral pressure to `do something' in 
4 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, 4`h ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p298. 
5 See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview, 1989). 
6 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (London: Leicester University Press, 
1991), p. 239. 
7 See, for example, David P. Forsythe, `International Criminal Courts: A Political View', 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1997), pp. 5-19. 
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response to the worst atrocities occurring in Europe since the Holocaust. 8 `It was 
in this vacuum' between the public pressure to intervene and state leaders' 
reluctance to do so, Aryeh Neier argues, `that the proposal for a tribunal advanced 
until its establishment was formally approved. ' 9 The ICTY's creation was seen 
with suspicion, based on the dubious political calculations of political leaders to 
give the impression of doing something against humanitarian disasters, while 
avoiding direct and costly intervention. The same thing was argued for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which, unlike the ICTY, was 
created after the international community had failed to prevent 800,000 to 1 
million people from becoming the victim of genocide. 1° For those who brush 
aside the ICTs on the basis of this view, the ICTs appear very unlikely to operate 
successfully because the critical aspect of their work, the arrest and detention of 
war criminals, is heavily reliant on states' commitment, even with military force, 
which states were reluctant to make in the first place. For those cynics, the 
strategic purpose of the ICTs may not be of interest. 
On the other hand, international lawyers welcomed the ICTs as the 
8 See David Owen, `When it is right to fight', The Times, 4 August 1992. Bill Clinton, who at 
the time was the Democratic presidential nominee, supported the use of military force to ensure 
relief efforts succeeded, stating: `If the holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of 
remaining silent. ' Simon Tisdall, Hella Pick and Kurt Schork, 'US edges towards Bosnia force', 
The Guardian, 5 August 1992. 
9 Aryeh Neier, War Crimes. Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice (New York: 
Times Books, 1998), p. 112. See also Jerzy Ciechanski, `Enforcement Measures under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter: UN Practice after the Cold War', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No. 4 
(1996), pp. 95-96. 
10 Simon Chesterman, `No Justice without Peace? International Criminal Law and the Decision to 




development of international law under an anarchical international society. 11 
International legal scholars, for many of whom `the demystification of sovereignty 
has been a part of [their] culture', 12 claimed that the ICTs were the first step 
towards universal jurisdiction and towards the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court. 13 Many lawyers see the key to the success of the 
ICTs is whether trials are conducted fairly and efficiently. 14 This, for them, can 
be achieved by protecting the legal process of the Trial from `being poisoned' by 
political elements. '5 
Because many international political theorists take little interest in 
international war crimes trials on the one hand, and the analysis of the ICTs has 
been conducted enthusiastically by international legal scholars, on the other, 
existing works have been heavily based on the legal aspects of the Tribunal; rarely 
touched on, until quite recently, has been what it is the ICTs aim to achieve 
through war crimes prosecution and what the implications are for international 
peace and security. 
See Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Antonio Cassese, `On the Current Trends towards Criminal 
Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law', European Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), pp. 2-17. 
12 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, `International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship', The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 92, No. 3 (1998), p. 389. 
13 Richard J. Goldstone, `War Crimes: a Question of Will', The World Today, Vo. 53, No. 4 (1997), 
p. 108. 
14 For example, deputy prosecutor Graham Blewitt states: `To me, the best measure of success is if 
it can achieve the prosecution of individuals fairly, regardless of whether they are convicted or 
acquitted. ' Quoted in Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First 
International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg (Durham, N. C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1997), 
p. 220, emphasis added. 
15 See Hazel Fox, `The Objections to Transfer of Criminal Jurisdiction to the UN Tribunal', 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46 (1997), pp. 435-439. 
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The ICTs as judicial bodies were created by the UN Security Council as 
its enforcement measures for the sake of international peace and security. It is 
here, as Rachel Kerr identifies, `an explicit linkage' between law and politics 
exists in their creation. 16 It is exactly because of this that law and politics are 
both vital elements in the operation of the ICTs. The ICTY, Kerr argues, is a 
judicial body that is expected to function in `a highly politicised context' : 
in order to be successful, the Tribunal must perform a delicate 
balancing act at the interface of law and politics, so that it is able to 
manipulate the political environment in order to serve the judicial 
function, without the judicial process becoming politicized. 17 
This suggests that the ICTs is a research topic not only for international lawyers 
and human rights scholars but also for scholars of international politics and 
international security. At the same time, either of these alone cannot grasp the 
whole significance of international war crimes prosecution in the setting of 
post-Cold War international peace and security. This was belatedly recognised 
by several scholars in the field. Entering into the 2 1St century, there have been a 
number of research conducted by political theorists on the significance of the ICTs 
on the one hand, and by legal scholars on the political context of international war 
crimes prosecution, on the other. '8 
16 Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in 
Law, Politics, and Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 9. 
17 Ibid., p. 3. 
1$ For such research, see Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, `Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice', International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), 
pp. 5-44; Simon Chesterman, `No'. See also the work of David Chuter, War Crimes: Confronting 
Atrocity in the Modern World (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
47 
Chapter 1 
The application of both political and legal approaches to international 
affairs, which are representatively seen in the case of the ICTs, is not merely an 
academic exercise. As Anne-Marie Slaughter rightly points out, post-Cold War 
international peace and security itself demonstrates that international law and 
international politics together `comprise the rules and the reality of "the 
international system"'. 19 The new security environment has come to be 
discussed in terms not only of politics and national interests but also of norms, 
ethics and justice. It is such a reality, new security challenges, that requires the 
application of both political and legal approaches to the study of international 
peace and security. 
2. Peace and Justice in the International Criminal Tribunals: From the 
Perspective of Post-Cold War International Peace and Security 
As a Security Council's enforcement measure, the ICTs are not irrelevant to 
international peace and security, especially to changes in the post-Cold War 
international security environment. Indeed, it is these changes that made the 
creation of the ICTs `possible' in the new interventionist atmosphere of the early 
1990s. What is more, the new security environment made the ICTs `necessary' 
within the context of ethnic conflicts accompanying mass atrocities and the gross 
violations of human rights. The ICTs came to be understood as an important tool 
for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security by 
targeting and promoting the transformation and reconciliation of post-conflict 
societies. 
19 Anne-Marie Slaughter, `International law in a World of Liberal States', European Journal of 




While the possibility of nuclear war between the great powers decreased 
with the end of the Cold War, the impact of intrastate conflicts on international 
affairs increased. Accordingly, the focus of states has changed. The change can 
be seen from cases that have been determined by the Security Council as `a threat 
to the peace', `a breach of the peace, ' or `an act of aggression'. 20 
During the Cold War, a `threat to the peace' was understood primarily as a 
military threat caused by one state against another. At the time the UN Charter 
was drafted in the early 1940s, the Second World War was still under way; this fact 
20 Under Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is authorised to determine the 
existence of any `threat to the peace', `breach of the peace', or `act of aggression'. It should be 
emphasised that a `threat to the peace' is neither a descriptive concept nor a fixed standard. 
While stating that it can be objectively characterised as a situation with a `destabilizing and 
potentially explosive' character, Bernd Martenczuk argues that `The term "threat to the peace" is 
sufficiently flexible and dynamic to include all major forms of serious international misconduct. ' 
Bernd Martenczuk, `The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What 
Lessons from Lockerbie? ', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1999), p. 544. 
What is regarded as `a threat' reflects not only the actual type of conflicts breaking out in the 
world but also the perception or interpretation of events, which includes the conjecture of actual 
harm in the future. In that sense, it can be said `a threat to the peace is whatever the Security 
Council says is a threat to the peace. ' Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International 
Law, 6th ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 219. For `subjective political judgement' of the 
Council, see Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons, Charter of the 
United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1969), pp. 293-294. The question of whether the Security Council has unlimited discretion or not 
was raised in the Lockerbie case. See Martenczuk, `Security'. Nonetheless, it is important to 
examine the Council's determination of a `threat to the peace' for two reasons. First, it is such a 
determination that provides a legal basis for any enforcement measures taken by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, which binds every member state. Second, the Council's 
determination embodies what international society, or strictly speaking Great Powers, perceives as 
a threat to the peace. What matters more on examining how the international community reacts 
practically to the situation is how states perceive incidents rather than what those incidents 




surely had an impact on the Charter and the structure of the 
United Nations. The 
primary target of the organisation was war, and peace was regarded 
as 
international peace, which is the order among states, not within a state. 
2I There 
are a few cases in the 1960s and 1970s, in which domestic situations 
were 
determined as a threat to the peace. 22 However, the major understanding was 
that 
it was `not the purpose of the United Nations to maintain or restore internal peace 
by interfering in a civil war within a state. '23 After all, mutual respect of state 
sovereignty was the basis of international peace. 
With the end of the Cold War, however, situations that were not 
necessarily a `threat to the peace' previously came to be regarded as constituting 
such a threat: a threat posed by non-international and non-military incidents. 
First, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 up to 11 September 2001, most of 
the cases determined as a threat to the peace by the Security Council were civil 
wars or conflicts of a non-international nature in strict terms. 24 Conflicts and 
Z1 Akehurst, Modern, p. 219; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of 
Its Fundamental Problems - with Bound in Supplement (London: Stevens and Sons, 1951), p. 930. 
22 The civil war in the Congo [Resolution 161 (1961) of 21 February 1961, S/4741], the racist 
regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) [Resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965], and the 
system of apartheid in South Africa [Resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977)]. Inger 
Österdahl, Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN 
Charter (Uppsala: lustus Forlag, 1998), pp. 43-44. 
23 Kelsen, Law, P. 19, emphasis added. 
24 The Iraqi government's repression of its civilian population (SCR 688 of 5 April 1991); civil 
wars in Somalia (SCR 733 of 23 January 1992), in Liberia (SCR 788 of 19 November 1992), in 
Angola (SCR 864 of 15 September 1993); the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda (SCR 929 of 22 June 
1994), in Zaire (SCR 1078 of 9 November 1996); the instability in Haiti (SCR 841 of 16 June 
1993), in Burundi (SCR 1072 of 30 August 1996), in Sierra Leone (SCR 1132 of 8 October 1997) 
and in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (SCR 1291 of 24 February 2000). Three cases 
related to international terrorism, 
Libya (SCR 731 of 21 January 1992), Sudan (SCR 1054 of 26 
April 1996) and Afghanistan (SCR 1267 of 15 
October 1999), were also determined as a `threat to 
international peace'. See 
Österdahl, Threat, pp. 43-84. Whether civil war actually became more 
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instability within a state have become a matter of international concern because the 
international impact of those incidents has increased. As in the case of the 
Kurdish minority in Iraq, Somalia or Bosnia, mass violence and gross violations of 
human rights within a state's borders cease to remain domestic issues when they 
come to endanger the security of the neighbouring states through the expansion of 
conflicts and the flow of refugees. What is more, `ethnic conflicts' in a region 
tend to have a `domino effect' on neighbouring countries, which also have similar 
ethnic compositions within society. This is exactly the case with the conflicts in 
the Balkans and Rwanda; accordingly they became a serious concern of the 
international community at the time. Furthermore, globalisation and the 
development of communication technology promote the `internationalisation' of 
foreign domestic threats also in psychological terms. Now one becomes a 
witness of the incident, on the one hand, via the media, and a potential victim, on 
the other hand, because of the cross-border effects of the threat. 
When domestic issues become internationalised and threaten the 
international community, the concept of international peace and security changes. 
As James Gow states: `International peace and security have become not a matter 
of protecting the internal order of states from external intrusion, but a matter of 
protecting the state's external environment from threats of internal extrusion. '25 
Under a new security environment, the principle of non-intervention ceased to be a 
guarantor of peace but became an obstacle to restoring and maintaining peace. 
frequent in the post-Cold War era or whether each of the conflicts became more bloody than 
before can be argued. See for example Stephen J. Stedman, `The New Interventionists', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1993), pp7-8. However, for the current argument, the thesis regards, for 
reasons raised in footnote 20, what the Council perceives as a threat to the peace matters. 




Regarding the success of the operation in Northern Iraq to aid Kurdish refugees, 
the then UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar declared: `It is now increasingly 
felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction 
of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights 
could be massively or systematically violated with impunity. ' 26 The then UN 
secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali also emphasised the need for 
governments to understand that sovereignty is not absolute: `The time of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed; its theory was never matched by 
reality. '27 In sum, the international community came to discredit the absolute 
nature of state sovereignty as the basis of international peace and security. This 
opened the door for international intervention. 
The early 1990s saw the proliferation of `New Interventionism': 
intervention in domestic affairs was understood no longer as a threat to but as a 
remedy for international peace and security. 28 This international expectation of 
intervention was backed by the revival of the Security Council, which could now 
respond to crises collectively and thus more effectively after the end of the 
ideological confrontation of the Cold War. It was in such an international climate 
that the ICTY was established in 1993, half a century after its predecessors: the 
international military tribunals (IMTs). The new interventionist international 
atmosphere of the early 1990s is an important element that made the creation of 
26 Secretary-General of the United Nations Report on the Work of the Organization, 
U. N. Doc. A/46/1, September 1991. 
27 Report of the Secretary General, `An Agenda for Peace', 17 June 1992, U. N. Doc. 
A/471277-S/24111, paral7. 
28 See for example, James Mayall (ed. ), The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations 
Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 
(Polity Press, 1996). 
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the Tribunal `possible'. The ICTY, created as a Security Council enforcement 
measure to pursue criminal responsibility of individuals, including state leaders, 
clearly was an `international judicial intervention. ' 29 
Mass Atrocities and Humanitarian Crises 
As domestic issues came to be seen as a threat to peace, non-military 
dimensions of international peace and security also became a matter of concern. 
Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991, on the Kurdish crisis, interpreted Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter in a more expansive way to include situations of extremely 
aggravated civil oppression. Following the Resolution, on 31 January 1992 the 
Heads of Government of the Security Council Members declared: 
The absence of war and military conflicts among states does not in 
itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and 
ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The 
United Nations membership as a whole, working through the 
appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution 
of these matters. 30 
The `economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields', raised in the 
declaration, had been regarded in the previous period as being of secondary 
importance, or the sphere of `justice', which often clashed, or was seen to clash, 
29 David Scheffer, `International Judicial Intervention', Foreign Policy, No. 102 (1996), PP. 34-5 1; 
Rachel Kerr, `International Judicial Intervention: the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia', International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2000), pp. 17-26. 
30 S/23500 (1992), 31 January 1992. 
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with the pursuit of international peace and security . 
31 However, the declaration 
expressed the understanding that injustice and a sense of injustice existing in a 
society are the seeds of disorder. In other words, the Security Council recognised 
that the issue of justice needed to be sorted out in order to fulfil its principal aim: 
to maintain international peace and security. 
It was humanitarian and human rights issues that especially caught the 
eye of the international community in the early 1990s. In the armed conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, systematic and widespread massacres and rapes repeatedly 
occurred as a result of propagated historical hatred between different social groups. 
There was a situation in which war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
by one group brought about the others' vengeful act of further war crimes, leading 
to the escalation of conflict. Facing such a state of affairs, the Security Council, 
despite having already regarded the situation in the former Yugoslavia as 
constituting `a threat to international peace and security, ' 32 once more specifically 
determined `widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring 
within the territory' as constituting a threat. 33 This signifies the recognition by 
the Security Council that they should take some action against gross violations of 
international humanitarian law and the strong hatred existing among the victims of 
war crimes, which accompanied those violations. It is for such a `threat' that the 
Security Council established the ICTY, as an enforcement measure to maintain 
international peace and security. The idea behind the establishment of the ICTY 
was `peace through justice': for the achievement of peace and security, it is 
31 On the traditional view of order/peace and justice, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A 
Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); Hedley Bull, Justice in 
international relations, Hagey Lectures (Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1984). 
32 U. N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991), 25 September 1991. 
33 U. N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), 22 February 1993. 
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`necessary' to deal with violations of international humanitarian law and achieve 
justice for the victims. In this context, peace and justice were regarded not as 
confrontational but complementary concepts. 
Peace and Justice in the ICTs 
The idea of `peace through justice' and the significance of the ICTs to 
international peace and security cannot be understood if they are seen through the 
lens of Realism/Liberalism (or Idealism) dichotomy. However, debate between 
Realists and Liberalists and debate over the primacy of peace or justice are at the 
heart of international relations. 34 Each position endorses its idea from a different 
view of the world and thus possesses a different aim to be pursued. What is more, 
each tends to pose a question from a different philosophical level: `what can be 
done' and `what should be done'. The discourse between the two, therefore, 
rarely reaches the agreement. 35 
34 Some pointed out that a tension between `peace' and `justice' exists in the structure of the 
United Nations, whose Charter declares its purpose as `to maintain international peace and 
security' as well as `to promote and encourage respect for human rights'. See Sydney D. Bailey, 
`Intervention: Article 2.7 versus Articles 55-56', International Relations, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1994), 
pp. l-10; Martti Koskenniemi, `The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical 
View', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6 (1995), No. 3, p. 327; Duanne Bratt, `Peace 
over Justice: Developing a Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations in International 
Conflicts', Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 
Vol. 5, No. I (1999), pp. 63-65. 
3s This point is exemplified in the work of Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri. Their three 
categorised approaches to international war crimes tribunals are based on different logic regarding 
a choice of action taken: the logic of appropriateness - `whether it follows right principles'; the 
logic of consequence - `whether it leads to the right outcome'; and the logic of emotion - 
`whether it feels right given the person's current emotional state'. Snyder and Vinjamuri, 
Realists, associate themselves with the logic of consequence, and argue that the strategy of the 
ICTs is not workable because they are based on the logic of appropriateness that places too much 
emphasis on the strength of norms, which is not effective in the deterrence of mass atrocities. 
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Liberalism and Realism each prioritises different values to be pursued in 
international life: justice and peace. 36 `Contemporary' liberalism, unlike 
classical liberalism focusing on free market principles, takes a normative approach 
to reality. Liberals believe that human rights and democracy, for example, are 
universal values and thus they need to be promoted internationally. The gross 
violations of human rights in other countries are taken seriously and the justice of 
the victim is regarded as necessary to be met for its own sake. Some see a strong 
link between the liberal's stance and a legalistic approach to the punishment of 
war criminals. 37 Realism, on the other hand, not only disregards the legalistic 
approach to international politics, as seen above, but also regards state interests, 
the maximisation of power in a material sense, as being of primary importance. 
The pursuit of human rights means little for Realists both in terms of practice and 
values; it is even regarded as harming international peace, based on the mutual 
respect of state sovereignty. 
International security environments in the 1990s, however, clearly 
showed the limitation in such a dichotomised approach to peace and justice. 
Facing an increase in intra-state conflicts, accompanied by violent attacks against 
civilians, and growing concern about human rights, the international community 
had to expand the conventional concept of international peace and security and 
take non-political and non-military issues into consideration. In the cases of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, mass atrocities and `ethnic cleansing' were not 
Snyder and Vinjamuri, `Trials'. 
36 See Barrie Paskins and James Gow, `The Creation of the International Tribunals from the 
Perspectives of Pragmatism, Realism and Liberalism', International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3 
(2000), pp. 11-15. 
37 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 20. 
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merely a consequence of war but also an instrument of war; 38 and one `ethnic 
cleansing' became the seeds for another `ethnic cleansing' in the future. When 
`threats to international peace' are of such a nature, a cease-fire is not enough for 
the achievement of peace; long-term stability without any prospect of the revival 
of violence has to be ensured. In other words, the quality of peace that follows 
the war comes to matter. The voice for `justice', demanding remedies for gross 
violation of human rights, needs to be heard in order to ensure this quality. 
`[P]eace without justice is an illusion', Richard Goldstone maintains: 
If you have peace without justice in countries where millions of 
people have suffered, where hundreds of thousands of people have 
been murdered and tens of thousands of women have been raped, do 
you really expect that by brushing the atrocities committed under the 
carpet and allowing collective guilt to take hold one will achieve 
lasting peace? 39 
Peace that is unjust or seen as unjust would become a hotbed for future violence 
and private revenge. Regarding the long-term, Payam Akhavan claims, 
`punishing the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing is the only realistic option for 
achieving peace. ' 40 It is here that peace and justice, traditionally seen as 
antinomical, face a common task under the operation of the ICTs. 
38 See James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: a Strategy of War Crimes (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2003); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern 
Society (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2003). 
39 Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting War Criminals (London: David Davies Memorial Institute of 
International Studies, 1996), p. 19. 
40 Payam Akhavan, `Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on 




The logic of justice came to be regarded as important not only in itself 
but in its potential contribution to peace. The US President Bill Clinton 
expressed his sympathy for this idea: 
Some people are concerned that pursuing peace in Bosnia and 
prosecuting war criminals are incompatible goals. But I believe 
they are wrong. There must be peace for justice to prevail, but there 
41 must be justice when peace prevails. 
This is a pragmatic, or more realistic, understanding of justice in the context of 
post-Cold War international peace and security. The ICTs, therefore, cannot be 
easily dismissed as `liberalist' or `legalist' because they were originally embedded 
in the pursuit of international peace and security, the core agenda of Realism, 
which has been facing various challenges since the end of the Cold War. 42 
Crossing Boundaries: Constructivism and the ICTs 
What is required in research of the ICTs is a non-static approach to 
international peace and security. During the 1990s, the international community 
witnessed that normative discourse affected the interests and behaviour of states. 
The growing significance of human rights claims, debates over humanitarian 
intervention and the limitations on the use of certain weapons, all raise normative 
as well as empirical interests to explain `how the "ought" becomes the "is" ... how 
people's ideas about what is good and what "should be" in the world become 
41 Remarks by the President at the Opening of the Commemoration of `50 years after Nuremberg: 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law', 15 October 1995, 
http: //clinton6 nara. gov/1995/10/1995-10-15-president-at-50-years-after-nuremberg-symposium. h 
tml. 




translated into political reality. '43 The ICTY, in spite of cynics' views, certainly 
created the momentum for further international war crimes prosecutions, paving 
the way for the creation of the International Criminal Court and other international 
criminal justice mechanisms in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and so on. The ICTs 
reflect a delicate balance between a traditional norm - the non-intervention 
principle - and an evolving idea - the importance of pursuing justice for the sake 
of international peace. 
Regarding the necessity of crossing the Realist/Liberalist boundary in 
order to analyse the role and impact of the ICTs in international peace and security, 
Constructivism provides a potential approach for this research agenda. The 
strength of Constructivism is its incorporation of ideas and values to theorise 
about state interests, which is traditionally understood only in terms of material 
elements. Rather than regarding state interests and identities as exogenously 
given and thus static, Constructivism argues that they are constructed, as well as 
constrained, by the structure and culture of international politics, which 
themselves consist of the ideas and behaviour of states. Regarding state identity 
and interests as being not only produced but also reproduced in this way, or even 
transformed through interaction among states, Constructivism understands and 
explains changes in the structure and culture of international politics. 44 
It is this process-oriented theorisation that explains changes that can 
potentially bridge gaps between Realism and Liberalism because it `applies 
equally to Realism, Idealism, and any other school of thought, or practice. 05 
43 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, `International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), p. 916. 
44 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 313-369. 
as James Gow, Defending the West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 27. 
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Unlike the claim of Alexander Wendt, the original advocate of Constructivism in 
international studies, James Gow argues that Constructivism is neither a uniquely 
Liberal nor counter-Realism approach; rather it enhances Realism by `permitting it 
greater variety and flexibility, as well as allowing legitimate scope to values and 
other elements than power. ' 46 `Constructivist Realism', Gow identifies, has true 
value and utility in understanding the complex and fluctuating nature of threat and 
thus tackling `the real security problems in the contemporary world. ' 47 This 
suggests that Constructivism as a methodology and approach, rather than as a 
theoretical school of thought, adds `realistic' perspectives, which tend to be 
lacking in Realism and Liberalism and, thus, is necessary for examining the 
operation and impact of the ICTs. 
In addition to crossing the Realist/Liberalist boundary, a Constructivist 
approach also has the potential to incorporate the two disciplines of international 
law and international politics. The approach focuses not merely on the regulative 
function of rules, laws and norms but also their constitutive function. In other 
words, it can theorise that rules and norms matter even if they fail to regulate state 
behaviour in the short term. Through the constitutive function focusing on 
long-term process, the significance of international law with regard to a normative 
impact on international politics can be understood. This is an important point 
considering the fact many international political theorists dismiss international law 
from the standpoint that it is unable effectively to constrain state behaviour. 
What is more, such an approach to international law can be commonly 
held by international legal scholars, which is important when the true 
46 Ibid., p. 29. 
47 Ibid., p. 35. 
60 
Chapter 1 
incorporation of the two disciplines is sought. 48 International legal scholars have 
been interested in the `compliance question', an issue that is both legal and 
political in nature. Harold Hongju Koh argues that it is through the repeated 
cycle of interaction among states, interpretation of international norms, and 
internalisation of new interpretations of norms into the other party's internal 
normative system that `international law acquires its "stickiness, " that 
nation-states acquire their identity, and that nations come to "obey" international 
law out of perceived self-interest. '49 This process, Koh argues, will explain well 
why states obey international law in e. g. the human rights area, `where 
enforcement mechanisms are weak, but core customary norms are clearly defined 
and often peremptory (jus cogens). ' 50 For Constructivism, how international law 
is institutionalised in the international system is the important part of its 
theorisation. 51 Through its process-oriented approach, Constructivism incorporates 
international politics and international law, showing that law/politics is a false 
dichotomy: `no political society can exist without law, and ... law cannot exist 
except in a political society, ' states E. H. Can, who sought to be `realistic' rather 
than `idealistic' about reality. 52 
48 See for example, Reus-Smit (ed. ), Politics. 
49 Harold Hongju Koh, `Why Do Nations Obey International Law? ', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 
106, No. 8 (1997), p. 2655. 
so Ibid. 
51 See Finnemore and Sikkink, `International'; John Gerald Ruggie, `What Makes the World Hang 
Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', International 
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 855-885. 
52 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, Second edition. (Macmillan: 1995), p. 164. 
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3. The Nuremberg Analogy and the Establishment of the ICTY 
Along with the new security challenges inherent in post-Cold War international 
peace and security that enabled and required international war crimes tribunals, 
the NGOs and the media played a vital catalytic role in the birth of the ICTs, 
through the application of the Nuremberg and Holocaust analogy to the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia. 
The proposal for a `new Nuremberg court' for crimes committed during 
the war in the former Yugoslavia was made as early as May 1991 by a Yugoslav 
reporter, Mirko Klarin. In his article in the Yugoslav newspaper Borba, he 
claimed: 
Not when "this is all over", but instead of whatever might soon befall 
us. Precisely because of what has already happened and what is 
happening now, all of which can quite easily be shown to be 
punishable under the terms of the Nuremberg judgement and other 
legal documents just as valid here at home as in the rest of the world 
[sic. ]. " 
`All the more reason', Klarin emphasised, `to ask for an objective assessment by 
impartial foreign experts in international laws of war. A tribunal, in other words, 
similar to the one at Nuremberg [sic. ]. '54 
Internationally, it was the Helsinki Watch Committee of Human Rights 
Watch that first called on the United Nations `to establish such a tribunal and to 
prosecute, adjudicate and punish those responsible for war crimes starting with 
those with the highest level of responsibility for the most egregious crimes. ' S5 Its 
s' Mirko Klarin, `Nuremberg Now! ', Borba, Belgrade, 16 May 1991 in The Path to The Hague: 
Selected Documents on the Origins of the ICTY (New York: ICTY, 1996), p. 35, emphasis added. 
sa Ibid., emphasis added. 
55 Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, A Helsinki Watch Report (New 
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report in July 1992 on war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina claims: `The principle of 
universal jurisdiction to try war crimes was recognized in the establishment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal'. 56 
In August that year, ITN's coverage showed the world pictures of 
Omarska, a Serb detention centre for Muslim prisoners. The image of prisoners 
behind barbed wire reminded viewers around the world of Nazi concentration 
camps and the Holocaust, ` reinforcing powerfully the analogy to Nazi practices 
made by reports of ethnic cleansing. ' 57 Considering the atrocities in Bosnia, 
David Owen stated on 4 August 1992: 
This is a moral issue. History really is repeating itself in Europe. 
And this time we can see it on television. The annexation of 
territory, the concentration camps, even the jargon is the same with 
racial purity being replaced by the even more odious `ethnic 
cleansing'. We have been spared the gas chambers, but tales of 
death and brutality make it no exaggeration to warn of a holocaust. 58 
The media, NGOs, and practitioners started to talk about the atrocities in Bosnia in 
terms of the Holocaust and Nazism, and state leaders were criticised for having 
turned their backs `in the style of Neville Chamberlain, on a modern holocaust'. 59 
York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), p. 5. 
56 Ibid. 
5' Neier, War, p. 135. The news coverage itself was encouraged by previous news reports by Roy 
Gutman of Newsday. He also utilised the Holocaust analogy to describe the situation in Omarska. 
See Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide: the 1993 Pulitzer Prize-Winning Dispatches on the 
"Ethnic Cleansing" of Bosnia (Shaftesbury: Element Books, 1993). 
58 David Owen, `When it is right to fight', The Times, 4 August 1992, emphasis added. 




Facing Nazi-like crimes, it is natural that the idea of establishing a 
Nuremberg-like institution eventually emerged. 60 David Scheffer, the first US 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, says the response of the international 
community towards atrocities in Bosnia and Croatia was reminiscent of the Allies' 
response to Nazi atrocities during the World War II: `Government officials and 
scholars have debated theories of law and prosecution just as their predecessors 
did in the 1940s. U. S. federal agencies have had to struggle to coordinate their 
war-crimes work just as they did during World War II. ' 61 This can be observed 
from the initiative of the United States, who had made great efforts fifty years 
earlier to establish the IMTs, to create an international tribunal for the situation in 
the former Yugoslavia. According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, on establishing the 
Commission of Experts to investigate violations of international humanitarian law 
in the region, the United States wanted to have the words `war crimes' as part of 
the name of the commission, `which would have been reminiscent of the 1943 
[United Nations War Crimes Commission] and the Nuremberg proceedings. ' 
Bassiouni states: `The U. S. position was based on its expectation that the 
Commission would pave the way for an eventual tribunal'. 62 It might not be a 
coincidence that one of the strongest advocates of the tribunal, Madeleine Albright, 
`the mother of all the tribunals' according to Richard Goldstone, was herself a 
refugee from the Nazis in Czechoslovakia. 
60 Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis: Volume 1 
(Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1995), p. 17. 
61 Scheffer, `International', p. 35. 
62 M. Cherif Bassiouni, `The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, 
No. 4 (1994), p. 790, footnote 42. 
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On adopting Resolution 808 (1993), which decided the establishment of 
an international tribunal for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Albright, as 
American Ambassador to the United Nations, stated at the Security Council: 
There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg principles 
have been reaffirmed. We have preserved the long-neglected 
compact made by the community of civilized nations 48 years ago in 
San Francisco to create the United Nations and enforce the 
Nuremberg Principles. 63 
She continued: 
It is worthwhile recalling that the Nuremberg Principles on war 
crimes, crimes against the peace, and crimes against humanity were 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. By its action today, with 
resolution 808 (1993) the Security Council has shown that the will of 
this Organization can be exercised, even if it has taken nearly half a 
64 century for the wisdom of our earliest principles to take hold. 
The ICTY was valued not only for having revived Nuremberg but also 
for having modified Nuremberg's structural shortcomings and legal procedures. 
The Statute of Nuremberg was carefully examined and revised into the ICTY 
Statute in such a way as to ensure the fairness of the trial and to avoid being 
criticised as `victor's justice'. 65 The drafters of the Statute for the ICTY were 
especially concerned about the nature of the jurisdiction to avoid ex post facto 
63 U. N. Doc. S/PV. 3175 (1993), 22 February 1993, emphasis added. 
64 Ibid. 
65 For a comparison of the Statutes of the ICTY and the IMTs, see Yves Beigbeder, Judging War 
Criminals: the Politics of International Justice (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1999), pp. 152-154. 
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legislation. 66 They were also very sensitive to the rights of the accused being 
respected. 67 Above all, it was hailed that the ICTY, unlike its predecessor, was a 
true international tribunal established by international society. 68 On analysing 
the Tadic trial, the first case of the ICTY, Michael Scharf states: `Just as the 
Nuremberg trials following World War II launched the era of human rights 
promulgation fifty years ago, the Tadic trial has inaugurated a new age of human 
rights enforcement. ' 69 
Some others saw `the revival of Nuremberg' cynically, arguing that 
Nuremberg was `unique' and thus could not be taken as a model. 70 One feature 
of such uniqueness was `unconditional surrender'. It was argued that, in order 
for an international tribunal to work effectively and successfully, it had to meet 
this condition, which enabled outside powers to occupy the territory, guaranteeing 
the arrest of the indicted and the seizure of evidence and documents. 7l Without 
66 See James C. O'Brien, `The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law in the Former Yugoslavia', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 4 (1993), 
pp. 639-659. In the Security Council, state representatives emphasised that the Council was not 
creating new law but simply applying existing international law. See the statement of 
Venezuelan, Brazilian and Spanish Ambassadors in U. N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993), 25 May 1993. 
67 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 21. The 
trial in absentia, which was conducted by the Nuremberg Trial, is impermissible, and the right of 
appeal, which was ignored by the previous trial, is provided under the ICTY Statute. 
68 See, for example, the statement of The President, Vorontsov, Russian Ambassador to the United 
Nations, at the Security Council. U. N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993). 
69 Scharf, Balkan, pp. 214-215. 
70 Timothy D. Mak, `The Case against an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter 1995), p. 550; Richard Falk, 
`Telford Taylor and the Legacy of Nuremberg', 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(1998-1999), p. 711; Gerry J. Simpson, `War Crimes: A Critical Introduction' in Timothy L. H. 
McCormack and Gerry J. Simpson (eds. ), The Law of War Crimes: National and International 
Approaches (Boston, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 5-8. 
71 Mak, `Case', p. 552; Anthony D'Amato, `Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia', The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, No-3 (1994), p. 501. 
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such a condition, the ICTY had to depend on the cooperation of states, including 
the state whose nationals it was indicting, for crucial aspects of its work: the arrest 
and detention of the accused within their territories. However, in practice, there 
is no guarantor for compelling such cooperation; unlike Nuremberg, it is not 
guaranteed that anyone, let alone `big fish', would be seen in the dock. For 
example, at the time of writing, the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, and 
commander of the Bosnian Serb military forces, Ratoko Mladic, have been at large 
ever since they were indicted by the Tribunal in 1995. 
Sharing this cynicism, Timothy Mak nonetheless states: `Perhaps the 
most remarkable feature of the [Nuremberg and Tokyo] trials was not the fact that 
they occurred, but the fact that they have subsequently been universally accepted 
by the international community as indicative of international norms. ' 72 Indeed, 
since their creation, Nuremberg has been regarded as synonymous with war crimes 
trials in general. 73 What is more, the Nuremberg Trial has been treated as the 
'Z Mak, `Case', p. 552. 
73 Timothy L. H. McCormack and Gerry J. Simpson, `Preface' in McCormack & Simpson (eds. ), 
Law, p. xix. Gary Bass states that to see, as many do, Nuremberg as `an almost unique moment' 
for war crimes tribunals is incorrect: `In fact, war crimes trials are a fairly regular part of 
international politics'. Bass, Stay, p. 5. In the aftermath of the First World War, there was a 
plan to prosecute leaders of the defeated nations before an international tribunal for personal 
responsibility for the war. International lawyers and diplomats at the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission set up in 1943 to prepare for prosecuting the Nazi leaders studied this 
precedent closely. See James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: the Politics and Diplomacy of 
Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Westport, Conn; London: Greenwood Press, 
1982), pp. 173-174. However, the trial of the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, ended in failure as he 
found asylum in the Netherlands that was not a contracting party of the Versailles Treaty of Peace. 
The Treaty also was not influential enough to force Germany to prosecute and punish its own war 
criminals severely; most of the national trials either ended up as shams or with very light 
sentences, or convicts were even allowed to escape after their trials. The Nuremberg Trial, on 
the contrary, successfully prosecuted Nazi leaders, while establishing important and innovative 
principles. The significance of the Nuremberg Trial lies in the fact that it established those 
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quasi-norm not only for its significance as an event, i. e. its establishment, but also 
for its promising process, the achievement of long-lasting peace. 
Conclusion 
The ICTs were established in response to the new security environment that 
emerged after the end of the Cold War. The creation of the ICTs was based on a 
delicate balance between rational calculation and the normative concerns of states. 
Their procedures were and are based on the delicate interaction between the 
function of politics and law. They aim to contribute to international security 
through a delicately-balanced logic of peace and justice. And, the impact of war 
crimes prosecutions is clearly legal as well as political. It is here that the ICTs 
and their success have become an important topic not only for international 
lawyers but also for international political theorists, not only for human rights 
scholars but also for the scholars of international peace and security. 
What is more significant about the ICTY is that an international tribunal 
was created to prosecute war crimes half a century after the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
and the Tokyo Tribunal, which were created in the aftermath of World War II. 
The establishment of the ICTY, the first tribunal since the IMTs, was discussed, 
considered and put into practice with the experience of its predecessors, especially 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, borne closely in mind. It is within the context of the 
ICTs and post-Cold War international peace and security that the experience of the 
Nuremberg Trial came to be focused. Among those theorists and practitioners of 
principles at the same time as it demonstrated the feasibility of an international tribunal's 
prosecuting individuals, including state leaders, based on those principles. It is because of this 
that Nuremberg is different from any other past international war crimes prosecution and has been 
treated as epoch-making and the model, not merely as `only the most successful example'. 
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international tribunals, the phrase, the `Nuremberg legacy' became a mantra, 
accompanying certain assumptions about the impact of Nuremberg on the 
subsequent peace and security. 
However, the exact content and significance of the `Nuremberg legacy' is 
not necessarily clear nor is its usage coherent. Before re-examining the 
Nuremberg legacy through the experience of the Tokyo Trial and post-war Japan, 
the next chapter examines and analyses what the Nuremberg legacy exactly is. 
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THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: IDEAS AND PRACTICES 
The International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals, the 
so-called Nuremberg Trial, has been treated as a synecdoche for war crimes tribunals. 
As the titles of articles and books on this subject show, examination and assessment of 
the international war crimes tribunals have been strongly coloured by the experience of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal: the Nuremberg legacy. ' In spite of the casual usage of the 
phrase, the meaning of the Nuremberg legacy is neither clear nor coherent. Telford 
Taylor suggests that the name Nuremberg `conjures up the moral and legal issues raised 
by applying judicial methods and decisions to challenged wartime acts'. 2 David Luban 
puts `the legacy of Nuremberg' as: 
the potential of [Nuremberg] principles for growth and development, for 
extension and precedent-setting, for adaptability to changed political 
circumstances, for underlying moral commitments that are not so much 
the logical implications of the principles as they are their deep structure. 3 
Defined as such, the Nuremberg legacy takes various forms. On the one hand, the 
legacy is legal and can be observed through the development of international law, 
' See, for example, Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountabilityfor Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law. Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); 
Hazel Fox, `An International Tribunal for War Crimes: Will the UN Succeed Where the Nuremberg 
Failed', The World Today, Vol. 49, No. 10 (1993), pp. 194-197; Jose E. Alvarez, `Nuremberg Revisited: 
The Tadic Case', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1996), pp. 245-264; Michael P. 
Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg 
(Durham, N. C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1997); Richard Falk, `Telford Taylor and the Legacy of 
Nuremberg', 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998-1999), pp. 693-723. 
2 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1992), 
p. 626. 
3 David Luban, Legal Modernism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 343. 
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especially international humanitarian law and human rights law, or the actual trial and 
punishment of crimes dealt with under Nuremberg. The legacy in this sense takes a 
concrete form. 
On the other hand, the Nuremberg legacy can be political, moral or normative, 
taking more abstract forms such as culture, norm or `lesson'. The impact of Nuremberg 
derives both from Nuremberg as an event and as a process. `This process', Richard Falk 
states, `is often interpreted teleologically as containing an assumed promise of future 
justice'. 4 The content of the Nuremberg legacy in this sense depends strongly on the 
understanding of what the Nuremberg Trial aimed at and achieved. However, as one 
prosecutor at Nuremberg stated, the Trial itself had various faces: 
The Trial turned out to be many things: a court of justice; an historical 
inquest; a forum in which Nazi leaders could state their motivations and 
their rationalizations; a condemnation of tyranny and of racial prejudice; 
and a precedent in moving toward international means for bringing to 
justice modern day perpetrators of gross evils wherever they may be 
found. 5 
It is here that a question arises: do people who talk about the Nuremberg legacy look at 
the same aspects of the Trial in the same way? Was the Nuremberg legacy mentioned in 
the past in the same way as it is now? 
This chapter first examines how the Nuremberg legacy was seen and 
understood during the Cold War. The examination of the legacy as it was perceived in 
this period clarifies the background of the international community's reluctance to setup 
any international war crimes tribunal for nearly half a century. This is important for 
4 Falk, `Telford', p. 695, emphasis added. 
5 Drexel A. Sprecher, Inside the Nuremberg Trial: a Prosecutor's Comprehensive Account (Lanham, Md.: 
University Press of America, 1999), p. 1457. 
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analysing why after fifty years the legacy was revived in the form of ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals (ICTs), in other words, what is significant about the experience of 
Nuremberg in the context of post-Cold War international relations. The point is strongly 
related to the main theme of this thesis: the strategic purpose of international war crimes 
prosecutions and its significance to international peace and security. The chapter then 
moves on to examine the significance of the Nuremberg legacy in the context of ongoing 
international criminal tribunals. 
1. The Nuremberg Legacy and Post-World War II International Peace and 
Security 
In his final report to the President on 7 October 1946, Robert H. Jackson, US Chief 
Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal, insisted: `The importance of the trial lies in the 
principles to which the Four Powers became committed by the Agreement, by their 
participation in the prosecution, and by the judgment rendered by the Tribunal. ' 6 
Jackson expected that the principles set out by Nuremberg would become `a basic 
charter in the international law of the future. ' Those principles became a milestone for 
the development of international humanitarian law and human rights law that followed 
after the Trial. However, the experience of Nuremberg as a whole had been regarded 
cynically or had simply been ignored during the Cold War. This can be attributed partly 
to the defects of the Nuremberg Trial. It is, however, more to do with the international 
security environment during the Cold War, as examined below. Unlike the early 1940s, 
what was lacking in post-war international relations was not law but political will: states 
were reluctant to prosecute individuals for conducting war crimes. There was little 
space for the Nuremberg legacy to prevail. 
6 Robert H. Jackson, The Nürnberg Case, as presented by Robert. H. Jackson, together with other 
documents (New York: Knopf, 1947), p. xiv. 
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Legal Aspects of the Nuremberg Legacy 
The Nuremberg Trial, which prosecuted 24 major German war criminals for 
`crimes against peace', war crimes and `crimes against humanity', contributed 
significantly to the development of international law after World War 11.7 The United 
Nations General Assembly on 11 December 1946 unanimously adopted Resolution 95 
(I): Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. 8 In 1950, the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal together with 
its judgment were formulated into seven principles by the International Law 
Commission. In addition to the statement that `crimes against peace', `war crimes', and 
`crimes against humanity' are crimes under international law (Principle VI), the 
Commission set out individual criminal responsibility under international law: `Any 
person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is 
responsible therefore and liable to punishment' (I), whether or not international law 
imposed a penalty for such an act (II). 9 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 
two protocols of 1977 further endorsed the concept of individual criminal responsibility 
for war crimes, requiring the party states to `enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of 
the grave breaches of the present Convention'. '0 
' On the development of international law deriving from Nuremberg, see Theodor Meron, War Crimes 
Law Comes of Age: Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Dordrecht; Boston: M. 
Nijhoff Publishers; Norwell, MA, U. S. A: Sold and distributed in the U. S. A. and Canada by Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1992). 
' General Assembly Resolution 95 (I), 1 (2), Resolutions Adopted by General Assembly (1946), p. 188. 
9 The Principles also deny, as did the Nuremberg Tribunal, a defence based on an official position and on 
the existence of superior orders (Principles III and IV). The Principles also affirm the right of the accused 
to a fair trial under international law (V). See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol. 
II, pp. 374-378. 
lo Common Article 49/50/129/146 of the Geneva Conventions. 
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Theodor Meron regards the definition of `crimes against humanity' as the most 
revolutionary contribution made by the Nuremberg Charter to international law: `it 
established, for the first time, direct international criminal responsibility under 
international law for atrocities committed in one country, even as between its citizens. "' 
`Crimes against humanity' became the basis of the development of the post-war human 
rights regime. In 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was followed by the two Covenants of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and of Civil and Political Rights, which came into force in 1976. The 
concept of crimes against humanity was also developed into various international laws: 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide came into 
force in 1951, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid, came into force in 1976, and the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, came into force in 1987. 
These developments were accelerated by clear evidence of the Holocaust and other 
crimes presented at the Nuremberg Tribunal, which shocked, horrified and thus 
motivated the international community to create a human rights regime through the 
United Nations. 12 War crimes are thus codified and the concept of individual 
responsibility has penetrated international law. 
In spite of this remarkable development of international law, however, the 
`Nuremberg Principles' were rarely implemented during the Cold War. This relates to 
the fact that the international community, though affirming the Charter and judgment of 
Nuremberg, was critical and cynical about the Trial per se. This is attributed to the 
`original sin' of Nuremberg: retroactive justice and `victor's justice'. 
" Theodor Meron, `The Humanization of Humanitarian Law', The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 94, No. 2 (2000), p. 263. 
12 Yves Beigbeder, Judging Criminal Leaders: the Slow Erosion of Impunity (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), p. 3. 
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The Original Sin of Nuremberg 
The Nuremberg Judgment claimed that the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) was `not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious 
nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, ... it is the expression of international law 
existing at the time of its creation'. 13 However, many international legal scholars then 
and now argue that the defendants at Nuremberg were prosecuted and punished 
retroactively, charged for acts that were not crimes at the time they were conducted. 14 Ex 
post facto law raises a serious question on the fairness and legality of the Trial because 
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege - no crime without law, no punishment without 
law - is an important legal principle to guarantee the fair application of law. 
The defence counsel argued that `crimes against peace', or wars of aggression, 
were not clearly codified at the time the alleged acts were committed. Even if, as the 
prosecutor insisted, Germany's act was `illegal' because of the violation of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that renounced war as an instrument of national policy in 
states' relations with one another - and of eight other treaties to which Germany was a 
party - it does not automatically mean that her conduct was `a crime', leading to 
punishment. 15 It may also be possible to argue that the pact did not completely outlaw 
the conduct of war because there was no provision for sanctions and it implicitly 
13 International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals, `Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (with the dissenting opinion 
of the Soviet member), Nuremberg, 30th September and Ist October, 1946' (London: H. M. S. O., 1946) [as 
Judgment hereafter], p. 38. 
14 For the arguments soon after the Nuremberg Trial, see George A. Finch, `The Nuremberg Trial and 
International Law', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1947), pp. 20-37; Quincy 
Wright, `The Law of the Nuremberg Trial', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, No. 1 
(1947), pp. 38-72; Hans Kelsen, `Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in 
International Law? ', The International Law Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1947), pp. 153-171. 
15 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst 's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised edition (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 354. 
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acknowledged the state's right of self-defence. 16 In the case of the violation of those 
inter-war treaties that renounced war, Hans Kelsen argued, the sanction provided by 
general international law - authorisation to resort to reprisals or counter-war against the 
violator - would have applied, but not the pursuit of individual criminal responsibility 
under an international court. 17 
As for `crimes against humanity', it was a totally new `legal' category 
introduced by the IMT Charter annexed to the London Agreement in 1945 for the 
Establishment of the Tribunal. 18 Under the name of `crimes against humanity', 
atrocities conducted by a state against its own citizens before or during the war were 
criminalised. Traditionally, a state's acts against its citizens and acts before the war did 
not constitute war crimes; they had simply been ignored under international law. 19 
War crimes, that is violations of the laws or customs of war, was a less 
16 James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: the Politics and Diplomacy ofPunishing War Criminals of the 
First World War (Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 170. Yoram Dinstein argues that 
none of those international instruments during the interwar period proclaiming the criminality of 
aggressive war was legally binding. Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-defence, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 106-107. 
" Kelsen, `Will', p. 155. 
'$ `Crimes against humanity' in itself was not entirely new concept. The term, covering `inhumane acts 
committed by a government against its own subjects', was first used in 1915 by the governments of France, 
Great Britain and Russia to denounce the massacre of the Armenian population. However, the term had 
been used in a `non-technical' sense. United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London: H. M. S. O., 1948), 
pp. 188-189. In 1919, the Commission on Responsibility in charge of inquiring into the responsibilities 
relating to WWI found the specific juxtaposition of `war crimes' and `crimes against humanity'. However, 
the Versailles Treaty did not refer to the `laws of humanity' nor `crimes against humanity'. Again, `crimes 
against humanity' was used in the context of the Treaty in a `non-technical sense'. Ibid., pp. 35-36, p. 45. 
19 It is, in general, positively accepted that with the concept of `crimes against humanity', the Charter 
extended the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal `to include those who committed other serious crimes 
that fall outside the ambit of traditional war crimes, such as crimes where the victim is stateless, has the 
same nationality as the perpetrator, or that of a state allied with that of the perpetrator. ' Opinion and 
Judgment, Prosecution vs. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, May 1997, para. 619. 
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problematic concept, as the origin of the development of the laws of war can be traced 
back to the Middle Age of Europe. 20 By the early part of the twentieth century, the 
restriction on the conduct of war, jus in bello, was codified through the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions and the 1929 Geneva Convention, which recognised constraints on 
the method of warfare and certain duties towards enemy civilians and soldiers not 
engaging in battle. However, international law had not established individual criminal 
responsibility under international law. Individual criminal responsibility was not an 
international matter dealt under an international trial, but was a matter for states, who 
were in charge of judging violators under national jurisdiction by introducing the 
category of war crimes into their penal and/or military codes. 21 The Nuremberg Tribunal 
broke this tradition by prosecuting and punishing individuals under an international 
tribunal. `That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well 
as upon States has long been recognised, ' the Judgment clearly stated: 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced. 22 
Along with the affirmation of individual responsibility under international law, the 
Nuremberg Charter denied the official position of defendants of immunity from 
prosecution. By prosecuting state leaders, the Tribunal departed from the traditional 
doctrine of `act of state'. 23 The denial of the notion of superior orders, which had 
20 See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, Third Ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 3 
21 Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals: the Politics of International Justice (London: Macmillan, 
1999), p. 44. 
22 Judgment, p. 41. 
23 Luban, Legal, pp. 337-339. 
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protected individual soldiers following their superiors, was also a departure from 
traditional military mentality and practice. 24 The judgment at the Tribunal stated: `the 
very essence of the Charter [of the IMT] is that individuals have international duties 
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual 
State. 25 
As existing research shows, in spite of international support for principles 
recognised by the Nuremberg Charter, the legality of the application of such principles to 
the Nazi leaders has been fiercely argued. The Allies were also well aware of those 
defects right from the beginning. 26 However, it was felt absolutely necessary to judge 
the crimes even through ex post facto legislation. There was a common understanding 
that the crimes committed by the Nazis were unprecedented both in scale and character 
and thus could not be treated with the then existing law: `Novel problems may require 
novel wrenchings of normal legal practice. '27 The Tribunal did violate the principle of 
legality but `[b]y violating this principle for the first time, ' Kriangsak Kittichaisaree 
argues, `the Nuremberg Tribunal set precedents for future criminal prosecution of 
24 Whether obedience to superior orders can be used to defend war crimes is such a difficult issue that 
states could not agree, even after Nuremberg, the content of a Nuremberg principle regarding obedience to 
orders. See Yoram Dinstein, The Defence of `Obedience to Superior Orders' in International Law 
(Leyden: Sijthoff, 1965), pp. 228-241. See also L. C. Green, Superior Orders in National and 
International Law (A. W. Sijthoff, 1976) for national and international approach to the problem of the 
defence of superior orders. 
25 Judgment, p. 42. 
26 The British had held that there were no laws relevant to such crimes against humanity. Donald A. Wells, 
War Crimes and Laws of War (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1984), p. 84. On the 
preparation of the draft of the Charter, French legal professionals questioned the criminality of launching a 
war of aggression under international law. Even an American jurist was doubtful about the idea that a 
violator of international law should suffer criminal penalties, unless such penalties were specified in the 
law concerned. Beigbeder, Judging War, p. 42. 
27 Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill, The Ethics of War (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 271. See also 
Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 164. 
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individuals before an international tribunal' applying the concept of crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 28 However, what makes this ex post facto law 
even more problematic is the fact that only the German and the Japanese, the vanquished, 
were prosecuted and punished under those new principles. It is here that the Tribunal 
was given the notorious name: `victor's justice'. 
Whether the Nuremberg Tribunal was purely a legal product or not has been 
argued, and the Tribunal is often regarded as a political trial that `pursues a very specific 
policy - the destruction, or at least the disgrace and disrepute, of a political opponent. '29 
The Nuremberg Trial was a one-sided trial: no alleged crimes committed by the Allies, 
the victors, were examined. Examining the concept of crimes against peace, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity, for which the Nazi officers were prosecuted, the Tribunal 
could also have prosecuted some of the Allies' war conduct: the British and American 
strategic air bombing against Hamburg, Dresden and other German cities; the American 
use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Russia's aggression against Finland 
and its invasion of its other Baltic neighbours in 1940; and Russia's participation in 
Germany's seizure of Poland. However, all these were outside the terms of the 
Nuremberg Charter: beyond its mandate. 
From a practical point of view, this was related to the setting up of the Tribunal, 
which was established `for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis' and consisted of judges exclusively from the Allied 
states: the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. 3° In the 
absence of judges from neutral states and other parts of the world, some question 
28 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 16. 
29 Shklar, Legalism, p. 149. 
30 See Article 1 and 2 of the Charter of International Military Tribunal. 
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whether it really was an `international' tribunal, as the Allies wanted it to be seen. 31 
From a moral point of view, prosecuting the Allies leaders, such as Truman and 
Churchill for the above alleged crimes together with Nazi leaders, would have lessened 
the moral appeal that the Tribunal was eager to convey to the world. 32 
Through the creation of the Tribunal and the application of law instead of 
summary execution, the victors declared to the world their moral stance on the issue. 
Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill argue: `They are thus subject to judgement in moral 
terms which they themselves espoused. 03 However, the partial application of the 
Charter did only partial justice, which undermined the normative weight of the Trial. 
The only way to justify `victor's justice', as well as retroactive justice, is to show that 
victors themselves have been committed to institutionalising, through laws and practices, 
the `justice' created at the Nuremberg Trial. However, the view that Nuremberg was 
`victor's justice' was further strengthened by the poor record, in the post-Nuremberg era, 
of states' commitment to the idea and principles they themselves established. 
War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, and State Sovereignty 
The post-WWII international climate was hardly favourable to the 
implementation of the international humanitarian law and human rights law developed 
after Nuremberg. Accordingly, there was no international war crimes tribunal to follow 
31 Beigbeder, Judging War, p. 40. The Chief Prosecutor for the US, on the other hand, argued: `The 
worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but few real neutrals. ' International 
Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals, `The Trial of the Major German War 
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 -1 October 1946' 
[as Trial hereafter], Vol. 11, Proceedings, 14 November - 30 November 1945, p. 101. Interestingly, the 
ICTY sees the Nuremberg as well as Tokyo tribunals as `multinational in nature, representing only part of 
the world community. ' Opinion and Judgment, Prosecution vs. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, May 1997, para. 1, 
emphasis added. 
32 Luban, Legal, p. 361. 
33 Paskins and Dockrill, Ethics, p. 277 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo. Some argue that this is because there had been, since World War 
II, `no recurrence of the unique circumstances that made the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals possible': unconditional surrender. 34 What is more significant, however, was 
the lack of will to resort to the Nuremberg precedent. The international community as a 
whole was reluctant to prosecute and punish individuals for war crimes or crimes against 
humanity because of the concern that such conduct would infringe states' interests. 
Nuremberg was revolutionary in introducing individual criminal responsibility 
into international law, which is claimed to have altered `some state-to-state aspects of 
international humanitarian law'. 35 However, it is important to differentiate between two 
levels of responsibility emerging from this: individual criminal responsibility for the 
crime one has committed, and state responsibility to prosecute and punish those 
individuals. Under international society, which, unlike domestic society, lacks a central 
authority to conduct enforcement and punishment `vertically', the pursuit of individual 
criminal responsibility had been heavily based on state responsibility 36 International 
humanitarian law is implemented within a `horizontal' relationship between states, 
respecting and relying on the action and policy of the individual state. 37 However, states 
3a Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis, Volume 1 (Transnational Publishers, Inc.: 
1996), p. 14. 
35 Meron, `Humanization', p. 243. 
36 Common Article 49/50/129/146 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 made it the state's obligation 
to search for persons responsible for grave breaches, bring them before its own courts, or extradite them to 
another state that has made out a prima facie case. 
37 On the difference between `vertical' and `horizontal' mechanisms, Antonio Cassese argues that the 
extradition of accused persons and surrender to an international jurisdiction are `two totally different and 
separate mechanisms. ' Antonio Cassese, `On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and 
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law', European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), p13. Yoram Dinstein wrote in 1975 that without the existence of a permanent 
international criminal court, the distinction between `real international offenses [sic. ]' and `national 
offences originating in international treaties' is difficult to draw. Dinstein, `International Criminal Law', 
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do not always fulfil this responsibility. 
States are not always enthusiastic about prosecuting and punishing their own 
soldiers for alleged war crimes committed in the pursuit of national interests. The 
United States faced this problem in the case of the massacre at My Lai during the 
Vietnam War, in which the American troops allegedly killed some 350 village residents 
including women, children, and the aged who showed no resistance. The Army's 
Criminal Investigation conducted an inquiry and determined that Lieutenant William 
Calley and twelve men under his command were chiefly responsible for the 1968 
massacre. Of the thirteen men charged, it was only Calley that was convicted. Several 
officers were also accused of covering up the atrocities but only Calley's immediate 
superior, Captain Ernest Medina, and his brigade commander, Col. Oran Henderson, 
were court-martialed. Both were acquitted. Although Calley was originally sentenced 
to life imprisonment in 1971, the case subsequently went through several reviews; his 
sentence was finally reduced to ten years. 38 Some see the case as evidence of the 
reluctance of the United States, the principal sponsor, organiser, and executant of the 
International Military Tribunal, to apply the `Nuremberg Principles' strictly on its own 
side. 
Nuclear strategy during the Cold War also was one of the reasons why states 
were reluctant during this period to implement the Nuremberg Principles. Strict pursuit 
of the responsibility for `crimes against humanity' would question the usage of nuclear 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 55 (1975), p. 73, excerpted from Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 2"d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 1136. 
38 Frederic L. Borch III, Judge Advocates in Vietnam: Army Lawyers in Southeast Asia 1959-1975 
(Kansas: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), p. 52-54. See also Telford Taylor, 
Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), pp. 123-153; Michael 
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2"d edition (Basic Books, 
1977), pp. 309-316. 
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weapons, which would have shaken the then international order based on a delicate 
balance of nuclear deterrence. As Donald Wells concludes, nuclear weapons together 
with massive bombing against cities would imply that `[t]he crime against humanity had 
now become conventional war strategy. '39 
Considering the fact that crimes against humanity are often carried out by a 
state against its own people during civil wars or under dictatorships, it is unlikely that the 
state would conduct trials to prosecute crimes against humanity by itself. However, 
other states were also reluctant to prosecute leaders of the state concerned. The strict 
pursuit of the crime may lead to the intervention in and infringement of state sovereignty. 
Luban sees an inherited dilemma in the Nuremberg Charter, which set out `crimes 
against humanity' together with `crimes against peace', the latter pulling in the opposite 
direction to the former: 
To end all war, the authors of the Nuremberg Charter were led to 
incorporate an intellectual confusion into it. The Charter criminalized 
aggression, and by criminalizing aggression, the Charter erected a wall 
around state sovereignty and committed itself to an old-European model 
of unbreachable nation-states. ... leaving us ... with a legacy that is at best 
equivocal and at most immoral. 40 
When India's intervention in Pakistan brought to end the latter's massacre of over one 
million Bengalis, members of the Security Council and General Assembly, except the 
Soviet Union, did not support India's justification of its use of force based on 
humanitarian ground. Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia was heavily sanctioned for 
breaking the principle of non-intervention, in spite of the fact that the intervention ended 
39 Wells, War, p. 89. 
40 Luban, Legal, pp. 336-337. 
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the murderous Pol Pot regime. 41 These cases show, as Adam Roberts states, `Where 
there seemed to be a conflict between the morality of states and the morality of 
individual justice, the morality of states generally prevailed. '42 Richard Falk warns `an 
overestimation of the willingness and capacity of governments operating in a realist 
mode to adhere to Nuremberg constraints if doing so runs counter to their perceptions of 
vital national interest. '43 The pursuit of responsibility for crimes against humanity faced 
difficulties under international relations where the non-intervention principle was the 
basis of the order among states. 
One way of resolving this dilemma was to create a permanent international 
criminal court with a jurisdiction to prosecute individuals directly, regardless of 
nationality. Such a court, however, was not established during the Cold War. One 
reason for this is the failure of the international community after Nuremberg to codify 
`crimes against peace'. 
`Crimes against Peace' and Aggression in the Cold War Period 
Criminalisation of aggression was emphasised by the organisers and 
participants of Nuremberg as one of the main aims of the Trial. For those who pressed 
for a trial instead of summary execution, Nuremberg was a means to criminalise 
aggressive war and create post-war international peace and order. Robert Jackson 
al See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 55-1 10. 
42 Adam Roberts, `Order/Justice Issue at the United Nations' in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and 
Andrew Hurrell (eds. ), Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 74. Tanzania's intervention in Uganda was tacitly approved based on the fact that it had 
overthrown the barbaric regime of Idi Amin. However, as Nicholas Wheeler points out, the approval was 
possible because `Tanzania had been attacked first and her intervention did not touch on vital superpower 
interests, as in the case of Vietnam. ' Wheeler, Saving, p. 136. 
43 Falk, `Telford', p. 708 
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declared in his Opening Statement at the Trial: 
This trial is part of the great effort to make the peace more secure. One 
step in this direction is the United Nations organization, which may take 
joint political action to prevent war if possible, and joint military action to 
insure that any nation which starts a war will lose it. This Charter and this 
Trial implementing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, constitute another step in the 
same direction - juridical action of a kind to ensure that those who start a 
war will pay for it personally. 44 
Jackson was determined to establish a precedent for punishing individuals who 
committed aggressive war, expecting a deterrent effect: `while this law is first applied 
against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must 
condemn aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now in 
judgment. '45 At the same time, by enforcing international law directly on individuals 
rather than states, the Tribunal sought to lessen the possibility of warfare, `the most 
practicable method of coercing a state' and, thus, to maintain peace. 46 In sum, 
Nuremberg was anticipated as `the Trial to end all wars'. 
However, `crimes against peace', unlike `crimes against humanity', was not 
codified or institutionalised thereafter. Having received an instruction from the UN 
General Assembly in 1947, the International Law Commission (ILC) prepared in 1954 
the Draft of Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. While laying 
down that acts of aggression `are crimes under international law, for which the 
responsible individuals shall be punished', the Draft could not reach an agreed definition 
as Jackson's Opening Statement for the Prosecution, in Trial, Vol. II, p. 154. This idea was also shared by 
Telford Taylor who sees the Nuremberg Trial and the United Nations as `twin offspring of the Allied 
negotiations and agreements with respect to the peace that would follow victory. ' Taylor, Nuremberg, 
p. 78. 
' Jackson's Opening Statement, in Trial, Vol. II, p. 154. 
46Ibid., p. 150. 
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of `aggression'. 47 Within the context of the Cold War and ideological confrontation, it 
was almost impossible to reach a consensus on the use of word `aggression'. In 1974 the 
General Assembly adopted a consensus Definition of Aggression. 48 Yoram Dinstein 
points out that although it is `the most recent and the most widely ... accepted', the 
Definition of Aggression is less useful for actual international prosecution and 
punishment because `the General Assembly largely deemphasized the criminal aspect of 
its formulation, and brought to the fore the political dimension'. 49 
The lack of codification of aggression had an effect on the creation of the 
permanent court. The attempt to create an international criminal court started soon after 
Nuremberg. The General Assembly established a Special Committee, which prepared 
the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court in 1951, which was then revised in 
1953. The General Assembly, however, found it necessary to consider first the 
codification of international crimes: the Draft Code of Offences. Accordingly, the Draft 
Statute had been tabled until the ILC came up with the definition of `aggression' in 1974. 
However, it took until 1991 to finalise the text, which took another five years to be 
revised and adapted by the ILC in 1996.5° M Cherif Bassiouni pinpoints the scepticism 
and reluctance among the major powers to establish an international criminal court as 
the reason for the failure to synchronise the codification of international crimes and the 
elaboration of a draft statute for an international court: `it was the result of a political will 
to delay the establishment of an international criminal court because that was a time 
when the world was sharply divided and frequently at risk of war. ' 51 After all, 
4' Dinstein, War, pp. 112-113. 
48 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974. 
49 Dinstein, War, p. 115. 
so M. Cherif Bassiouni, `Historical Survey: 1919-1998' in M. Cherif Bassiouni compiled, The Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 
1998), pp. 11-15. 
51 Ibid., p. 15. 
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aggression and war crimes are too political and ideological as matters to be put under the 
jurisdiction of an institution that is entitled to prosecute even heads of states, and 
therefore to override the sovereignty of states. 52 
While `aggressive war' was not formally codified, there have been a number 
of alleged `crimes against peace' in a Nuremberg sense. Wells, for example, claimed: 
`The major elements of a crime against the peace and the crime of aggressive war were 
to be found in the American role in Vietnam'. 53 Giving examples of the Soviet invasion 
of Hungary and France's counter-guerrilla war in Algeria and Vietnam, Eugene 
Davidson pointed to the limitation of the Nuremberg Principles in preventing wars of 
aggression: `Despite these sweeping declarations of a new legal world order, we have 
lived since the Nuremberg trial in a time of unremitting international tension in which 
more than eighty wars or revolutions have been fought. '54 The idea that `Nuremberg 
was to be the Trial to End All Wars' was seen as naive. Davidson cynically concluded: 
it may be argued that the uneasy peace that has endured between the major 
powers since World War II has been kept not because of, but despite, 
Nuremberg. Had the Nuremberg principles of the illegality of aggressive 
war been maintained as rigorously as many of their proponents would 
have liked, a world war could have started in Hungary, in the Middle East, 
in the Far East - in fact, anywhere at all. ... 
it is by ignoring the doctrines 
of Nuremberg rather than by trying to enforce them that the post-war 
52 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in 1998 includes the crime of aggression 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, article 5 of the Statute notes that `The Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 
123 defining the crime'. Judging from articles 121 and 123, such a procedure does not seem to take place 
immediately. See Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 46-47. The definition of aggression 
remains a difficult issue for states to face. 
53 Wells, War, p. 103. 
sa Eugene Davidson, The Nuremberg Fallacy: Wars and War Crimes Since World War II (New York: 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 2. 
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world has lived through the cold war and then peaceful coexistence, 
which is another stage of the same process. " 
`Crimes against peace' having been one of the main foci of the Trial, it may be natural 
that the Nuremberg legacy was perceived rather cynically by the post-war international 
community, because the record of the legacy in this aspect was very poor during the 
Cold War. 56 
Nuremberg, as Theodor Meron argues, contributed to changing the emphasis of 
international humanitarian law from the interest of states to the rights of individuals. He 
argues that the trend of human rights law influencing the formation of international 
humanitarian law began in Nuremberg. 57 However, the foundation of international 
humanitarian law, the laws of war, is not humanity; it has `consisted principally of a set 
of internationally-approved national professional military standards'. 58 What is more, 
ss Ibid., p. 291 
56 Interestingly, although the importance of punishing the defendants for `crimes against peace' was 
emphasised by the organisers and participants of Nuremberg, actual sentences given to the defendants 
show slightly different story. Among 22 defendants, 16 were charged for `crimes against peace', and 12 
were found guilty, while 18 defendants were charged for `crimes against humanity' and 16 were found 
guilty. Among 12 defendants who were sentenced to death, no one was hanged for `crimes against peace' 
alone, while 4 were sentenced to death for war crimes and `crimes against humanity', and one hanged only 
for the charge of `crimes against humanity'. As B. V. A. Röling, a judge at the Tokyo Trial, sees, sentences 
given for `crimes against peace' may be too lenient considering the fact that the Tribunals called crimes 
against peace `the supreme international crime'. See Chapter 3. This discrepancy in what was publicised 
at the beginning, the outcome of Nuremberg Judgment and the following public view and image of 
Nuremberg as `the Trial to end all wars' may point to an interesting aspect of `legacy', which, as noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, is often based on teleological interpretation, not necessarily on the rigid fact. 
57 Meron, `Humanization', pp. 243-244. 
58 Adam Roberts, `The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts' in Law in 
Humanitarian Crises Volume I. How Can International Humanitarian Law be Made Effective in Armed 
Conflicts? (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995), p. 80. 
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international humanitarian law was from the beginning `paradigmatically interstate law, 
driven by reciprocity', 59 which does not protect people from their own government. 
Furthermore, although the UN General Assembly unanimously affirmed the Charter and 
judgement of Nuremberg, it in fact could not affirm the Nuremberg Principles 
formulated by the ILC because of several `observations' made by member states. 60 
As Roberts states, `A questionable part of the legacy of Nuremberg is the 
creation of expectations that, in general, trials are an appropriate way to handle war 
crimes issues. '61 A further interesting aspect of the Nuremberg legacy, moreover, is the 
fact that such expectations were created in spite of the poor record of the `Nuremberg 
Principles' being implemented. 
Human Rights, Transitional Justice, and the Nuremberg Legacy 
While they had not been implemented internationally, principles derived from 
the Nuremberg Trial surely had some normative impact on post-WWII international 
relations. Barrie Paskins points out that the Nuremberg Trial provided `a common 
vocabulary of moral discourse' with which states' foreign and military policy could be 
discussed and examined. 62 This can be seen in the context of the Vietnam War, in which 
many of the opponents of American policy cited Nuremberg. One commented: `Our 
actions in Vietnam fall within the prohibited classifications of warfare set down at 
Nuremberg 
... the United States is clearly guilty of "War Crimes, " "Crimes against 
Peace" and "Crimes against Humanity, " crimes for which the top German leaders were 
Roberts states that this view of the laws of war `does have the merit of concentrating attention on what is 
practically achievable within our own societies and their armed forces. ' Ibid. 
59 Meron, `Humanization', p. 243. 
60 General Assembly Resolution 488 (V), `Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles', 12 December 1950. 
61 Roberts, `Laws', p. 29, emphasis added. 
62 Barrie Paskins, `Prohibitions, Restraints and Scientists' in Nicholas A Sims (ed. ), Explorations in Ethics 
and International Relations: Essays in Honour of Sydney D. Bailey (Croom Helm London, 1981), p. 76. 
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either imprisoned or executed. '63 
The normative and moral aspects of Nuremberg remained even after the 
conclusion of the Vietnam War. `Once having entered the discourse', Jonathan Bush 
argues, `talk of war crimes spread from the Vietnam War to become a typical part of the 
public response to any number of brutal foreign wars and regimes'. According to Bush, 64 
`By the mid-1970s, activists pressed to extend Nuremberg from the context of war to 
that of domestic human rights violations as well.... the new, exciting feature seemed to 
be the use of Nuremberg in domestic human rights settings. ' 65 The human rights 
movement embraces the idea that universal values and morality exist in human life and 
thus that `it is not reasonable to allow this value to be diluted by the mere boundaries 
which human beings happen to have constructed against each other. '66 This idea was 
strongly tied to `crimes against humanity'. Geoffrey Robertson regards crimes against 
humanity as the vital legal legacy of Nuremberg, and expects it to `become the key to 
unlocking the closed door of state sovereignty'. 67 For human rights advocates, Steven 
Ratner and Jason Abram, Nuremberg signified `an opportunity to enforce human rights 
in the most direct way possible - by assigning responsibility to those who abuse human 
rights in the belief that they do so with impunity. '68 The important point here is that the 
63 Eric Norden quoted in Taylor, Nuremberg, p. 96. The title of this Taylor's book, Nuremberg and 
Vietnam. An American Tragedy, itself is a good example of the normative application of Nuremberg to 
examine Vietnam. 
64 Jonathan A. Bush, `Nuremberg: The Modem Law of War and Its Limitations', Columbia Law Review, 
Vol. 93 (1993), p. 2066. 
65 Ibid., p. 2066-2067. 
66 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), p. 125. 
67 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2"d Ed. (London: 
Penguin Books, 2002), p. xiiii. 
68 Ratner and Abrams, Accountability, pp. 343-344. They argue that the Nuremberg Trial married two 
trends: international law which directly mandates individual criminal accountability for violations of the 
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Nuremberg legacy started to be discussed within the context not only of the relations 
between states but also of the relations between a state and its citizens. 
Together with the increasing interest in accountability for human rights 
violations, the late 1970s to 1980s saw a wave of transition in Latin American countries 
from military dictatorship to democracy. What those post-totalitarian societies had to 
tackle along with the democratisation process was the state's traumatic past, in which 
former authoritarian regimes perpetrated, or permitted, gross human rights abuses. 69 
Anguished demands for apology, retribution, or reparation for past suffering were raised 
by victims and their families. In addition, increasing international awareness of human 
rights also pressured new governments to respond to those voices. The pursuit of 
so-called `transitional justice' became vital for new governments in order to achieve 
national unity and reconciliation and prevent the recurrent violence that threatened order 
within society. 70 The question, however, was how to achieve transitional justice. It is in 
this context that `the Nuremberg ethos' was revived `in a series of distinct political 
settings that shared the need to solve "the transition to democracy problem" within the 
confines of state/society relations. '71 
Ruti Teitel examines the proposition that successor justice since World War II 
has been dominated by the legacy of Nuremberg: `How justice was done at Nuremberg 
laws of war; and the evolution of international human rights law, which seeks `to guarantee the rights of 
persons vis-ä-vis their own government'. See, Ibid., p. 5,10. 
69 David A. Crocker, `Transitional Justice and International Civil Society' in Aleksandar Jokic (ed. ), War 
Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 271. 
70 Neil Kritz, `The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice' in Neil J. Kritz (ed. ), Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Vo1. I, General Considerations (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p. xx; Jose Zalaquett `Confronting Human Rights Violations 
Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints' excerpted in Kritz 
(ed. ), Transitional, Vol. 1, p. 6. 
71 Falk, `Telford', p. 718. 
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... has become virtually synonymous with successor justice. '72 Punishment and trials 
are regarded as being necessary for the transition to democracy not only to achieve 
justice per se. These are taken as a ritual to draw a clear line between the old and new 
regimes, delegitimise the past `evil' governments and thus facilitate the transition and 
legitimisation of the new government. 73 Some commentators further emphasise that 
prosecution and punishment are indispensable to preserving collective memory or to 
deter the recurrence of future human rights abuses. These show that the Nuremberg 
legacy is `generalized beyond its postwar uses'. 74 
Transition in Argentina was haunted by the legacy of Nuremberg. Under the 
government of President Alfonsin, Argentina faced the question of transitional justice 
for the repression under the military regime from 1976 to 1983, which resulted in 
thousands of `disappearances' and arbitrary imprisonment and torture. Events following 
the transition were put under the scrutiny of international human rights organisations, 
who had `the ethical and legal legacy' of the post-WWII international trials strongly in 
mind. 75 International public opinion saw that it was the duty of the successor 
governments to prosecute and punish those who were guilty of human rights abuses. 
Having sensed this pressure, Alfonsin issued, in December 1983, a decree declaring the 
necessity to prosecute the leaders of guerrilla organisations. In February 1984, a law 
was enacted providing that `all crimes committed by members of the security forces in 
the context of anti-subversive operations since 1973 should be tried by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces. '76 
72 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 31. 
73 Ibid., p. 29; See also Kritz, `Dilemmas', p. xxi. 
74 Teitel, Transitional, p. 29. 
75 Jose Zalaquett, `Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: the Dilemma of New 
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations' excerpted in Kritz (ed. ), Transitional, Vol. 1, 
p. 204. 
76 Zalaquett, `Confronting', p. 23. 
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In practice, however, the Alfonsin government confronted a serious dilemma. 
Facing military disobedience, the government realised that some degree of clemency 
and forgiveness was needed in order to achieve national reconciliation and social order. 
In the end, the government enacted in December 1986 `Full Stop Law' to set a deadline 
for new prosecutions. Jose Zalaquett, examining the case in Argentina, points out that 
prosecution and punishment causes several practical problems when perpetrators of 
human rights abuse still possess considerable power within the new government, which 
was often the case with transition in Latin America. 77 This is a significant difference 
from the case in post-war Germany and Japan, where unconditional surrender made it 
impossible to negotiate or hinder the process of war crimes prosecution. The ultimate 
goal of transitional justice is social reconciliation and the transformation of society into 
democracy, and whether prosecution and punishment contribute to this end, in other 
words, whether Nuremberg is an appropriate model for achieving that goal, remains the 
main focus of the debate on the issue of transitional justice. 78 
There are other points that question the applicability of the Nuremberg 
experience to achieve transitional justice. The context of post-war Germany is different 
from the contexts of Latin American countries: the former was concerned with the 
" Other countries in Latin America also experienced the same kind of tension between punishment and 
impunity during their transition and finally selected the latter. In El Salvador, the National Assembly 
approved a government-backed amnesty and thus prevented further investigation and punishment of the 
perpetrators. In Chile, an amnesty law created under the Pinochet government in 1978 was applied to 
those who committed human rights violations in the name of political objectives, and, accordingly, only a 
few human rights violators were actually punished. See Beigbeder, Judging War, pp. 107-115. 
78 A number of research on transitional justice compares and contrasts prosecution and its alternatives - 
amnesty, clemency or truth commission - and examines their effect on post-totalitarian society. See Kritz 
(ed. ), Transitional; Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide 
and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, `Trials and Errors: 
Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice', International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 
(2003), pp. 5-44. 
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transition from war to peace within an international context, and the latter was concerned 
with the transition from one regime to another, a process mostly confined to a domestic 
setting. In this sense, the Nuremberg legacy is interpreted in the case of Latin America 
in `decontextualised' ways. However, as the pursuit of transitional justice depended on 
`what the transition is from' and `what the transition is to', in theory, there should be no 
universal approach to the issue. 79 Nonetheless, the experience of Nuremberg also 
influenced a wave of transition in East and Central Europe. 80 
What needs to be pointed out in terms of the present thesis is that, in spite of 
these practical and theoretical problems, the - Nuremberg precedent `has shaped the 
pervasive understanding of transitional criminal justice. '81 With the decontextualised 
application of the Nuremberg legacy, that legacy acquired a different significance and 
nuance from that which it had originally possessed. Being connected to the concept of 
transitional justice, war crimes prosecutions acquired the role to prosecute not only the 
violation of international humanitarian law but also gross violations of human rights 
conducted by state leaders against their people. In other words, war crimes trials came to 
be discussed in the context not only of states' relations but also of relations between a 
state and its people. And, it is along with this process that the focus of the Nuremberg 
legacy shifted from `crimes against peace', the crime committed against other states, to 
`crimes against humanity', the crime committed against people. The perceived aim of 
war crimes prosecutions also shifted from the deterrence of war to the pursuit of victim's 
justice and the promotion of transition from the old regime. 
79 Crocker, `Transitional', p. 272. 
80 See the cases of Czechoslovakia, Germany (after Communism), Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia in Kritz 
(ed. ), Transitional, Vo1.11, Country Studies. 
81 Teitel, Transitional, p. 31. Jose Alvarez posits that the model of closure -'emotionally cathartic closure' 
- is inspired by the Nuremberg Trials. Alvarez, `Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, ' 96 
Michigan Law Review (1998), pp. 2032-2033. 
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It is within the context of transitional justice that the Nuremberg legacy acquired 
a significance beyond the original emphasis of its own advocates. And it is with the end 
of the Cold War that there emerged an environment, in which `the legacy of the 
Nuremberg Trials ... has never before seemed so compelling. ' 
82 
2. The Nuremberg Legacy in the Post-Cold War Context 
The revival of the Nuremberg legacy in the 1990s in the form of ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTs) is strongly related 
to the growth of international interest in gross violations of human rights. However, as 
seen above, the idea of and movements for universal human rights alone could not lead 
to the setting up of any international war crimes trial during the Cold War. State leaders 
mostly ignored human rights violations, which were still marginalised issues in 
international relations. What is more, preventing and stopping the gross violations of 
human rights requires intervention in domestic issues of a state, which endangers the 
mutual respect for sovereignty. The absoluteness of state sovereignty was the primary 
principle for international peace and security. 
The ICTs were created against the backdrop of changes in the international 
security environment, as examined in the previous chapter, which gave states political 
incentives to take action against humanitarian disasters, even through intervention in 
another state's domestic matters. In other words, the new international security 
environment more or less eliminated those elements - the absoluteness of state 
sovereignty and the marginalisation of human rights issues in international relations - 
that had been preventing the Nuremberg legacy from being implemented during the 
Cold War. The creation of the ICTs was the result of the political will of the 
82 Bush, `Nuremberg', p. 2023. 
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international community to intervene in conflicts in those regions. As the understanding 
of `who or what is being secured, from what threats' changed, so did the understanding 
of `by what means' to tackle threats. 83 An ad hoc international criminal tribunal, 
inspired by the experience of Nuremberg, was regarded as a new option in response to 
post-Cold War international peace and security. 
Armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were accompanied by 
systematically-conducted murder, rape and torture. When atrocities are conducted on a 
massive scale against different ethnic groups, a cease-fire solves only half of the 
problem. Peace in a real sense requires long-lasting stability in the post-conflict society, 
in which the elimination of social and humanitarian threats and the achievement of 
reconciliation are critical. As argued in previous chapters, it is the transition from war to 
a long-lasting peace that the ICTs and a `peace through justice' project are tackling. 84 
The idea overlaps with the Nuremberg Trial, which was also meant to be `the last act of 
the war and first act of the peace'. 85 
The Nuremberg legacy was revived in the form of the ICTs not for its own sake 
but as a solution to new problems the international community faced, and in that sense, 
the legacy was interpreted `teleologically'. Nuremberg came to be understood in the 
1990s as a model for post-conflict nation-building, promoting the transformation of 
war-torn society. In this context, one aspect of the aims of the Nuremberg Trial stood 
out: the promotion of the democratisation and de-nazification process in post-war West 
German society. 86 The dialogue of those who supported the ICTY clearly shows that 
83 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, `Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and 
Methods', Mershon International Studies Review, Vo. 40, No. 2 (1996), p. 242. 
84 Aurelien Colson, `The Logic of Peace and the Logic of Justice', International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(2000), p. 51. 
85 Paskins and Dockrill, Ethics, p. 266. 
86 The Allies' aims in establishing the International Military Tribunal were not necessarily clear nor 
coherent, and consisted of different factors, such as the creation of an international legal order examined 
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this aspect of the Allies' agenda, the political and social policy towards post-war 
Germany, was strongly recognised. 
Nuremberg and the Allies' Policy on Post-war German Transformation 
The immediate aim of the International Military Tribunal for major German 
war criminals was to prosecute and punish Nazi leaders. However, prosecution and 
punishment were placed within wide-ranging social and political reform policies 
towards post-war Germany, which were laid down at Potsdam in August 1945 and can 
be summarised as four `d's: denazification, demilitarisation, decentralisation and 
decartelisation. 87 It was the United States who took the lead in planning and 
establishing an international tribunal. In Law and War: An American Story, Peter 
Maguire illustrates the background of the American war crimes policy towards 
Germany: `It was not enough for American leaders to simply defeat and destroy the 
Third Reich; they also insisted on reforming their vanquished foes. '88 Punishment, in 
this sense, completes only half of the project: making the Germans accept the criminality 
of their own leader was also vital. The Trial was expected to achieve this strategic 
above, as well as the transformation of post-war Germany examined below. The aim of this chapter is not 
to complete the whole picture of Nuremberg. On examining the `legacy' of Nuremberg, the author 
believes it important to highlight certain aspects of the Allies' intention because they are often referred to 
by those who talk about Nuremberg in the context of the ICTs policy. 
87 John H. Herz, `Denazification and Related Policies' in John H. Herz (ed. ), From Dictatorship to 
Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 17-18. Herz insists to add to four `d's another `d': democratisation. 
88 Peter H. Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 
p. 284, emphasis added. The US agenda on the rehabilitation of Germany was strongly related to the Cold 
War strategy: the transformation of Germany into its friendly ally in order to prevent the expansion of the 
Soviet sphere of interests in Europe. Maguire analyses the relation and tension between American moral 
and ethical concerns and political concerns in promoting this agenda. 
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purpose through two inter-related devices: the pursuit of individual responsibility and 
the compilation of an historical record of Nazi crimes. 
The US Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal emphasised in the 
Opening Statement that the Trial had `no purpose to incriminate the whole German 
people' 89 but to target `the brains and authority back of all the crimes'. 90 By pursuing 
individual responsibility, focusing strictly on the Nazi leaders, through judicial 
procedure, the Trial avoided assigning the burden of `collective responsibility' to the 
whole German nation and people. 91 This was based on three strategic concerns. 
First, a war crimes tribunal was one way of normalising relations between the 
victor and the vanquished. There was a lesson from the victor's treatment of the 
vanquished in the aftermath of the First World War. On seeing Germany re-emerge as 
an enemy of the Allies in the inter-war period, the Washington planners believed that 
they `had not done a sufficiently thorough job of purging the country after the First 
World War. '92 As the German defeat became certain in the autumn of 1944 and the 
report of the atrocities committed by the Nazis became public, there emerged within 
Washington a plan for `punitive peace', led by the Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
89 Jackson's Opening Statement, in Trial, Vol. II, p. 102. 
90 Ibid., p. 104. 
91 Mark Osiel, however, argues that the prosecutor's usage of the concept of a `criminal organization' 
`appear to have entailed a commitment to elusive and illiberal notions of collective responsibility, 
distressingly similar to those the Nazis themselves employed. ' Mark J. Osiel, `Why Prosecute? Critics of 
Punishment for Mass Atrocity', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2000), pp. 124-125. His point 
indicates a potential difficulty in drawing the line between those who are responsible and not responsible 
for war crimes. See Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of this point in the case of the Tokyo Trial and 
post-war Japan. 
92 Bradley F. Smith, The Road to Nuremberg (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981), p. 8. Smith argues that the 
US's proactive approach to war crimes policy is strongly related to the guilt it felt having retreated from its 
international commitment after the First World War. Ibid., p. 260. 
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Morgenthau, Jr. Morgenthau's main idea was complete economic oppression through 
`deindustrialisation' of the country. Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, however, saw 
that such an excessively bitter approach would produce dangerous resentment within 
Germany: `Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war, they tend to breed war. '93 
Indeed, the inter-war international community had witnessed how an excessive burden 
through heavy reparations on the German nation had raised serious frustration and 
hatred on the part of the vanquished. This negative emotion, together with poverty, 
became the seedbed for the rise of Nazism, and paved the way for the Second World 
War. 94 Bradley Smith proposes that Stimson saw, as the alternative to the Morgenthau 
Plan, `a comprehensive war criminal trial system, systematically punishing Nazi leaders 
and organizations, as the best means of settling the Allies' score with the Third Reich 
and securing the future peace of the world'. 95 The failure of the post-World War I 
attempt to prosecute and punish German leaders in the German courts also made 
American leaders believe that national trials would not be feasible for these ends. The 
Allies' policy on war crimes prosecution was based on realist considerations of post-war 
Germany and international peace and security. Stimson in the end succeeded in making 
President Roosevelt take the issue of war crimes trials seriously. 
Second, the pursuit of individual responsibility through judicial procedure was 
to respond to the victims' outcry for revenge in a way that would stop the cycle of hatred, 
by targeting those most responsible for the grave crimes. 96 `To free them without a trial 
93 Document 13: From Henry L. Stimson to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., September 5,1944 in Bradley F. 
Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record 1944-1945 (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 30. 
94 Mark J. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997), p. 167. 
95 Smith, American, P. 9. 
96 The initial pressure for post-war trials came from the German-occupied nations. In January 1942 in 
London, representatives of the nine governments-in-exile organised themselves as the Inter-Allied 
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would mock the dead and make cynics of the living, ' Jackson wrote in his report to the 
President: 
But undiscriminating executions or punishments without definite findings 
of guilt, fairly arrived at, would violate pledges repeatedly given, and 
would not set easily on the American conscience or be remembered by our 
children with pride. 97 
As the details of the Holocaust became clear, there was an angry and violent reaction on 
the part of the victims, which could very likely have led to post-war arbitrary `lynch 
mob' justice against the Germans in Europe. In the case of large-scale violence, the 
whole society from which the victimiser comes is, to some extent, involved in the crimes, 
and the victims tend to demonise everyone and to pursue collective responsibility. One 
side's collective revenge as a response to collective responsibility leads to future 
collective revenge from the other side: the mechanism of the cycle of hatred, which is 
the source of future conflict and an obstacle for long-lasting peace. In this case, 
individual criminal punishment was aimed at diverting the victim's hatred from the 
whole nation to a handful of leaders. 
What is significant about the judicial procedure is that it itself is an example of 
pursuing justice, an alternative to raw revenge. While diverting the direction of the 
victim's hatred, Judith Shklar argues that the Nuremberg Trial `replaced private, 
Commission on the Punishment of War Crimes, and issued the `St. James Declaration' requiring the 
signatory powers to `place among their principal war aims the punishment, through the channel of 
organised justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered them, 
perpetrated them or participated in them. ' Punishment for War Crimes: the Inter-Allied Declaration 
Signed at St. James's Palace London on 13`h January, 1942, and Relative Documents, A Document issued 
by the Inter-Allied Information Committee, London, 1942 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1942), p. 4. 
97 Report to the President of the United States by Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, 
7 June 1945 in Jackson, Nürnberg, p. 8. 
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uncontrolled vengeance with a measured process of fixing guilt in each case, and taking 
the power to punish out of the hands of those directly injured. '98 A society infested with 
private revenge faces serious disorder. `The political function of criminal law', Shklar 
states, is `not just a matter of protecting society against its deviant members, but of 
protecting all the members of society against themselves, against the corrosive effects of 
their own passion for vengeance. '99 A trial is a way to pursue justice for the victim and 
thus plays an important role in reducing the tension between the victim and the 
victimiser, which is an indispensable step towards post-war reconciliation. Instant 
summary execution alone would not achieve this. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the strategy of the Tribunal focusing on 
individual responsibility was based on an agenda to isolate Nazi leaders from the 
German population. War crimes prosecution comprised an important part of this 
denazification policy. 100 On targeting the Nazi leaders at the International Military 
Tribunal, Jackson emphasised that Nazi aggression had ruined not only neighbouring 
countries but also Germany itself: `The German, no less than the non-German world, has 
98 Shklar, Legalism, p. 158. 
99 Ibid. 
ioo Herz explains that denazification meant `not only to destroy every remnant of the Nazi party and 
affiliated organizations and institutions and to repeal all Nazi types of laws ..., 
but also to remove all 
nonnominal Nazis from positions of influence and responsibility as well as to bring to justice all those who 
had participated in war crimes and atrocities. ' Herz, `Denazification', p. 19. In this sense, it is difficult to 
analyse the impact of the Nuremberg Trial separately from all those subsequent trials following the 
International Military Trial, conducted by Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States in their 
own military occupation zones. These trials covered a wide range of people including industrialists, 
diplomats and doctors, which had accompanied purges. This, Herz points out, created confusion between 
purge and punishment, and thus widespread feelings of resentment that the process of denazification was 
`punishment for collective guilt and thus was considered unfair. ' Ibid., p. 17. Herz's argument is an 
important clue for re-examining the Nuremberg legacy through re-examining the experience of 
Nuremberg and Germany. For the purposes of this thesis, this chapter focuses only on the IMT. 
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accounts to settle with these defendants. ' lol There was a clear intention on the part of the 
Trial advocates to demarcate the German people and their war-tom society from the 
Nazi regime and its crimes. Detachment from the past `evil' regime is necessary for 
re-educating people and rehabilitating society destroyed by war. 
The Trial was also able to promote denazification through the rule of law, 
which is normally absent in society under totalitarianism. The Tribunal, the 
embodiment of the rule of law, was expected to prove to the German people that `under 
an American-inspired system of justice, due process of law was extended to even the 
guiltiest. ' 102 In spite of several defects, the Trial's judicial procedure was generally 
regarded as fair to the accused. 103 Compared to some alternatives, such as summary 
execution and the show trials proposed by Churchill and Stalin, the form of judicial trial 
itself is fair. Jackson recorded in his opening statement: `If these men are the first war 
leaders of a defeated nation to be prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first 
to be given a chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. ' 104 What mattered 
was that justice was seen to be done. The promoter of the Trial was convinced that it 
was can expression of civilization's condemnation of the Nazi philosophy'. '05 
The denazification and political and social reform of Germany were expected 
to be promoted more directly through the second device of the Tribunal: the compilation 
of an historical record of German war crimes. 
101 Jackson's Opening Statement, in Trial, Vol. II, p. 103. 
102 Maguire, Law, pp. 145-146. Gary Bass relates the Allies' attempt at war crimes prosecution to their 
liberal political culture. See Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
103 Meron, War, p. 198. 
104 Jackson's Opening Statement, in Trial, Vol. II, p. 102. 
pos Document 18: The letter of the Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State (Hull), October 27, 
1944 in Smith, American, pp. 40-41. 
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Discrediting Nazism in the eyes not only of the international community but 
also of the German population was indispensable in order to prevent the martyrdom of 
the Nazi leaders and the repetition of the atrocities at a later date. Summary execution 
would not achieve this but would, instead, glorify Nazism and its leaders. Re-education 
of the German people, advocates of the war crimes trial believed, would be promoted by 
revealing through legal procedure the record of aggressive war and brutal atrocities 
conducted by the Nazi regime. Stimson claimed: `we can demonstrate the abhorrence 
which the world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our 
determination to expiate it and all its fruits forever'. 106 This idea can also be found 
behind the reason why the Anglo-American legal concept of conspiracy was brought 
into the IMT Charter. 107 Stimson believed that prosecuting Nazism for conspiracy `with 
all of the actors brought in from the top to the bottom would be the best way to try it and 
would give us a record and also a trial which would certainly persuade any onlooker of 
the evil of the Nazi system. ' 108 In the words of Shklar, Nuremberg was `a legalistic 
means of eliminating the Nazi leaders in such a way that their contemporaries, on whom 
the immediate future of Germany depended, might learn exactly what had occurred in 
recent history. ' 109 The presentation of evidence of the Nazis's crimes was expected to 
make Germans acknowledge the criminality of their leaders. ' 10 
Establishing the record of Nazi crimes was also necessary for the Allies and 
their people. The Trial's comprehensive account of Nazi crimes was expected to 
vindicate the just cause of the Allies' battle against the Axis powers, and convince 
106 Document 13 in Smith, American, p. 30- 
107 Conspiracy is: `Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all 
acts performed by any person in execution of such plan. ' Article 6 of the IMT Charter. 
108 Quoted in Smith, Road, p. 76. 
109 Shklar, Legalism, pp. 155-156, emphasis added. 
110 Maguire, Law, p. 13. 
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people that their sacrifices had been worthwhile. l ll Stimson claimed: `[the punishment 
of these Germans] will afford the most effective way of making a record of the Nazi 
system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to terminate the system and prevent its 
recurrence. ' 
112 
The staff at the Nuremberg Tribunal were well-aware that their judgement 
would inevitably be seen as `making history'. 113 Sir Hartley Shawcross, Britain's chief 
prosecutor, stated at Nuremberg: 
we believe that this Tribunal, acting ... with complete and judicial 
objectivity, will provide a contemporary touchstone and an authoritative 
and impartial record to which future historians may turn for truth, and 
future politicians for warning. ' 114 
Otto Kranzbuehler saw the International Military Tribunal as `the painful 
starting point for building the relations that exist today [ 1965] between Germany and her 
Western Allies. ' 115 By pursuing individual responsibility - avoiding collectivisation of 
guilt - and presenting an authoritative record of atrocities, the Nuremberg Trial was 
expected not only to contribute to international peace and security but also to endorse the 
transformation of German society and Germany's reconciliation within its society as 
well as with its neighbouring countries. It is widely seen from outside that the 
Nuremberg Trial did help German society to rehabilitate from Nazism, re-educate its 
people, and promote reconciliation within and with other nations. This view of 
"' Smith, Road, pp. 250-251. 
12 Document 14: Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President, September 9,1944 in Smith, American, 
p. 31. 
113 Osiel, Mass, p. 82. 
14 Statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross on 4 December 1945 in Trial, Vol. 111, p. 92, emphasis added. 
15 Quoted in Taylor, Anatomy, p. 626. 
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Nuremberg surely inspired those who worked and are working for the ICTY, the first 
international tribunal since the two post-WWII International Military Tribunals. 
The Lesson of Nuremberg Learned by the ICTs 
Armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which was characterised by 
systematic murder, rape and torture and mass violence among the different social and 
ethnic groups, threatened international peace and security in the 1990s. 116 What has 
been crucial for international as well as regional peace is the long-lasting stability of 
post-conflict society with no future prospect of a recurrence of violence deriving from 
hatred and vengeance. This, the proponents of the ICTY believe, is impossible if the 
culprits are allowed to go unpunished: `Those who have suffered, directly or indirectly, 
from their crimes are unlikely to forgive or set aside their deep resentment. ' 117 The 
ICTY Annual Report of 1994 stated as follows: 
The only civilised alternative to this desire for revenge is to render justice: 
to conduct a fair trial by a truly independent and impartial tribunal and to 
punish those found guilty. If no fair trial is held, feelings of hatred and 
resentment seething below the surface will, sooner or later, erupt and lead 
to renewed violence. 118 
In this sense, prosecution and punishment themselves are not the goal of the ICTY, and 
the Tribunal itself is aware that they would work as `a tool for promoting reconciliation 
116 See Chapter 1. 
117 'Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991,29 August 1994 [as The ICTY First Annual Report hereafter]: 
http: //www. un. org/icty/rai)i)annu-e/1994/AR24e. pdf, para. 15. 
118 Ibid., para. 15. 
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and restoring true peace'. 119 
As the post-Cold War international community took a strong interest in the 
transformation and reconciliation of war-torn society, 120 the Allies' strategy of war 
crimes prosecution and the political and social agenda behind the Nuremberg Trial 
became the lesson to be learned from Nuremberg. The two devices of war crimes 
prosecution - the pursuit of individual responsibility and the construction of an 
authoritative historical records of events - came to be seen by theorists and practitioners 
as the necessary tools for transformation, re-education, and reconciliation of 
post-conflict society. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal's attempt to individualise responsibility is one of the 
most important points reiterated within the discourse on the ICTs. `[The] purpose of an 
impartial tribunal', Antonio Cassese, first President of the ICTs, states, `is to determine 
individual criminal responsibility of individual offenders'. 12 1 For many of those who 
support the ICTs, the Nuremberg Trial proved the feasibility of ascribing individual guilt 
by assigning responsibility to individual offenders. Richard Goldstone, first Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTs, recognised Nuremberg as `a meaningful instrument for avoiding 
the guilt of the Nazis being ascribed to the whole German people. ' 122 
The importance of the individualisation of responsibility has been argued from 
several perspectives, the logic of which can also be found in the Allies' policy on 
Nuremberg examined above. First, what is strongly emphasised was that the victims of 
119 Ibid., para. 16. 
120 See Chapter 1. 
121 Antonio Cassese, `Reflections on International Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Violations of 
Humanitarian Law', in Jonathan I. Charney, Donald K. Anton and Mary E. O'Connell (eds. ), Politics, 
Values, and Functions: International Law in the 21 S` Century: Essays in Honor of Professor Louis Henkin 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), p. 269. 
122 Richard Goldstone quoted in Richard Norton Taylor, `Inside Story: The Ghosts of Nuremberg', The 
Guardian, 28 November 1995. See also Meron, War, p. 200. 
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violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda should see justice done in order to 
discourage their desire for private vengeance. 123 At the same time, just as in the case of 
Nuremberg, it was strongly claimed that justice should be rendered in such a way as to 
avoid collectivisation of responsibility. Decollectivisation of responsibility is especially 
important in cases like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in which systematic violence 
was based on the demonisation of all the adversarial groups. The ICTY Annual Report 
stated: 
The history of the region [in the former Yugoslavia] clearly shows that 
clinging to feelings of `collective responsibility' easily degenerates into 
resentment, hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to further violence 
and new crimes. 124 
To promote reconciliation and long-lasting peace in regions that are torn apart by mass 
violence based on ethnic hatred, breaking the cycle of hatred by pursuing individual 
responsibility is regarded as indispensable. 125 
Second, the pursuit of individual responsibility aims to remove, from 
post-conflict peace building, political and military leaders who have played significant 
roles in mass atrocities conducted because of ethnic hatred. Payam Akhavan argues that 
the root cause of the Yugoslav conflict is `the role played by elites in transforming ethnic 
consciousness from a legitimate communal identity into a legitimization of mass 
violence against rival groups. ' 126 It is regarded as indispensable to undermine the 
123 Richard J. Goldstone, `Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: Truth Commissions and International 
Criminal Tribunals', International Law and Politics, Vol. 28 (1996), p. 488. 
124 The ICTY First Annual Report, para. 16. 
125 Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting War Criminals: The David Davies Memorial Institute of 
International Studies: Occasional Paper No. 10 (August 1996), p. 19; Cassese, `Reflections', p. 269. 
'26 Payam Akhavan, `Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United 
Nations War Crimes Tribunal', Human Rights Quarterly, Vo. 20, No. 4 (1998), p753. 
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influence as well as the legitimacy of such leaders and eliminate them from post-conflict 
rehabilitation processes and domestic politics. 127 Stigmatisation of war criminals 
through indictment together with actual prosecution is expected to achieve this. 
Stigmatisation also isolates those indicted internationally. Being indicted by the ICTs, 
those political and military leaders, once beyond their national borders, will face 
possible arrest by international forces. `They will become international pariahs', states 
Madeleine Albright at the Security Council: `While these individuals may be able to 
hide within the borders of Serbia or in parts of Bosnia or Croatia, they will be imprisoned 
for the rest of their lives within their own land. ' 128 
What the stigmatisation and delegitimisation of guilty leaders, together with 
decollectivisation of responsibility, is expected to do is to demarcate clearly, both 
practically and psychologically, war criminals and others `dragged into' terrible crimes. 
The ritual of demarcation provides post-conflict society an opportunity to transform 
itself from conflict to peace. It is here that the criminality of those responsible needs to 
be clearly illustrated in the eyes of people in the war-tom society. This is expected to be 
further promoted by another device of the Tribunal: constructing an authoritative record 
of events. 
The ICTs, like Nuremberg, are expected to reveal what happened during a 
given conflict and to build an impartial and objective record of events. Recognition of 
what happened in what way is claimed as necessary for preventing a recurrence of mass 
violence. Akhavan, emphasising the elites' role in the Yugoslav conflict, claims the 
importance of revealing the mechanisms of mass violence to the people in the region in 
order to counter distorted ethnic hatred instigated by their political leaders: `The truth 
127 See Cassese, `Reflections', p. 270; Payam Akhavan, `Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal 
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities? ', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 1 (2001), 
pp. 7-31. 
128 U. N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993), 25 May 1993. 
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will demonstrate that there was nothing inevitable or irreversible about the eruption of 
ethnic violence and that interethnic harmony is both possible and desirable. ' 129 The 
pivotal role played in genocide not by inevitable ethnic hatred but by state leaders and 
the media is also pointed out in the Rwanda case. 130 
In addition to preventing future violence, constructing a record of events is also 
regarded as important to promote the coexistence of former rival groups in post-conflict 
society. The record created by an international tribunal, Cassese states, is `of crucial 
value as a historical account of events, a public acknowledgement of their existence for 
collective memory. ' 131 Cultivation of collective memory has been argued as important 
for restoring national identity, or the collective, which is lost in a society torn apart by 
large-scale violence. The collective is vital in order that former enemies, or victims and 
victimisers, can coexist. And attempts have often been made to shape this collective 
memory through legal process. 132 Jose Alvarez examines this view: `The goal of using 
[... ] trials to preserve an accurate collective memory is also based on the model of 
closure', which he suggests has been inspired by Nuremberg. 133 
The key to the work of the ICTs, it has been emphasised, is to satisfy the 
victims of conflicts, that is to achieve `victim's justice'. From the victim's perspective, it 
is strongly argued that the victims and their families first of all need to be told what has 
129 Akhavan, `Justice', p. 741. 
"3o See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2001) for examination of the way a 
radio station developed genocidal propaganda. 
131 Cassese, `Reflections', p. 269, emphasis added. Theodor Meron sees the historical record prepared by 
the Tribunal as `analogous to the report of a truth commission. ' Meron, `Answering for War Crimes: 
Lessons from the Balkans', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. l (1997), p. 8. 
132 Against this popular view and practice, some point out several limitations and problems in the legal 
process with regard to `fashioning national identity through cultivation of collective memory'. See Osiel, 
Mass; Teitel, Transitional, p. 69-118. 
133 Alvarez, `Rush', p. 2034. 
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happened during mass violence: they have a `right to know'. Albright stated: `it is only 
the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious hatreds and begin the healing 
process. ' 
134 At the same time, the victims needed their suffering to be recognised. 
Official recognition of that suffering is important for restoring the dignity of the victims. 
Some point out that a trial has a potentially therapeutic effect by providing victims with 
can official public forum for the acknowledgement and vindication of the suffering of the 
victims. ' 135 pavan refers to the Holocaust and Nuremberg, and argues: `the 
recognition of the truth through testimony is an irreplaceable remedy and a powerful 
catharsis that will contribute to deterrence by discouraging acts of vengeance and 
retaliation. ' 136 It is here that putting the procedures of the ICTs under the scrutiny of the 
international community is regarded as important. 
There are various means for `truth-telling' and constructing a historical record 
of what has happened during war and mass violence. A truth commission, attempted 
during the transitional period in Latin America and South Africa, is one popular forum, 
which provides both victims and victimiser opportunities to tell their story and to reveal 
the `truth' but mostly not accompanied by criminal punishment. ' 37 Not surprisingly, 
however, the promoter of the ICTs emphasises the desirability of trials for the 
truth-telling process. Michael Scharf maintains that `the most authoritative rendering is 
possible only through the crucible of a trial that accords full due process. ' 138 On 
'34 U. N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993). 
'35 Akhavan, `Justice', p. 765. 
'36Ibid., p. 767. 
137 Unlike the truth commissions established in Latin America, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa is a unique case, which attempts to combine criminal procedure and truth-telling. The 
Commission is given power to grant amnesty to those who have made `total disclosure' of their violation 
of human rights. This, however, is not automatic, as each case is strictly examined under criteria for 
amnesty, given only for an act associated with a political objective. 
138 Scharf, Balkan, p. 215. 
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analysing the first case of the ICTY, he states: 
By carefully establishing these facts one witness at a time in the face of 
vigilant cross-examination by distinguished defense counsel, the Tadic 
trial produced a definitive account that can endure the test of time and 
resist the forces of revisionism. 139 
Albright stated at the Security Council: `Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law, and it 
will point towards individuals, not peoples, as perpetrators of war crimes. ' 140 The idea 
of an international trial as an appropriate forum for constructing a record of events is 
strongly influenced by the legacy of Nuremberg. On analysing the Milosevic Trial, 
Geoffrey Robertson refers to Nuremberg and argues that the Nuremberg Trial succeeded 
for the reason that `it provided an imperishable factual record to confound future 
Holocaust denials. ' 141 It is no coincidence that Scharf, on arguing the positive role of a 
trial in recording history, writes: `The record of the trial provides an authoritative and 
impartial account to which future historians may turn for truth, and future leaders for 
warning'; a phrase almost identical to the statement made by Shawcross at Nuremberg, 
quoted earlier in this chapter. 142 
The positive impact of the ICTs is also claimed based on their educational 
effect. A culture of impunity, the promoters of the ICTs believe, is a source of recurring 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Tribunal is seen as to play an 
indispensable role in establishing a culture of law and order, which not only promotes 
the transformation of post-conflict society but also contributes to international peace and 
139Ibid, p. 216. See also Cassese, `Reflections', p. 269. 
lao U. N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993), emphasis added. 
141 Geoffrey Robertson, `Opinion: The Court is on Trial too', The Guardian, 30 June 2001, emphasis 
added. 
142 Scharf, Balkan, p. 215. 
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security by sending a warning to dictators and potential war criminals around the 
world. 143 
Although supporters of the ICTs refer very often to Nuremberg with regard to 
their expectation of such trials having a positive impact, their discourse is different from 
those at Nuremberg in one important point: the focus on victim's justice. Strictly 
speaking, Nuremberg was not necessarily a victim-conscious trial, 144 while the ICTs are 
strongly aware of the victims of violence. James O'Brien states 
Ultimately, it is not who is accountable that matters the most, but to whom 
the international community is accountable. The people who have been 
victimized by atrocities in the former Yugoslavia - and those elsewhere 
who will benefit from strong international humanitarian law - deserve to 
see that justice is sought. They should be allowed to turn their attention to 
building the future, not to seeking vengeance for the past. 145 
In this sense, the ICTs were influenced more by the experience of Latin America and 
elsewhere with regard to the pursuit of transitional justice than by Nuremberg per se. 
This can be seen from the fact that Richard Goldstone, first Chief Prosecutor of the ICTs, 
has a great record in pursuing justice for post-Apartheid South Africa as chairperson of 
143 Goldstone, `Justice', pp. 499-501. 
144 Mark Osiel points out: `At Nuremberg, there was little testimony by surviving victims of the 
concentration camps and entirely nothing about their felt experience of life there or its emotional 
aftermath. ' Osiel, Mass, p. 103. The difference may be related to the difference in the jurisdictions 
between the ICTs and Nuremberg. The ICTs set at their centre `crimes against humanity' and other war 
crimes conducted especially against civilians. Nuremberg was more focused on `crimes against peace', 
which the ICTs did not even include in their jurisdiction. 
145 James C. O'Brien, `The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the 
Former Yugoslavia', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 4 (1993), p. 659. 
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the Commission of Inquiry Regarding Public Violence and Intimidation. 146 The ICTs, in 
sum, received the Nuremberg legacy via the experience of transitional justice, which has 
interpreted and adopted Nuremberg more `normatively' than the creators of Nuremberg 
intended. 
Conclusion 
The legacy of Nuremberg during the Cold War was rather ambiguous and ambivalent. 
While international humanitarian law and human rights law developed immensely based 
on principles set out by the Nuremberg Tribunal, states were reluctant to resort to the 
Nuremberg precedent; there was no international war crimes tribunal established 
thereafter to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity. The international 
community also failed to institutionalise crimes against peace, which the Nuremberg 
Trial called `the supreme international crime'. The underlying belief was that strictly 
following the Nuremberg precedent would threaten state sovereignty and the 
non-intervention principle, on which international peace and security rested. What was 
fatally lacking during the Cold War was the political will of states to revive the 
experience of Nuremberg. States are always cautious about any step that might 
challenge their sovereignty. They also have little incentive to remedy injustice done to 
people in other parts of the world that are irrelevant to their own interests. Nonetheless, 
as Falk rightly pointed out, the Nuremberg legacy survived the Cold War due to `the 
unexpected, yet vital, role that civil society has played in keeping the Nuremberg idea 
146 Goldstone regards the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa as a `political 
compromise' between doing little and Nuremberg style trials. Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: 
Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 66. Chapters 
3 and 4 of this book show how he developed his belief in the ICTs through his experience in 
post-Apartheid South Africa. 
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alive'. 147 And, within this half century, the Nuremberg legacy has been given new 
impetus. 
The ICTs are expected to promote reconciliation and the transformation of a 
society that has experienced mass atrocities conducted among rival groups under the 
influence of mutual hatred. The key devices are to pursue only those who are the most 
responsible and thus to avoid the collectivisation of responsibility; and to create an 
authoritative account of what has actually happened during such conflicts. Supporters of 
the ICTs repeatedly emphasise the importance of the individualisation of responsibility 
and truth-telling, referring to the experience of Nuremberg. What is more, the 
experience of Nuremberg is seen as having proved the necessity of rendering justice 
through criminal procedure as well as the feasibility of a fair trial under an international 
tribunal. 148 
The extent to which the Nuremberg Trial itself promoted transformation and 
reconciliation in post-war German society is still debated. l49 Nonetheless, for those who 
talk about the Nuremberg legacy in the context of post-Cold War international war 
crimes tribunals, the aspects of the Nuremberg experience discussed above are regarded 
as a positive model, which can be applied to the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
elsewhere universally. 
However, to regard the Nuremberg legacy as a universal model is problematic 
because this universality is based only on the experience of post-war Germany. This is a 
147 Falk, `Telford', p. 716. 
148 Robertson, `Opinion'. 
149 The `pedagogic' impact of Nuremberg on the German people, or such an attempt on the part of the 
Allies, is questioned by various authors pointing out the negative attitude of the Germans towards 
Nuremberg. See Maguire, Law; Taylor, Anatomy, pp. 233-235. Jonathan Bush states that Nuremberg had 
more success as a history lesson for the Allies: `For the next fifteen years, the Nuremberg legacy was 
essentially retrospective: it was a definitive historical text, especially for British and American audiences, 
verifying the evil of the Third Reich. ' Bush, Nuremberg, pp. 2062-2063. 
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serious point because an international military tribunal was in fact established not only 
for Germany but also for another WWII vanquished state: Japan. The International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal) was created on the heels of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, based on the Nuremberg Charter and for the same objective: 
prosecuting the major war criminals conducting `crimes against peace', war crimes, and 
`crimes against humanity'. The key questions, therefore, are the following: What does 
the Tokyo Trial tell us about the validity of the Nuremberg legacy? Has the Tokyo Trial 
promoted the transformation and reconciliation of Japanese society, as the Nuremberg 
Trial is claimed to have done for German society? Did the individualisation of 
responsibility and the record of events provided by the Tribunal contribute to post-war 
Japan in some ways? If so, the Nuremberg legacy, though still based only on two cases, 
becomes more credible and profound. If not, the current attempts at international war 
crimes prosecution may require some theoretical and practical reconsideration. It is the 
aim of the remainder of this thesis to re-examine the Nuremberg legacy as understood in 




THE TOKYO TRIAL: AN OVERVIEW AND PURPOSES OF THE TRIAL 
The Tokyo Tribunal, formally named the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (IMTFE), and the Nuremberg Tribunal are often regarded as twin institutions. 
The Tokyo Trial, whose Charter is almost identical to the Nuremberg Charter, is 
referred to as the first case that confirmed the principles and experience of Nuremberg. 
However, in spite of the fact that Tokyo and Nuremberg both took the form of an 
international military tribunal prosecuting the WWII vanquished, close examination of 
the two cases reveals that there are several important differences between them. This 
chapter analyses those differences, linking them to the different degree of initiative 
taken by the United States in Tokyo. 
The chapter begins by setting out the key features of the Tokyo Trial, its 
purposes and the impact expected by the Allies. Based on an examination of 
documents and the discourse of those who organised and participated in the Tokyo 
Trial, the chapter illustrates that the Trial was expected to create identical effects to 
those at the Nuremberg Trial, examined in the previous chapter, i. e. the transformation 
of post-war society through demilitarisation and democratisation, using as devices the 
pursuit of individual responsibility and the creation of an authoritative record of the 
war. 
1. The Tokyo Trial 
The Allies' intention to `retain and punish the aggression of Japan' was announced as 
early as 27 November 1943, in the form of the Cairo Declaration released by the 
leaders of the United States, Great Britain and China. However, the basic policy to 
punish by trying individual Japanese war criminals was publicised for the first time in 
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the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, which stated that `stern justice shall be 
meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our 
prisoners. ' 1 The terms of the Declaration were accepted by the Japanese Government 
through the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September 1945, and became the legal basis 
for the trials of Japanese war criminals. At the same time, the Instrument of 
Surrender made the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government subject to 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP), General Douglas 
MacArthur of the United States, who took the initiative in procedures relating to the 
war crimes prosecutions as well as the whole occupation policy. 2 The occupation of 
Japan started when MacArthur arrived in Japan on 30 August 1945. 
The Occupation Forces started to arrest war crimes suspects as early as 
September 1945.3 The first round of arrest warrants included General Töjö Hideki, 
Prime Minister at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. By the end of the year, 
more than a hundred people were being held in custody as suspected `Class-A war 
t Article 10 of Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, issued at Potsdam, July 26 1945. 
Interestingly, the Japanese Government, for its part, had difficulty in determining what the Allies were 
trying to do. The Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare wrote in 1955: `Even though there was the 
precedent of post-war Germany and its war trials, bearing in mind differences between Japan and 
Germany with regard to the circumstances surrounding the surrender, national characteristics and so on, 
the Japanese government could not easily grasp what the Allies meant by Article 10 of the Potsdam 
Declaration's "stern justice to all war criminals". ' K6seish6 (ed. ), Zoku Hikiageengo no Kiroku, 
Fukkoku-ban (Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 2000), p. 127. 
2 The characteristic aspect of the US occupation of Japan was indirect occupation, exercising the 
authority of the SCAP through the existing Japanese government via SCAP directives. For an analysis 
of the intricate relationship between the US and the Japanese government as well as the Japanese people 
during the occupation, see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II 
(Penguin Books, 2000). The book illustrates how the Japanese people perceived and accepted the 
American occupation following the defeat. It also highlights US policy regarding democratising Japan 
and the paradox lying therein. 
The responsibility for arrest was subsequently delegated to the Japanese government. 
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criminals', or major war criminals, having perpetrated `crimes against peace' .4 
The 
Tokyo Tribunal was established based on the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, issued on 19 January 1946. The Charter was modelled on 
the Nuremberg Charter and included `crimes against peace', conventional war crimes, 
and `crimes against humanity' as part of its jurisdiction. The Tribunal was composed 
of eleven judges from the nine signatories of the Instrument of Surrender - Australia, 
Canada, China, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States - plus India and the Philippines, each one of which also offered 
a member for the Prosecution section. The selection of the accused started from 
March 1946, and indictments were issued for 28 defendants on 29 April 1946. 
Among those indicted were Töjö, and 17 other military officers. Four of the 
defendants were former Prime Ministers, and most others were members of wartime 
4 `Minor war criminals' having conducted conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity were 
called `Class-B' and `Class-C' war criminals. Under the Nuremberg Charter, Class B war crimes are 
categorised as conventional war crimes, and Class C as `crimes against humanity'. In the Tokyo Trial, 
B and C were dealt with in the same category of `conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity'. 
In the case of Japanese war criminals, some see Class B as referring to actual perpetrators of war crimes 
and C as the superior officers responsible for planning and giving orders, or failing to prevent, war 
crimes; or vice versa. Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in 
the East, 1945-1951 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 33. This, however, was difficult to 
determine under the Japanese military command structure. Instead of treating the two separately, trials 
dealt with minor war criminals as `Class B/C war criminals. ' Tokyo Saiban Handobukku Henshii 
Iinkai (ed. ), T5kyb Saiban Handobukku (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1989), p. 84. The term `Class B/C war 
criminals' is now commonly used in Japan to refer to war criminals other than those prosecuted and 
punished under the Tokyo Tribunal. Suspects of Class B/C war crimes were prosecuted under special 
national military courts organised by the United States, Britain, Australia, France, Holland, the 
Philippines and China, in their own occupied territory previously dominated by Japan, based on their 
own laws and in their own jurisdiction. For details of trials conducted by each country, see Piccigallo, 
Japanese. The Soviet Union also conducted Class B/C war crimes trials, details of which are still not 
known. The well-known Yamashita Tomoyuki case, which is often examined under the heading of the 
Tokyo Trial, was in fact the first case of Class B/C war crimes trials conducted by the United States in 




The Tokyo Trial opened on 3 May 1946. The Prosecution case lasted until 
24 January 1947. During this period, prosecutors developed the case that 
the accused participated in the formulation or execution of a common 
plan or conspiracy to wage declared or undeclared war or wars of 
aggression and war or wars in violation of international law, treaties, 
agreements and assurances against any country which might oppose them 
- against any country or countries which might oppose them - with the 
object of securing military, naval, political and economic domination of 
East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and all countries 
bordering thereon and islands therein and ultimately the domination of 
the world. 6 
The case was developed under fourteen phases plus the one developed against 
individual defendants. 7 Prosecutors also raised issues concerning `war crimes' and 
`crimes against humanity'. During the Prosecution case, the Defence, unlike the 
Nuremberg Trial, was given an opportunity to put forward a motion to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Defence lawyers claimed that the Tokyo Trial was 
ex post facto legislation because the Potsdam Declaration referred only to the trial of 
war crimes but not to `crimes against peace' and `crimes against humanity'. The 
Defence also argued that the Declaration limited the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to war 
between Japan and the Allies and thus charges on the incidents in South-East Asian 
5 See Appendix B. 
6 Prosecution Opening Statement presented by Joseph Keenan, 4 June 1946, in R John Pritchard and 
Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds. ) and Project Director: Donald Cameron Watt, The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East in Twenty-two Volumes (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1981) [as Transcripts 
hereafter], Vol. 1, p. 43 5. 
' For a concise summary of each phases, see Solis Horwitz, `The Tokyo Trial', International 
Conciliation, November 1950, No. 465, pp. 503-524. 
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countries should be excluded. In addition to those points, the Defence lawyers' 
motion included the following claims: `war is not a crime'; `individuals may not be 
charged with responsibility for wars'; `killing in war is not murder follows from the 
fact that war is legal'; and violations of the laws and customs of war are punishable by 
a trial by a military commission but not by an international military tribunal as such. 8 
At this stage, Defence motions were dismissed by the president of the Tribunal `for 
reasons to be given later. '9 
The Defence took its turn from 24 February 1947 until 12 January 1948. 
The Defence started its case with a joint presentation, which was broken down into 
five sections: general problems, relations with Manchuria and Manchukuo, with China, 
with the Soviet Union, and the Pacific War. The presentation aimed at two things: 
the minor one was to deny `the existence of conspiracy and joint action by the 
defendants in committing crimes against peace'; and the major one was to claim that 
the acts of the defendants and the government of Japan were `acts of self-defense 
against provocative acts of other nations threatening and interfering with Japan's 
recognized and legitimate rights in Asia and her right of national existence'. 10 The 
joint presentation was followed by individual defences. " The case for the Defence 
was followed by rebuttal, surrebuttal, Prosecution summation, Defence summation, 
8A motion on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was put forward by the Defence lawyers on 13 and 14 
May 1946. Transcripts, Vol. 1, p. 119-215. 
9lbid., p. 319. 
10 Horwitz, `Tokyo', p. 526. 
' The Japanese government decided, as early as 12 September 1945, the supreme principle of defence 
as: 1) To avoid any responsibility being placed on the Emperor; 2) To defend the state; and 3) To defend 
individuals within the sphere of 1) and 2). K6seishö (ed. ), Zoku, p. 127. Defence lawyers agreed to 
the first principle, but could not reach consensus on the prioritisation of the state or individuals in their 
defence. The Defence opening statement, written by Kiyose Ichirö, Associate Chief of the Japanese 
Defence section, was based on the defence of the state and therefore was not approved fully by some of 
his staff. Tokyo Saiban Handobukku Henshü Iinkai (ed. ), Tokyo, p. 25. 
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and Prosecution reply. 
The Trial closed its cases on 16 April 1948. There were 417 court days in 
total, during which 419 witnesses testified in court and 4,336 documents were 
accepted as `Exhibit in Evidence'. The transcript of the proceedings covered 48,412 
pages. 12 The number of sessions and witnesses and the duration of the proceedings 
of the Tokyo Trial were double that of Nuremberg. 
The eleven judges spent seven months writing the judgment, which took eight 
days to read out, starting on 4 November 1948. On 12 November 1948, the 
judgement was rendered to 25 defendants, excluding two defendants who had died 
during the Trial and one who had been discharged because of a mental disorder. All 
of 25 defendants were found guilty. Seven including Töjö were sentenced to death, 
sixteen to life imprisonment, one to twenty years' imprisonment, and one to seven 
years' imprisonment. 13 Responding to Defence motions, the Tokyo judgment 
rejected challenges that aggressive war was not a crime, that there was no individual 
responsibility for war, and that the Tokyo Charter was ex post facto legislation, 
reasoning mostly based on the Nuremberg judgment in October 1946: `The Charter is 
not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations but is the 
expression of international law existing at the time of its creation. ' 14 The judgment 
also rejected the Defence claim that a tribunal comprised of the governments of the 
victorious nations could not conduct a fair and impartial trial. 
The judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal was not unanimous. The majority 
12 General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education 
Section and Public Information, Press Release: `Summary of the Final Judgment International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East', in Herbert P. Bix (et al. ) (eds. ), Tökyö Saiban to Kokusai Kensatsukyoku: 
Kaitei kara Hanketsu made (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryo Shuppan, 2000), p. 4. 
13 For details of verdict, see Appendix C. 
14 The Judgment of the Tribunal, Transcripts, Vol. 20, p. 48,437 (The judgment starts from p. 48,413). 
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decision was signed by nine judges out of eleven. Five judges wrote separate 
opinions, including two dissenting opinions by the French justice Henri Bernard and 
Justice Radhabinod Pal of India. 15 Delfin Jaranilla, a Judge from the Philippines, 
stated that sentencing was too generous to expect a deterrent effect; 16 the Dutch justice 
B. V. A. Röling claimed that Hirota Köki, former Prime Minister and the only civilian 
sentenced to death, was not guilty of any charge; and William Webb, the President of 
the Tribunal, expressed a reservation about applying death sentences, questioning its 
deterrent effect and also questioning the immunity given to the Emperor. The most 
powerful was the 1,235 pages dissenting opinion of Justice Pal. '7 Arguing that the 
Tokyo Trial was ex post facto legislation, and that there was no evidence for the 
existence of a conspiracy in Japanese foreign policy during 1930s and 1940s, and 
accepting the defendants' claim that the wars fought by Japan were self-defensive, Pal 
concluded that every defendant was not guilty of any charges and thus should be 
acquitted of all charges. An opportunity was not given for these separate opinions to 
be read out at the Tribunal. 
On 24 November 1948, with his power under the Tokyo Charter, MacArthur 
gave a final confirmation of the judgment of the Tribunal. However, sentences were 
not executed immediately, as the Defence Counsel appealed on 29 November 1948 to 
the US Supreme Court for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court dismissed it on 20 
December citing absence of jurisdiction in the case. The execution of the seven 
defendants sentenced to death was finally conducted on 23 December 1948. The 
judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal was officially accepted by the Japanese government 
15 All the separate opinions are available in Transcripts, Vol. 21. 
16 Justice Jaranilla in fact was a survivor of the Bataan Death March, a notorious example of Japanese 
mal-treatment of POWs; this clouds his objectivity as a judge at the Tribunal. 
17 His opinion was published as Radhabinod Pal, International Military Tribunal for the Far East: 
Dissentient Judgment (Calcutta: Sanyal, 1953). 
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through the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951, the enforcement of 
which in 1952 ended the American occupation. 
2. Purposes of the Tokyo Trial 
In an opening statement on 4 June 1946, Joseph Keenan, Chief of Prosecution, read 
out the purposes of the Tokyo Trial: 
Our purpose is one of prevention or deterrence. It has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the small meaner purpose of vengeance or 
retaliation. But we do hope in these proceedings that it is neither 
impossible nor improbable that the branding of individuals who visit 
these scourges upon mankind as common felons, and punishing them 
accordingly, may have a deterring effect upon aggressive warlike 
activities of their prototypes of the future, should they arise. 18 
By confirming the `already recognised rule' that individuals of a nation who planned 
and conducted aggressive war would receive punishment, the prosecutor expected that 
the International Military Tribunal, by establishing aggression as an international 
crime, would contribute to the maintenance of post-war international peace and 
security; `the prevention of the scourge of aggressive war' was embedded in this grand 
strategy. 19 Indeed, the Tokyo Trial, just like Nuremberg, set itself out clearly as `the 
Trial to end all wars': `we are waging a part of the determined battle of civilization to 
preserve the entire world from destruction, ' Keenan declared in his statement. 20 At 
18 Transcripts, Vol. 1, pp. 387-388 
191bid., p. 384, p. 389. 
20 Ibid., p. 384, emphasis added. Based on Keenan's opening statement, the Tokyo Trial came to be 




the same time, the Tokyo Trial was strongly connected to US policy towards post-war 
Japan. 
The Strategic Purposes of the Tokyo Trial 
For the United States, the principal organiser of the Tokyo Trial, the issue of 
war crimes and punishment had been conceived within the framework of policies on 
the occupation of Japan and on the post-WWII Far East. The American military 
occupation aimed to achieve the `ultimate objectives' laid out in SWNCC 150/4/A (21 
September 1945): 
a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United 
States or to the peace and security of the world. 
b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and 
responsible government which will respect the rights of other states 
and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in 
the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 21 
The `ultimate objectives', in other words, were the transformation of Japan. The 
`political tasks' of the military occupation to achieve those objectives were threefold: 
disarmament and demilitarisation as the primary tasks, following the prosecution of 
war criminals, and the encouragement of democratisation. 22 In sum, the 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East constituted a 
major part of the political task of occupation, which aimed to transform Japanese 
society through demilitarisation and democratisation into a nation that would never 
21 Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-defeat Policy Relating to Japan 
(SWNCC 150/4/A), 21 September 1945, p. 1. 
22 SWNCC150/4/A, pp. 3-4. 
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again threaten the United States, and international peace and security. 23 
US policy regarding the issue of Japanese war criminals was specifically 
discussed at the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 12 September 1945. 
The Committee confirmed that procedures and policies already contemplated for and 
applied to post-war Germany were basically applicable. 24 The crimes to be punished 
and the authority of the SCAP over the coming trial were also defined by the 
Committee. This `American policy' on Japanese war criminals formally became the 
`Allied policy' later, through the admission of the Far Eastern Commission, an 
organisation empowered to formulate the basic policy to govern the terms of 
surrender. 25 
Devices of the Tokyo Trial 
Just like Nuremberg, the international prosecution of Japanese war crimes 
was expected to endorse demilitarisation and democratisation. To achieve these ends, 
23 Demilitarisation in this context is not mere disarmament. The thesis adopts Meirion and Susie 
Harries' definition of demilitarisation encompassing `both the eradication of the symptoms of 
militarisation, and the creation of a democratic state. ' Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the 
Sword: the Demilitarisation of Japan (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), p. xxxiv. It is militarism, `the 
spirit that pervades militarised states, ' not the actual arms, that the Tokyo Trial was directly targeting. 
Demilitarisation was also attempted through purges of thousands of officers, bureaucrats, and 
industrialists conducted in the first two years of the occupation. See Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: the 
Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (New York, London: Continuum, 2002). 
24 The Apprehension and Punishment of War Criminals (Japan) (SWNCC57/3), 12 September 1945, 
Appendix B, para. 2. 
25 Apprehension, Trial and Punishment of War Criminals in the Far East, Far Eastern Commission 
(FE0007/3), 29 March 1946. Higurashi Yoshinobu argues that FE0007/3 had a legal effect to give 
retroactively an `international authority' to the Tokyo Tribunal. Higurashi, Tokyo Saiban no Kokusai 
Kankei: Kokusai SeUi-ni okeru Kenryoku to Kihan (Tokyo: Bokutaku-sha, 2002), p. 205. The Far 
Eastern Commission was established in February 1946 and consisted originally of eleven countries - 
Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
the Soviet Union and the United States, later also joined by Burma and Pakistan. 
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the punishment of war criminals was not enough; the criminality of those prosecuted 
had to be accepted by the Japanese people. The United States had little doubt of 
achieving these political ends by applying the devices and strategy of the war crimes 
trial conceived for Nuremberg: 26 the pursuit of individual responsibility and the 
presentation of a record of the war and associated war crimes. 27 
The Allies' policy on war crimes prosecution clearly embraced the idea of 
avoiding blame and responsibility being placed on the Japanese nation as a whole. 
Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration clarified that the Allies' war crimes prosecution 
was not targeting the Japanese as a whole but specific individuals: 
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or 
destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war 
criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our 
prisoners. 28 
The decollectivisation of responsibility was regarded as an important tool for 
the demilitarisation and democratisation of Japan. Article 10 of the Declaration 
continued from above: 
The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. 
Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for 
26 SWNCC 57/3 concluded: `The advantages of an international military tribunal or tribunals for the 
trial of major criminals charged with offenses [... `crimes against peace'], and of organizations whose 
members are collectively charged with criminal acts, for example, the Japanese Army and Navy General 
Staffs of recent years and the leading ultra-nationalistic societies, are as apparent in the case of Japan as 
in the case of Germany. ' SWNCC57/3, Appendix B, para 3. 
27 See Chapter 2 for the strategy and devices of the Nuremberg Trial. 
28 Article 10, the Potsdam Declaration. 
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the fundamental human rights shall be established. 29 
Article 6 of the Declaration clearly stated that the `obstacle' that the Allies viewed as 
being necessary to eliminate comprised a handful of individuals responsible for the 
war, who were clearly differentiated from the Japanese people in general: 
There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of 
those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into 
embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, 
security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is 
driven from the world. 30 
By punishing the wartime leaders, the Tokyo Trial sought to eliminate those figures 
from the post-war Japanese government, which was expected to transform itself in a 
democratic entity. This signified the physical demarcation of wartime militarism and 
post-war Japan 
On examining US policy to demilitarise Japan, Meirion and Susie Harries 
regard the Tokyo Trial as `an integral part of the campaign for psychological 
demilitarisation. ' 31 Indeed, the Tribunal intended to demarcate wartime leaders and 
other Japanese people not only physically but also psychologically. For this purpose, 
the Tokyo Trial attempted not only to show that the defendants were war criminals but 
also to indicate that the people in Japan were their victims. The Prosecution's 
opening statement stated: 
We must reach the conclusion that the Japanese people themselves 
were utterly within the power and forces of these accused, and to such 
29 Ibid, emphasis added. 
30 Article 6, the Potsdam Declaration. 
31 Harries, Sheathing, p. xxix, emphasis added. 
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extent were its victims. With the permission of the Tribunal, we would 
point out that the forces of occupation, who have the full power under 
the terms of surrender to implement its terms in such manner as they 
should see fit, have given full opportunity to the Japanese people and to 
the world to observe the fair manner in which the same is being 
conducted. 32 
Prosecuting individual war criminals was also a way to respond to the 
victim's cry for justice. Just as the voices demanding the prosecution of Nazi war 
crimes suspects were initially raised by representatives of the nine 
governments-in-exile in Europe, it was China, the biggest victim of wartime Japan, 
who first raised a clear voice in support of the international prosecution of Japanese 
war crimes suspects. 33 
Keenan expressed strong concern about the situation in which people were 
required to enforce the law by themselves against their leaders. Indeed, people in 
Japan had been under constant oppression and censorship during the war, which had 
prevented them from expressing their objections to national policy. Many anti-war 
movements were regulated and those engaged in peace movements were arrested and 
severely punished. Keenan insisted that the importance of `Stern punishment 
imposed by orderly international tribunals', arguing that the trials at Tokyo `are neither 
32 Transcripts, Vol. 1, p. 468. 
33 In reply to an invitation to the ceremony in London to sign the St. James Declaration identifying the 
principal war aims against the European Axis as `the punishment, through the channel of organised 
justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes', the Chinese Minister to the Netherlands 
expressed his intention to `apply the same principles to the Japanese occupying authorities in China 
when the time comes. ' The Minister continued: `The Chinese Government believes that the 
elementary principles of justice and morality cannot be vindicated unless the wrongs thus done to the 
Chinese people as those done to other peoples are equally righted and the guilty persons equally dealt 
with according to law. ' `Punishment for War Crimes: the Inter-Allied Declaration Signed at St. 
James's Palace London on 13`h January, 1942', and Relative Documents, A Document issued by the 
Inter-Allied Information Committee, London, 1942 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1942), p. 16. 
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blood purges nor judicial lynchings, but if they are not held, the people in impatience 
and disgust, will have their own lynchings and blood purgings. '34 
For the United States, punishing individuals responsible for the war and the 
alleged war crimes was regarded as being necessary for constructing a new 
relationship with Japan. Indeed, the United States, for its part, had a need to be 
reconciled with its former enemy over the attack on Pearl Harbor. According to an 
opinion poll in August 1945,67% of Americans wanted to treat the Japanese in general, 
and war criminals in particular, in a harsh manner: `a show trial of "Tojo and his 
gangs" would seem to have been the obvious answer', stated Meirion and Susie 
Harries. 35 General MacArthur himself had a strong feeling that `Pearl Harbour 
should be avenged'. However, whether he expected the Tokyo Trial to achieve this 
end is doubtful. According to one judge at the Tokyo Tribunal, MacArthur would in 
fact have preferred a swift trial examining only the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in this 
sense he was against the Tokyo Trial, which indicted responsibility for the war itself. 36 
An American, who worked in a prison accommodating major war crimes suspects, 
nonetheless pointed out that war crimes trials provided `the psychological moment of 
restoration' for the victors. 37 Such restoration was vital to enable the United States to 
construct a new and friendly relationship with Japan, against whom it had fought the 
'a `Our Relations in the Far East As They Appear in the International War Crimes Trial in Tokyo', An 
address prepared for delivery by Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel, International Prosecution Section, 
to be read at the meeting of the American Bar Association at Atlantic City, October 29,1946', p. 40. 
RG-41, Box 4, Folder 4, MacArthur Archive. 
35 Harries, Sheathing, p. 103. 
36 B. V. A. Röling, edited and with an introduction by Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: 
Reflections of a Peacemonger (London: Polity Press, 1993), p. 80. Röling points out that such a limited 
trial in Japan was `effectively precluded' by the precedent of the Nuremberg Trial. 
37 John L. Ginn, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo: an Account of the Trial and Sentencing of Japanese War 
Criminals in 1948, by a U. S. Participant (Jefferson, N. C: McFarland & Co, 1992), p. 241. 
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war, characterised by mutual demonisation and de-humanisation: 38 Japan became 
increasingly important geo-politically with the development of the Cold War. 
The Japanese people and the soldiers of the Allies were not the only victims 
of the Japanese military, however. What was missing from the Tokyo Trial was 
civilians in other Asian countries who had suffered most from Japan's war and colonial 
rule. The Tokyo Trial did not examine in detail their sufferings for political reasons 
which are addressed below. In this sense, the Trial did not truly offer a forum for 
`victim's justice' and reconciliation between people in Japan and those in neighbouring 
countries. 
The goal of the Tokyo Trial was broader than mere punishment; and this is 
even more apparent from the Tribunal's enthusiasm for establishing an authoritative 
historical record which would be accepted by the Japanese. The Tokyo Trial's history 
lesson was expected to have educational effects for demilitarisation and 
democratisation. 
To start with, the Japanese people had little information about the war they 
were fighting. Therefore, to reveal the facts through documentary evidence alone 
was expected to have a great impact on post-war Japan. However, this was not 
enough. The historical account of the Tokyo Trial had to be accepted by the 
Japanese: `The purpose of the trial was to convince the Japanese people that their 
leaders misled them into war, ' Owen Cunningham, a member of Defence Counsel 
stated. 39 Establishing the history in the minds of the Japanese was an important part 
38 See John W. Dower, War without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) for details of the 
propaganda war conducted by both the Americans and the Japanese. 
39 Quoted in Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, N. J: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 126, Footnote 3, emphasis added. Keenan also echoed this point 
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of the `psychological campaign for demilitarisation', and the Tokyo Trial was expected 
to play a major role in it. This is clear from the fact that in December 1945, before 
the establishment of the Tokyo Trial, the major newspapers started to serialise the 
history of the Pacific War, based on the sources offered by the GHQ. 40 This 
historical account took a similar line to the indictment and judgment of the Tokyo Trial, 
emphasising that the militarists in the government had been hiding the truth from the 
nation, by depicting how they had terrorised the country, how Japan, despite 
propaganda to the contrary, had been fighting against heavy odds from an early stage 
in the war, and how brutally the Japanese military had fought in China and the 
Philippines, perpetrating war crimes against the Allies soldiers and locals. 
Considering the fact that this history was serialised in major newspapers all at the 
same time, that the GHQ was the source of this account, and that the Japanese media 
at the time was subject to GHQ censorship, it can be concluded that the GHQ had been 
preparing the ground for the Japanese to accept the Trial as well as the Trial's account 
of the war. 41 
The history lesson was not only for the Japanese. B. V. A. Röling, a Dutch 
judge at the Tokyo Tribunal, stated that the Trial `was also desired to show the 
shortly after the Tokyo Trial ended: `I think that the foremost service they [the Tokyo Trial] rendered 
was to establish the facts authentically, particularly with the Japanese people. ' Quoted in Ibid. 
40 The serial was published in major newpapers during 8 to 17 December 1945. Asahi Shimbun 
entitled its serial `The History of the Pacific War: the Collapse of Truthless Militarist Japan - the Source 
Offered by the GHQ' (Taiheiyö Sensö-shi: Shinjitsu-naki Gunkoku Nihon no Hökai, Rengögun 
Shirei-bu Teikyö); and Yomiuri Shimbun as `The History of the Pacific War written by the GHQ' 
(Rengögun Shirei-bu no Kyutsuseru Taiheiyö Sensö-shi). 
a` Hosaka Masayasu, `Dakara 'Tokyo Saiban Shikan wo Koerarenai', Shokun! (January 1998), 
pp. 143-145. Ariyama Teruo points out that this serial was the highlight of the `war guilt and 
responsibility' campaign promoted by the Civil Information and Education section of the GHQ. 




American people and the whole world the criminal treachery of the attack on 
Hawaii. A2 For the American leaders, the Trial was to appeal to their own people and 
ease the anger over Pearl Harbor and other wartime sacrifices. It was also expected 
to show the world the righteousness of the war they had fought, even including 
dropping two atomic bombs. 
Resorting to legal procedure rather than summary execution was expected 
by itself to have an educational effect as an ethical example of democracy, showing 
that law and justice can be applied even to enemies through a fair trial. 43 The US was 
well-aware of the importance of the justice as well as the authority of the Tribunal 
being made clear to the Japanese people. SWNCC57/3 of 12 September 1945 
emphasised: `the international character of the court and of the authority by which it is 
appointed should be properly recognized and emphasized, particularly in dealings with 
the Japanese people. '44 This interestingly shows not only US awareness of the 
importance of the `justice needs to be seen to be done' maxim but also the recognition 
of such `justice', as well as `authority', in terms of the `international' character of the 
Trial. 
3. Tokyo and Nuremberg Compared 
As seen above, the Tokyo Tribunal was modelled on the Nuremberg Tribunal, and it 
42 Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 79. 
43 Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: the Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington, K. Y.: University Press 
of Kentucky, 2000), p. 121. Takayanagi Kenzö, member of the Defence Counsel at the Tokyo Tribunal, 
wrote that he as well as many Japanese were impressed by `a spirit of fair play' in the Tribunal, which, 
despite being a militarry tribunal, gave equal status to the Defence and the Prosecution and allowed the 
Defence to challenge the legal logic of the Prosecution. Kenzo Takayanagi, The Tokio Trials and 
International Law (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1948), p. 5. 
44 SWNCC 57/3, Appendix "C", para. 5. 
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was expected to function and impact in the same way as Nuremberg. However, the 
two tribunals are not as identical as is often assumed. The two are different in critical 
ways, reflecting differences in the background and context of the defeat of the two 
countries. 
The Level of Fairness and Politicisation 
In general, the Tokyo Trial is more often said to be unfair and politicised 
than Nuremberg. Defects in the Tokyo Trials were pointed out even by American 
officials involved in the prosecution of Japanese war criminals. For example, U. S 
Brigadier General Elliott Thorpe, who participated heavily in the process of selecting 
major war crimes suspects, reflected years after the end of the Trial that he still did not 
believe the Tokyo Trial was the right thing to do: `I still believe that it was an ex post 
facto law. '45 The ambivalent and complex nature of the Tokyo Trial is symbolised 
also in the fact that judges of the Tribunal could not speak with one voice at the final 
judgment. 
On the fairness of the trials, many argue that the procedural flaws at the 
Tokyo Trial were greater than that at Nuremberg. In the words of John Appleman, 
compared with Nuremberg, the proceedings before the Tokyo Tribunal `seem strangely 
disorganized'. 46 Justice Henri Bernard of France dissented from the majority opinion 
on procedural grounds: `A verdict reached by a Tribunal after a defective procedure 
as Elliott Thorpe quoted in Dower, Embracing, pp. 451-452. 
46 Reading through transcripts, Appleman finds legal problems in `the nature of evidence to be 
introduced', `rules of procedure to be followed', and `the respective duties owing by counsel to the 
tribunal and by the tribunal to the counsel'. John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and International 
Crimes (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), pp. 237-264. See also Yves Beigbeder, Judging War 
Criminals: The Politics of International Justice (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1999), pp. 63-64. 
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cannot be a valid one. '47 Justice Pal also raised, as a reason for his dissent, that rules 
of evidence had been slanted in favour of the prosecutor. This point was put forward 
strongly to MacArthur, shortly after the close of the Tokyo Trial, by Defence lawyer 
Ben Blakeney, representing the whole group of the Defence Counsel: 
The Tribunal accepted from the prosecution `evidence' in the form of 
newspaper reports, second and third-hand rumours and hearsay, 
opinions of self-styled `experts', and made its findings and verdict on 
the basis of such `evidence'; it ignored all defence evidence in its 
verdict, saying that the evidence of Japanese witnesses (although not 
those who testified for the prosecution) was unsatisfactory and 
unreliable. 48 
In addition, the Prosecution was allowed greater resources than the Defence, 
including translators, the Prosecution having 102 at its disposal at the beginning of the 
Trial compared to three for the Defence. 49 Even though the Japanese defendants 
were permitted to have American lawyers in addition to Japanese lawyers, there is no 
doubt that they were involved in a trial based on an unfamiliar Anglo-American legal 
system, in a language in which they were not perfectly proficient. 
The poor quality of the staff at the Tokyo Tribunal is also pointed out. 
William Webb, President of the Tribunal, is described as `coarse, ill-tempered and 
47 The Dissenting Opinion of the Member for France (Henri Bernard), p. 20, in Transcripts, Vol. 21. 
He also raised as his reasons for objection the prosecutor's not having indicted the Emperor. 
48 Excerpts taken from Maurice Paschal Alers Hankey, Politics, Trials and Errors (Oxford: Pen-In-Hand, 
1950), pp. 112-113. Dower points out that the Tribunal's controls over acceptable evidence, i. e. the 
authority given by the Charter, are reasonable considering the fact that it was a military tribunal. 
Special restrictions on the Defence evidence were based on strong US concern that the Trial was being 
used by the defendants as a stage for propaganda. Dower, Embracing, p. 466. 
49 Dower, Embracing, p. 467. 
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highly opinionated. ' 50 In addition, his career in Australia from 1943 as a 
Commissioner under National Security Regulations to investigate Japanese war crimes 
is raised to question his impartiality as President of the Tribunal; Webb's prejudice 
towards Japan and its military is often pointed out. 51 Some others point to the 
inadequacy of Joseph Keenan as the Chief Prosecutor both in terms of his ability and 
his character, described as he was by his colleagues as a heavy drinker and `a 
disgrace'. 52 Röling commented: `Certainly, he was not up to his job. This is of 
course of great importance, because he was the chief prosecutor. '53 With regard to 
judges, Röling is no less cynical: `The judges in Nuremberg had a very competent staff 
that wrote drafts [of the verdict]. By contrast, I did not have such a high opinion of 
the qualities of the staff of my colleagues in Tokyo. '54 The Soviet and French judges 
were not able to command English sufficiently well to do their job, and among the 
eleven judges, Justice Pal was the only expert in international law. 
Whether the verdict and sentences of Tokyo were more severe than 
Nuremberg is not a simple question. 55 Some see Tokyo as harsher, pointing out that 
none were acquitted, while three were acquitted at Nuremberg. 56 Regarding the 
death sentence as the criterion of severity, Nuremberg was harsher than Tokyo, 
50 R John Pritchard, An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial, Nissan 
Occasional Paper Series No. 5 (Oxford: Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, 1987), p. 17. 
51 Appleman points out through the transcript of proceedings that Webb frequently insulted the Defence 
Counsel and that his attitude was not consistent with the standards of US courts. Appleman, Military, 
pp. 243-244. 
52 Donald Cameron Watt, `Historical Introduction' in R John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide 
(eds. ) and Project Director: Donald Cameron Watt, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Comprehensive 
Index and Guide to the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Five 
Volumes (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1987), Vol. 1, p. xvii. 
53 Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 31. 
sa Ibid., p. 61. 
ss See Appendix C. 
56 Kojima Noboru, Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo: Chükö Shinsho, 1971), WE, p. 179. 
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sentencing 12 out of 22 defendants to death, compared to seven out of 25 sentenced to 
death in Tokyo. Richard Minear compares the number of those who were sentenced 
to death and life imprisonment and argues that the Tokyo judgment, by sentencing 23 
out of 25 defendants as such was more draconian than Nuremberg, where only 15 out 
of 22 were sentenced either to death or life imprisonment. 57 Also, the Tokyo 
judgment was signed by judges, some of whom expressed the view that, the sentences 
were harsher, either regarding their content or regarding certain individuals, than they 
should have been. 
As for the level of politicisation, the Tokyo Trial, especially its aftermath, 
was far more susceptible to the politics of the Cold War than Nuremberg, which closed 
in October 1946. Already in the summer of 1947, the United States and Great Britain 
had lost enthusiasm for the originally-planned second round of the Tokyo Trial. 
Entering 1948, it became clear that no further international trial of Class-A war 
criminals was conceived. 58 In July of that year, Joseph Keenan wrote to the Secretary 
General of the Far Eastern Commission, regarding the release of some Class-A war 
crimes suspects, stating that `There is no further trial contemplated for any of the 
suspects on charges of planning, negotiating and waging aggressive warfare in 
violation of treaties, assurances, or international law. ' He attributed this to `the 
greatly prolonged proceedings' before the ongoing Tokyo Trial and under such 
situation `no reasonable estimate of the time involved in such subsequent proceedings 
could be safely made. '59 Indeed, the slow process of the Tokyo Trial, due to the 
5' Minear, Victor's, pp. 31-32, footnote 24. 
58 Higurashi argues, based on archival research, that the lack of interest in a further international trial on 
the part of the United States was affected by its policy on Germany's subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 
which the US, at least until the spring of 1947, saw as one of the options for post-Tokyo Trial Japan. 
Higurashi, Tokyo, pp. 528-537. 
59 Mr. Joseph B. Keenan to the Secretary General of the Far Eastern Commission (Johnson), July 16 
1948 in Foreign Relations of the United States [as F. R. U. S. hereafter], 1948, Vol. VI, pp. 831-833. 
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number of countries involved and language problems, was clearly one of the reasons 
for the passive attitude of the Allies towards further international war crimes 
prosecution. 60 
This reluctance, however, had significantly more to do with the rapid 
changes in international relations. Relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union were worse than they had been at the time of the Nuremberg Trial. In 
addition, there was also the rise of the communist threat in East Asia. As the original 
purposes, demilitarisation and democratisation, were regarded as already being on 
track as early as 1947, it was not thought to be a good idea to continue a punitive 
policy against Japan; the United States started to seek a conciliatory policy to 
transform Japan into a bulwark against communism in Asia. This shift in American 
policy on Japan was clearly outlined in NSC 13/2,7 October 1948, which illustrated a 
policy which was less punitive and more focused on economic recovery. NSC 13/2 
commented on the war crimes trial as follows: 
The trial of Class A suspects is completed and decision of the court is 
awaited. We should continue and push to an early conclusion the 
screening of all "B" and "C" suspects with a view to releasing those 
whose cases we do not intend to prosecute. Trials of the others should 
60 According to Horwitz, when witnesses were examined via simultaneous translation, the speed of the 
trial was reduced to one-fifth of its normal pace. Horwitz, `Tokyo', p. 538. In March 1948, George 
Kennan, the first director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, expressed his strong 
scepticism regarding the ongoing trials of the Japanese war criminals: `there is no question in my mind 
but what these trials were profoundly misconceived from the start and are working increasing injury to 
the Allied cause in Japan. ' Kennan gave several reasons for his scepticism: the punishment of 
individual leaders of the defeated nation `should take place as an act of war, not of justice; too slow 
process of the ongoing trials is harmful by itself; that legal professionals are not up to political trials; 
and American lawyers defending the Japanese defendants, and their past policies, is `absolutely 
preposterous in its impact on the Japanese. ' Explanatory Notes by Mr. George F. Kennan, March 25, 
1948 in F. R. U. S., 1948, Vol. VI, pp. 717-718. 
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be instituted and concluded at the earliest possible date. 61 
The development of the Cold War strongly influenced the aftermath of the 
Tokyo Trial. On the day following the execution of Töjö and others in December 
1948, nineteen class-A war crimes suspects waiting for the second round of the Tokyo 
Trial were released. Instead of further prosecution, the GHQ found the 
anti-Communist posture of former war crimes suspects useful for US Cold War 
strategy. The policy of `no more trials on major war criminals in Japan' was 
officially announced by MacArthur in February 1949. The Japanese government, for 
its part, had been working behind the scenes for the release of the war criminals, a 
reduction in their sentences or pardons. It speeded up its effort after the occupation 
formally ended. In autumn 1952, Japan asked several states for the release of its war 
criminals, on the understanding that, with the formalisation of the peace, the war 
criminals issue should be solved politically. By the end of 1958, all the prisoners 
under sentence, including Class B/C war criminals held by the Allies, excluding the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, were released: `The political 
verdicts of the Tokyo trial would be followed by political paroles, reductions of 
sentences, and clemency', concluded Minear. 62 
US Initiative in the Tokyo Trial 
61 Recommendations with Respect to U. S. Policy toward Japan, October 7,1948 (NSC 13/2), A Report 
to the President by the National Security Council, para. 18. 
62 Minear, Victor's, p. 173. A shift in American war crimes prosecution policy is not unique to the case 
of Japan. Peter Maguire illustrates that war crimes prosecutions in Germany, especially those trials 
after the international military tribunal, were influenced by changes in US Cold War strategy. At the 
same time, he indicates that `a political solution to war crimes question in Japan' had been postponed 
because of the State Department's concern about `the dramatic repercussions it would have in 
Germany. ' Peter H. Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), p. 254. 
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In addition to the general points on fairness and politicisation noted above, 
there are several specific differences in appearance, procedures and background 
between Tokyo and Nuremberg. These can be attributed to the difference in the 
degree of American involvement at each tribunal. 
Unlike Nuremberg, Tokyo was more of an `American' Tribunal than an 
international tribunal, as it was named. The Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg was issued by the London Agreement in the form of a joint 
declaration of the Four Powers - the United States, France, the Soviet Union and the 
United Kingdom - and endorsed by 19 other countries later on. However, the 
issuance of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal took the form of an executive decree of 
General MacArthur, who regularly received instructions from the US Joint Chief of 
Staff. What is more, the Charter, though it was modelled on the Nuremberg Charter, 
was drafted by the International Prosecution Section, which at the time of drafting was 
staffed only with American prosecutors. 63 According to the Tokyo Charter, 
MacArthur had the authority to appoint the justices as well as the President of the 
Tribunal, 64 while in Nuremberg the four signatories had appointed judges, who in turn 
appointed their President. What is more, MacArthur was given the authority to 
review their judgments. 65 
It was clear to the participants that it was the United States who was taking 
the initiative in respect of the Tribunal and its procedure. Röling reflects: `In fact the 
63 Horwitz, `Tokyo', p. 483. The Associate Prosecutors, after having arrived in Japan, were given an 
opportunity to suggest revisions to the draft Charter. 
64 Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Eleven 
justices at the Tokyo Trial were appointed by the SCAP, one each from the nine signatories of the 
Instrument of Surrender - Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the Soviet Union and the United States - and India and the Philippines. 
65 Article 17 of the Charter allows the SCAP `at any time [to] reduce or otherwise alter the sentence 
except to increase its severity. ' 
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Americans were in control of most aspects of the trial. The trial was very much an 
American performance'. 66 The structure of the Tribunal also reflects the central role 
of the United States. Unlike Nuremberg, where there were four chief prosecutors, 
one each from the Four Powers, in Tokyo the Prosecution consisted of one chief 
prosecutor from the United States and ten associate prosecutors from other countries. 67 
A significant effect of American domination of the Tokyo Trial procedure 
can be seen in the selection of people and issues judged by the Trial. It was 
susceptible to US political considerations, that is, the US occupation policy and its 
Cold War strategy in the Far East. Accordingly, several important issues were absent 
from the Trial's legal investigation. First was the research and human-body 
experiments of biological weapons conducted by the so-called Unit 731 based in 
Manchuria. 68 The conduct of Unit 731 led by Lieutenant General Ishii Shirö was a 
serious type of `crimes against humanity'. However, it, together with Japan's alleged 
use of biological weapons in the war in China, was given immunity and not even 
examined during the Trial, in exchange for the research results achieved by the Unit. 
The United States wanted to monopolise the information the unit obtained, hiding it 
especially from the Soviet Union: `Apparently the American military were eager to 
profit from the crimes committed by the Japanese, to enhance their knowledge of 
66 Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 31. 
67 The subordinate position of other Allies can be seen from the comment of the US Secretary of State, 
who clearly stated that he did not believe that the Far Eastern Commission, which was in charge of 
formulating the policies, principles, and standards of war crimes prosecutions, would be `the appropriate 
agency for the final determination of the list of the accused for trial in Japan. ' `The Secretary of State 
to the Australian Minister (Eggleston)', February 5,1946, in F. R. U. S., 1946, Vol. VIII, p. 400. Such a 
subordinate position of other countries can be attributed to the fact that it was the US who played the 
primary role in fighting and defeating Japan militarily. See Watt, `Historical', p. ix. 
68 For details of Unit 731 and American policy, see Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese 




biological warfare, ' states Röling. 69 He sees with hindsight that one defendant was 
directly responsible for the establishment of the biological laboratory: `I am ... 
convinced that one of our accused, who got life imprisonment, escaped a 
well-deserved death penalty because our Court was not informed about what he had 
done. '70 The facts about human experimentation had remained little-known to the 
Japanese public until a best-selling report of Unit 731 was published in Japan in 
1981.71 
Significant immunity was also given to the Emperor, under whose name 
Japan fought the war, 72 MacArthur being a strong opponent of the indictment of the 
Emperor. The former enemy having immediately become a vital strategic ally with 
the start of the Cold War, the United States wanted to avoid a `convulsion' among the 
Japanese people and anger towards the United States for disgracing their sacred 
figure. 73 What is more, it was seen that the confused war-torn society would be 
69 Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 48. In a similar case in Germany, human medical experiments 
conducted by Nazi doctors and military surgeons, were judged by the American military trial following 
Nuremberg. 
70 Ibid., pp. 49-50. The conduct of Unit 731 was later judged by the Soviet court martial at Khabarovsk 
in December 1949. The trial, lacking most of the top leaders of the Unit who had been given immunity 
by the GHQ, sentenced the defendants to a maximum of 20 to 25 years imprisonment. 
71 See Chapter 4. 
72 While Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, stating no immunity for defendants official positions, 
clearly states `whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments', Article 6 
of the Tokyo Charter simply mentions `the official position, at any time, of an accused'. Although this 
does not preclude the pursuit of Japan's head of state, the Emperor, the disappearance of the phrase, 
`Heads of State', is worth noting given that immunity was accorded to the Emperor. 
73 In his well-known telegram to Eisenhower, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, on 25 January 1946, 
MacArthur strongly insisted that indicting the Emperor would cause a tremendous convulsion among 
the Japanese people, causing the nation to disintegrate into total chaos and disorder. As a result, `It is 
quite possible that a minimum of a million troops would be required which would have to be maintained 
for an indefinite number of years. ' Telegram, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief of 
Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower), 25 January 1946, in F. R. US., 1946, Vol. VIII, p. 396. The 
impact of MacArthur's view can be seen in a later telegram of the Secretary of State who wrote on 18 
141 
Chapter 3 
easily reunited under the name of the Emperor. Accordingly, the Emperor was not 
indicted or even summoned to the Tribunal. The decision not to indict the Emperor 
was supported also by China and the Soviet Union in accordance with their own 
political interests at the beginning of this new phase of international relations. 74 
The third element that was put beyond the remit of the Tokyo Trial was 
`Asia'. The lack of an Asian element is well-reflected in the composition of judges at 
the Tribunal: out of eleven there were only three judges from Asia - China, India and 
the Philippines - in spite of the fact that it was people in Asian countries, not the 
Western Allies, that suffered most from harm caused by the Japanese army. During 
the Trial, Japan's conduct of war crimes in China, especially, the `Nanjing Massacre, ' 
was examined to some extent. However, Japan's acts in Taiwan and Korea, countries 
under Japan's colonial rule, were not investigated; the forced migration and labour of 
Koreans were all left untouched. Some argue that these acts, although the intention 
and scope of the crimes were not equivalent to the Nazis' crimes, can be defined as 
`crimes against humanity'. Alternatively, given the fact that people under Japanese 
colonial rule had been Japanese subjects, some state that non-humanitarian acts against 
these people could have been punished under the charge of `crimes against humanity', 
February 1946 that `This question [of position of Emperor as war criminals] has far-reaching political 
implications involving also military security'. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United 
Kingdom, February 18,1946, in F. R. U. S., 1946, Vol. VIII, p. 415, emphasis added. 
74 Against the often claimed view that the Soviet Union and China insisted on indicting the Emperor, 
recent research based on Soviet and other archival material shows that it was only Australia that firmly 
maintained the position of working to bring the Emperor to justice. According to research conducted 
by N}IK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), supervised by Awaya Kentar6, in spite of its people's zeal to 
punish the Emperor, Chian Kai-shek of China regarded him as a useful bulwark against the expansion of 
communism. Awaya Kentar6 and NHK Shuzai-han, Tokyo Saiban he no Michi: NHK Supesharu 
(Tokyo: Nihon H6s6 Shuppan Kyökai, 1994), pp. 60-72. The Soviet Union's decision not to push for a 
prosecution of the Emperor was based on the consideration not to confront American policy directly; it 
can be understood as a part of Soviet Cold War policy in the Far East. Ibid., pp. 161-162. 
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just like the Nazis' acts against the German Jews. 75 However, war crimes related to 
Japan's colonial rule and policy were not dealt with by the Tribunal. The exclusion 
of these crimes reflects the primary interest of the United States: the war fought in the 
Pacific. At the same time, the Tribunal was operated by many countries which were 
themselves colonial powers. The voice of the victims of colonialism was blocked. 
`The plight of the Koreans was, in its way, emblematic of the larger anomaly of 
victor's justice as practiced in Tokyo, ' John Dower states: 
The tribunal essentially resolved the contradiction between the world 
of colonialism and imperialism and the righteous ideals of crimes 
against peace and humanity by ignoring it. Japan's aggression was 
presented as a criminal act without provocation, without parallel, and 
almost entirely without context. 76 
This may be relevant to the fact that there was less focus on `crimes against humanity' 
in the Tokyo Trial, where they played a minor role compared to Nuremberg. 77 
Prosecutorial Strategy Regarding Alleged Crimes 
While Nuremberg had only four counts for indictment - conspiracy, `crimes 
against peace', war crimes, and `crimes against humanity', there were 55 counts in 
Tokyo, which were separated into three groups under headings of `crimes against 
peace' (Group I: Counts 1 to 36); murder (Group II: Counts 37 to 52); and 
conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity (Group III: Count 53 to 55). 78 
'S Arai Shinichi, `Sensö Sekinin toha Nanika: Semarareru Futatsu no Sengo Shori', Sekai (February 
1994), p. 193. 
76 Dower, Embracing, pp. 470-471. 
" Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 55. 
78 According to Higurashi, the reason why the number of counts went up to 55 was due to diplomatic 
bargaining and compromising among prosecutors, each one of whom tried to reflect in the indictment 
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Interestingly, `Crimes against humanity' was not dealt with independently but 
combined with conventional war crimes under Group III. Some argue that in the 
Tokyo Trial, `crimes against humanity' were actually not examined because the three 
counts of Group III were in practice the charge with conventional war crimes. 79 This 
is related to the fact that Japan's war crimes, no matter how horrendous and evil they 
were, were different from the Nazi war crimes in nature, falling short of being `crimes 
against humanity', which originally had Nazi crimes in mind. 80 This was recognised 
by the judges at the Tokyo Tribunal. Justice Webb stated in his separate opinion that 
`The crimes of the German accused were far more heinous, varied and extensive than 
those of the Japanese accused. ' 81 
In comparison to the little focus on `crimes against humanity', the focus on 
`crimes against peace' was far higher in the Tokyo Trial than at Nuremberg. A 
comparison of the charters of the two tribunals illustrates this point. Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter gives the Tribunal the power to try and punish persons who 
`committed any of the following crimes': `crimes against peace', war crimes, and 
`crimes against humanity'. On the other hand, Article 5 of Tokyo Charter restricts 
war criminals tried and punished by the Tribunal to be those who `are charged with 
offenses which include Crimes against Peace'. In other words, no defendant was 
prosecuted without a charge of committing crimes against peace. 82 In addition, out of 
their country's own interests. Higurashi Yoshinobu, `Kensatsu no Ronri to Saiban no Tenkai' in 
Igarashi Takeshi and Kitaoka Shinichi (eds. ), `Söron' Tokyo Saiban toha Nandattanoka (Tokyo: 
Chikijishokan, 1997), p. 74. 
79 Awaya Kentarö, `Tokyo Saiban ni miru Sengoshori' in Awaya Kentarö et. al, Sensö Sekinin, Sengo 
Sekinin: Nihon to Doitsu ha Dö Chigauka (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1994), p. 86. 
80 Dower, Embracing, p. 458. 
81 The Separate Opinion of the President of the Tribunal, William Webb, p. 15, in Transcripts, Vol. 21. 
82 The result of this restriction was the exclusion from the process of selecting defendants members of 
the industrial group (zaibatsu), who had played a vital role in carrying out aggressive wars and 
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55 counts, 36 represented crimes against peace. 83 
The Tokyo Trial's focus on crimes against peace needs to be examined also 
from the standpoint of the actual judgment and sentences. Out of 55 counts, the 
Tribunal actually examined only 17 counts; most of the others were dismissed from 
the judgement because they were repetitious and were in effect charging the same type 
of offences. 84 And out of 17 counts, judgement was made on 10 counts: count 1 
(conspiracy), 27,29,31-33,35-36 (crimes against peace), 54 and 55 (war crimes and 
crimes against humanity). 85 Interestingly, as is the case with Nuremberg, no one was 
hanged for conspiracy and crimes against peace alone. 86 However, at Tokyo, 22 
mistreating POWs, but nonetheless could not be charged with the commission of `crimes against peace'. 
Horwitz, `Tokyo', pp. 497-498. 
83 Counts 1 to 5 charged the accused with conspiracy. Count 1 was the basic count charging that the 
defendants, between 1 January 1928 and 2 September 1945, participated together in formulating or 
executing a common plan or conspiracy. This was broken down into smaller conspiracies under 
counts 2 to 5: conspiracy to wage aggressive war against China, the United States, the British 
Commonwealth of Nation, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Thailand, the Philippines, and the Soviet 
Union; and conspiracy with Germany and Italy to mutually assist in aggressive warfare. Counts 6 to 
17 charged defendants with the planning and preparing of aggressive wars, and counts 18 to 26 with the 
initiation of such wars. Counts 27 to 36 charged defendants with waging aggressive war against 
named countries. 
84 Counts 6 to 26 were regarded as charges which replicated Counts 1 to 5. Counts 39 to 52 were 
regarded as charges against killing which had resulted from the unlawful waging of war, thus could be 
incorporated in the charge against aggressive war. Counts 37,38,44 and 53 were dismissed for the 
reason that `the Charter does not confer any jurisdiction in respect of a conspiracy to commit any crime 
other than a crime against peace. ' Transcripts, Vol. 20, pp. 48,447-48,453. 
85 Counts 2 to 4 were incorporated into Count 1, so was Count 28 into 27. Insufficient evidence was 
found for judging Count 5. Count 30, wars of aggression waged against the Philippines, was not 
examined as they were regarded as `being a part of the war of aggression waged against the United 
States of America. ' Count 34, aggressive wars against the Kingdom of Thailand, was also not 
examined. Transcripts, Vol. 20, pp. 49,769-49.772. 
86 To Röling, the sentences given at both Nuremberg and Tokyo for crimes against peace were `more 
lenient than one would expect, ' considering the fact that the Tribunals called crimes against peace `the 
supreme international crime'. Ruling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 67. 
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defendants out of 25 were found guilty of at least one count in the category of crimes 
against peace, while in Nuremberg, 16 out of 22 defendants were charged for crimes 
against peace and 12 were found guilty. As for crimes against humanity, Nuremberg 
found 16 out of 18 defendants guilty, while in Tokyo only 10 out of 24 defendants 
were found guilty of either count 54 or count 55, or both. Judging from the sentences 
alone, it may not be too simplistic to conclude that the Tokyo Trial was focusing on 
crimes against peace much more than had been the case at Nuremberg. 
The Impact of Specific Features of the Tokyo Trial 
As seen above, the Tokyo Tribunal was not a clone of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal; on applying the Nuremberg model to the case of Japan, several `adjustments' 
were made to suit the situation in Japan, or US policy on Japan. However, these 
adjustments, in the longer term, hurt the general perception of the Tokyo Trial and 
sowed various seeds for future problems of a kind that did not necessarily emerge in 
the case of post-war Germany. 
First, Tokyo's heavy focus on `crimes against peace' meant that the Trial was 
examining less the way Japan had conducted the war but more the reasons why Japan 
had conducted it. Crimes against peace, or aggressive war, was a much more 
disputed concept than conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, because 
it dealt directly with the nature and cause of war, which is recognised differently by 
different participants, and differently at different times. In the case of the war in 
Europe, there is little argument that it was aggression started by Hitler to dominate the 
continent. 87 However, the nature of the war in Asia is still under debate: whether 
Japan's war was purely aggressive in nature or had some element of self-defence, or 
whether it was a colonial war that had been also waged by the Allies. Accordingly, 
87 Ibid., p. 87. 
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there was a question over whether Japan alone had to take responsibility for `starting' 
the war. The point is still raised by the right in Japan and is brought to the centre of 
the debate of the Tokyo Trial among the Japanese. 88 
Several researchers on the Tokyo Trial see the fact that `crimes against 
peace' was the central charge of the Trial as the reason why it is more controversial 
than Nuremberg. Philip Piccigallo reflects: `had the Tokyo defendants been tried on 
conventional war crimes charges only - as lesser Japanese suspects were - most likely 
no substantial controversy or criticism of the IMTFE would have arisen. '89 `I am 
fully in favor of conventional war crimes trials, ' Minear states: `But, when the issue is 
not conventional war crimes but aggression, ... then I must demur. '90 The difficulty 
of the concept `crimes against peace' is reflected in the failure of the post-war 
international community to codify and criminalise aggression because of the difficulty 
in reaching a definition that differentiates the crime from a war of self-defence. 91 
Since the Tokyo Trial, `crimes against peace' has not been included in the jurisdiction 
of any ad hoc international war crimes tribunal. Judith Shklar sees that a criminal 
trial in respects of aggressive war inevitably involves an interpretation of the past, and 
that, for this reason, `the charge of waging aggressive war made the Trial seem a more 
conventional political trial and as such reduced its value for legalistic politics. '92 
Second, issues that were given immunity and not examined under the Tokyo 
Tribunal were buried and left untouched for such a long time that they became too 
complex and controversial to be handled. It did not mean that issues and people 
eliminated from the legal procedures at the Tokyo Tribunal were acquitted of their war 
$$ This point is examined and analysed in the following chapters. 
89 Piccigallo, Japanese, p. 210. 
90 Minear, Victor's, pp. x-xi. 
91 See Chapter 2. 
92 Judith Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 172. 
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responsibility in any sense; they were merely postponed for a while. The issues of 
the war responsibility of the Emperor and of Japan's war responsibility towards its 
Asian neighbours are still debated emotionally after more than half a century, and even 
more fiercely than before. 93 The absence of the Emperor at the Tokyo Trial is often 
raised as evidence that the Tokyo Trial was a political trial: `the political objective of 
the American occupation policy conspicuously distorted the trial, ' Önuma Yasuaki 
claims: `In this sense, the Tokyo Trial was obviously a political trial'. 94 In addition, 
unresolved responsibility has left a deep scar on both the victims and victimisers. For 
these reasons, some on the left in Japan are reluctant to accept the Tokyo Trial 
positively. 95 
Conclusion 
`Regardless of the important differences between the European and Pacific wars', 
Minear argues, `Tokyo was to be the Nuremberg of the Pacific. '96 As this chapter has 
examined, the overall structure and proceedings of the Tokyo Tribunal were modelled 
on the Nuremberg Tribunal. What is more, the expected impact of the Tokyo Trial on 
society, especially the effect of the individual criminal punishment of wartime leaders 
and an historical account of the war through legal procedures, were identical to those 
in the Nuremberg Trial on post-war Germany, which were examined in the previous 
chapter. However, post-war Germany and Japan reacted differently to the 
international military tribunals they experienced: while the former actively discussed it 
93 See Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
94 Önuma Yasuaki, Tökyö Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisö he, 4 `h ed. (Tokyo: Töshind6,1997), 
p. 10. 
95 See Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
96 Minear, Victor's, pp. 22-23. 
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and acknowledged the outcome, the latter was relatively silent over the Tribunal and 
the issues with which it dealt. 
The difference in attitude of the people in the two countries can be attributed 
to several critical differences between the two tribunals examined above. The 
specific character of the Tokyo Trial raised several problems of kinds that were absent 
in the case of Nuremberg and thus created an impact of a different kind on the people 
and society of post-war Japan. In this sense, such an impact is unique to the Tokyo 
Trial, and it may be concluded, accordingly, that the Tokyo Trial worked differently, or 
did not work at all, on post-war society because of its unique features. The following 
analysis of the Tokyo Trial's impact on post-war Japan cannot ignore this point. 
However, what this thesis focuses on in the following chapters is whether the impact 
and effect of the Trial can be attributed to the two devices of the international tribunal: 
the individualisation of responsibility and the creation of the record of the war, which 
were considered also for Nuremberg and are considered for ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals and other post-Cold War international war crimes tribunals. Before 
examining each of these devices and their impact, the next chapter overviews the 
general reaction and perception of the Japanese people regarding the Tokyo Trial from 
1946 to 2003. 
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THE JAPANESE PERCEPTION OF THE TOKYO TRIAL: 1946-2003 
This chapter illustrates chronologically the attitude of the Japanese towards the 
Tokyo Trial from the 1940s to 2003. The general view held by the Japanese now 
and then is that the Tokyo Trial was `victor's justice'. It was, and is, perceived as 
`a display of power' rather than of morality or justice. B. V. A. Röling, the Dutch 
judge at the Tribunal, reflects his experience in Japan during the Trial: 
I sometimes had contacts with Japanese students. The first thing 
they always asked was: `Are you morally entitled to sit in 
judgement over the leaders of Japan when the Allies have burned 
down all of its cities with sometimes, as in Tokyo, in one night, 
100,000 deaths and which culminated in the destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Those were war crimes. '' 
Indeed, the Tokyo Trial was `victor's justice' because of legal 
shortcomings in its foundation and procedures and political elements that 
influenced the creation and operation of the Tribunal. As is the case with 
Nuremberg, Tokyo too has been criticised as a trial based on an ex post facto law 
because it is disputable whether `crimes against peace' and `crimes against 
humanity' were `crimes' at the time they were committed. It is also questioned 
whether prosecuting individuals under international trials for committing 
conventional war crimes was already regarded as an international custom. 2 The 
Tokyo Trial is also criticised as unilateral trial, having prosecuted Japan's 
conduct only. `Crimes against peace' raised questions not only regarding 
whether Japan only was guilty of starting the war, but also whether the Soviet 
1 B. V. A. Röling, edited and with an introduction by Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and 
Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger (London: Polity Press, 1993), p. 84. 
2 See Chapter 2. 
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declaration of war against Japan on 8 August 1945 was not an act of aggression, 
a breach of the 1941 non-aggression pact with Japan. On `crimes against 
humanity', the American use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
was not examined. 3 This is often referred to as a symbolic example of `victor's 
justice'. 4 
`Punishment should be meted out', a sense that was shared by the Allies 
in the aftermath of the war, was `noble sentiments, to be sure', says Richard 
Minear, the author of Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: `Yet they do 
not alter the uncomfortable facts. Gross injustice was committed at Tokyo. The 
leaders of the defeated nation, and they alone, were offered as a sacrifice to a 
better world. ' 5 
In spite of a widely-held understanding of `victor's justice', the general 
reaction of the Japanese people towards the Tokyo Trial has been a passive 
acceptance, or apathy. This chapter illustrates this attitude, by putting it in the 
context of the time, and analyses how perceptions of the Tokyo Trial developed, 
changed, or remained unchanged over time. The chapter also considers whether 
there is any difference in perception and attitude between the intellectuals and 
' When the Defence offered, as evidence, a document on the American decision to use atomic 
bombs against Japan, British Associate Prosecutor, Arthur Comyns-Carr, claimed that `the 
question of the choice of weapons on the Allied side in the war has no bearing upon any issue 
before this Tribunal. ' The Tribunal subsequently rejected the document. R John Pritchard and 
Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds. ) and Project Director: Donald Cameron Watt, The Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty-two Volumes (New York and London: Garland Publishing 
Inc., 1981) [as Transcripts hereafter], Vol. 8, pp. 17,655-17,662. 
4 Awaya Kentar6, `Tokyo Saiban wo Kangaeru' in Ajia Minshn-hötei Junbi-kai (ed), Toinaosu 
Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo: Ryokufü Shuppan, 1995), p. 25. 
5 Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, N. J: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), p. 169. 
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the general public, by analysing the publications on the Tokyo Trial, media 
reports, events related to the Trial, and public discourse surrounding them. 6 
1. American Occupation and the Tokyo Trial: 1946-1951 
The opening of the Tokyo Trial in May 1946 received almost totally supportive 
coverage from the Japanese media. 7 This remained as such all through the 
Trial's procedures. On the day of the judgement, the editorial of Asahi Shimbun, 
a daily newspaper with one of the biggest circulations in Japan, representatively 
stated: 
The judgment of the Tokyo Trial has a special significance in the 
history of Japan and the world because it is a global expression of 
the determination for peace, which can be commonly held both by 
the victors and the vanquished, and is an oath of its practice among 
related countries. 8 
The media paid little attention to Justice Pal's dissenting opinion that all the 
defendants were not guilty, but reported more the Tribunal's President, William 
Webb's opinion that the Emperor also had some responsibility for the war. The 
6 As some Japanese scholars rightly point out, the perception of the Tokyo Trial is strongly 
related to the issue of war responsibility, which has been debated and researched much more 
broadly and within greater dynamics. See Utsumi Aiko, `Changing Japanese Views of the 
Allied Occupation of Japan and the War Crimes Trials', Journal of the Australian War 
Memorial, Issue 30 (April 1997). For the purpose of this thesis, however, the following 
analysis is focused on debates and research on the Tokyo Trial; debates on war responsibility in 
general will be examined when they are directly related to the Trial. 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan, 
No. 8, May 1946, p. 242, para. 38. 
8 The editorial, Asahi Shimbun, 13 November 1948. 
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media also reported that many of the people on the street regarded the Trial as 
generally fair. 9 
The reporting of the Japanese media cannot be interpreted without 
considering the fact that the GHQ conducted strict censorship covering 
newspapers and radio, as well as theatres and films, which lasted until the end of 
the occupation in 1952. The targets of deletions and suppression included 
`Criticism of Military Tribunal' and `Justification or Defense of War Criminals', 
together with 29 other items. 10 As a result, the information that the Japanese 
people received on the Tokyo Trial was not complete. 11 The impact of 
censorship cannot be under-estimated in influencing the atmosphere of the 
society. 12 The coverage of the media, however, was not insensitive to the 
9 Awaya Kentar6, `Tokyo Saiban ni miru Sengoshori' in Awaya Kentar6 et. al, Sensö Sekinin, 
Sengo Sekinin: Nihon to Doitsu ha Dö Chigauka (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1994), 
pp. 117-118. 
10 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (Penguin Books, 
2000), p. 411. For example, the report on the Defence Counsel's claims that `conspiracy' would 
not be applied in the case of international law and that `crimes against peace' and `crimes 
against humanity' did not constitute a generally-accepted concept of war crimes was deleted 
from the original drafts of the article for the 24 February 1947 edition of Yomiuri Shimbun, a 
popular daily newspaper together with Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun. Also deleted was 
a report in Yomiuri on 24 October 1947 that the Diary of Kido, highly-regarded evidence on the 
part of the Prosecutor, was roughly translated and interpreted. Takakuwa Kökichi, Makkäsä no 
Shimbunkenetsu (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, 1984), pp. 130-131, p. 207. 
'1 Having been asked by a publisher to write on the Tokyo Trial in December 1948, Kiyose 
Ichir6, Associate Chief of the Japanese Defence section, rejected the offer. He finally 
published a book on the Trial in 1967 based on his critical view. Kiyose wrote: `Had I accepted 
the offer [during the occupation] and written honestly [my critical view on the Trial], the 
newspaper agency might have suffered suppression or something even worse. However, if I had 
commented mildly, people would have taken it as the truth because of my official position at the 
Tribunal. That is why I decided not to write on the Trial during the occupation. ' Kiyose Ichir6, 
Hiroku Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, 1967), pp. 276-277. 
12 Tsurumi Shunsuke, on the other hand, sees that the media's role in conveying the story of the 
Trial was very limited, because newspapers were printed on one sheet of paper, radio stations 
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general feelings of the society at the time. The Japanese for their part had 
reasons for accepting the Trial, albeit passively. 
The General Reaction 
The Tokyo Trial was accepted by the Japanese as a consequence of 
defeat in the war. The Japanese embraced their old saying: `Kateba Kangun, 
Makereba Zokugun (Win and you are the official army, lose and you are the 
rebels)', equivalent to the western saying, `Might is right', with which they 
swallowed frustration: why should only Japan face a trial? What is more, facing 
the overwhelming American military presence, the Japanese felt that there was 
no other choice for the vanquished; `victor's justice' was regarded as a `physical 
necessity'. 13 Japanese acceptance of the Tokyo Trial was connected to their 
initial acceptance of the American occupation. The absence of systematic 
looting, violence or rape by American soldiers that had been fully expected by 
the Japanese, together with the `spontaneous generosity' of the Americans gave a 
favourable impression of the American occupier. 14 
had been destroyed, and television was not yet available. Instead, he states, the Japanese people 
came to know about the Tokyo Trial mainly through `gossip', which focused on four issues: the 
massacre of Nanjing and other atrocities conducted by the Japanese soldiers; the American 
chief prosecutor's accusing Japanese leaders in the name of civilisation; seven leaders being 
hanged; and the Emperor's not being called to the court. `It was these four things', Tsurumi 
argues, `which remained in the memory of the Japanese people. ' Tsurumi Shunsuke, A Cultural 
History of Postwar Japan: 1945-1980 (London and New York: KPI Limited, 1987), p. 14. 
13 Ibid., p. 15. 
14 The MacArthur report states: `The firm hand of General MacArthur was controlling and 
guiding the Japanese nation and the people seemed responsive and cooperative. The large task 
of demilitarization of factories and resources had begun. War criminals were being arrested and 
held for trial. Ammunition, weapons, and other military material were being moved to depots 
to be inventoried and eventually destroyed. All these things the Japanese people had initially 
accepted, and continued to accept submissively, if not favorably. ' GHQ Sanbö Dai-nibu (ed. ), 
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At the same time, there existed among the Japanese nation anger 
towards their wartime leaders. Sudden defeat in the war profoundly shocked 
people who had been informed very little of the war they were fighting. A man in 
his late 60s reflected: 
We had always been told that we would win the war. So when I 
found out that Japan has lost the war, I could not stop crying and was 
totally stunned for a while. I was just ten- years old but I can 
imagine how bad it was for the grown-ups at the time. Total change 
had occurred so suddenly. '5 
Many people possessed a strong sense that they were betrayed and deceived by 
their own government. 16 This, together with post-war poverty, hunger and 
devastation, raised the rage towards the wartime cabinet and the military, 
especially Tojö Hideki, Prime Minister at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific 
War. Tojö's popularity among the Japanese further declined when he attempted 
to commit suicide, and failed at the time of the arrest by the GHQ in September 
1945. 
The people needed someone to blame for their wartime and post-war 
misery; there existed within the Japanese a sense that they were the victims of a 
war recklessly conducted by a military clique. 17 People's strong disbelief in the 
wartime leaders detached them from the defendants at the Tribunal. The Trial, in 
Reports of General MacArthur, prepared by His General Staff, Vol.!, supplement, MacArthur in 
Japan: the Occupation, Military Phase (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryö Shuppan, 1998) [Originally 
published from Washington, DC: U. S. G. P. O., 1966], p. 53, emphasis added. 
15 Interview with a man born in 1935 (Interviewee M), 12 January 2004, Kyoto Japan. 
16 See Chapter 5 and 6 for further examination of people's sense of `having been deceived' by 
their leaders. 
" See Chapter 6. 
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other words, was accepted by the Japanese as punishing `the bad fellow' on their 
behalf. 18 This may be one of the reasons why the Tokyo Trial, together with 
other minor war crimes trials, created very little resentment and anger from the 
Japanese people at the time. According to private letters among the Japanese, 
which were secretly censored by the GHQ, 34% of those who mentioned the 
Tokyo Trial praised it, and 39% were critical, sympathising with the defendants 
for their heavy sentences - but not necessarily protesting against the Trial per se. 
Another 27%, the GHQ analysed, showed no clear opinion. 19 The only 
exception was the Tribunal's death sentence on Hirota Kaki, a civilian political 
leader, which disturbed many Japanese and led to a movement for petition. 
Hirota, since the Trial, has been seen as a tragic hero of the Tokyo Trial, having 
tried to avoid the war as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs but 
becoming the only civilian sentenced to death together with the military 
clique. 20 
In addition to the shock of defeat and anger towards their leaders, the 
easy acceptance of the Tokyo Trial was due to general disinterest. War crimes 
prosecution was an issue of little importance compared with serious post-war 
poverty and hunger. Disinterest was cultivated also by the slow progress of the 
Tokyo Trial together with its dry legal procedures, which deprived it of its 
maximum impact. `It was only at the beginning that each news agency mobilised 
18 The sentence of the Nuremberg Trial in October 1946 may have also encouraged the Japanese 
to think their leaders, who had allied themselves with the Nazis, deserved the punishment. 
Nakamura Masanori, 'Shöwashi Kenkyü to Tokyo Saiban' in Igarashi Takeshi and Kitaoka 
Shinichi (eds. ), `Söron'Tokyo Saiban toha Nandattanoka (Tokyo: Chikijishokan, 1997), p. 179. 
19 Awaya, `Tokyo Saiban ni', P. 118. 
20 Hirota's `tragic' life was put into a well-read novel. For the English translation of the novel, 
Rakujitsu Moyu, see Saburo Shiroyama; translated by John Bester, War Criminal: the Life and 
Death of Hirota Koki (Tokyo; New York: Kodansha International, 1977). 
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all of its journalists and reported the Trial in detail', a journalist from Kyddö 
Tsüshin reflected: 
However, when it came to technical arguments between the 
Prosecutor and the Defence Counsel, they lost interest. ... Within a 
month, the press box was filled only with a few sleepy-looking 
journalists staying there for appearance's sake. Others were 
relaxing in a waiting room. 21 
As the Trial had extended over a long period, even sympathy towards the 
defendants increased. With the closing of the Tribunal, the media stopped not 
only reporting on the Tokyo Trial but even mentioning it. 22 
Issues in which the people took specific interest were Töjö's defence and 
the judgment of the Tribunal. Unlike many other defendants, during his defence 
from 26 December to 7 January 1948, Töjö did not deny his political and 
administrative responsibility as former Prime Minster. At the same time, he 
powerfully justified the policy of Japan and denied the aggressive nature of the 
war Japan fought, which appealed to those Japanese who were frustrated with 
`victor's justice'. 23 With his `very long and very impressive speech', Röling 
21 Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu (ed. ) and Directed by Utsumi Aiko and Nagai Hitoshi, Shimbun 
Shiryö ni miru Tökyö Saiban, BC-kyii Saiban, Voll (Tokyo: Gendaishiryö Shuppan, 2000), 
p. xx. 
22 According to its database covering 1946 to 2000, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper issued 1,001 
reports on the Tokyo Trial, out of which 934 were published between 1946 and 1948. Coverage 
dropped drastically in 1949, during which only four articles were published. Much of the 
coverage after 1952 are reviews of publications, films or symposiums on the Tokyo Trial and 
the news on the release and declassification of primary sources. 
23 Dower, Embracing, p. 510. For a sense of `victor's justice' shared by the then Japanese, see 
Yoshimi Yoshiaki, `Senry6-ki Nihon no Minshü-Ishiki: Sens6-Sekinin-ron wo Megutte', Shisö, 
No. 811 (January 1992), pp. 82-84. See also Chapter 5 and 6. 
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sees Töjö `restored his dignity in the eyes of the Japanese people. ' 24 However, 
in general, the degree of public interest in the Tokyo Trial was low, which was a 
matter of concern even for academics at the time. 25 
The Reaction of Academics 
Unlike the general public, academics and scholars were not 
uninterested in the Tokyo Trial. With the close of the Tokyo Trial, various 
academic journals issued special editions on the Trial, 26 some of which sought to 
identify the political and historical significance of the Tokyo Trial, focusing on 
the meaning of judgment for the denial of wartime militarism. Some articles 
argued that the Tokyo Trial on its own was not enough, pointing out that the 
Emperor and zaibatsu (conglomerate) were not tried. 27 
The interests of academics during this period, however, were mostly 
focused on the legal aspects of the Trial: the concept of war crimes, the 
development of international law and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 28 Legal 
scholars at Waseda University conducted research on the background, structure, 
indictment and procedures of the Tokyo Trial. 29 In 1948, after the judgment of 
24 Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 34. 
Z5 Yoshida Yutaka, `Senryö-ki no Sensö Sekinin-ron' in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai (ed), 
Toinaosu, p. 212. This is based on his earlier article, Yoshida Yutaka, `Senryö-ki ni okeru 
Sensö-Sekinin-ron', Hitotsubashi Ronsö, Vo. 105, No. 2 (1991), pp. 21-38. The following 
references are from his later work. 
26 For example, see Chöryü (September 1948); Höritsu Jihö, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1949); Rekishi 
Hyöron, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1948). 
27 See articles by Inoue Kiyoshi, Gushima Kanesaburö and Kainö Michitaka in Rekishi Hyöron, 
Vol. 3, No. 6 (1948). For a detailed analysis of academic debate, during this period, on the Tokyo 
Trial and war responsibility, see Yoshida, `Senryö-ki'. 
28 Higurashi Yoshinobu, Tökyö Saiban no Kokusai Kankei: Kokusai Seiji-ni okeru Kenryoku to 
Kihan (Tokyo: Bokutaku-sha, 2002), pp. 14-17. 
29 Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kenkyükai (ed. ), Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kenkyü, 
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the Tokyo Trial, Takayanagi Kenzo's The Tokio Trials and International Law 
was published. 30 Takayanagi was a member of the Defence Counsel at the Tokyo 
Tribunal and the publication was based on his statement for Defence Summation 
at the Trial, pointing out legal defects of the Trial. He raised a concern about the 
negative impact of such a trial on the Japanese. In contrast to Takayanagi, 
Yokota Kisaburö was a vocal supporter of the Tokyo Trial and its political 
significance. The international legal scholar, while recognising flaws in the 
form of law at the Tribunal, emphasised the importance of the essence of the 
Trial, that is, the substantive reasons for the punishments given, which, 
according to him, should not be dismissed by legal and technical arguments. 31 
Yokota argued that the true objective of the Trial and punishments was to pay a 
price for aggressive wars and violence that Japan had conducted and `draw a line 
in the sand', opening the way to Japan's rehabilitation. 32 His comments were 
published in major newspapers on the day of judgment, as a `scholar's view of 
the Tokyo Trial'. 
Overall, the view of academics and social commentators of the Tokyo 
Trial was positive, in spite of their awareness that there were several defects in 
the Trial. 33 The motivation of academics and intellectuals was seemingly based 
Vol. 1-3 (Tokyo: Heiwashobo, 1947-1948). 
3° Kenzo Takayanagi, The Tokio Trials and International Law (Tokyo: Yühikaku, 1948). 
31 Yokota Kisaburö, Sensö Hanzai Ron (Tokyo: Yühikaku, 1947), p. 5. 
32 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
33 See a round-table talk, chaired by Kainö Michitaka and participated by Ukai Nobushige, 
Takano Yüichi, Tsuji Kiyoaki and Maruyama Masao: `Tokyo Saiban no Jijitsu to Höri', Höritsu 
Jihö, Vo1.21, No. 2 (1949), pp. 13-28. Kainö and Maruyama have written several important 
articles on the Tokyo Trial. Maruyama's article, `Gunkoku Shihaisha no Seishin Keitai' written 
in 1949 is an important work on Japanese militarism and the Tokyo Trial. In this famous article, 
he analyses the pathology of Japan's `structure' that had created unplanned and disorganised 
political power, which paved the way for the Pacific War. Through examining the statements 
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on their sense of mission to cultivate positive significance of the Trial for the 
sake of post-war Japan. Members of Waseda University stated that the Tokyo 
Trial was an attempt at a new world order for perpetual peace and its record was 
vital reading for people in post-war Japan. At the same time, they wrote in the 
preface of their volumes of research as follows: 
We are aiming to faithfully report the facts and opinions 
presented at the Tribunal, but not to criticise. Each article should 
adhere to strict academic standards and refrain from any 
exaggeration or prejudice in making comments on the Trial. 34 
The fact that they had to state this in a strong tone implies that they were having 
some difficulty or dilemma in examining the Trial `frankly' and analysing it 
`critically', be it due to their own views or to social atmosphere. This comment 
is intriguing because it already indicated the difficulty that Japanese academics 
and intellectuals were going to face hereafter in researching the Tokyo Trial. 
and behaviour of the defendants at the Tokyo Tribunal, Maruyama observed an undeveloped 
sense of responsibility among the leaders and saw it as `a manifestation of the way in which the 
system itself had decayed. ' His arguments of `the dwarfishness of Japanese fascism' and the 
`system of irresponsibility' having the Emperor at the head of it reflect the widely-shared view 
of people at the time. Considering the academic impact of the article, Maruyama's argument 
may have given logical justification to blame the wartime leaders for the war and defeat. 
Maruyama's article is translated into English: Maruyama Masao `Thought and Behaviour 
Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders', in Ivan Morris (ed. ), Thought and Behaviour in Modern 
Japanese Politics by Masao Maruyama (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 84-134. 
For Kainö's work, see Ushiomi Toshitaka (ed. ), Kainö Michitaka Chosakushü, Vol. 3 (Tokyo: 
Nihon Hyöronsha, 1977), pp. 271-284. 
34 Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kenkyükai (ed. ), Kyokutö, Vol. 1, p. 6. 
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2. After the Occupation: 1952-1960 
With the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951 coming into effect in 
April 1952, Japan regained its sovereignty, and the American military 
occupation that lasted for six years and eight months formally ended. At the 
same time, with the acceptance of the Peace Treaty, the Japanese government 
officially accepted the judgment of the Tokyo Trial, and issues of war crimes 
prosecution were solved in terms of international law. 35 
Critical View Emerges 
The end of the occupation meant an end to censorship conducted by the 
GHQ, and criticism of the Tokyo Trial became more visible, some of it as a 
reaction to the censorship. Takigawa Masajirö, a member of the Defence 
Counsel at the Tokyo Tribunal, published in 1952 a book titled Judging the Tokyo 
Trial, in which he argued that the judgment was prepared beforehand and there 
was no scope for the defendants to justify the war they fought. He strongly 
claimed that the Tokyo Trial was a retaliatory punishment: 
Being based on the illusion that a World Government could only be 
created by the victor, the Tokyo Trial judged the vanquished 
arbitrarily in the name of `civilisation' with the primitive idea of 
retaliation, but without any self-examination on their part. It was 
3s Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty goes: `Japan accepts the judgments of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both 
within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese 
nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole 
with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government 
or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on recommendation of Japan. 
In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such 
power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments 
represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan. ' 
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not even an unjust trial but was a vice that does not deserve to be 
called a trial. The Tokyo Trial did not contribute to the progress of 
international law but rather made it relapse for several centuries. 36 
On the other hand, even after the end of censorship, there was a 
reluctance to criticise the Tokyo Trial. The research group of Asahi Shimbun, 
while pointing out the problem of `victors' justice', expressed concern that 
criticism of the Trial would lead to the justification of Japan's militarist past: `If 
the Japanese come to see the lofty idea of the Trial negatively as a reaction to the 
GHQ's censorship, we may repeat the tragedy of turning back the clock. ' 37 
Against this backdrop, Takigawa expressed frustration: 
During the occupation, self-examination through the Tokyo Trial 
was said to be the starting point for re-establishing the country.... 
To regret guilty past actions and apologise to the world was said to 
be the only way for Japan to re-enter international society. But that 
was the policy of the United States to weaken the mentality of 
post-war Japan. 38 
Takigawa wrote in 1978 that in the 1950s his book was bitterly criticised as a 
`bad book' by journalists and critics. 39 Sugahara Yutaka, another member of the 
Defence Counsel of the Tokyo Trial, lamented: `Although the Government 
formally regained sovereignty a year and half ago, no effort has been made to tell 
36 Takigawa Masajirö, Tökyö Saiban wo Sabaku, Vol. l (Tokyo: Töwasha, 1952-1953), p4. 
3' Asahi Shimbunsha Chösa Kenkyüshitsu (ed), Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kiroku: 
Mokuroku oyobi Sakuin (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Chösa Kenkyü-shitsu, 1953), pp. 8-9. On the 
difficulty of criticising the Tokyo Trial, see Chapter 5. 
38 Takigawa, Tokyo, pp. 258-259. 




the nation about the truth of the Tokyo Trial. ' 40 He pointed out the defects of the 
Trial and criticised it as `savage revenge', having tried to destroy Japanese 
tradition. Sugahara's essay written in 1953 was actually published in 1961 
because he was given advice that the time was not yet ripe for his book. Kobori 
Keiichirö, an academic specialising in comparative culture, who has strongly 
criticised the Tokyo Trial, argues that the journalism during this period 
conducted `self-censorship and self-regulation' on behalf of the occupation 
army. 
41 
It was in 1952, four years after the end of the Trial, that Justice 
Radhabinod Pal's 1,235 page dissenting opinion was published in Japan. 42 In his 
`dissentient judgment', Pal concluded that all the defendants were innocent, 
arguing that the Tokyo Trial was an ex post facto legislation: 
It has been said that A VICTOR CAN DISPENSE TO THE 
VANQUISHED EVERYTHING FROM MERCY TO 
VINDICTIVENESS; BUT THE ONE THING THE VICTOR 
CANNOT GIVE TO THE VANQUISHED IS JUSTICE [sic. ]. At 
least, if a tribunal be rooted in politics as opposed to law, no matter 
what its form and pretenses, the apprehension thus expressed would 
be real, unless `JUSTICE IS REALLY NOTHING ELSE THAN 
THE INTEREST OF THE STRONGER [sic. ]' . 
43 
40 Sugahara Yutaka, Tokyo Saiban no Shötai (Tokyo: Jiji Tsüshinsha, 1961), pp. 8-9. 
4' Kobori Keiichir6, Sai-Kenshö Tokyo Saiban: Nihon wo Damenishita Shuppatsuten (Tokyo: 
PHP Kenkyü-jo, 1996), p. 90. 
42 For the English version, see Radhabinod Pal, International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East: Dissentient Judgment (Calcutta: Sanyal, 1953). Pal's judgment, together with other 
separate opinions, was not read at the Trial. The GHQ prohibited its publication considering 
that it would have stimulated Japanese anger and harm the occupation policy. `Jo' in Tokyo 
Saiban Kenkyü-kai (ed. ), Paru Hanketsu-sho: Kyödö Kenkyü, Vol. 1 (Tokyo, K6dansha, 1984), 
p. 4. 
43 Pal, International, p. 700. Some argue that Pal's opinion is not free from his political and 
ideological background. lenaga Sabur6, a left-wing academic, famous for his decades of legal 
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In the 1960s, two publications on Pal's judgment were released, both of 
which support the judgment. Interestingly, while one book was entitled, Justice 
Pal's Argument of Japan's Innocence, 44 the other suggested that the claim of 
`innocence' was misleading; the latter argued that Pal did not state that Japan 
was morally innocent and that his argument should not be taken as a total 
acquittal of modern Japan. 45 In any case, with his judgment, Judge Pal became 
one of the most known and important figures for debate and research on the 
Tokyo Trial in Japan. 46 Especially for those who strongly criticised the Tribunal, 
his above-quoted words became a mantra. 
Besides the legality of the Tokyo Trial, the account of the war presented 
at the Tribunal's judgment came to be openly discussed. The research group of 
Asahi Shimbun, who supported the Tokyo Trial in general, nonetheless expressed 
some reservations at the way the Tribunal constructed the record of the war. 
Pointing out the dubious selection of the defendants and the Tribunal's failure to 
examine the rise of Communism in Asia, the group stated that `the Trial was 
influenced by international politics and thus distanced itself from the historical 
battle with the government over the history textbook, criticises Pal's judgment on the basis of 
`his vehement anti-Communist ideology'. Ienaga Saburö, `The Historical Significance of the 
Tokyo Trial' in Chihiro Hosoya [et al. ] (eds. ), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International 
Symposium (Tokyo: Kodansha; New York, N. Y.: Distributed in the U. S. by Kodansha 
International through Harper & Row, 1986), p. 169. In addition to his anti-communist stance, 
Dower attributes Pal's repudiation of the majority judgment to his `anticolonial consciousness 
as an Asian nationalist'. Dower, Embracing, p. 632, footnote 65. 
44 Tanaka Masaaki, Paru Hakase no Nihon Muzai-ron (Tokyo: Keibunsha, 1963). 
as Tsunoda Jun, `Paru Hanketsusho to Shöwa-shi' in Tokyo Saiban Kenkyü-kai (ed. ), Paru, 
Vol. 1, p. 202. This volume was originally published in 1966 by a group of academics, which 
later became a society for research of the Tokyo Trial. 
46 In 1966, Pal was given by the Japanese government the Grand Cordon of the Order of the 
Sacred Treasure (Kun Ittö Zuih(5 Shö), and an emeritus doctorate from Nihon University. 
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truth. ' 47 The historical account was criticised also from different standpoints. 
Tsurumi Shunsuke emphasised the importance of examining Japan's aggressive 
war against China, not against the United States that was focused on in the Tokyo 
Trial. 48 Rather than using the term `Pacific War', Tsurumi used in 1956 the term 
`Fifteen-years War' and by doing so regarded three different armed conflicts - 
the Manchurian Incident of 1931-1935, the Sino-Japanese Conflict of 1937-1945, 
and the Pacific War of 1941-1945 - as a chain of Japanese aggressive wars. His 
point was to emphasise Japan's aggression towards China, which was not fully 
examined in the Tokyo Trial. On the other hand, Takigawa, as part of his 
criticism of the Tokyo Trial, rejected the idea that Japan had conducted an 
aggressive war; he claims that it was a war of self-defence. 
The General Perception 
On the part of the Japanese people, once the occupation had ended, 
general apathy towards the Tokyo Trial further increased. In May 1952, a month 
after Japan's recovery of sovereignty, Asahi Shimbun conducted an opinion poll 
on the occupation policy, in which 47% answered that some positive things had 
been done during the occupation (14% finding nothing positive) and 28% 
answered that some negative things had been done (26% finding nothing 
negative). Being asked what, in concrete terms, was positive or negative, the 
Tokyo Trial or war crimes prosecutions were deemed to fall into neither 
category. 49 Considering the supposed impact and significance of the Tokyo Trial, 
47 Asahi Shimbunsha Chösa Kenkyüshitsu (ed), Kyokutö, p. 6, emphasis added. 
48 Nakamura, `Shöwashi', p. 186. 
49 Asahi Shimbun, 17 May 1952. Among the positive things raised were complete 
democratisation (13%), agrarian reform (9%), food imports (7%), the improvement in the 
position of women (6%), economic support (4%), education reform (3%), and others (13%). As 
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this is rather odd; it seems as if the Tokyo Trial had completely disappeared from 
the Japanese memory. At the same time, 39% responded `do not know' to the 
question whether there was anything positive in the occupation, and 46% for 
anything negative. This may imply the passive attitude as well as ambivalent 
feelings of the Japanese towards the occupation, which is not unrelated to their 
perception of the Tokyo Trial. 
The nation's interest was now focused on the rapid growth of the 
country's economy. Regarding the economic situation, the government declared 
in 1956 in its economic white paper that `the post war is over [mohaya sengo 
deha nai]'. In 1964, Tokyo hosted the Olympic Games. The interest of the 
nation was immediately shifted from the country's recovery from the war to its 
further development; in such an atmosphere, the reference to the Tokyo Trial was 
not actively made. 5° 
Instead of the Tokyo Trial, in which major war criminals were judged 
and punished, people after the occupation came to take more interest in the trials 
of minor war criminals, the so-called `Class-B/C' war crimes trials, which were 
conducted by the United States, Britain, Australia, France, Holland, Philippines, 
China and the Soviet Union, in their own occupied territory in Asia, based on 
their own laws and jurisdiction. 51 More than 55,000 individuals were taken into 
custody and 5,700 faced trial as Class B/C war criminals. 984 were sentenced to 
death, 475 to life imprisonment and 2,944 to limited prison sentences. 52 These 
for negatives, poverty, educational reform, too much emphasis on freedom and agrarian reform 
were raised. 
5° Awaya Kentar6, T5ky5 Saiban-ron (Tokyo: Ötsuki Shoten, 1989), p. 276. 
5' For details of trials conducted by each country, see Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on 
Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1979). 
52 Quoted in Tokyo Saiban Handobukku Henshü Iinkai (ed. ), T5ky5 Saiban Handobukku 
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figures exclude war crimes trials conducted by the Soviet Union, details of which 
are still unknown. 
Many Class B/C war crimes trials were said to have had many defects: 
the absence of interpreters, wrongful arrests, and unfair procedures and 
judgements caused by various problems in the law as it was applied. In addition, 
many Japanese prisoners suffered serious torture and ill-treatment conducted by 
vengeful locals; yet those acts did not receive any punishment. 53 However, these 
facts had not been known to the Japanese people at home during the occupation. 
Instead, with the despair of the defeat and poverty together with the Allies' 
propaganda, people soon after the war were furious about war criminals as well 
as the families of those criminals. 
It was not until the end of occupation that the details of those trials 
became known to the public through the words of the ex-servicemen and the 
publication of memoirs and farewell notes of the indicted. 54 Accordingly, 
sympathy and interest regarding minor war criminals increased. 55 The tragedy 
of those minor war criminals became better known through the story of a man 
who was prosecuted and executed for killing American POWs, which he 
(Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1989), p. 219. A fact which is not well-known is that those indicted for 
Class B/C war crimes included 173 Formosans and 148 Koreans, who, as Japanese colonial 
subjects, were forced to work for the Japanese Imperial Army. More than 40 were executed. 
See Utsumi Aiko, Chösenjin BC-kyü Senpan no Kiroku (Tokyo: Keisöshobö, 1982). 
s' In stark contrast to this shared view of Class-B/C war crimes trials among Japanese 
academics, Piccigallo states that trials were conducted fairly and justly with `excellent and 
devoted defense counsel', `fair-minded judges', `extraordinary thorough and impartial review 
procedures in all theaters', `adequate translation facilities', and `accessible, complete records 
of the proceedings'. Piccigallo, Japanese, p. 214. 
54 See Seikino Isho (Tokyo: Sugamo Isho Hensan-kai Kankö Jimusho, 1953). 
ss K6seishö (ed. ), Zoku Hikiageengo no Kiroku, Fukkoku-ban (Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 2000), 
p. 152, p. 156. 
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conducted unwillingly following orders. The story, Watashi ha Kai ni Narita j, 56 
was made into a TV drama and a film in 1959 and elicited national compassion. 
Those soldiers had obediently followed orders, as was the custom of the 
Japanese military based on the Imperial Rescript of 1882; nonetheless, they were 
punished after the war for committing war crimes. In many of these trial cases, 
following orders was not regarded as a mitigating circumstance. `The 
discrepancy between the legal concept held by countries running trials and the 
customs of the Japanese military, ' which had the same effect as actual law, `made 
the fate of soldiers so tragic, ' the Asahi emphasised. 57 
The tragedy and suffering of Class B/C war criminals were easily shared 
by the people, because they, unlike the major war criminals at the Tokyo Tribunal, 
were ordinary citizens who participated in the war as foot soldiers. At the same 
time, minor war crimes trials are seen `to be connected in an unbroken chain' 
with the Tokyo Trial. 58 In that sense, the Japanese view of the Tokyo Trial has 
been influenced, to some extent, by their view of the trials of minor war 
criminals, which gave overall war crimes prosecutions a negative image. 
Instead of taking over the investigation of war crimes from the hand of 
the Allies, post-occupation Japan welcomed back former war criminals into 
s6 Hashimoto Shinobu, Watashi ha Kaini Naritari (Tokyo: Gendaisha, 1959). 
57 Asahi Shimbun Hötei Kisha-dan, Tokyo Saiban, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Saiban Kank6-kai, 
1962), p. 44. In addition to supreme order, some point out the culture and mentality of the 
Japanese Imperial Army which regarded becoming a POW as a disgrace. Such a mentality is 
not irrelevant to the way they treated the Allies' POW. 
58 Tsurumi Shunsuke, `What the War Trials Left to the Japanese People' in Hosoya (eds. ), Tokyo, 
pp. 141-142. Indeed, both in public and private discourse as well as in some academic research, 
the Tokyo Trial and Class-BC war crimes trials have often been confused by incorporating the 
latter into the former. 
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society. While all remaining Class-A war crimes suspects had been released 
soon after the execution of Töjö and others in December 1948, the Japanese 
nation came to regard those who remained in prisons as `the victim of 
international policy'. With the end of the occupation, the responsibility for the 
management and control of the Sugamo Prison in Tokyo, which interned Class-A 
as well as B/C war criminals, was passed over to the Japanese government. 
Accordingly, the treatment of prisoners improved immensely. 59 Regarding war 
criminals not as ex-convicts under domestic law, the government started to 
prepare financial support system for such prisoners as well as their families. 60 
As Utsumi Aiko examines, it was certainly `not an atmosphere in which people 
and society could contemplate the defendants' experience in the trials and in 
their imprisonment' and incorporate this into their post-war soul-searching as a 
`peaceful nation'. 61 Japan after the occupation also welcomed former Class-A 
war crimes suspects back onto the political stage. Kishi Nobusuke, who was one 
of the released `Class-A" war crimes suspects that were waiting for the future 
trial at the time of the Tokyo Trial, became the Prime Minister in 1957 and served 
two consecutive terms until 1960, in spite of his alleged major roles during the 
war. Shigemitsu Mamoru, sentenced by the Tokyo judgment to seven years in 
62 prison, became the Foreign Minister in 1954. 
59 Dower, Embracing, pp. 514-515. 
60 Korean and Formosan war criminals living in Japan were not entitled to receive equal state 
assistance on war-led issues. See Tokyo Saiban Handobukku Henshü Iinkai (ed. ), Töky5, 
pp. 230-232. 
6' Comment by Utsumi Aiko in `Tokyo Saiban to Sensö Sekinin', Sekai, January 2003, p. 289. 
See also Hayashi Hirofumi, Sabakareta Sensö Hanzai: Igirisu no Tainichi Senpan Saiban 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998), p. 303. See Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of the Japanese 
sense of war responsibility. 
62 Unlike other defendants, Shigemitsu was a figure who had been favourably regarded by 




3. The 1960s and 1970s 
A revival in the interest among academics towards the Tokyo Trial took place in 
the mid-1960s. 63 One of the reasons for this is the Vietnam War and the reported 
atrocities there. They recalled `crimes against peace', war crimes, and `crimes 
against humanity', which the international military tribunals examined and, thus, 
raised interest in the Tokyo Trial. However, raised interest brought to the fore 
different standpoints from which the Tokyo Trial was examined: the awareness 
of responsibility for the past war and frustration and cynicism towards the Trial. 
Sumitani Takeshi argues that the Vietnam War together with a series of 
radical social movements in Japan during this period prompted the Japanese to 
see themselves as aggressors in relation to other Asian countries. 64 The 
normalisation of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972 also raised Japanese 
interest in China, as well as the issue of Japan's war crimes against the Chinese. 
Kinoshita Junji stated: `The reason why I came up with an idea to write a 
play on the Tokyo Trial was because I thought that one of the origins of this 
strangely distorted post-war Japan might be found in the Trial. ' 65 His play was 
first staged in 1970. Kami to Hito tono Aida (Between God and Man) consists of 
two parts: the first half is a recreation of the Tokyo Trial and the second deals 
Hankey together with his friends had tried to help Shigemitsu at his indictment and his 
conviction. In his Politics, Trials and Errors (Oxford: Pen-In-Hand, 1950), Hankey conducts a 
defence of Shigemitsu. 
63 For a good summary and analysis of academic research during this period, see Awaya, T5kyö, 
pp. 269-297; Higurashi, Tökyö, pp. 17-19; Sumitani Takeshi, `Sensö Hanzai Saiban-ron, Sensö 
Sekinin-ron no Dökö: Bunken Shökai wo Chüshinni', Shisö, No. 719 (May 1984), pp. 126-130. 
64 Sumitani Takeshi, ' "Shösha no Sabaki" ron Saikö' in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai, 
Toinaosu, pp. 52-53. 
65 Kinoshita, quoted in Awaya, T5ky5, p. 270. 
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with a minor war crimes trial of a private. 66 The play points out that the Tokyo 
Trial did not offer an opportunity to the Japanese for self-examination because it 
`dealt with the matter in terms of expediency'. 67 By involving the audience in 
the recreation of the Tokyo Trial and by showing the agony of a private in a 
minor war crimes trial, Kinoshita pushed the audience to think about each 
person's own guilt and responsibility: the play deals with `the act and art of 
self-judgement, the first half by obvious silence, the second by active 
demonstration. ' 68 
On the other hand, regarding awareness of responsibility for the war, the 
realpolitik of international relations during this period raised cynicism over the 
Tokyo Trial. The fact that war crimes, `crimes against humanity' and `crimes 
against peace' of the post-WWII wars were generally left unpunished 
strengthened the view among the Japanese that the Tokyo Trial was after all the 
victor's justice and that war crimes prosecutions would and could only be done 
by the victor against the vanquished. `The Tokyo Trial is an exact reflection of 
various contradictions in current international society, ' Asahi Shimbun Press 
Corps wrote: `the weakness of international law is revealed by the fact that the 
vanquished of the unconditional surrender can easily be brought to court but that 
the great power's "dirty hand" cannot be judged. ' 69 In addition to the 
international neglect of the legacy of the international military tribunals, 70 
cynicism among the Japanese towards that legacy was due to the threat of nuclear 
66 For an English translation of the script of the play, see Junji Kinoshita, translated and with an 
introduction by Eric J. Gangloff, Between God and Man: A Judgement on War Crimes -A Play 
in Two Parts by Kinoshita Junji (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979). 
67 Ibid., p. 9. 
68 Ibid., p. 4. 
69 Asahi Shimbun Hötei Kisha-dan, Tokyo, p. 49. 
70 See Chapter 2. 
171 
Chapter 4 
war caused by the two members of the former Allies. Peace now was threatened 
by those who punished the aggressors of the Second World War in the name of 
civilisation. This was a strong setback for the Tokyo Trial, which was claimed 
by the prosecutor, and accepted by the Japanese people, as a great trial whose 
`proceedings could have a far reaching effect on the peace and security of the 
world'. 71 
Criticism and frustration derived from `victor's justice' was a driving 
force for anti-Tokyo Trial polemicists. The advent of nuclear weapons showed, 
Kiyose Ichirö argued, that perpetual peace would not be attained with a mere 
`revenge tragedy', like the Tokyo Trial. 72 Tanaka Masaaki, a vocal opponent of 
the Tokyo Trial, claims that the International Military Tribunals, embracing the 
motto of `peace and humanity', ended in total fiasco: `We are now threatened not 
only by a possible WWIII but also by brutal mass slaughter comparable to no 
past events. ' 73 These people share the view that the Tokyo Trial was utterly 
unfair and vengeful, and went against the development of international law, all of 
which endorsed the anarchy of the post-war world. 
The Tokyo Trial and the Debate on the Nature of the War 
In the 1960s, the term `Daitöa Senso' (the Greater East Asia War) came 
to be used in public again to refer to Japan's war during the 1930s up until 
1945.74 The usage of the term was prohibited by the GHQ during the occupation 
71 Prosecution Opening Statement presented by Joseph Keenan, 4 June 1946, in Transcripts, 
Vol. 1, p. 384. 
72 Kiyose, Hiroku, p. 219. 
73 Tanaka, Paru, p. 2. 
74 The term was used in the title of Hayashi Fusao's article for Chüö Köron in 1963 in a rather 
sensational way: `Daitoa Senso Köteiron' [Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War]. He 
argues that Japan's war was a part of a hundred-year war against Western imperialism and 
172 
Chapter 4 
because of its connection with wartime ultra-militarism. 75 In the contemporary 
context, the term connotes the justification, sometimes glorification, of Japan's 
war history. During the 1960s, most of the terms currently used to describe the 
war surfaced: `the Second World War', `the Pacific War', the `Fifteen-years 
War', the `Greater East Asia War', each of these terms is strongly related to how 
one sees the nature of the war, which is not free of political and ideological 
colour. 76 
The debate on the Tokyo Trial relates to the nature of the past war 
because the Trial itself offered a specific account of the war, that Japan, through 
conspiracy, prepared and waged wars of aggression from the late 1920s until 
1945. The account of the Tribunal has been called the `Tokyo Trial view of 
history', especially by those refuting it. For this reason, the Tokyo Trial became 
the principal target to attack for those who regard the war as self-defensive in 
nature or as an attempt to liberate Asian countries from Western imperialism and 
77 create the Greater East Asian new order. Awaya Kentarö analyses the debate 
over the Trial during this period as follows: 
The already present confrontation between the different views of 
the Tokyo Trial became even more controversial with the added 
political and ideological flavours of the 1970s. What is more, 
through the pros and cons of the Trial, the confrontation between 
emphasises Japan's role in liberating Asian countries. 
" The GHQ prohibited the use in official writings of the term, together with other terms `whose 
connotation in Japanese is inextricably connected with State Shinto, militarism, and 
ultranationalism'. SCAP Directive, `Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support 
Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto', SCAPIN 448,15 December 1945. 
'6 In addition to these terms, the term `Asian-Pacific war' came to be used in the mid 1980s, 
which is now more generally used in public. 
" See Chapter 5 for a further examination of the Tokyo Trial's account of war and anti-'Tokyo 
Trial view of history' critics. 
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the different views on the history and present status of Japan 
became radicalised. 78 
Because of its political and ideological implications, the Tokyo Trial 
became difficult as well as delicate as an issue to be researched. 79 It is worth 
noting that authors of those anti-Tokyo Trial publications were often 
non-academics or academics not specialised in the field - thus their work cannot 
be regarded as solidly academic. Up until the late 1970s there was a lack of 
diversity in authors writing on the Tokyo Trial; books written by the same 
authors were re-published or published under different titles, and they were 
mostly written from anti-Tokyo Trial and right-wing points of view. Academic 
works on the Tokyo Trial, except those conducted by legal scholars, or positive 
reviews of the Trial were rarely published. Writing on the Tokyo Trial in 1971, 
Richard Minear pointed out that Japanese scholars were either staying away from 
the Tokyo Trial, perhaps for ideological or personal reasons, or `tended to affirm 
the validity of the trial and its verdict' when they had to comment on it. 80 This 
kind of attitude frustrated people like Tanaka, who claimed that the servile 
Japanese unconditionally accepted that `Japan had conducted an aggressive war' 
and still did not understand, or even try to understand, the real intention of the 
Tokyo Trial, which he saw was a means of propaganda under the occupation. 
8' 
The result, he claimed, was the obsequious national attitude of the Japanese, 
burdened with a sense of guilt. There was a clear contrast between those vocal 
rightist critics and leftist or `liberal' intellectuals who remained silent. 
78 Awaya, Tokyo, p. 270. 
79 See Chapter 5. 
80 Minear, victor's, p. ix. 
81 Tanaka, Paru, p. 5. 
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The General Reaction 
During the 1960s and 1970s, several books providing overviews of the 
Tokyo Trial were published, many of which were written by people who had 
directly or indirectly participated in the Trial. 82 However, a slight increase in 
the number of publications during this period compared to the 1950s did not 
necessarily mean an increase in general interest regarding the Tokyo Trial. 
Rather, most of the books were based on the authors' concerns about apathy 
among the Japanese people regarding the Trial. Sumitani, who started to take an 
interest in the Tokyo Trial in the 1960s, looks back at the period and states that he 
thought the issue had already faded away because he had rarely heard about the 
Trial during this period. 83 The nature of the silence and indifference during this 
period may be different from that of the occupation period. With the passing of 
time, the memory of the war started to fade and the so-called post-war generation, 
without the experience of the war and the Tokyo Trial, increased. Many 
publications implicitly or explicitly targeted the younger generations who might 
not know much about pre-war and wartime history and were enjoying post-war 
economic development. 84 The general apathy, at the same time, may not be 
irrelevant to the cynicism created by the Cold War as noted above. 85 
Kojima Noboru is the author of perhaps the most widely-read 
ß2 For example, Kiyose, Hiroku; Sugahara, Tokyo. Takigawa republished in 1978 his book 
published in 1952. These three were all members of the Defence Counsel. Kojima Noboru, the 
author of Tökyö Saiban, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Chükö Shinsho, 1971), was a student at the time who 
attended the Trial two or three times a week. 
83 Sumitani, `Shösha', p. 53. 
$4 See for example, Asahi Shimbun H6tei Kishadan, Tokyo, Vol. 1, pp. 30-31; Takigawa, Tokyo, 
Shinpan, pp. 8-9. 
85 See Chapters 5 and 6 for a detailed analysis of the nature of Japanese apathy. 
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Japanese-written work on the Tokyo Trial, who critically reviews the Trial. He 
claimed that constructive effects of the Tokyo Trial were nowhere to be seen. 
What may be worse, he argued, `the Tokyo Trial might have led post-war Japan 
and international society in untoward directions. ' 86 Kojima claimed, in 1971, 
that exactly because of such an impact, `the Tokyo Trial, together with the 
Pacific war, should be the starting point to which people now should go back and 
rethink Japan and where it should go. ' 87 For this purpose, he raised a 
fundamental question: `What was the Tokyo Trial? ' The question seems to be the 
central concern of most of the literature on the Tokyo Trial up to the present time, 
which focuses on how the Tribunal was established; how its procedures were 
carried out; who was sentenced and for what reason, and so on. Whether to claim 
the wrongfulness of the Trial or to emphasise its positive impact, each author is 
strongly aware that one has to start by depicting what actually happened. In 
other words, there was, and still is, a common understanding that the people in 
Japan know very little about the Tokyo Trial. The people's long-time 
indifference kept arguments on the Tokyo Trial focused on the historical facts, 
rather than on lessons learnt and its universal significance. 
4. The 1980s 
Up until the late 1970s, most of the argument on the Tokyo Trial had been 
focused on either whether the Trial was victors' justice or not - in other words, 
whether the Trial itself was just or not, or whether the Trial's historical account 
86 Kojima, Tokyo, Voll, p. iii. His book has been well-read because it was one of the popular 




of the period between 1928 and 1945 was right or not - in other words, whether 
Japan's war was a criminal aggressive war or inevitable self-defence. Focusing 
on the former easily leads to cynicism, because the more research on the Trial 
develops, the more the inherent defects of the Trial come to light. 88 Cynicism 
ends the discussion and thus leads to indifference to the whole issue. Focusing 
on the latter often ends up in less constructive debate, as it is often accompanied 
by emotional and ideological zeal. In sum, the Tokyo Trial had been either 
ignored in general or debated emotionally among a rather limited circle in an 
extreme form. Given such a situation, very little interest was shown in the Tokyo 
Trial's `universal' significance or the lessons that could be learned from it. 
During the 1980s, however, attempts to reinvestigate the Tokyo Trial from this 
perspective started to emerge. 
Beyond Dualisms 
Andö Nisuke, an international legal scholar, pointed out that the 
question `What is the Tokyo Trial? ' has various faces: `what it was for the judge', 
`for the judged' or `for the third parties'. Or, it can be seen as a question of the 
past `what it was', or `what it should have been', providing lessons for the future. 
Andö saw it in terms of what the Tokyo Trial should be to the Japanese now. 89 
After more than thirty years, the memory of the Tokyo Trial has already faded. 
Nonetheless, the significance of the Tokyo Trial, Andö emphasised, was too 
important for the contemporary Japanese to allow to fade with the passing of 
time. 90 He proposed that instead of the conventional `all-or-nothing' style of 
88 See Chapter 3. 
89 Andö Nisuke, `Tokyo Saiban toha Nanika' in Ködansha (ed. ), Tökyö Saiban: Shashin Hiroku 




analysis, the assessment of the Tokyo Trial required facing the facts with 
open-mindedness and having `courage and practice to look for the truth within 
grey areas. ' 91 
The point that had been absent in previous debates on the Tokyo Trial 
was how the people in Japan themselves see the Trial and how they learn lessons 
from it for the future. Another international legal scholar, Önuma Yasuaki, 
emphasised the importance of re-examining the way the Japanese had reacted to 
the Tokyo Trial, and tried to examine the Trial within the context of `post-war 
responsibility [Sengo Sekinin]' of the Japanese people, especially responsibility 
towards the Asian victims. He pointed out that what was symbolically absent 
from the Tokyo Trial was `Asia' and the Japanese people themselves. 92 By 
regarding the war as the Pacific War fought against the United States and 
referring to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese strengthened their feeling of 
being victimised by the war, which allowed them to dismiss to some extent 
Japan's war crimes. However, Onuma claimed that this perception should not be 
used to offset Japan's conduct against the Asian people. 93 
It is also during this period that empirical research based on primary 
sources started to be conducted, representatively by Awaya Kentarö. 94 
Symposium, Film and General Reactions 
With Andö and Önuma, together with Hosoya Chihiro, international 
91 Andö Nisuke in Richard H. Minear, translated by Andö Nisuke, T5kyö Saiban: Shösha no 
Sabaki (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1985), p. 217. 
92 Önuma Yasuaki, Tökyö Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisö he, 4`h ed. (Tokyo: T6shind6, 
1997), p. 55. First edition was published in 1985. 
93 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
94 Awaya, Töky5. 
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political theorist, playing a central part, the International Symposium on the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial was held in Tokyo in May 1983. It was the first 
opportunity to examine the Trial in public on such a scale within an international 
and interdisciplinary context. The 2-day symposium focused on historical, legal, 
international, and contemporary aspects of the Tokyo Trial and the panellists of 
the symposium were academics and journalists from both Japan and abroad. 95 
The symposium achieved great success, with about a thousand participants. 
While there was broad agreement among panellists that the Tokyo Trial had 
serious defects, the symposium emphasised that it was more important to 
recognise the positive aspects of the Trial for international peace and security. 
The symposium thus set forth a new direction for research of the Tokyo Trial, 
adding issues and perspectives that had been absent in past discussion of the 
Trial. Examining the emergence in the late 1970s of a small group of scholars 
and journalists working on the Tokyo Trial, a chairman of the symposium stated: 
thirty years after the end of the war, and of the trial itself, we were 
liberated from emotional bias and were able to evaluate the Tokyo 
trial from a position of relative calm. This is one of the reasons 
the time is ripe for a reexamination of the Tokyo trial. 96 
The symposium, however, also revealed that it was difficult, even after 
thirty-five years, to talk about the Tokyo Trial objectively. One of chairmen had 
to remind the participants at one point: `the purpose of our gathering here is not 
95 A record of the symposium was published in 1984, which is available in English: Chihiro 
Hosoya (et al. ) (eds. ), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium (Tokyo: 
Kodansha; New York, N. Y.: Distributed in the U. S. by Kodansha International through Harper 
& Row, 1986). 
96 Comment by Önuma Yasuaki in Hosoya (eds. ), Tokyo, p. 123. 
179 
Chapter 4 
to take nationalistic positions against one another. Please bear this in mind in 
making statements. ' 97 Debates at the symposium became heated especially on 
the historical aspects of the Tribunal and its historical record of the war. 
Questions regarding the veracity of the Tribunal's historical account were 
constantly raised even during the session focusing on legal, international or 
contemporary aspects of the Trial. The record of the symposium shows that the 
chairmen interrupted a number of members of the audience, pointing out that the 
issue raised should have been discussed in the session on `The Trial in Historical 
Perspective'. 98 
The symposium was held as the pre-release event of a feature-length 
documentary film of the Tokyo Trial. Tökyö Saiban [The Tokyo Trial] released 
in 1983 was based on films that were shot and had been kept by the US 
Department of Defense. Director Kobayashi Masaki's intention was to 
`illustrate the Tokyo Trial, the historical truth, as objectively as possible', and `to 
examine, within a historical context, the significance of the Trial for the 
Japanese in order to think about war and peace. ' 99 The film achieved great 
success. However, to his surprise, Kobayashi received comments from the 
audience which he had not expected, such as: `Those 28 defendants were 
praiseworthy', `That Trial was a political trial', or `The trial was coloured with 
97 Hosoya (eds. ), Tokyo, p. 56. 
98 See Ibid., pp. 58-59, p. 62. 
99 Comment by Kobayashi Masaki in `Tokushü Tokyo Saiban: Zadankai - Rekishi-teki 
Shinjitsu wo Kyakkanteki ni Guröbaruna Shiten de', Kinema Junpö, No. 858 (April 1983), p. 64, 
p. 67. Kobayashi is a director who had been tackling various war films, in which he tried to 
`express the horror, futility and foolishness of war'. He saw the Tokyo Trial as `the historic 
heritage of the century that should be taken up by any of Japanese who take part in filming. ' 
Kobayashi Masaki, `Watashi no "Tokyo Saiban"' in K6dansha (ed. ), Tokyo, p. 112. 
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racism'. 100 Several film critics and journalists had warned that the film might 
highlight problems with the Trial and lead people to justify Japan's past. 101 
Önuma observed that the public responded more acutely to Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki than Nanjing, both of which were depicted in the film. 102 He 
pointed out the popularity of the story of the tragic life of Hirota Köki, the only 
civilian sentenced to death in the Trial, in spite of the fact he, according to 
general understanding, had tried to avoid the war: `The Japanese people's feeling 
towards the Tokyo Trial is reflected in the fact that the whole significance of the 
Trial is condensed into the injustice of Hirota's death sentence. ' 103 People were 
embracing the feeling that `something is wrong with the Tokyo Trial, ' and the 
reaction to the film, Önuma saw, was easily understood as the eruption of 
thirty-five years of pent-up feelings: `Through the tragic hero, Hirota, the 
Japanese in 1983 reacted to the film acutely, most feeling negatively towards the 
Trial. ' 104 Rather than to educate the people, the film stimulated emotions that 
had long laid dormant among the Japanese: a sense of `victor's justice'. 
Frustration against the Tokyo Trial was associated with national pride. 
Having attained huge economic development and been reputed `Japan as 
Number One, ' los Japan in the 1980s regained self-confidence, which at the same 
time lessened its long-time inferiority complex towards the United States. 106 In 
100 Kobayashi in `Tokushii', p. 67. 
"I Shinada Yükichi in `Tokushn', p. 67. 
102 Önuma, Tokyo, pp. 156-157. 
103 Ibid., p. 23. 
104 Ibid.. 
105 The title of the book by Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One, published in 1979 and also 
published in Japanese in the same year, was repeatedly referred to in Japan through the 1980s. 
106 According to an opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in July 1985,48% answered that 




the process, the emphasis on Japanese pride grew stronger, and along with this 
the Tokyo Trial came to be targeted. In the summer of 1985, Prime Minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro set out his `General Reckoning with the Post-war [Sengo 
Seiji no Sö-Kessan]', in which he emphasised the importance of cultivating 
Japanese national identity that could stand tall in the world. Although he 
acknowledged that some of Japan's war conduct deserved harsh judgement, 
Nakasone questioned the way in which the Tokyo Trial had been conducted and 
expressed concern that the Trial had created a masochistic tendency among the 
Japanese to regard everything as wrong with Japan. 107 In the same year, 
Nakasone became the first Prime Minister to conduct an `official visit' to the 
controversial Yasukuni shrine, which holds the souls of about 2.5 million 
Japanese war dead since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, including 14 convicted 
Class-A war criminals, who were enshrined in 1978. The visit was strongly 
objected to by China, South Korea and other countries in South-East Asia as an 
expression of glorifying the past war. Having received these protests, Nakasone 
gave up the visit the following year. 
In the 1980s, several `hawkish' members of the cabinet publicly 
expressed their frustrations with the Tokyo Trial as well as the `Tokyo Trial view 
of history'. In 1986, the Minister of Education commented that the Tokyo Trial 
was a `black trial [ankoku saiban]'. 108 He was dismissed for having also stated 
that `Korea on her part had her own responsibility for Japan's annexation of the 
country'. 109 These people are a minority among Japanese politicians. In fact, 
most politicians rarely refer to the Tokyo Trial. This is in stark contrast to their 
107 Maki Tar6, Nakasone Seiken 1806-nichi, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Gyöken Shuppankai, 1988), p. 24. 
108 Fujio Masayuki, `Högen Daijin Öini Hoeru', Bungeishunjü (October, 1986), p124. 
109 Quoted in Nakamura, `Shöwa-shi'. P. 184 
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German counterparts, who do not hesitate to speak positively of Nuremberg. 110 
The words and deeds of Japanese politicians, together with the `textbook row' in 
1982, which was caused by a media report that the Japanese Ministry of 
Education had ordered some textbook authors to change the account of the war, 
led to several diplomatic rows with China. 
The film Tökyö Saiban in 1983 clearly was the catalyst for an increase 
in interest in the Tokyo Trial among the Japanese. This was well-reflected in the 
sudden rise in the number of publications on the Tokyo Trial that year. 111 
Although public interest declined at the end of the film's distribution, 112 the 
release of the film had stimulated academics and intellectuals. Various journals, 
10 The German Minister of Justice, Sabine Leutheusser-Scharrenberger, for example, 
commented in November 1995 publicly on Nuremberg: `From this trial the German people 
learned of the complete scale of atrocities committed, in their name, by an unscrupulous clique 
of criminals .... 
The Nuremberg tribunal was the first time a criminal system that breached all 
civilized values was given the correct responses. ' Quoted in Drexel A. Sprecher, Inside the 
Nuremberg Trial: a Prosecutor's Comprehensive Account, Vol. 1 (Lanham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 1999), p. 1450. 
"' According to the National Diet Library's database, 174 books, appeared under key words 
either `Tökyö Saiban [the Tokyo Trial]' or `Kokusai Gunji Saiban [the International Military 
Tribunal]' excluding Nuremberg, were published between 1946 and 2003. Among them 23 
books including court materials were published during the occupation (1946-1951); 13 during 
the 1950s; 14 in the 1960s; and 21 in the 1970s. The number suddenly went up in the 1980s, 
during which 36 were published, out of which 33 were published after 1983, the year the film 
was released. In 1990s, there were 54 publications, and after 2001 up until 2003, there were 13. 
Nearly 60 % of the publications on the Tokyo Trial up until 2003 were published after 1983. In 
the 1980s, the variety of people conducting research on the Tokyo Trial increased, unlike 
previous periods when only a small number of regular members published and republished their 
works. 
112 Tanaka Nobumasa, `Rekishi wo Kakutoku Surutame no Teiki' in Ajia Minshü H6tei Junbikai 
(ed. ), Jikö naki Sensö Sekinin: Sabakareru Tennö to Nihon, Zöho-ban (Tokyo: Ryokufü 
Shuppan, 1998), p. 28. 
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of both right and left ideological persuasion, issued editions specifically focused 
on the Tokyo Trial, 113 and articles and books written by academics have 
appeared constantly ever since. Several signs of productive academic research 
of the Tokyo Trial also emerged, as the symposium indicated. 
In spite of the expectations held by some academics, however, the 
passage of time did not curb the emotional and ideological reaction to the Tokyo 
Trial. The Trial was still caught in irreconcilable dualisms, which were further 
strengthened during the 1980s through increasing interest in the Trial as well as 
in the domestic and international environment. In addition, the Tokyo Trial came 
to be caught in a third type of dualism: between an attitude which was inclined to 
face Japanese responsibility towards the suffering of Asian victims and an 
attitude which denied the existence of such sufferings and Japan's responsibility 
for them. Confrontation between the two attitudes became ever starker entering 
into the 1990s, when the victims of Japanese Imperial Army broke silence and 
pressured the Japanese government for official acknowledgement and 
compensation. 
5. The Perspective of the 1990s Onward 
Academic approaches on the Tokyo Trial developed in the 1980s were passed on 
to the 1990s. In 1996 there was another symposium on the Tokyo Trial, Thinking 
about the Tokyo Trial: How the War was Judged, which attempted to examine 
academically and empirically the Trial's historical and international political 
113 See for example the following issues of journals: Seiron, No. 114 (December 1982), No. 163 
(April 1986); Asahi Jänaru, Vol. 25, No. 23 (1983); Shokun, Vol. 15, No. 8,9,10 and 11 (1983); 
Chüö Köron, Vol. 98, No. 9 (1983); and Shisö, No. 719. (May 1984). 
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background, its approach to the military, diplomats, the Imperial Court, and the 
Emperor, and its overall significance. 114 The historian Higurashi Yoshinobu 
conducted a full-scale research on the Tokyo Trial based on fact-finding via 
primary sources, examining its significance as a foreign policy. Considering that 
the true facts of the Tokyo Trial were being distorted by the ideological 
confrontation between those who affirmed the Trial and those who opposed it, 
Higurashi attempted to analyse the policy of the Trial through the relations of 
`norm' - or `civilisation's justice' - and `power' - or `victor's justice' - in 
international politics. 115 Sensitivity over `post-war responsibility' increased in 
the 1990s and various academics, from various fields, started to tackle the theme. 
As part of that process, some referred to the Tokyo Trial. 116 
The end of the Cold War gave access to Soviet documents that illustrate 
the Soviet policy on the Tokyo Trial. With these documents, Awaya Kentarö, 
together with NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), conducted research on the 
origins of the Tokyo Trial, focusing especially on a decision process regarding 
the immunity given to the Emperor. The result of the research was made into a 
documentary programme and shown on NHK in August 1992.117 Awaya, with 
other researchers, compiled the Numerical Case File, the International 
Prosecution Section's official records of interrogation stored in the National 
114 See Igarashi Takeshi and Kitaoka Shinichi (eds. ), `Söron' Tokyo Saiban toha Nandattanoka 
(Tokyo: Chikijishokan, 1997), for the record of the symposium. 
"S Series of his articles became a monograph, Higurashi, Tokyo. 
116 See for example, Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai (ed), Toinaosu; Awaya Kentarö et. al, Sensö; 
Ajia Minshü Hötei Junbikai (ed. ), Jikö; Takahashi Tetsuya, Sengo Sekinin-ron (Tokyo: 
Ködansha, 1999). 
117 The content of the documentary is published as Awaya Kentarö and NHK Shuzai-han, Tokyo 
Saiban he no Michi: NHK Supesharu (Tokyo: Nihon Hösö Shuppan Kyökai, 1994). 
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Archives, and published it in 28 volumes. 118 A substantial number of the 
defendants' documents that had been rejected, not submitted, or withdrawn, were 
also compiled in 1995.119 
In the 1990s, half a century after the war, several issues were brought to 
the fore that caused tension between Japan and its neighbouring countries over 
the past war, war crimes, and Japan's responsibility for them. In 1991, several 
Korean women publicly testified about their experiences as military sexual 
slaves. The existence of a system of institutional sexual slave labour, the 
so-called `comfort women', shocked the Japanese nation. The fact of comfort 
women had been not heard in public until the victims themselves came to the fore. 
With archival documents coming to light in 1992 that backed up the claim that 
the wartime government was directly involved in organising `comfort 
women', 120 the Japanese government could no longer ignore those claims. In 
August 1993, the government publicly acknowledged the issue, offered an 
apology, and decided to sponsor an NGO, the Asia Women Fund, to provide 
`sympathy money' to the victims. However, the NGO, in spite of its goodwill, 
was severely criticised because the Fund did not constitute direct compensation 
by the Japanese government. The government stated that it had no legal 
responsibility to pay compensation to individual victims because the issue of 
118 The series of 28 volumes are titled as Kokusai Kensatsu-kyoku Oshu Jüyö Bunsho, edited by 
Awaya, Kawashima Takane, Nakazono Hiroshi and Ikö Toshiya. 
9 Tokyo Saiban Shiryö Kankö-kai (ed), Tokyo Saiban Kyakka Miteishutsu Bengogawa Shiryö, 
Vol. 1-8 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankö-kai, 1995). 
120 See Yoshimi Yoshiaki, translated by Suzanne O'Brien, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in 
the Japanese Military During World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 
originally published in Japanese in 1995. Yoshimi is the one who located wartime documents 
on the comfort women issue. He points out in his research that gender, racial and ethnic 
discrimination together with imperialist domination facilitated the operation of the comfort 
women system and the victimisation of Asian women. 
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reparation had been solved with post-war state-to-state treaties. However, some 
victims have been bringing suits against the Japanese government to receive 
official post-war compensation. 
The action taken by the victims of the comfort women policy and other 
Japanese war crimes, and the `apologetic' reaction of the Japanese government to 
them angered and frustrated right-wingers and conservatives, which led to the 
so-called neo-nationalist movement. The movement in the mid-1990s came to 
target Japanese education and school textbooks that depicted war crimes 
committed by the Japanese Imperial Army, as well as people's historical 
perception; it is within this context that the Tokyo Trial and its account of the war 
were pinpointed and attacked severely as the cause of Japan's apologetic attitude. 
The so-called textbook row led to diplomatic rows with neighbouring 
countries. 
121 
In addition to the comfort women policy and the textbook row, 
Japanese ministers' regular visits to the Yasukuni shrine became a new source of 
tension between Japan and its neighbours. The Yasukuni row became bigger 
under Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichirö, who has been conducting visits to the 
shrine, not strictly in the form of an `official visit', every year ever since he took 
office in 2001. Koizumi insists that his visits were to pray for the dead and make 
a vow for peace. In response to strong criticism abroad, his visits were not 
scheduled for 15 August, a symbolic day for the Japanese to commemorate the 
end of the Pacific War. Such a `consideration', however, did not placate China 
and South Korea. On Koizumi's visit to the Shrine in April 2002, the Chinese 
foreign ministry expressed `strong dissatisfaction' with the action, saying that 
China `resolutely opposes' all such visits. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign 
121 See Chapter 5 for details of the neo-nationalism and the textbook row. 
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Affairs and Trade also commented: `We are very concerned that the visit is made 
to remember convicted war criminals who made neighbouring nations undergo 
deep pain and suffer the ravages of war'. 122 
Between Japan and its former victim countries in Asia, tension 
continually increased in the 1990s over issues such as comfort women, history 
textbooks, and the Yasukuni Shrine. The Tokyo Trial itself was rarely discussed 
publicly within these contexts. However, these issues can be traced back to who 
and what were prosecuted in the Tokyo Trial and how the war was depicted in it. 
At the same time, far more books on the Tokyo Trial were published in 1995 
alone, the symbolic year that marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War, than any other single year in the past. 123 Although the Tokyo 
Trial has been rather invisible in Japanese public discourse, these two points 
indicate that the Trial surely remains in the Japanese psyche, probably as a scar 
and ache, when Japan reflects on its past and present and its responsibility for the 
war. 
Conclusion 
Having examined the Japanese attitude towards the Tokyo Trial since 1946 up to 
2003, the following points can be made. First, apathy towards the Tokyo Trial, 
which can be observed as a general attitude of the Japanese right from the 
'ZZ 'Japanese shrine visit angers Seoul', Monday, 22 April, 2002, BBC News, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1942086. stm, 7 March 2004. 
123 According to the database of the National Diet Library, in 1995 alone, twenty-one books on 
the Tokyo Trial, including eight volumes of compiled documents of the Defence Counsel, were 
published. They comprise about 40% of the book published in the 1990s. 
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beginning, derives from the fact that it was regarded as irrelevant to most of the 
people in Japan. The Tribunal's prosecuting a handful of wartime leaders made 
the majority of the population detached from the defendants as well as their 
alleged war crimes. Second, at the same time, people's apathy was also related to 
the Tribunal's having not examined the Japanese army's war crimes against 
civilians in other Asian countries, as well as the role of the Emperor. This 
strengthened people's self-image that they were the principal victims of the war 
that was conducted by a military clique, but were not the victimiser, and thus 
prevented them to take interest in the issue of war responsibility. Third, apathy 
also consists of cynicism, which derives from the recognition that the Tokyo 
Trial was `victor's justice'. What is also important about `victor's justice' is that 
it is accompanied by frustration. Why was only Japan's conduct prosecuted has 
been the driving force for the nationalist criticism of the Tokyo Trial. And fourth, 
the Tribunal's verdict and historical record that Japan had conducted wars of 
aggression have been the source of fierce and emotional debates in Japan, so 
much so that they hinder productive discussion over the significance and lessons 
of the Tokyo Trial. As a result of these four points, the Tokyo Trial becomes, in 
Japan, an issue that is either discussed and talked about emotionally by a 
minority and limited circle, or ignored by the majority of the population. 
The thesis regards the above four points as the Tokyo Trial's important 
`side-effects' on Japan, which, although immediately achieving demilitarisation 
and democratisation, nonetheless is still struggling, after half a century, for 
reconciliation with its victims as well as with its own past. The rest of the thesis 
examines the content and mechanisms of these `side-effects', in more detail, 
with the two devices of the Trial as pillars of analysis: the individualisation of 
responsibility and the Tribunal's record of the war - the first and fourth points 
189 
Chapter 4 
raised above. Rather than to illustrate the Japanese perception as it is, the 
remainder of the thesis attempts to analyse and explain the Japanese attitude in 
relation to these two devices that are recurrent themes in the discourse of the 
`Nuremberg legacy' within the context of current international war crimes 
prosecution. The aim is to examine whether these devices had any impact on 
post-war Japan, and if so what kind. The second and third points -'victim 




THE TOKYO TRIAL AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE WAR 
Through its legal procedure and judgment, the Tokyo Tribunal provided a 
historical record of the war and war crimes conducted by Japan. Of its 1,218 
pages of judgment, the Tribunal devoted 1,050 pages to a detailed explanation of 
Japanese policy during the period between 1928 and 1945. This shows how 
much the Tribunal attached importance to the creation of a historical record 
besides the actual judgment and sentences. This chapter examines what kind of 
impact, if any, the Tokyo Trial's historical record has had on post-war Japan. 
Analysis is conducted from two perspectives: whether and in what way the 
Tribunal's historical record helped demilitarisation and democratisation of Japan, 
the strategic purpose of the American occupation policy; and whether and in what 
way it had any impact on the cultivation of people's historical perception, 
collective memory, identity, and reconciliation, which is raised by promoters of the 
`Nuremberg legacy' as a key utility of the trial's historical record. It is not the 
aim of this chapter to explain post-war Japan's demilitarisation and 
democratisation process as the outcome of the historical record of the Tokyo Trial, 
which was merely one part of bigger American occupation policy. What the 
following attempts instead is to examine the impact of the Tribunal's historical 
record from the perspective of demilitarisation and democratisation. In the same 
vein, the chapter does not try to analyse Japanese collective memory, national 
identity, and reconciliation as such. These are topics of increasing popularity but 
very complex ones that consist of multiple elements, which cannot be explained 
only by the Tokyo Trial. Rather, the following attempts to examine whether the 
Tokyo Trial can be placed within a bigger framework of collective memory and 
reconciliation and see if there is any role that the Trial's historical record played or 
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plays in it. The aim of this chapter is to test, through the Tokyo Trial, one of the 
two pillars of the Nuremberg legacy: the positive impact of the trial's historical 
record on post-war societies. 
1. The Historical Account of the Tokyo Tribunal 
During the procedures at the Tokyo Tribunal, both the Prosecutor and the Defence 
Counsel spent much of their time characterising the war Japan had fought during 
the period of 1928 and 1945. The Defence claimed that the wars Japan had 
fought were justifiable acts of self-defence to preserve the welfare and prosperity 
of the Japanese nation threatened by the Allies' measures to restrict the economy 
of Japan. Against this claim, the judgment of the Tribunal, accepting the case for 
the Prosecution, concluded that there was, in Japanese policy, a criminal 
conspiracy to wage wars of aggression: Japan launched a war of aggression against 
China, had planned and prepared for a war of aggression against Britain, France, 
the Netherlands, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and had launched a war 
of aggression against the United States and the British Commonwealth. The 
judgment defined the conspirators as the military and their supporters and found 
that they had succeeded in `obtaining control of the organs of government of Japan 
and preparing and regimenting the nation's mind and material resources for wars 
of aggression designed to achieve the object of the conspiracy. ' 1 They, according 
to the judgment, `carried out in succession the attacks necessary to effect their 
1 The Judgment, in R John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds. ) and Project Director: 
Donald Cameron Watt, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty-two Volumes (New 
York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1981) [as Transcripts hereafter], Vol. 20, p. 49,765. 
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ultimate object that Japan should dominate the Far East. ' 2 
The Tribunal also found that the Japanese military had perpetrated serious 
war crimes against the Allies' POWs and against civilians while waging war in 
China, including the notorious Nanjing massacre: `from the opening of the war in 
China until the surrender of Japan in August 1945 torture, murder, rape and other 
cruelties of the most inhumane and barbarous character were freely practiced by 
the Japanese Army and Navy. ' According to the evidence and testimony, the 
Tribunal declared that only one conclusion was possible: `the atrocities were either 
secretly ordered or wilfully permitted by the Japanese Government or individual 
members thereof and by the leaders of the armed forces. ' 3 
Defects in the Tribunals' Account 
Whether broadly in agreement with the verdict of the Tokyo Trial or not, it 
is now widely agreed among academics that it is risky to accept unconditionally 
the account of the war and Japanese wartime policy provided in the Judgment of 
the Tokyo Tribunal. There are several defects in the Tribunal's historical account 
of the war, of which the thesis focuses on the following three points, which 
directly influenced, or are said to have influenced, the memory and discourse of 
the Japanese people regarding the war and war crimes. 
One of the fundamental flaws, or `perhaps the fundamental flaw' 
according to Richard Minear, was the Tribunal's application of the concept of 
conspiracy to account for the wars fought by Japan. 4 The term `conspiracy' was 
Z Ibid., p. 49,765. 
3 Ibid., p. 49,592. 
4 Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, N. J: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), p. 134. Other than the substantiation of conspiracy, Minear argues that 
the historical accuracy of the verdict is doubtful in narratives on relations between Japan and the 
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originally conceived to apply to the case of Nazi Germany. The question raised 
here is whether it can also be applied to the Japanese case. First, the constitutive 
element of conspiracy is the existence of an organised plan `that was formed and 
laid its plans deliberately and programmatically as part of some master plan'. 5 
The Prosecution at the Tokyo Tribunal insisted that `it is apparent from the 
evidence that there did exist a really carefully planned conspiracy or common plan 
for commission of the crimes set forth in the Indictment. ' 6 However, historian 
lokibe Makoto posits that, in the case of Japan, the whole war was `not the matter 
of the existence of cool-headed and evil "conspiracy" but the matter of its 
non-existence. ' 7 The complexity and incoherence of wartime Japanese policy 
can be seen from the simple fact that the Japanese cabinet changed seventeen 
times during the period between 1928 and 1945. What is more, the lack of 
conspiracy is well-reflected in the stark confrontation during the Trial between two 
defendants, Tögö Shigenori, a career diplomat, and Admiral Shimada Shigetarö, 
over the issue of the attack on Pearl Habour. 
Secondly, the Tokyo Judgment concluded: 
These far-reaching plans for waging wars of aggression and the 
prolonged and intricate preparation for and waging of these wars of 
aggression were not the work of one man. They were the work of 
many leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for the 
Soviet Union and Japan and the Axis Alliance, and on the attack of Pearl Harbour. See Ibid., 
pp. 125-159. 
5 Donald Cameron Watt, `Historical Introduction' in R John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide 
(eds. ) and Project Director: Donald Cameron Watt, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The 
Comprehensive Index and Guide to the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East in Five Volumes (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1987), Vol. 1, p. xviii. 
6 Summation by the Prosecution, 11 February 1948, Transcripts, Vol. 16, p. 38,972. 
7 lokibe Makoto, ' "Tökyö Saiban" ga Sabaita Hito to Jidai' in Ködansha (ed. ), Tokyo Saiban: 
Shashin Hiroku (Tokyo: K6dansha, 1983), p. 109. 
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achievement of a common object. That common object, that they 
should secure Japan's domination by preparing and waging wars of 
aggression, was a criminal object. 8 
Who, however, are those `many leaders'? In practice, prosecutors of the Tokyo 
Tribunal had found it difficult to identify conspirators. Arthur Comyns-Carr, 
British Associate Prosecutor, who took a central part in drafting the indictment, 
stated: 
the whole Japanese situation is infinitely more complicated than the 
German for the purposes of a prosecution, as all the politicians, 
soldiers and sailors were all squabbling and double-crossing one 
another all the time and it is by no means easy to pick the right 
defendants. 9 
A staff member in the attorney generals office also stated: `the difficulties of 
drafting and agreeing the defendants have been much greater than over the 
Nuremberg indictment in that Japan never had any consistent party like the Nazis, 
and out of a plethora of possible defendants responsible since 1931, only a few can 
be picked from a very competitive bunch. ' 10 This fact raises the question as to 
whether the count of `conspiracy', the existence of an organised plan formed 
`deliberately and programmatically as part of some master plan', can be applied to 
the Japanese case. 
8 Transcripts, Vol. 20, pp. 49,768-49,769, emphasis added. 
9 Quoted in Watt, `Historical', p. xviii. 
10 Ibid., xviii. Unlike Nuremberg, in the Tokyo Trial there was no provision for trying `criminal 
organisations', according to which the SA and the SS were tried under Nuremberg. This was 
because of the conclusion of preliminary studies of Japanese organisations that `failed to reveal 
any close parallel between the German organizational program and that of Japan. ' Solis Horwitz, 
`The Tokyo Trial', International Conciliation, November 1950, No. 465, p. 487. 
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The structure of Japanese wartime decision-making that lacked centrally 
given criminal order is a reason why the Tokyo Trial focused on another difficult 
criminal concept: `negative criminality', or legal culpability for having failed to 
prevent the commission of war crimes. " The prosecution and punishment for 
the omission to stop crimes yielded doubtful judgements against several 
defendants. 12 
`Japan was not Germany; Tojo was not Hitler; the Pacific war was not 
identical with the European war, ' Minear argues: `Yet in spite of these crucial 
differences the legal trappings set up to punish the Nazis were applied in precisely 
the same manner to the Japanese leaders. ' 13 Conspiracy is a convenient concept 
that enables wholesale prosecution of military leaders; however, it is too simplistic 
a concept on which to base historical narration. `Declaring that documentary 
materials introduced revealed an eighteen-year-long "common plan" to wage 
aggressive war, ' John Dower states, `was much closer to propaganda than to 
serious historical analysis. ' 14 
The second shortcoming of the Tokyo Trial's account of the war is its 
heavy focus on the role of the military clique. The judgment spent a great many 
pages, under the heading of The Military Domination of Japan and Preparation 
" The indictment charged 26 defendants under Count 55: `deliberately and recklessly disregarded 
their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches thereof, and 
thereby violated the laws of war'. Seven were found guilty. 
12 General Matsui Iwane was sentenced to death only for the charge of negative criminality for the 
Nanjing Massacre. Hirota Köki was sentenced to death for counts including negative 
responsibility for the Nanjing massacre that occurred when he was the Minster of Foreign Affairs, 
while three defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment for exactly the same counts as Hirota 
except the conviction for negative criminality. 
13 Minear, Victor's, p. 134. 
14 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (Penguin Books, 
2000), p. 463. 
196 
Chapter 5 
for War, to describe how the military, through propaganda, persuasion or 
assassination, came to dominate Japan, created a `reign of terror', and prepared for 
aggressive wars. The military, according to the judgment, gradually rose: 
to such a predominance in the government of Japan that no other 
organ of government, neither the elected representatives of the people, 
nor the civilian ministers in the Cabinet, nor the civilian advisers of 
the Emperor in the Privy Council and in his entourage, latterly 
imposed any effective check on the ambitions of the military. 15 
Blaming the military for Japan's wars of aggression may be inevitable, considering 
the fact that the Tokyo Trial was part of American policy to demilitarise Japan. '6 
However, to explain seventeen years of Japanese history only by a conspiracy of 
the military clique is too simplistic. lokibe claims that the Tribunal's defendants 
lacked two important civilian figures that played a significant role in expanding 
the war: Matsuoka Yösuke, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who concluded 
the Axis Alliance, and Konoe Fumimaro, a former Prime Minister who contributed 
to the expansion of the Sino-Japanese war. 17 
Arai Shinichi, historian, claims that examining the developments which 
led to the war within the framework of extreme militarist versus moderate political 
leaders is the `elitists' view of history', which lacks `structural analysis of social 
and historical elements that have enabled Japan to conduct aggression'. 18 This 
15 Transcripts, Vol. 20, p. 48,513. 
16 See Chapter 3. 
" Iokibe, "`Tokyo"', pl. 11. Konoe committed suicide before arrest. Matsuoka was one of 28 
defendants of the Tokyo Tribunal but died immediately after the opening of the Trial. 
18 Quoted in Nakamura Masanori, 'Shöwashi Kenkyü to Tökyö Saiban' in Igarashi Takeshi and 




was pointed out by the research group of Asahi Shimbun soon after the occupation: 
If the aim was to reveal the truth and avoid the tragedy of the war 
being repeated, wasn't it most important to investigate why Japan 
had come to pursue aggression? For that purpose, it was first of all 
necessary to examine Japan's social structure, with the Emperor at 
the top.... However, the prosecutor started off their argument with 
the fact that a chain of bad guys that planned the aggression and had 
mobilised the whole structure of Japan. In this way, it avoided 
issues of the Emperor and Zaibatsu, and ended up in targeting a few 
military men with `star value', along with a very limited number of 
bureaucrats. 19 
As examined in Chapter 3, the Tokyo Trial exempted several important issues and 
people from prosecution as a result of political calculations by the United States. 
The total absence of the Emperor in the record of the war is a fatal blow in terms 
of clarifying Japan's social structure and its relationship to the war. The 
significance of an historical record with important pieces missing is rather 
dubious. 20 
The third shortcoming is that the Tokyo Trial, as well as its account of the 
war, focused heavily on the Pacific War. Awaya Kentarö, an historian, points out 
that World War II in the Asian-Pacific sphere had three aspects: war among 
imperial powers; war between fascist and anti-fascist powers; and liberation war 
against colonialism. Rather than examining the complex nature of the war, the 
Tribunal created a simple account based on the Allies' view of the war, i. e. war 
19 Asahi Shimbunsha Chösa Kenkyü-shitsu (ed), Kyokut6 Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kiroku: Mokuroku 
oyobi Sakuin (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Chösa Kenkyn-shitsu, 1953), pp. 6-7. 
20 Iokibe pointed out that the absence from the Trial of Ishihara Kanji, a military officer and the 
mastermind of the Manchurian Incident, together with Matsuoka and Konoe, degraded the 
standard and accuracy of the Tribunal's historical record. Iokibe, "`Tokyo"', p. 108. 
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between fascist Axis vs. anti-fascist Allies. This is because of the strong 
influence of the United States in conducting the Tokyo Trial, the American interest 
being in the Pacific War. Accordingly, `the aspect of the war among the imperial 
powers was overlooked and the aspect of liberation against colonialism was dealt 
with subordinately'. 21 
The colonialist aspect of the war in the Asian sphere and Japanese colonial 
rule over its Asian neighbours were ignored at the Tribunal in spite of the fact 
various war crimes were allegedly conducted against civilians there. Kainö 
Michitaka, a member of the Defence Counsel at the Tribunal, saw it as a problem 
to put Töjö Hideki, Prime Minister at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War, 
at the centre of the Tokyo Trial: 
The Tokyo Trial should have focused on Japan's war against China. 
As a war, the Pacific War was bigger in scale and impact, causing 
greater harm to the world. However, on the point of immorality and 
aggressiveness, it is doubtful whether Japan's war in the Pacific 
should be focused on. Something is wrong with regarding the war 
22 crimes trial as being equal to the Toj ö trial. 
Japan's war responsibility against its Asian neighbours had been left untouched 
and rarely mentioned within the debate on the Tokyo Trial, until the 1970s. 23 
21 Awaya Kentarö, Tökyö Saiban-ron (Tokyo: Ötsuki Shoten, 1989), pp. 269-270. The Tribunal 
also ignored the defendants' claim that Japan had been facing the threat of the rise of communism 
in the region, by rejecting the defendants' evidence as irrelevant. Tokyo Saiban Shiryö Kankökai 
(ed. ), Tökyö Saiban Kyakka Miteishutsu Bengogawa Shiryö, Vo. 1 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankökai, 
1995), p. 29. 
22 Quoted in Yoshida Yutaka, `Senry6-ki no Sensö Sekinin-ron' in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai 
(ed. ), Toinaosu Toky6 Saiban (Tokyo: Ryokufu Shuppan, 1995), p. 248. 
23 See Chapter 4. 
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The Tokyo Trial was conducted with a specific view of the war, and the 
pre-existence of such a view can be seen from the fact that the Tribunal set its 
jurisdiction between 1 January 1928 and 2 September 1945, implying that this was 
the period of Japan's war. On this temporal jurisdiction, Arnold Brackman states 
that rather than present `the link between the accused and the reign of barbarism 
they had conducted as state policy from 1931 to 1945, the prosecutors plunged 
into murky Japanese domestic politics of the 1920s and 193Os, '24 that is, the rise 
of the military clique. What is more, by setting the temporal jurisdiction, the 
Tribunal could and did determine `who will play the villain, who the victim. ' 25 
For these reasons, many Japanese academics believe that `[i]n a real sense, ... the 
Tokyo trial sat in judgement on the history of the Pacific region up to the end of 
World War II. ' 26 In other words, the Trial had defined the nature of the war. 
John Pritchard, who compiled the transcript of the Tokyo Trial in twenty-one 
volumes in the 1980s, states: `There is, perhaps, a philosophical divide between 
those who call it the "Tokyo War Crimes Trial" and those who call it the "Tokyo 
War Trial". I prefer the latter. ' 27 
In the Tokyo Tribunal's account of history, some find a problem of 
resorting to legal procedure for the account of the events. Minear's conclusion 
follows: 
24 Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials 
(New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1987), p. 23. 
25 Mark J. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, N. J.: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 133. 
26 Preface in Chihiro Hosoya [et al. ] (eds. ), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International 
Symposium (Tokyo: Kodansha; New York, N. Y.: Distributed in the U. S. by Kodansha 
International through Harper & Row, 1986), p. 8, emphasis added. 
2' R John Pritchard, An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial, Nissan 
Occasional Paper Series No. 5 (Oxford: Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, 1987), p. 50. 
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Historical process does not yield to adjudication; and the attempt to 
make history justiciable is doomed from the start. The mistakes of 
Tokyo were attributable in part to bias and to restrictions on 
admissible evidence. But the larger share of the blame must fall on 
the basic misconception that the events at issue could be 
adjudicated. 28 
The documents and materials of the Tokyo Trial were collected and examined for 
the purpose of judicial procedures, that is to prove the guilt of the defendants, not 
for the pursuit of factual truth per se. In addition, the Tokyo Trial as well as the 
Nuremberg Trial, was a military trial. To the eyes of historians, Donald Watt 
claims, `the inefficiency of the adversary system of legal investigation at least as 
practiced by Anglo-Saxon lawyers as a means of uncovering historical "truth"' is 
clear, 29 Even some high officials in the US government expressed some doubts 
at the time on the appropriateness of the Tokyo Tribunal as a means of establishing 
the historical record: `the validity of the trial itself doubtless will be long debated, 
as will the wisdom of using a court process to reveal this military past to the 
Japanese, ' wrote William Joseph Sebald. 30 
Impact on the People at the Time 
Although the experts seriously question the `authoritativeness' of the 
Tokyo Tribunal's historical record, they commonly accept that without the 
structure of an international trial and the strong authority of the GHQ controlling 
the country, it was not possible to assimilate the enormous amount of documents 
28 Minear, Victor's, p. 159. 
29 Watt, `Historical', p. xxii. 
30 William Joseph Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan: a Personal History of the Occupation 
(London: Cresset Press, 1967), p. 151. 
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and records of wartime Japan. Indeed, the Japanese government and military 
organisations had tried to burn many of their secret documents before the start of 
the American occupation. Many important issues would never have come to light 
without the Tokyo Tribunal. Many Japanese academics accept this as a positive, 
or the most positive, aspect of the Tokyo Trial for contemporary Japan. 31 What 
is more, it is the procedures of the Tokyo Trial through which the Japanese people 
came to know in detail what had actually happened during the war and what kind 
of atrocities had been conducted by their soldiers. 
The Tokyo Trial's account of the war had a significant impact on the 
Japanese people at the time. 32 The Trial offered people facts about the war - who 
planned and conducted the war in what way - which were for a long time 
concealed from the public. In addition, what shocked the Japanese was the detail 
of atrocities committed by the Japanese army, such as the Nanjing massacre. 
This information convinced the nation that they had been deceived by the military 
clique during the war. `During the war we were forced to suffer a poor life; but 
we lost the war that Töjö had said that we would definitely win, ' an executive of a 
company said during the Trial: `Now I came to learn through the Tokyo Trial that 
it was a reckless, aggressive war pursuing the interests of the privileged class and 
capitalists, and realised that we had been completely deceived. ' 33 The impact of 
the Tokyo Trial's account rests not only on its revealing the hidden aspects of the 
war and wartime government, but also on `interpreting and providing an overview 
31 Awaya Kentarö, `Tokyo Saiban wo Kangaeru' in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai (ed. ), Toinaosu, 
pp. 22-23; Önuma Yasuaki, Tokyo Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisö he, 4 `h ed. (Tokyo: 
Töshindö, 1997), p. 150. 
32 Iokibe, "`Tokyo", ' p. 108; Igarashi Takeshi and Kitaoka Shinichi (eds. ), Söron, p. iii. 
33 Quoted in Yoshimi Yoshiaki, `Senryö-ki Nihon no Minshü-Ishiki: Sensö-Sekinin-ron wo 
Megutte', Shisö, No. 811 (January 1992), p. 77. 
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of the period'. 34 And importantly, the information and the way it was portrayed 
were accepted by the majority of the population. Acceptance of the Trial's 
historical account is natural, considering the fact that the Tokyo Trial itself was 
accepted albeit passively by the nation, as seen in the previous chapter. What is 
more, the GHQ's campaign before the Tokyo Trial, such as a series of articles in 
major newspapers on `The History of the Pacific War, ' may have had a substantial 
effect. 35 
However, it needs to be pointed out that the Trial's account was also 
accepted by people because it was, in several aspects, `comfortable' for the people 
at the time. First, by revealing the wartime politico-military structure, the Tokyo 
Trial pointed the finger at who should be blamed for the war and misery and 
poverty which accompanied it. At the same time, by pointing the finger at the 
military clique, the account freed the majority of the population from the burden of 
war responsibility. The story offered by the Tokyo Trial matched the national 
anger that existed at the time towards the wartime government and the military, as 
well as people's disassociation from them. 36 One political cartoonist expressed 
his hatred for the defendants at the Tokyo Trial: `All of us people were deceived 
and used by them, and cooperated in the war without knowing the true facts. 
Looking back now, this was because of ignorance and being deceived. ' 37 The 
Trial's account of the war, in turn, further impressed the Japanese that they had 
been deceived by their own leaders. 
Second, the Tribunal's account of the war excluded the role of the 
34 Comments by Hata Ikuhiko in Hosoya (eds. ), Tokyo, p. 103. 
35 See Chapter 3. 
36 Carol Gluck, `The Past in the Present' in Andrew Gordon (ed. ), Postwar Japan as History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 66. 
37 Quoted in Dower, Embracing, p. 490. 
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Emperor, who was supported by the majority of the nation even after the war. 38 
Here, an interesting US-Japan collaboration in the Tokyo Trial's historical record 
can be seen. The historical record without the Emperor could not have been 
constructed without cooperation from the Japanese side, including the 
defendants. 39 An often-noted episode is the testimony of Töjö, who, during his 
defence on 31 December 1947, stated that `there is no Japanese subject who would 
go against the will of His Majesty; more particularly, among high officials of the 
Japanese government or of Japan. ' 40 The statement upset the US Chief 
Prosecutor Joseph Keenan because it implied war responsibility on the part of the 
Emperor. Keenan urged T6j6 via Kido, the Emperor's close adviser, to retract his 
statement. On 6 January 1948, Töjö claimed that his statement on the Emperor 
was based on his `feeling towards the Emperor as a subject, and that is quite a 
different matter from the problem of responsibility, that is, the responsibility of the 
Emperor. ' He emphasised that war was decided by his cabinet: `It may not have 
been according to his will, but it is a fact that because of my advice and because of 
the advice given by the High Command the Emperor consented, though reluctantly, 
to the war. ' 41 
38 According to the opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in August 1948,68.5% supported 
the Emperor remaining his status, while 18.4% wanted him to abdicate in favour of his son, 4% 
wanted the abolition of the Emperor system, and 9.1% answered `do not know'. Quoted in 
T6ky6 Saiban Handobukku Henshüt Iinkai (ed. ), Tökyö Saiban Handobukku (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 
1987), p. 233. Kiyoko Takeda points out, through careful examination of public opinion polls at 
the time, that people were `favourable to the person of the emperor and not to an absolute and 
authoritarian emperor system. ' Kiyoko Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 150. 
39 John W. Dower, "`An Aptitude for Being Unloved": War and Memory in Japan' in Omer Bartov, 
Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (eds. ), Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: The New Press, 2002), p. 233. 
40 Transcripts, Vol. 15, p. 36,521. 
a' Ibid., p. 36,780. 
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The Tokyo Trial attempted to facilitate the demilitarisation and 
democratisation of Japan, and demarcate wartime and post-war Japan. The 
Japanese, on their part, accepted the Trial's judgment and its account because they 
themselves felt resentment against the military and were willing to leave the war 
behind and move forward. Thus, the Japanese albeit passive acceptance at the 
time of the Tokyo Trial's account - an acceptance which remains - is not a 
one-way story. 42 
2. The `Tokyo Trial View of History' and Revisionism 
The account of the war for which so many people fought and died is never without 
controversy. For some people, the view that `Japan has waged wars of 
aggression and committed terrible war crimes along the way' is hardly acceptable. 
Such a view is more unacceptable when it is seen as having been given, or 
imposed, through an international trial, and even more so when the trial is 
regarded as `victor's justice'. The Tokyo Tribunal's historical record together 
with the Trial itself has been bitterly criticised by the right-winger, the nationalist, 
and the revisionist, who justify, even glorify, pre-war and war-time Japan. 
The `Tokyo Trial View of History' and Its Critics 
The historical record of the Tokyo Tribunal has been targeted by 
42 Unlike other anti-'Tokyo Trial view of history' critics, Hosaka Masayasu points out the 
US-Japan collaborative aspects of the `Tokyo Trial view of history' and argues that various 
`contribution' to the view on the part of the Japanese government and people are the very reason 
why the Japanese still cannot break the `spell' of the Tribunal's account. Hosaka Masayasu, 
`Dakara "Tokyo Saiban Shikan wo Koerarenai', Shokun! (January 1998), p. 150. See also Gluck. 
`Past', pp. 66-70. 
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right-wing polemicists under the banner of the `war crimes trial view of history', 
or the `Tokyo Trial view of history' (Tokyo saiban shikan). What exactly the 
term `Tokyo Trial view of history' means is not necessarily clear, and the term in 
fact has been used in various ways. However, it is rarely used academically and 
most of the time denotes the negation of the judgment of the Tokyo Trial. Fuji 
Nobuo, a user of the term, defines the `Tokyo Trial view of history' as: 
an historical view which regards the account of the Tokyo judgment 
as totally true and considers that the wars conducted by Japan were 
`wars of aggression' against international law and treaties and that 
Japan's past actions were all criminal and 'bad'. 43 
The biggest attack on the `Tokyo Trial view of history' is made on the 
Tribunal's conclusion that the wars Japan fought from the late 1920s until 1945 
were aggressive in nature. While academics in the field, examined above, see it 
as a problem that the Tribunal applied a concept of conspiracy to account for 
Japan's aggressive war, such an account itself is the problem for the anti-'Tokyo 
Trial view of history' critics. For them, the historical account of the Tokyo Trial 
is simply not true: they emphasise, echoing the assertion of defendants at the 
Tribunal, the self-defensive aspect of Japan's wars or the aspect of the wars to 
liberate Asia from western imperialism. `The view that Japan conducted 
aggression was created and proliferated based mostly on the judgment of the 
Tokyo Tribunal, ' argues Satö Kazuo, an international legal scholar. 44 
The `Tokyo Trial view of history' becomes even more unacceptable as it 
43 Fuji Nobuo, Watashi no Mita Tökyö Saiban, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Ködansha, 1988), p. 542. This 
volume records the proceedings of the Tribunal through the eyes of the author, who had attended 
most of the Trial procedures. 
44 Satö Kazuo, Kenpö Kyü jö, Shinryaku Sensö, Tökyö Saiban (Tokyo: Hara Shobö, 1985), p. 71. 
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is seen as the creation of `victor's justice': the war fought by the vanquished was 
judged as criminal aggression by the victor. Takigawa Masajirö, a member of the 
Defence Counsel at the Tribunal, stated: `whether the war Japan conducted was an 
aggressive war or a war of self-defence should be left to future historians. It is 
not an issue left to the judgement of the victor. '45 Fujioka Nobukatsu, a strong 
opponent of the `Tokyo Trial view of history', states: `the history was written 
according to the prepared conclusion that Japan was the villain and the Allies were 
good. It was based on information that corresponded with such a conclusion. ' 46 
Kobori Keiichirö, an academic specialising in comparative culture, claims that the 
Trial's view is not a substantiated historical fact. He argues that the `Tokyo Trial 
view of history' was based on the argument of the prosecutor coloured with bias: 
`This was a historical interpretation of the "victor" of the Trial. ' 47 
In the place of the `Tokyo Trial view of history', those critics are willing 
to promote an affirmative, or glorifying, account of pre-war and war-time Japan. 
This is why anti-'Tokyo Trial view of history' critics show stronger resentment of 
the Tribunal's account of the Japan's war crimes than of its silence over American 
alleged war crimes: Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Nanjing massacre first came 
to be known to the Japanese public through the Tokyo Trial, which recorded that 
the Japanese Imperial Army killed, raped, and tortured more than 200,000 people 
in the city. The massacre has been one of the prime targets of the right-wing 
activists as it harms their account of wartime Japan. For those who refuse to 
accept the fact of the massacre, the Tokyo Trial is detestable as the origin of the 
`fictionalisation' of the crime. The title of Fuji's book, The "Nanjing Massacre" 
as Takigawa Masajirö, Tökyö Saiban wo Sabaku, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Töwasha, 1952-1953), p. 3. 
46 Fujioka Nobukatsu in `Koko ga Okashii! Rekishi Kyökasho Ronsö', This is Yomiuri (March 
1997), p. 38. 
47 Kobori Keiichirö, `Kaisetsu' in Fuji, Watashi, p. 602, emphasis added. 
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was Invented in This Way: the Deception of the Tokyo Trial [`Nankin 
Daigyakusatsu' ha Köshite Tsukurareta: Tokyo Saiban no Giman], is symbolic in 
this sense. Tanaka Masaaki, a strong opponent of the Tokyo Trial also writes a 
book entitled: The Fiction of the "Nanjing Massacre" [Nankin Gyakusatsu no 
Kyokö]. Satö claims that the `Nanjing incident' was `extravagantly publicised' 
by the Tokyo Trial, based on insufficient evidence in order to make Japan, 
unreasonably, into a criminal state equivalent to Nazi Germany. 48 
This kind of claim, however, had been relatively muted, until the 1990s 
when the nationalists found an atmosphere developing within Japanese society 
where their assertion could be heard. 
48 Sat6, Kenpö, p. 67. Although the narrative of Nanjing under the Tokyo Tribunal shocked the 
Japanese people at the time, it soon went out of and had been absent from people's consciousness 
until the 1970s, when the series of reports on the Nanjing massacre written by Honda Katsuichi 
appeared in Asahi Shimbun, one of the most popular daily newspapers in Japan. After his first 
series of Chügoku no Tabi [Journey to China], he wrote The Road to Nanjing, which appeared in 
serialised form in Asahi Jcmal in 1984. His research is translated into English, Honda Katsuichi; 
translated by Karen Sandness; Frank Gibney (ed. ), The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist 
Confronts Japan's National Shame (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998). Honda's report brought 
about a reactionary claim that `the Nanjing Massacre did not occur', raised by Suzuki Akira in his 
`Nankin Daigyakusatsu' no Maboroshi (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjü, 1973). Honda has been attacked 
by right-wing activists for `propagating the "Tokyo Trial view of history", ' and has been harassed 
by extreme right-wingers because of his continuous research on the Japanese war crimes in China. 
Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan, paperback edition 
(London: Phoenix, 2002), p. 121; Honda, Nanjing, p. xxvi. Honda, for his part, calls people like 
Tanaka `unprincipled hacks'. Tanaka's work is strongly criticised for misquoting the primary 
source in a way to justify his argument. Ibid., p. 291. Most publications on the Nanjing 
massacre up to the present concentrate on the verification of the event: whether it was a 
`massacre', an `incident', or did not occur at all. Only a few of them, however, were based on 
rigid academic examination. The number of the massacre's victims is still under fierce debate 
even among those who accept that the massacre occurred. In any case, the Nanjing massacre has 
been a cause of serious tension with China. See Ibid., p. vii-xiv. 
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The Neo-Nationalist and Revisionist Movement in the 1990s 
The death of the wartime Emperor in 1989 signified the end of an era 
begun in 1926, and people in Japan started re-examining the bright and dark sides 
of this tumultuous period. At the same time, entering the 1990s, individuals in 
Japan's neighbouring countries started to raise their voices, asking for an apology 
and compensation for the suffering inflicted on them by Japan half a century ago. 
The pursuit of the nature of Japan's responsibility for the past war and war crimes 
was also talked about both inside and outside Japan. Facing increasing claims 
from the victims of Japanese war crimes, notably from the comfort women, the 
Japanese government publicly acknowledged the issue in 1993 and sponsored the 
establishment of an NGO to provide `sympathy money' to the victims. 
The end of the domination of Japanese politics by the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) enabled the Japanese government to face Japan's past more frankly. 
In 1993, Hosokawa Morihiro, the first Prime Minister outside the conservative 
LDP since 1955, expressed `profound remorse and apologies for the fact that 
Japan's actions, including acts of aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable 
suffering and sorrow for so many people. ' 49 The year 1995 marked the fiftieth 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War, a mile-stone which encouraged 
Japan to look back on the past. The so-called `war apology' resolution was 
passed in that year by the National Diet under Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi 
of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDJP). It aimed to put to rest criticisms 
from its neighbours for not having apologised properly for its past war and war 
crimes, 50 Murayama himself expressed a more unequivocal apology to Japan's 
49 Quoted in Yoichi Funabashi, `Introduction' in Yoichi Funabashi (ed. ), Reconciliation in the 
Asia-Pacific (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), p. 5. 
50 Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History, 
House of Representatives, National Diet of Japan, 9 June 1995: 
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neighbours, with a clear reference to Japan's colonial rule and aggression that 
`caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, 
particularly to those of Asian nations. 'sI 
While the Japanese government's actions during the first half of the 1990s 
were criticised as insufficient from one side, 52 they angered and frustrated some 
others as too `apologetic'. What angered the latter was the nation's uncritical 
acceptance that `Japan conducted wars of aggression and committed war crimes' 
and their `ignorance' and apathy towards the past. It is in this context that these 
people attacked the Tokyo Trial, especially its verdict and historical record of 
wartime Japan, as the source of such an attitude of the Japanese people. Titles of 
books written in the 1990s by anti-Tokyo Trial critics, Re-examining the Tokyo 
Trial: the Starting Point that Ruined Japan or Let's Awake from the Brainwash of 
the Tokyo Trial View of History illustrate the frustration they felt towards the 
Tokyo Trial. 53 Fuji lamented the negative influence of the `Tokyo Trial view of 
history' on future Japan, `if the young and innocent generation came to be 
contaminated by the Tokyo Trial view of history and held the wrong historical 
Hhttp: //www. mofa. go. jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/address9506. htmlH, 15 October 2004. 
51 Statement by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, `On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of 
the war's end' (15 August 1995), 
Hhttp: //www. mofa. go. ip/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508. htmlH, 15 October 2004. 
52 The 1995 resolution in fact ended up being incoherent, reflecting conflicting attitudes towards 
the war and responsibility for it among political parties constituting the then coalition government. 
The LDP, which was supported by conservative voters as well as the association of war-bereaved 
families (Nippon Izoku-kai), strongly opposed an unequivocal apology. Some point out that the 
resolution ended up avoiding any phrase that directly implied responsibility for Japan's aggression 
and thus could not persuade the Japanese people or those in Asian countries that it was making a 
sincere apology. Jeff Kingston, Japan in Transformation, 1952-2000 (New York: Longman, 
2001), pp. 45-46. 




view. ' 54 For these people, the Japanese people's acceptance of the `Tokyo Trial 
view of history' symbolised a lack of pride and the decay of morale. 
Unlike the previous time, in the 1990s these frustrations and attacks on the 
Tokyo Trial were raised more loudly, and echoed by many more people. The fact 
that several heads of large corporations joined the criticism may not be irrelevant 
to a sudden decline of Japanese economic activity and a recession during this 
period, a period which challenged the Japanese national identity and pride that had 
been built on economic development and transformation since the end of the war. 
It may be the case that national history tends to become more nationalistic in times 
of uncertainty both about the past and future. 55 
Maeno Töru, a businessman born in 1926, sees that many Japanese people 
are losing the pride and identity as the `Japanese race [Nihon minzoku]'. He 
finds reasons for this in the `Tokyo Trial view of history': 
The guilty verdict at the Tokyo Trial that concluded that Japan was 
the aggressor totally denied Japanese tradition and culture, which 
had been established up to then. Japanese history was distorted 
and the truth of the Greater East Asia War was concealed. Since 
then, the Japanese have been overcome with a sense of guilt, and 
many Japanese have come to regard Japanese history and 
traditional culture negatively based on the `Tokyo Trial view of 
history'. 56 
Maeno's book is recommended by the Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarö, a 
popular outspoken right-wing politician who never hesitates to bluntly deny the 
Nanjing massacre. 
54 Fuji, Watashi, pp. 542-543, emphasis added. 
55 Gluck. `Past', p. 94. 
56 Maeno Töru, Sengo Rekishi no Shinjitsu (Tokyo: Keizaikai, 2000), p. 23. 
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Nakajö Takanori, another businessman of the wartime generation, is 
concerned about the young generation's ignorance about the unfair Trial and their 
being `brainwashed' with the idea that `Japan's past was totally wrong'. He 
wrote in his best-selling book, Grand-dad, Tell Me about the War, that he wanted 
the historical facts to be known to the young generation, who did not know that 
Japan had been convicted by an unreasonable trial. 57 He claimed that Japan's 
war against Western countries led to the liberation of Asian countries: `To 
conclude that everything was wrong because we lost the war is to distort 
history. ' 58 Arguments of people like Maeno and Nakajö are not based on 
thorough academic analysis; but because they are based on the perceptions of 
individuals who have lived through wartime and post-war Japan, and because of 
their casual and straight-forward style of writing, these publications have been 
accessible and have appealed to the public. 
The slogan of the so-called `neo-nationalism' in the 1990s was most 
powerfully conveyed by Kobayashi Yoshinori, a cartoonist, who, in his comics, 
glorifies the Japanese Imperial Army and dismisses the Nanjing massacre and 
comfort women as fiction. His On War has sold nearly a million copies and has 
become a social phenomenon. 59 Kobayashi claims: 
Only Japan refuses to recognize its own justness. Is this because 
its people have turned into mice with electrodes stuck into their 
head? Remove the electrodes, Japan! There was justice in 
Japan's war! We must protect our grand father's legacy ! 60 
57 Nakajö Takanori, Ojichan Sensö no Koto wo Oshiete: Mago-Musume karano Shitsumon-Jo 
(Tokyo: Chichi Shuppansha, 1998), p. 158. 
58 Ibid., p. 161. 
59 Kobayashi Yoshinori, Shin-Gömanizumu Sengen Special Sensö-ron (Tokyo: Gentösha, 1998). 
60 Kobayashi Yoshinori quoted in Howard W. French, `Japan's Resurgent Far Right Tinkers with 
History', New York Times, 25 March, 2001. 
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The neo-nationalist claims led to a series of `revisionist' movements, 
which attacked not only the `Tokyo Trial view of history' but also those whom 
they regard as having been proliferating and sustaining the `enemy propaganda' 
ever since the occupation: journalism, the `progressive intellectuals', and the 
school teachers' union, which were strongly influenced after the war by the leftist, 
or Marxist, analysis of modern Japanese history. For the right-winger and the 
nationalist, the media and schools are guilty of undermining the morale of the 
Japanese, especially the young. 61 In 1996, Fujioka Nobukatsu, Professor of 
Education at Tokyo University, established the Association for Advancement of 
Liberalist View of History (Jiyüshugi Shikan Kenkyü-kai), which claims that 
Japan's education of modern history fails to successfully `mould' the Japanese 
nation. 62 Fujioka's `liberalist' view claims that it attempts to go beyond the 
dichotomised historical arguments between the left that totally reject the element 
of self-defence in the war and the right that rejects the aggressive aspect of the war. 
However, his arguments have very much in common with the traditional 
right-wing view of history. 63 The Association claims that the `Tokyo Trial view 
of history' was imposed by the victor of the Second World War through the war 
crimes trial, and warned that the Japanese people's attitude of remaining accepting 
of that view is `masochistic'. It maintains the importance of the departure from 
such a `masochist view of history [Jigyaku-shikan]'. Fujioka argues that the 
61 Kobori, Sai-Kenshö, p. 44. 
62 The English website of the Association is: Hhttp: //www. iiyuu-shikan. org/e/index. htmlH, 11 
June 2002. 
63 For detailed analysis of the `Fujioka phenomenon' and his approach, see Gavan McCormack, 
`The Japanese Movement to "Correct" History' in Laura Hein and Mark Selden (eds. ), Censoring 
History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2000), pp. 53-73. 
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seven years of the US occupation, especially the censorship conducted by the 
GHQ, was focused on the `thought-reform' of the Japanese nation, brainwashing 
the people with the story that only Japan was evil and making them embrace a 
sense of guilt: `it is wrong to think that the war ended in the summer of 1945; the 
war continued all through the occupation and ended in April 1952. ' 64 His 
comment shows that `victor's justice' is a strong catalyst for the revisionist 
nationalist view of the past. 
How to teach children Japanese modern history has been a controversial 
issue. School textbooks in Japan have to go through the Ministry of Education's 
check and certificate process in order to be regarded as official textbooks. 
During this process, various forms of `textbook row' have occurred especially in 
the case of history textbooks, which have often created tension between Japan and 
its Asian neighbours. 65 The `textbook row' of the mid-1990s came to be 
connected strongly with the anti-'Tokyo Trial view of history'. The row was 
intensified in 1996 when Ministry of Education approved junior high school 
history textbooks, started to depict the issue of comfort women, responding to 
international as well as domestic criticism of Japan's long-time reluctance to 
acknowledge the crime. For the `revisionist', this was abominable; the issue of 
comfort women was the prime target of their criticism because the issue totally 
harmed their account of the past. 66 Fujioka being one of its promoters among 
64 Fujioka, `Koko', p. 40. 
65 For details of the textbook row which emerged before the 1990s, see Nozaki Yoshiko and 
Inokuchi Hiromitsu, `Japanese Education, Nationalism, and lenaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits' 
in Hein and Selden (eds. ), Censoring, pp. 96-126. 
66 Fujioka regarded the comfort women as `an unfounded scandal created in the 1990s for the 
political purpose of bashing Japan. ' Quoted in McCormack, `Japanese, ' p. 60. Some others 
opposed textbook depictions of the issue on the basis that `sexual labour' is not an appropriate 
topic for children. 
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other academics and public figures, the Japanese Society for History Textbook 
Reform (Atarashii Kyökasho wo Tsukuru Kai) was established in 1997. The 
Society, so-called `Tsukuru-kai', claims: 
Post-war education made the Japanese forget about the culture and 
tradition that the Japanese inherited, and deprived the people of pride. 
Especially in modern history, Japan is dealt with as a criminal that is 
destined to apologise down the ages. In the post-Cold War era, this 
masochist tendency has been strengthened and current history 
textbooks have even come to treat an account of the propaganda of 
the former enemy as fact. There is no country in the world that 
conducts such history education. The textbook the Society writes 
illustrates a self-portrait of Japan and the Japanese, with dignity and 
balance, with a global historical view. ... It is a textbook that 
makes children confident and take responsibility as a Japanese 
citizen and to contribute to international peace and prosperity. 67 
The textbook written by Tsukuru-kai put forward the view that the 
colonisation of Manchuria and the `Greater East Asia War' were part of a series of 
Asia's liberation wars against the Western powers. Having gone through several 
corrections, Tsukuru-kai's textbook for junior high schools was given the 
Ministry's certification and was published in 2001. Although only a very small 
number of schools actually decided to use the textbook, its depictions of Japan's 
war in Asia caused strong criticism from China and South Korea, and raised heated 
debates both domestically and internationally. 68 
In 1998, a film on the Tokyo Trial was released. Unlike the one in 1983, 
Puraido: Unmei no Toki [Pride: the Fateful Moment] focused on the `heroic 
67 Hhttp: //www. tsukurukai. coin/02 about us/01 opinion. htmlH, 10 June 2002. 
68 The Tsukuru-kai textbook became the source of diplomatic tension again in 2005, when its 
latest version passed the check and certificate process of the Ministry of Education. 
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agony' of Töjö Hideki at the Tokyo Tribunal, paralleled with the struggle of the 
Indian judge Pal and India's movement for independence from Great Britain. Itö 
Shunya, the director of the film, states: 
Töjö was the one who saw the real nature of the Trial and fought 
against it.... that the Trial was a continuation of the war by the Allies, 
especially the United States, within the context of its post-war 
strategy. It was a trial to drag Japan into a subordinate relationship 
to the United States in order to stop it from once again becoming a 
military threat. In addition to demilitarisation, the Trial stepped 
even into the Japanese mentality and labelled the war an inexcusable 
act of aggression. 69 
Tsugawa Masahiko, a well-known actor who played the role of Töjö, claims: `the 
arrogant Tokyo Trial unilaterally humiliated the Japanese by attributing militaristic 
inhumanity to the Japanese national. This has prevented the Japanese mind from 
loving our own country. ' 70 
The film created a controversy. In Japan, several groups held meetings 
criticising the film for trying to acquit Japan of the responsibility for aggression 
and wrongdoing. Some of them even campaigned for the suspension of the 
screening. The film also received exceptionally strong and sustained criticism 
from the media abroad. 71 The film, at the same time, did evoke some sympathy 
from Japanese viewers. Tsugawa states: `A comment, "I am glad that I was born 
69 'Ima, Naze Töjö Hideki: Töei Eiga "Puraido Unmei-no Toki" -Interview with Director Itö 
Shunya', Kyoto-Shimbun, Hhttp: //www kyoto-np co jp/kp/event/ eg_ino/pride02. htmlH, 10 
September 2002. 
70 `Shuyaku Tsugawa Masahiko ha Kataru', Kinema Junpö, No. 1257 (June, 1998), p. 119. 
71 See for example, `Japanese Film Glorifies Tojo', 23 May 1998, 
Hhttp//news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/99344. stmH, 23 February 2002. 
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in Japan", made to me by a member of an audience pleased me the most. ' 72 
Tsugawa's comment implies the core logic of neo-nationalism and revisionism: the 
Japanese have been ashamed of themselves because of the sense of being an 
`ex-convict nation' imprinted by the Tokyo Trial; such a sense can be eradicated 
and replaced with pride through `enlightenment, ' by telling the `truth' through 
things like the film Puraido. 
The film had an educational impact, especially for the young generation, 
of a kind that was not exactly what Itö and Tsugawa expected. A student said she 
gained knowledge of the Tokyo Trial from the film and the film has increased her 
interest in the Trial. She was not aware that the film had caused controversy: 
I can understand that it was controversial. The content of the film 
was so different from what is written in the textbooks. What is more, 
it was sympathetic to Japan, supporting Japan's position and justifying 
the war. Whether it is good or not is another matter but Japan has 
never said so; but the film was expressing the fact that Japan had its 
own situation and had no other choice. I can understand why some 
people criticise it as the revival of militarism. 73 
A review of the film written by a man, seemingly in his 30s, stated that the film 
had great significance in bringing up several questions that had not been asked 
previously in Japanese society. 74 These comments show that, either supporting 
or opposing the film, young people sense that the film pointed out various missing 
pieces in the way Japan's past war has been understood and talked about, in other 
words, that the account of the war is not yet settled. 
72 `Shuyaku', p. 118. 
73 A participant in Focus Group C. See Appendix A for details of each interview and focus 
group. 
74 World Digest Mail News, Hhttp: //www. w-digest. com/movie/movie. htmlH, 10 September 2002. 
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Unlike Holocaust denial, the neo-nationalist and revisionist arguments in 
the 1990s have been widely-publicised and also supported by a number of public 
figures. In 1994, the Minister of Justice was made to resign for his statement: 
`the Nanjing massacre was a fabrication' and `the war was not an aggressive 
war'. 75 Kobayashi's medium of expression, a cartoon, made him an effective 
spokesman of the neo-nationalist movement: he is a well-known figure among 
both the young and the older generation, together with his political stance, and his 
publications achieved great success. 
One group indicates the reason why they criticise the Tokyo Trial as 
follows: 
With the criticism of the Tokyo Trial that concluded that the Greater 
East Asia War was an aggressive war, we want to wipe out the 
Tokyo Trial view of history enveloping our nation and to redeem the 
honour of a thousand of our countrymen who suffered disgrace, 
having been regarded as war criminals. 76 
Indeed, neo-nationalist criticism of the Tokyo Tribunal appealed to not a few 
war-bereaved who resisted the idea that the war was an aggression, because to 
accept that would be to disgrace the soul of their family members and to admit that 
they died in vain. 77 Examination of Japanese reaction regarding the Tokyo Trial, 
reaction especially of wartime generations, cannot ignore the fact that many 
75 Quoted in Nakamura, `Shöwashi', p. 184. 
76 Shüsen Gojushtinen Kokumin Iinkai (ed. ), Sekai-ga Sabaku Tökyö Saiban: 85-ninno Gaikoku 
Shikisha-ga Kataru Rengökoku Saiban (Tokyo: Jupita Shuppan, 1996), p. 283. 
77 The association of war-bereaved families (Nihon Izokukai) also has power as a lobby group with 
strong political influence on the government, and it is not unconnected to Prime Minister 
Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni shrine. 
218 
Chapter 5 
people at the time supported the war and, up to a point, its causes. 78 It is here 
that the generation gap in perception can be observed. In the opinion poll 
conducted by Mainichi Shimbun in August 2005, asking about the nature of 
Japan's wars against the US and China, 43% responded that they were `wrong 
wars', while 29% said they were `inevitable wars'. However, among the 
generation in their 70s and beyond, those who regarded the war as `inevitable' 
(45%) exceeded those who saw it as `wrong' (37%). 79 Kobayashi indicated in 
his work that he frequently received letters from those in their 70s and 80s, stating 
that his work well-exemplified their views. 80 
However, in spite of the above events and movements and the media 
coverage, both in Japan and overseas, warning of Japan's move towards the 
far-right in the 1990s, the neo-nationalist voices were not necessarily shared by the 
majority of the population. In fact, voices having been raised against the Tokyo 
Trial and the `Tokyo Trial view of history' can be regarded as a reaction to the 
current Japanese people's acceptance of criminality in the country's war history. 
3. Collective Memory, Amnesia, and the Tokyo Trial 
Despite frequent media coverage on the recent Japanese nationalist posture, the 
negation of the past Japanese war and militarism and the preference for pacifism 
are still strong among the nation. 81 According to an opinion poll conducted in 
78 This point was raised during the interview with And6 Nisuke, Professor of International Law, 
on 13 November 2003, Japan. 
79 15 August 2005, Mainichi Shimbun. 
80 Kobayashi, Shin-Gömanizumu, pp. 46-49. 
81 For the `contested memories' of the Japanese over the war and war crimes, see Dower, 
`Aptitude, ' pp. 217-241. 
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October 1993 by Yomiuri Shimbun, 53.1% agree with the statement that `Japan 
was an "aggressor" in WWII'; 24.8% disagree and 22.1% did not answer. What 
should be pointed out about this poll is that in every generation from those in their 
20s to those over 70, those who agreed with the statement exceeded those who 
disagreed. 82 Another opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in August 1994 
showed 72 % thought that `Japan has not done enough compensation to people 
under the Japanese colonial rule and occupation'. 83 
Focus groups and intensive interviews conducted by the author in the 
autumn and winter of 2003 also confirmed that people more or less hold the view 
that Japan conducted an aggressive war led by the military clique and committed 
war crimes that cannot be excused; the view that corresponds to the central 
message of the Tokyo Trial's verdict. In interviews, most people distanced 
themselves from the revisionist view, some showing immediate refusal to accept 
this view and showing disgust, and some expressing that they felt `something is 
wrong' with such an account of the war and the Tokyo Trial. 
Interestingly, while revisionists criticise the widely-held view of the war 
by attributing it to the Tokyo Tribunal, those who see criminality in Japan's war 
did not relate their historical view to the Tokyo Trial. In fact, most interviewees, 
while recognising the revisionist movement and argument, did not know the term 
`Tokyo Trial view of history' and the criticisms made against it. As illustrated in 
the previous chapter, the general attitude towards the Tokyo Trial, examined 
82 Yomiuri Shimbun, October 5,1993, quoted in Dower, `Aptitude', p. 315, footnote 5. The 
percentage of those who agree to the statement is highest among those in their 20s (61.7%), and 
lowest among those over 70 (41.1%). A difference in the nuance of a question asked by the 
opinion poll of Yomiuri and Mainichi quoted above should be noted; the former used the term 
`aggressor' and the latter `inevitable'. 
83 Asahi Shimbun, 23 August 1994. 
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through focus groups and intensive interviews, was apathy. However, close 
examination based on interviews reveals that the apathy consists of multiple 
elements: `indifference', `cynicism' and a sense of `taboo'. These are three 
different states of mind, but all lead to easy, or passive, acceptance of the Tokyo 
Trial. At the same time, the fact that the Japanese people accepted that the war 
and acts of violence perpetrated during the war were criminal does not necessarily 
signify that they accepted the justice of the Tokyo Trial that convicted their leaders. 
The following attempts to examine whether the Tokyo Trial has had any impact on 
the Japanese people's collective memory, or, rather, collective amnesia. 
Indifference: Ignorance and Demarcation 
Apathy can be attributed to indifference, that is lack of interest, but the 
current Japanese indifference to the Tokyo Trial is caused primarily by ignorance: 
the simple lack of knowledge. The Japanese people's ignorance about the Tokyo 
Trial has often been mentioned and speculated upon but became even more clear 
from interviews. Each interview began with a question whether s/he knows 
anything about the Tokyo Trial. Most of the interviewees, except for those 
beyond the age of 60 and beyond, answered that they had heard about it or 
recognised the event had taken place, but that they did not know about it in detail. 
Some of those born in the 1980s did not even know it as an historical event. 84 
Interestingly, while many of the current generation regard the war as 
`bad' and punishment-worthy, they only have a very vague idea exactly who were 
prosecuted under the Tokyo Trial and for what reason. An immediate response of 
the interviewees tended to be `war crimes' or as vague as `wrong doing' (warui 
koto). Having been asked in more detail about exactly what crimes they thought 
84 There was such a participant in Focus Groups A and B. 
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the war criminals had been tried for, several interesting points were raised. First, 
as for the war crimes considered by the Trial, many mentioned Japan's wartime 
conduct against China and other Asian countries, be it the war itself, aggression, or 
war crimes against civilians. Having been asked about Pearl Harbour, a woman 
in her 50s clearly stated: `That does not occur to me as the first thing about the 
Tokyo Trial. What occurs to me first is what Japan has done to its neighbouring 
countries. ' 85 Some younger people clearly stated that the Trial could not have 
been for Japan's conduct against the United States, pointing out the American use 
of atomic bombs. 86 These responses may be the effect of wide media coverage 
since the early 1990s of the comfort women and other war crimes, which made a 
strong impression as being representative of Japan's past war crimes. 
This relates to the second point: some, especially the young, claimed 
that the Tokyo Trial could not have been conducted in relation to the starting and 
waging of war per se, because, if so, every country, including the victor, was 
responsible. An interviewee in her 30s stated: `If it was a crime to start the war, 
other countries should have also taken some responsibility. But the fact that 
Japan was tried in such a manner may mean that it was about aggression towards 
Asian countries. ' 87 The comment reflects the general Japanese tendency to 
differentiate between the `war' against the Allies and the `aggression' towards 
their Asian neighbours. 88 And third, it is pointed out, especially by the over-40s 
generation, that wartime leaders were responsible for the crimes against their own 
85 Interviewee H. 
86 Focus Group C. 
8' Interviewee L. 
88 Honda Katsuichi, for example, sees Japan's war as follow: `Japan invaded the Asian countries, 
but it was as part of a struggle with the Western powers for supremacy in their colonises and 
semi-colonies'. Honda in Nanjing, p. xxv. 
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nation for having led Japan in the wrong direction. 89 
These are `images' held by many interviewees, which do not necessarily 
correspond with the facts: there is a gap between people's image of the Tokyo 
Trial and what the Trial actually was. First, the Tokyo Trial provided a platform 
for examining Japan's war against the Allies, not for Japan's war crimes against 
Asian civilians. Second, the Trial examined every aspect of the war from the 
perspective of a conspiracy, focusing more on Japan's war against the Allies. 
Third, not necessarily all the `wrongdoing' and all those `responsible' were 
examined by the Tokyo Trial because of political calculation on the part of the 
Allies. 90 It tends to be regarded, from the contemporary perspective, that what 
was punished was `crimes against humanity' or aggressive war that accompanied 
the atrocities against civilians. However, this was not the case. This is exactly 
why Arnold Brackman, the author of the chronological illustration of the Tokyo 
Trial, expressed concern that his attempt to write on the Trial might `unnecessarily 
offend today's pro-Western Japanese. ' 91 The author of this thesis shared this 
concern over conducting interviews. A question arose as to whether people's 
perception of the Tokyo Trial would become more hostile if they knew the detail 
of the Tokyo Trial. And, this is exactly what right-wingers have been trying to do, 
by stressing the defects and political aspects of the Trial. 
In addition to ignorance, general indifference arises also from the 
passage of time. `Why care about the Tokyo Trial now' was an immediate 
reaction shared by most interviewees. More interestingly, there is a strange kind 
89 Interviewees D, E, I, J and M. 
90 See Chapter 3. 
91 Brackman, Other, p. 27. His book was translated and published in Japan in 1991. The 
concern is also shared by Tim Maga, the author of Judgment of Tokyo: the Japanese War Crimes 
Trials (Lexington, K. Y.: University Press of Kentucky, 2000). 
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of `temporal demarcation'. A man born in 1959 stated: `For me, even though the 
Tokyo Trial took place not that long before when I was born, it seems like a thing 
from the distant past. ' 92 As some academics analyse, there is `a radical break in 
1945' in the Japanese psyche, that is a clear demarcation between pre-war and 
post-war Japan. 93 The Tokyo Trial was conducted at the juncture of war and 
peace, as `the last act of the war and first act of the peace'. 94 However, to the 
Japanese, it was more `the last act of the war. ' `The army of occupation and the 
Tokyo Trial do not exist in parallel in my image, ' a man in his late 30s stated. 95 
The former is the image associated with the beginning of peace. This implies 
that the Tokyo Trial for the Japanese is an event that is related to pre-war and 
wartime events and, thus, is pushed to the bottom of their collective memory 
together with the war. 
Cynicism: `Victor's Justice' 
In addition to indifference based on ignorance and demarcation, apathy 
among the Japanese derives also from cynicism, which is strongly based on a 
widely-shared understanding that the Tokyo Trial was `victor's justice'. 
Irrespective of the amount of knowledge acquired and of age, almost all the 
interviewees expressed their belief or supposition that the Tokyo Trial was an 
unfair trial because it was conducted by the victor of the war against the 
vanquished. In talking about the Trial, most of the interviewees repeatedly used 
92 Interviewee A. 
93 See Gluck, `Past'. One interviewee born in 1965 said: `I have images of the war, the image of 
bombers flying and of battleships and aircraft carriers. But I have very little image of events 
right after the end of the war. My image jumps to the high-growth period of Japan's economy. ' 
Interviewee G. 
94 Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill, The Ethics of War (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 266. 
95 Interviewee G. 
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terms such as `victor', `vanquished', `winning' the war, or `defeat' in the war. 
Unlike the revisionists, the `Tokyo Trial view of history' as such was 
rarely mentioned by the interviewees; however, a number of them believed that the 
Trial had succeeded in stigmatising Japan as an evil villain. `The Allies wanted 
to create the impression that Japan was wrong, ' commented a businessman in his 
40s. 96 `It was needed as a symbol of whom to blame, ' stated a student: 
`Otherwise, why was such a thing needed? Everybody was wrong, weren't they? 
I wondered when I first heard about the Tokyo Trial whether defeat equals wrong 
doing. ' 97 The view is shared by various other interviewees who echoed that the 
Tokyo Trial was conducted in order to justify the war ex post facto. 98 Many 
Japanese people sensed that the Trial was a punishment given for disciplinary 
purposes. A student in a focus group commented as follows: 
It was a show trial, perhaps for people in China and Korea. After the 
war, you need a "bad guy", you need to clarify who was bad. The 
Tokyo Trial was a way of clarifying that. That is my image. Image 
of a scapegoat. 99 
The victor's mentality of `establishing the history' by a trial to prove they had had 
a just cause in fighting against the evil enemies was also pointed out by many 
Japanese academics. 100 
In general, however, `victor's justice' has not necessarily caused an 
96 Focus Group E. 
97 Focus Group C. 
98 Interviewees D, I, L and 0. 
99 Focus Group C. 
100 Higurashi Yoshinobu, `Kensatsu no Ronri to Saiban no Tenkai' in Igarashi Takeshi and 
Kitaoka Shinichi (eds. ), `Söron' Tokyo Saiban toha Nandattanoka (Tokyo: Chikijishokan, 1997), 
p. 77; Önuma, Tokyo, p. 27. 
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emotional reaction, except in the case of some nationalists as examined above. 
Instead, it created cynicism: `the Tokyo Trial was a result of the defeat, nothing 
more'. This is based on the logic of `Might is right' ; '0' for some post-war 
generation it may be to do with indifference, more specifically ignorance, as one 
interviewee replied: `I cannot get resentful over things that I don't know much 
about. ' 102 In any case, cynicism deprives the Trial of the positive educational 
impact it expected to convey to the Japanese. Ohara Yasuo, an academic, saw the 
Tokyo Trial as mere `victor's justice' and doubted if there are any lessons to be 
learned from it: `The only lesson that can be learned from the Tokyo Trial is to 
recognise that the Trial did not contribute to international peace at all. ' 103 
`Victor's justice' also lessens the educational impact by confusing people 
about exactly what the Tokyo Trial judged. The dialogue between two women in 
their 30s and 40s on `what was judged' is indicative: 
I: Aggressive war, the responsibility for the war, I think. It was to do 
with starting the war. 
J: But if you talk about responsibility for starting the war, regardless of 
winning or losing, how about Bush and the Iraq War? 
I: Well, if we talk about starting the war, I think it was the 
responsibility more of the Emperor rather than Töjö. 
J: That's true. 
I: Then, the Tokyo Trial may not have been to do with starting the 
war... Then was it to do with the treatment of POWs? 
J: But it was the victor's trial against the vanquished, right? 
I: The Allies judged Japanese war criminals... 
J: Does that mean Japan was tried because it lost the war? If it had 
won, it wouldn't have been judged? 
I: Yes, yes. 
101 See Chapter 4. 
102 Interviewee C. 
103 Ohara Yasuo in `Shimpojium Tokyo Saiban', Shokun, Vol. 19, Nob (1987), p. 67. 
226 
Chapter 5 
J: That's funny... 104 
Interviews also showed that there are some, though a minority, who 
expressed strong antipathy against `victor's justice'. Here the nature of the 
influence of neo-nationalism and revisionism could be observed. In each of three 
focus-group interviews with university students, consisting of three to eight people, 
there was one person who vocally criticised the Tokyo Trial. '05 They were the 
ones who showed the most interest in and knowledge of the Tokyo Trial. 
Focus-groups embodied what is illustrated in Chapter 4: those who 
enthusiastically talk about the Tokyo Trial tend to be strongly critical of it. 
Interestingly, these small minorities all stated that they had gained knowledge of 
the Tokyo Trial through their readings of well-known right-wing authors, and the 
logic of their arguments exactly echoed those of the neo-nationalists and 
revisionists: that the Tokyo Trial was imposed by the victor to destroy the 
Japanese mentality, that it disgraced Japanese-ness and pride, and that the 
Japanese attitude is masochistic and ignorant. What is more, these interviewees 
all referred to the `masochist view of history'. `With hindsight, I think I was very 
much brainwashed by my education, ' said a student participating in a focus-group 
of undergraduate students: `At the time, I strongly held the view that the war was 
wrong and the Tokyo Trial was right. ' 106 A student in a focus-group of 
postgraduate students supported the anti-'Tokyo Trial view of history' movement: 
After having read books like Kobayashi's, I thought Japan has been 
too obedient to the United States. In other words, we have leaned 
too far to the left. We should push ourselves a bit more towards the 
ioa Interviewees I and J. 
105 Focus Groups A, B and C. 
106 Focus Group B. 
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right. And as a start, I welcome the movement that is re-examining 
the Tokyo Trial. Through reading right-wing literature, I have found 
that there are so many things that the United States is hiding. I think 
it is wrong to accept a given history. 107 
A businessman said he was currently interested in the Tokyo Trial after having 
read Nakaj ö's book. He stated: `The history class at school was boring. I now 
know that this was because it portrayed a masochist view of history. ' 108 
Overall, `victor's justice' deprives people of the will to reflect on the 
Tokyo Trial and learn the lessons from it. People fail to understand not only for 
what reasons their leaders were prosecuted and punished but also what such 
prosecution meant to Japan. At worst, it provides justification to nullify the 
significance of the war crimes prosecution as a whole. Awaya is concerned that 
there has been `a social illusion that one can avoid facing Japan's war crimes and 
war responsibility by pointing out the defects of the Allies' war crimes 
tribunals. ' 109 
Education and Long-term Educative Impact of the Tokyo Trial 
As mentioned earlier, although there are those who sympathise with 
neo-nationalism and revisionism, most of the interviewees distanced themselves 
from the revisionist view that affirms Japan's past war. Interestingly, comments 
made by interviewees suggest that people cannot agree with the revisionist claims 
not merely because of the content of those claims but also because of the political 
and ideological agenda they sense behind those claims. According to a woman in 
her 30s, `After all, what those revisionists are saying is a self-justification of 
107 Focus Group C. 
108 Interviewee S. 
109 Awaya, `Töky6', P. 106. 
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aggression. I cannot sympathise with that. ' l 10 A student stated: 
I wonder if those who claim that the Tokyo Trial has had a negative 
impact on current Japanese society are raising their voices because 
they are ashamed of the defeat of the past. I feel some concern about 
their stirring up nationalism in such a way. lll 
A similar view is also given by another interviewee born in 1974: 
Hearing such a view, I simply wonder whether those people want to 
wage the war again, whether they are ashamed of having lost the war 




I do understand what those people are trying to say, because you can 
interpret history totally differently depending on your standpoint. 
But I think we should not mix up what one wanted to have happened 
and what has actually happened. It does not change the fact. ... 
It 
is a distortion of history to deny a certain view of history by saying 
that it would harm the pride of Japanese youth. I do understand them 
wanting to think that Japan has not done such a thing, but it is not the 
fact. ' 113 
These comments are not necessarily backed up by solid knowledge and 
understanding of history. The above interviewee in her 30s, for example, based 
her view on a number of claims made by Asian victims. At the same time, she 
110 Interviewee L. 
'1 Focus Group C. 
112 Interviewee F. 
113 Interviewee H. 
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could not deny the revisionist's claim that she as well as the Japanese as a whole 
were 'brainwashed'. Nonetheless, she said: 
It may be that I don't want to say that Japan's war was not aggressive. 
I don't want to justify past militarism in such a way. As a Japanese 
person, I don't want people in other countries to equate Japan 
present-day with militarism or a country that invaded Asian nations. 
That may be why I admit the aggression, detaching myself and 
present-day Japan from its past militarism. 114 
The above interviewee born in 1974 emphasised the importance of preventing 
another war and stated: `For our generation, it is more constructive to admit what 
has happened in the past. It is not being obsequious. ' 115 
Several interviewees see points in the neo-nationalist and revisionist 
assertion that the Japanese have been brainwashed. Interestingly, however, this 
does not lead to accepting their argument. A man in his late 30s stated: 
For them, my view is the `Tokyo Trial's view', right? If they say I 
am brainwashed, yes, I may be. If you examine the history in detail, 
it is true that it was not only Japan who was wrong and you can say 
that there was no need to try Japan in such a harsh way. But I think 
at that time there was no other option but the `Tokyo Trial's view'. It 
may be possible from now on to redeem history by relativising the 
`Tokyo Trial's view', and defending Japan's conduct as a necessary 
evil within international relations as they were then. ... But, can 
wrongdoing be justified if you did it for the sake of your country? 
Things done were wrong because they were conducted by sacrificing 
people in other countries. 116 
114 Interviewee L. 
'15 Interviewee F. 
116 Interviewee G. 
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Some students see a positive meaning in being `masochistic'. A student in a 
focus group commented: 
I don't know about the authenticity of each historical view. But 
without some elements of a `masochistic view', the war will keep on 
being justified, while self-examination diminishes. The war might 
be just and such a claim may be right, and in that sense, we may not 
need to be totally masochistic. But we should not forget 
self-examination; otherwise, we can go to extremes. 117 
Another student in the group agreed: `I've seen Tsukuru-kai's textbook but it was 
romanticising Japan too much. Why can't we have a middle ground? We need 
to have both views. ' 118 A student in the same focus group who expressed strong 
criticism towards the Tokyo Trial's view of history also agreed with these 
comments. Without direct experience of the war and being detached from the 
past, the younger generations are more `pragmatic' and future-oriented, seeking 
what is needed for present-day Japan. 
However, these comments indicate people's reluctance to examine and 
understand the country's past and to verify the view they hold. It can be said that 
the Japanese people are feeling `comfortable' or `safe' in admitting criminality in 
their country's past, whether it is true or not; in other words, stick to the `Tokyo 
Trial's view of history', rather than dig-up and face the painful past. This 
attitude, while accepting the country's past wrongdoing, does not mean, in a real 
sense, that `Japan is facing its history honestly'. And, it is here that the 
neo-nationalist has a point in criticising the Japanese people's easy acceptance of 
the `given history'. 
117 Focus Group B. 
118 Focus Group B. 
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At the same time, regarding such an attitude of general people, another, 
albeit more subtle, aspect of the Tokyo Trial's `educational impact' can be seen. 
Asada Sadao, scholar of diplomatic history, pointed out: 
Not knowing about the Tokyo Trial per se, people are well-aware of 
its legacy: anti-war and anti-military consciousness and pacifism. 
In many ways, they may be indebted to the educational impact of the 
Tokyo Trial. ' 19 
Asada's point was echoed especially by the younger generation. `The Tokyo 
Trial says that you become a villain if you wage war. It is telling us that we 
become war criminals and are tried, ' an interviewee born in 1959 concluded. 120 
A student at a focus group regarded the Tokyo Trial as good because it changed the 
Japanese perception of the war. 121 The Tokyo Trial may exemplify what John 
Dower calls `a kind of "contested institutionalized memory" that has kept critical 
consciousness of World War II ... alive in Japan'. 
122 
It is here that the Tokyo Trial's record of history and its educational 
impact are ambivalent. On the one hand, the Trial had encouraged the spirit of 
anti-militarism and pacifism, which since have been very strong in the Japanese. 
On the other hand, the Trial did not provide a `history lesson' as such, as some 
promoters of the Tribunal had intended. Instead, in the long run, the Tokyo 
Trial's historical record prevented the enhancement of the Japanese people's 
understanding of the war and war crimes, by depriving them of the opportunity to 
19 Interview with Asada Sadao, Professor of Diplomatic History, 15 January 2004, Kyoto Japan. 
120 Interviewee J. 
121 Focus Group A. 
122 Dower, `Aptitude', p. 239. Dower himself raises domestic controversy over war responsibility 
and apology, the pros and cons of sending Japanese `Self-Defence Forces' abroad, and 
constitutional revision as examples of `contested institutionalized memory'. 
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examine the war unaided themselves Ara Takashi argues that the limitations of 
the Tokyo Trial lie in the fact that it concluded that the American view of history 
was just; what was required after the Trial was to construct `a historical perception 
based on the Japanese people's view. ' 123 Kojima Noboru argues that the `Tokyo 
Trial view of history' has put `a brake on dispassionate research on the history of 
the period. ' 124 He expresses a concern that the strong influence of the `Tokyo 
Trial view of history' `shrouds the most important aspects of history and leads us 
to forfeit opportunities for reflection and research. ' 125 
In spite of some educational impact and legacy, the Tokyo Trial and its 
historical record are not visible in Japanese society. The Japanese are well-aware 
of their ignorance of the Tokyo Trial. Most of the interviewees excused 
themselves more than once for their lack of knowledge of the Trial. Interestingly, 
most of them attributed this to their having not learned about it at school; almost 
all the interviewees of the post-war generation said that they had `no memory' of 
having learned about the Tokyo Trial. 
A high school history teacher admitted that very little is taught about the 
Tokyo Trial. 126 She immediately attributed this to the Japanese education system, 
a structure based on the needs of the university entrance examinations, in which 
pre-WWII history only is questioned in detail. However, she also stated that 
history after the end of the WWII has not yet been clearly established, even after 
'23 Ara Takashi, `Tokyo Saiban: Sensö Sekininron no Genryü - Tokyo Saiban to Senryöka no 
Yoron', Rekishi Hyöron, No. 408 (April, 1984), pp. 19-20. 
124 Kojima Noboru in Hosoya [et al. ] (eds. ), Tokyo, pp. 77. 
125 Ibid., p. 78. Little interest in the Tokyo Trial even among postgraduate students specialising 
in US-Japanese history, which was observed in Focus Group D, may be indicative. 
126 Interviewee K. 
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more than half a century: `On the part of teachers, there is not yet agreement 
regarding from which standpoint and in what way the history of the period can be 
taught, or what is right and wrong. ' She pointed out that some teach August 1945 
as `the end of the war', and some as `the defeat in the war'; and the Tokyo Trial is 
embedded in this delicate period, which is not yet settled in the eyes of the 
Japanese. The teacher concluded: `History education in Japan does not deal with 
raw incidents of modern history; it only deals with issues about which no-one 
disagrees. ' 127 This is sensed by students. A woman in her mid-50s reflected on 
the education she had received in the 1960s: `We were not taught about the Tokyo 
Trial at school not because of a lack of space within the timetable, but because of 
the topic itself. People don't want to touch it. 
Taboo and Silence over the Tokyo Trial 
I sense that in our society'. 128 
Many interviewees admitted that issues of `this kind' - the war and war 
crimes of the past - are what the Japanese have been reluctant to talk about. 
'29 
The very problem surrounding the Tokyo Trial and the Japanese people is that it is 
either talked about emotionally and ideologically within a limited circle, or simply 
ignored by the majority of the population in spite of its importance in Japanese 
127 Current secondary school textbooks contain critical information of the war, referring to the 
Nanjing massacre and harsh colonial policies. Some researchers point out, however, that these 
depictions of Japan's war crimes tend to be `elliptical': `[T]he textbooks themselves seem to seek 
an elusive middle ground that avoids explicit evaluation of the wartime past', Laura Hein and 
Mark Selden analyse: `Their enigmatic comments can be used either to open debate about wartime 
attitudes and postwar responsibility or to dismiss the events in question as regrettable but 
unimportant facts, depending on the stance of the classroom teacher. ' Laura Hein and Mark 
Selden, `The Lessons of War, Global Power, and Social Change', in Hein and Selden (eds. ), 
Censoring, p. 11. 
128 Interviewee H. 
129 Interviewees D, H and L. 
234 
Chapter 5 
modern history. 130 In addition to indifference and cynicism on the part of the 
Japanese, this attitude is strongly related to the general perception that the Tokyo 
Trial is a national taboo. Intensive interviews revealed this perception as well as 
the complex features of this perceived taboo, which consists of multiple elements. 
The first element of the taboo is the Japanese people's reluctance to face 
the issues that were examined by the Tribunal. Asada states that it has been 
difficult to talk about the Tokyo Trial in Japan because an examination of it makes 
people face the Tribunal defendants: 
I think there is a kind of guilty consciousness among the Japanese, a 
consciousness that there were many others who could have been 
tried but were not tried. People may be reluctant to re-examine 
only the victims of the Tokyo Trial. 131 
The post-war generation senses significance in the older generation's silence over 
the Tokyo Trial. Several interviewees pointed out that their parents and 
grand-parents often talked about the national sufferings of the war but rarely about 
war responsibility and the Tokyo Trial. An interviewee stated: 
For the wartime generation, talking about the Tokyo Trial would mean 
talking about their own guilt. They supported the war but only their 
leaders were tried. The desire to evade one's own responsibility, the 
desire to put the blame on someone else, has prevented people from 
talking about the Tokyo Trial. They don't want to touch the war 
anymore. The issue of the Tokyo Trial, I think, is a taboo for 
them. 132 
'3o See Chapter 4. 
13' Interview with Asada. 
132 Interviewee B. 
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Asada also points out that the things and events that were revealed in the 
Trial were not at all comfortable for the Japanese to closely look at, especially 
after more than half a century. `I think the Tokyo Trial is a national taboo, ' 
states Asada, who himself did not give a lecture on the Tokyo Trial during his 
seminar on the history of US-Japan relations. `I think I had been avoiding the 
topic unconsciously. It is not a topic that can be dealt with from a neutral 
standpoint. ' 
133 
`I don't think there is a country that make a point of emphasising its own 
stain and disgrace, ' a man in his 40s stated. 134 His view is echoed by another: 
If there is something good about what we have done, we actively 
examine and research it. But if there is something we don't want 
to see and which is painful to know, we don't want to know. It is 
not a matter of minds but of hearts. 135 
These comments indicate that it is not only issues examined at the Tribunal but 
also the war crimes trial itself that are uncomfortable for the Japanese to face; 
indeed, the Tokyo Trial is not an event that the Japanese can be proud of. This 
may be related to the point examined earlier: although it was conducted after the 
war under the US occupation policy, the Tokyo Trial, unlike other occupation 
policies, is associated not with post-war but with wartime Japan and, thus, people 
have preferred to banish it from their memory. The Tokyo Trial simply does not 
fit in well with Japan's post-war identity. 
Second, the taboo comes also from the issues that were not examined by 
the Tribunal: the Emperor, human-body experiments, and war crimes under 
'33 Interview with Asada. 
134 Interviewee A. 
'35 Interviewee H. 
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colonial rule. 136 For the Japanese, the reexamination of the Tokyo Trial means 
opening Pandora's Box. How does the nation face the responsibility of the 
Emperor and Unit 731, both of which were left untouched even by the Tribunal? 
On the issue of the Emperor's war responsibility, for example, it is not until his 
death in 1989 that it gradually came to be actively discussed in public. 137 It is in 
this year that Asahi Shimbun conducted an opinion poll on the Shöwa Emperor, 
which included a question about whether the Emperor had any kind of 
responsibility for the Second World War. Twenty-five per cent answered yes and 
31%, no; however, 38% replied they could not say either yes or no. 138 
Even after the death of the Emperor, the issue remained a taboo, or at 
least a difficult issue to discuss in Japan. A woman in her early 30s explained: 
We don't know at all the whole picture regarding the war and war 
crimes. It may be because of the Emperor, because of his existence, 
the whole picture cannot be clarified. The pressure from the 
right-wing is also strong. Because of all these things, people have 
been reluctant to talk about war crimes. 139 
In 1990, the mayor of Nagasaki was shot by an ultra-nationalist because of his 
comment that the Emperor had responsibility for the war. Inoue Hisashi, a 
playwright, states that he received continuous threats and harassment after having 
136 See Chapter 3. 
137 See Chapter 6 for the issue of the Emperor's responsibility and Japanese perceptions of it. 
138 Asahi Shimbun, 8 February 1989. The poll clearly showed a difference of opinion between 
the generations and gender. Among men aged from 20s to 40s, those who answered `yes' to the 
question exceeds those who answered `no', while among men in their 50s and those over 60 as 
well as women of all generations, those who think the Emperor was not responsible for the war are 
in the majority. 
139 Interviewee I. 
237 
Chapter 5 
stated that the Emperor was responsible for the war. 140 Indeed, the issue of the 
Emperor is one of the focal points of strong disagreement between the rightist and 
leftist view of the war. At the same time, some wartime generation felt relieved 
that the Emperor's war responsibility was `settled' by outsiders. 141 In other 
words, the Tokyo Trial has given a good excuse for the Japanese to close the 
debate on the Emperor's wartime responsibility, which is too delicate for them to 
face by themselves. 142 
The third and most significant aspect of the taboo is the fact that the 
Tokyo Trial is strongly related to another sensitive issue: how to see the nature of 
the war, which has been debated politically and ideologically. In fact, in Japan, 
there is even now no consensus on how to refer to the war that ended in 1945: `the 
Second World War', `the Pacific War', `Fifteen-Years War', or `the Greater East 
Asia War', each of which is strongly associated with different views on the nature 
of the war. 143 Many of the government's and the Emperor's statements still call 
the war `the previous war' (saki no sensö). This illustrates well the delicacy of 
140 Inoue Hisashi, `Wareware Hitori Hitori no Sensö "Mu"Sekinin', Gekkan Asahi (March, 1990), 
p. 98. 
'41 Interviewee D. 
142 See Chapter 6 for further analysis regarding this issue. 
143 Utsumi Aiko in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai (ed. ), Toinaosu, p. 3; Nakamura, `Shöwashi', 
p. 185. While the `Second World War' and the `Pacific War' are rather neutral, the `Fifteen-years 
war' and the `Greater East Asia War' are burdened terms, which carry the political and ideological 
stance of those who utilise them: the former emphasises the aspect of Japan as an aggressor 
towards its Asian neighbours, while the latter connotes the justification and glorification of the 
war as self-defence and the liberation of Asia. In recent attempts to re-examine Japan's war 
conduct in the Sino-Japanese war, it is pointed out that the term `Pacific War' confines the 
historical view to that of America and ignore the Asian sphere of the war. Alternatively, since 
the mid 1980s, the term `Asian-Pacific war' has become popular. Yamaguchi Yasushi, `Futatsu 
no Gendai-shi: Rekishi no Aratana Tenkanten ni Tatte', in Awaya Kentarö et. al, Sensö Sekinin, 
Sengo Sekinin: Nihon to Doitsu ha Dö Chigauka (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1994), p. 245. 
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the issue. 144 The Tokyo Trial is related to this unsettled issue because the Trial 
itself has offered a specific account of the war. And, it is the Trial's account of 
the war, rather than its general significance and lessons, that has been the focus of 
debates on the Tokyo Trial. 
This can be seen from the fact that even in interdisciplinary symposiums 
of 1983 and 1996, there were heated debates especially on the Tokyo Tribunal's 
historical account and the issue of the Trial's historical significance. 145 For Satö 
Kazuo, an opponent of the Tokyo Trial, the symposium in 1983 was `a good 
opportunity to wipe out the myth of the Tokyo Trial and the fallacy of the "Tokyo 
Trial view of history"'. 146 Igarashi Takeshi, one of the organisers of the 1996 
symposium, expressed his particular interest in the fact that the symposium was so 
successful. At the same time, he expressed some anxiety about the fact that the 
heated atmosphere was caused at different points from those which the organisers 
had expected. An enthusiastic reaction from the audience was observed during 
the discussion, especially on the issue of historical perception. He, as an 
historian, states: `we were not at all aware how much the Tokyo Trial had left a 
deep scar on the Japanese people's perception of history. ' 147 
The Tokyo Trial became surrounded by political and ideological 
arguments because of its account of the war, and these various `isms' have become 
144 Utsumi, Toinaosu, p. 5. 
145 See Chapter 4. 
146 Sat6, Kenpö, p. 265. He also emphasised that the most important fact about the symposium 
was that all the panellists confirmed that the Tokyo Trial was an unfair trial and against the then 
existing international law. Ibid., p. 255. 
147 Igarashi Takeshi and Kitaoka Shinichi (eds. ), Söron, p. v. Igarashi states that the symposium 
was different from ordinary ones: the participants actively expressed agreement and disagreement 
with presentations and some even stood up and shouted at panel members. For the 1983 
symposium, see Chapter 4. 
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obstacles to a frank examination of the Trial. Andö Nisuke, an international legal 
scholar, pointed out that under the `absolute pacifism' proliferating in post-war 
Japan, `criticising the Tokyo Trial itself was a taboo. ' 148 Being critical of the 
Tokyo Trial does not necessarily mean denying the Tribunal's judgment that Japan 
conducted aggressive war and war crimes, and valuing the Trial is not equal to the 
acceptance of the whole judgment. However, they are inseparable in the 
Japanese mentality. The connection between the Tokyo Trial and its account of 
the war is so strong that it is not possible to repudiate the former without being 
seen to challenge the latter, and doing so, as Andö pointed out, has been a taboo in 
post-war Japan with its new image of a peace-loving nation. Indeed, soon after 
the occupation, there was some hesitation among the media to criticise the Trial, 
because of a fear that the criticism would lead to a justification of Japan's 
militarist past. 149 
It is true that those who have denounced the Trial and its judgment have 
tended to adopt the nationalist and revisionist posture. However, to regard this 
denunciation simplistically as a newly-emerged, ultra-nationalist tendency misses 
the significance of those criticisms that point out problems related to the Trial that 
need to be re-examined. On the other hand, valuing the Trial is easily targeted by 
nationalists as a masochistic attitude towards history, lacking national pride, 
confidence and patriotism. It is here that the revisionists and neo-nationalists are 
trapped by the strong link between the Trial and its historical account: it is not 
always clear whether a `masochist attitude' refers to the acceptance of the fact that 
Japan conducted aggressive war and war crimes, or to the acceptance of the 
historical account that was imposed by the victor through an international trial. 
148 Interview with Andö. 
149 Asahi Shimbunsha Chösa Kenkyüshitsu (ed), Kyokutö, pp. 8-9. 
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In other words, those who attack the `Tokyo Trial view of history' seem to base 
their claim on the inaccuracy of the view as much as on the inappropriateness of 
the way the view was proposed and proliferated throughout the Trial. These are 
two different issues that need to be examined separately; just as an inaccurate 
historical account can be given through appropriate procedures, a correct historical 
account can be given through inappropriate methods. It is unfortunate that the 
two are put together as part of the same emotional argument that aims at the total 
negation of the Tokyo Trial. 
The fact that the Tokyo Trial has not been well-examined by academics 
in the field is relevant to the above point, although it has been well-known that the 
Trial had serious defects as well as providing some lessons. Indeed, it is 
perceived as difficult to make constructive arguments regarding the Tokyo Trial. 
Some point out that modern history is regarded in Japan as `too fluid, too political, 
too controversial' for an academic topic and thus as `something best left to 
journalists'. 150 On the other hand, emotional and ideological debates conducted 
by journalists, polemicists or academics not specialised in the field, might have 
`scared away' senior academics from conducting research on the Tokyo Trial. In 
the eyes of a non-Japanese Tokyo Trial researcher, Japanese scholars have been 
avoiding the Tokyo Trial. Minear wrote in the 1970s: `Where some coverage 
was unavoidable, they have tended to affirm the validity of the trial and its verdict. 
Apparently, they fear that denigration of the trial will lead to a positive 
reevaluation of Japanese wartime policies and leadership. ' 151 
The pitfall in criticising the Tokyo Trial is acknowledged by Minear 
himself. In the preface for the Japanese version of his Victors 'Justice, he stated 
150 Buruma, Wages, p. 119. 
151 Minear, victor's, p. ix. 
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that he hoped that Japanese readers would learn that the Tokyo Trial was a 
large-scale, staged event based on a dubious US presumption. At the same time, 
he did not forget to emphasise: 
I also hope that the Japanese reader will understand that this book 
does not immunise or defend Japanese policy during the 1930s and 
1940s. The problem of historical responsibility remains irrelevant 
to innocence in legal terms. 152 
Despite Minear's concern, it was his book that impressed Fujioka very much: `The 
scales fell from my eyes, ' he commented having read Minear's book. 153 The 
difficulty of criticising the Tokyo Trial constructively can also be seen from the 
fact that Judge Pal at the Tribunal, who wrote a dissenting opinion challenging the 
jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal and acquitting every defendant, has been a 
favourite figure for the nationalists and revisionists, who regard him as the person 
Japan should be grateful to, and his opinion as the bible. His comment, `The 
name of Justice should not be allowed to be invoked only for the prolongation of 
152 Minear in Richard H. Minear, translated by And6 Nisuke, Shösha no Sabaki: Sensö Saiban, 
Sensö Sekinin toha Nanika (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1972), pp. 5-6. The Tokyo Trial may be 
a taboo also for western academics. Minear wrote in 1971: `The objection may be raised that it is 
unwise to reopen now an issue that the Japanese people themselves never really protested. They 
too had a maxim about might making right, and so they were prepared for some irrational 
vengeance from their conquerors. Nor were they particularly proud of their wartime leaders or 
sorry to see them punished. Moreover, most Japanese have come to agree at least with the major 
early aims of the Occupation, and the Tokyo trial is far less important to them than say, land 
reform. Finally, there is some danger in denouncing the trial today. Japan today is only just 
emerging from her postwar political dependence on the United States; and denunciation of the trial 
may play into the hands of reactionary elements in Japanese politics. ' Minear, Victor's, 
pp. 176-177. Similar concern is also expressed by Brackman and Maga on their writing on the 
Tokyo Trial. See footnote 91. 
153 Quoted in McCormack, `Japanese', p. 63. 
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the pursuit of vindictive retaliation', is often quoted in those anti-Tokyo Trial 
publications. 154 When he died in 1967, an association of the relatives of 
convicted war criminals held a memorial service in Tokyo. 155 
The difficulty sensed by academics and intellectuals in examining the 
Tokyo Trial is also shared by the general public. Many people in Japan recognise 
that war and war responsibility, together with the Tokyo Trial, are important issues 
that should be talked about more widely and deeply. Almost all the interviewees, 
who at first had shown very little interest in the Tokyo Trial, expressed at the end 
of the interview that they had enjoyed talking about it and had realised its 
significance to contemporary Japan. Many said that they wanted to know more 
about the Tokyo Trial as well as Japan's war history. However, many of them 
also expressed their reluctance and discomfort to talk about it in public, for fear of 
being involved in ideological disputes. `I hear about the Tokyo Trial from 
debates on the pros and cons of the Trial', stated an interviewee in her late 20s: 
`The debate seems to be conducted among people with very biased ideas, and I 
don't want to be involved in it. ' 156 Participants of one focus-group interview 
said that they enjoyed having talked about the Tokyo Trial, having exchanged 
various opinions with other participants. However, one commented at the very 
end of the interview: `We usually cannot talk about this kind of issue on the street 
or in a casual manner. People would think we are "wacky". ' Another also 
agreed and stated that was why she usually did not talk about the Tokyo Trial. 157 
154 Radhabinod Pal, International Military Tribunal for the Far East: Dissentient Judgment 
(Calcutta: Sanyal, 1953), p. 700. 
Iss Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: the Demilitarisation of Japan (London: 
Hamilton, 1987), P. 170. 
156 Interviewee B. 
157 Focus Group C. 
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`I don't mind talking about the Tokyo Trial to you', said a man in his 
mid-60s: `But I don't want to talk about this kind of issue to strangers. I don't 
want to be misunderstood. ' 158 He regarded the fact that comments on war and 
responsibility are very easily taken either as a right- or left- wing stance to be a 
serious problem. After having strongly criticised the Tokyo Trial, a businessman 
in his 40s excused himself: `Don't take me as being on the far-right. I am not 
one of those Emperor worshipers. ' 159 A woman in her mid-50s showed 
discomfort during the interview in case her comments were taken as those of a 
leftist. 160 Interestingly, this kind of hesitation was not seen among undergraduate 
students born in the 1980s. This is an interesting difference between the 
generations. For these students, it was not right/left political ideology but a lack 
of knowledge that made talking about the Tokyo Trial difficult. 161 They were 
not only ignorant of the Tokyo Trial but were seemingly unaware of political 
debates that surround the issue. A focus group with third-year undergraduate 
students gave an impression that substantive discussion of the Tokyo Trial is 
difficult to conduct with people in their early 20s and below. It is worth 
examining what kind of perception the young generation, with little knowledge of 
Japan's past, is going to be from now on. 162 
158 Interviewee D. 
159 Interviewee S. 
160 Interviewee H. 
16' Focus Group B. 
162 According to an opinion poll in August 2005 asking if Japan's war against the US and China 
was `wrong' or `inevitable', 34% of those in their 20s responded `do not know'. At the same 
time, it is this generation where the percentage of those who regarded the war as `inevitable' was 
the highest after the generation in their 70s and beyond. 15 August 2005, Mainichi Shimbun. 
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Andö states that in the Tokyo Trial there are several points that the 
Japanese can positively adopt: `The Tokyo Trial can be a good textbook for seeing 
things from a wider perspective, instead of doing so from the right and left in their 
extreme forms. ' 163 It is ironic that the Tokyo Trial and its historical record have 
become the fuel for such an ideological debate. The Tokyo Trial's account in 
fact satisfies neither the right nor left. They are both unhappy about the Trial's 
account and the Japanese people's ignorance of, and indifference to, the past war 
and war crimes. The rightists cannot accept the Tokyo Trial for having conveyed 
the view that has made the Japanese obsequious and masochistic, and the leftist 
criticises the Tokyo Trial for not having done enough to reveal Japan's war crimes 
against Asian civilians. Caught in the middle, the majority prefers to remain 
silent. 
4. Re-Examining the `Nuremberg Legacy': The Tokyo Trial's Historical 
Record and Post-War Japan's Reconciliation and Transformation 
This last section conducts some analysis on how the Japanese historical perception 
noted above affects Japan's reconciliation with neighbouring countries as well as 
its own past. Regarding the relation between Japan and other Asian countries, 
Funabashi Yöichi, the chief diplomatic correspondent for Asahi Shimbun, claims 
that it is a deepened historical consciousness more than an apology that is 
necessary for reconciliation: 
We have apologised at various times. But that would make the 
current young generation resistant and obstinate. What is 
important is not an apology but the historical consciousness of why 
163 Interview with Andö. 
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we have to apologise. 
164 
Sincerely facing the past and cultivating historical understanding are the 
indispensable first steps for reconciliation not only with victims but also with 
one's own past, which is necessary for true social transformation of post-war 
society. According to the `Nuremberg legacy', the historical record of the event 
created through an international war crimes tribunal endorses and contributes to 
these processes. A question here is whether this is the case with the Tokyo Trial 
and post-war Japan. Examination of this chapter suggests that the Tokyo Trial 
contributed neither to the cultivation of the Japanese historical consciousness nor 
reconciliation with Japan and its former victims. Instead, it can be concluded 
that the Trial has been an obstacle, though possibly an indirect and subtle one, 
hindering Japan from facing and settling its traumatic past. 
The `history problem', even after more than half a century, is a major, 
sensitive political issue between Japan and China and South Korea. '65 Japanese 
historical consciousness of and atonement for the past have been questioned by its 
neighbouring countries whenever high-ranking politicians make `careless' 
comments about the war and responsibility for it. 166 Since the late 1990s, the 
problem has become even more serious over the revisionist textbook rows and the 
Prime Minister's visits to the Yasukuni shrine. In the textbook row, the 
neo-nationalists bitterly attacked the Tokyo Trial for having proliferated a 
`masochist' view of history in Japan. As to Yasukuni, the Prime Minister was 
164 Funabashi Y6ichi in "`Sens6 Sekinin" no Chakuchiten wo Motomete', Chüököron (February 
2003), p. 69. 
165 See Victor D. Cha, `Hypotheses on History and Hate in Asia: Japan and the Korean Peninsula', 
and Daqing Yang, `Reconciliation between Japan and China: Problems and Prospects' in 
Funabashi (ed. ), Reconciliation. 
166 See Chapter 4. 
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criticised by China and South Korea for having visited the place that enshrines the 
spirit of Class-A war criminals. On Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the shrine 
in August 2004, the Chinese foreign ministry released a strong statement: `The 
Chinese side hopes the Japanese side will honour its word by facing up to 
history. ' 167 Although the Tokyo Trial itself is not the focus of these rows, in both 
cases, the Trial constitutes the nature of the problems that have prevented 
reconciliation. 
As examined above, these problems do not embody the general historical 
perception held by the Japanese, and unlike the assertion made by China and South 
Korea, Japanese children, especially since the 1980s, do learn at school about the 
aggressive aspects of Japan's war. 168 Nonetheless, compared to post-war 
Germany, Japanese society has been relatively `permissive' to nationalist and 
revisionist words and deeds. Some of those interviewees who distanced 
themselves from the revisionist view of the past war nonetheless commented that 
people are free to hold whatever view they like. 169 Having been asked about the 
victims' demand for compensation and apology as well as the revisionists' claim to 
oppose those requests, several interviewees confessed that they did not have 
enough knowledge to accept or deny those views. A student at one focus-group 
stated that the revisionist claim `confuses' her, so that she does not know what to 
believe. 170 This is echoed by some others. 
What has been an obstacle for Japan's reconciliation with its neighbours 
167 `Japan shrine visit angers China', BBC news, 15 August 2004, 
Hhttp: //news. bbc. co. uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3567084. stmH, emphasis added. 
168 For example, Interviewee C, in her mid-20s brought up in Hiroshima, remembered having 
learned about Japan's war crimes in China. The author of this thesis also has a memory of 
having been taught about the Nanjing Massacre at primary school. 
169 Interviewees C, D, E and F. 
170 Focus Group C. 
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may not be loud but minority voices that deny Japan's past war crimes, but the 
Japanese people's weak reaction to these voices, derived from a passive attitude 
and ignorance of their past, which are often criticised as `collective historical 
amnesia'. `We, Japanese, have not been taught enough about war crimes. We 
don't even know much about the whole picture of the war. So we cannot say 
anything even when we talk about it with other Asian people, ' an interviewee 
commented: `That must be irritating for them. ' 171 Many of those in their 20s and 
30s said that they had faced Japan's past directly for the first time when abroad, 
via encountering the victims of the Japanese Imperial Army and their families, and 
it was then that they realised how much they did not know about their country's 
past. 172 Reactions to that depend on the individuals concerned. Some said that 
they felt better admitting to the existence of the war crimes and apologising in 
order to create friendly relations with their Asian neighbours; some were frustrated 
about the fact that they were forced to respond to the issue of war crimes that they 
were not sure actually happened. 173 The former prefer not to challenge the 
criminality of the past war and received view of history; to the latter, the claims of 
the neo-nationalist that provide a release from the burdens of the past appeal 
immensely. In either case, they are not helpful in cultivating historical 
understanding, reconciliation, and healthy national identity. 
The interest of this thesis comes down to one question: whether the Tokyo 
Trial played any role in Japanese `collective historical amnesia' that prevents the 
nation's reconciliation with its victims and its past. Examination in this chapter 
suggests that it did. The Japanese did not have to face the war directly because 
171 Interviewee I. 
172 Interviewees A, C and L. 
173 Focus Group B. 
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they were given a judgement on their war by an international tribunal in the name 
of international justice. In the long run, this deprived the Japanese of the will and 
opportunity to face and judge their past and build up their own historical view. A 
man in his mid-60s pointed out the Japanese `allergy to the war', which makes 
people reluctant to think about the Tokyo Trial as well as the issues of war crimes. 
`It must be the result of pacifism, with which we were imbued during the 
occupation, ' he stated. `It, as well as democracy, is not what we've gained 
through shedding our blood. That is why we are unaware that we should actively 
protect these values. ' 174 His point may be the reason why some students 
majoring in history saw the neo-nationalist and revisionist claims as, in a sense, a 
`healthy' and `natural' reaction, compared to the national hesitation to discuss and 
challenge the taboo of the war and war crimes. 175 And, it is for this reason that 
some accept the film Puraido: 
Criticising the film for affirming Japan's aggressive wars is too easy. 
It is very strange that it has been a taboo to deal with this aspect of 
Japan's past. The film is bringing up several questions: whether 
the tribunal, the victor judging the vanquished, was conducted 
fairly; what was the object of Japan's war; and whether the Nanjing 
massacre actually occurred. It seems that asking these questions 
itself has been denied. In that sense, this film has a great 
significance. 176 
At the same time, ideological and emotional debates surrounding the 
Tokyo Trial's account of the war inhibited the majority of the population, who 
174 Interviewee D. 
15 Focus Group D. 




have found it difficult to examine the Trial as well as war crimes frankly. The 
`silence, ' as examined above, is different from `amnesia' but the difference may 
not be clear in the eyes of the victims. 
The logic of the `Nuremberg legacy' goes: the `authoritative' record of the 
event offered by an international tribunal not only discredits responsible leaders 
but also preserves and cultivates collective memory, which is necessary for 
restoring the national identity, and thus social transformation of war-torn 
society. 177 However, Japan is still struggling to come to terms with the war and 
cultivate post-war national identity exactly because of an absence of reconciliation 
and an unsettled past. As this chapter has examined, the Tokyo Trial not only 
failed to contribute to but also became an obstacle to the Japanese becoming 
reconciled to the past. It is questionable whether the Tokyo Trial's record of 
history was the catalyst for cultivating the sound national historical consciousness 
or hindrance to it. 
Conclusion 
The Tokyo Trial attempted to promote the demilitarisation and democratisation of 
post-war Japan through presenting an `authoritative' historical record of the war. 
In one aspect, the Tokyo Trial contributed to these strategic purposes by revealing 
the facts and criminality of the war, which had been hidden from the nation. 
Although the Trial's account of the war had several factual defects, Japanese 
"' See, for example, Antonio Cassese, `Reflections on International Criminal Prosecution and 
Punishment of Violations of Humanitarian Law', in Jonathan I. Charney, Donald K. Anton and 
Mary E. O'Connell (eds. ), Politics, Values, and Functions: International Law in the 21S` Century: 




people accepted its historical account with shock and a distrust of their wartime 
leaders; and the `wrongfulness' of the war is still what is perceived by the majority 
of the nation. However, it is not clear whether this perception can be attributed to 
the Tokyo Trial's historical record, as the neo-nationalists and revisionists claim. 
Collective memory of the war is not so simple as to be created and cultivated only 
by war crimes trials; the American occupation policy consisted of various 
elements and the Tokyo Trial was merely one of its tactics. The fact that the 
Tokyo Trial itself is not visible in Japanese collective memory may suggest that 
the Trial in fact did not play a direct or major role here. 
However, at least it can be concluded that the Tokyo Trial's authoritative 
historical record did not contribute to finalising the history of a traumatic 
experience and a controversial period of the Japan's past. The Japanese still, 
after more than half a century, hold an ambiguous and unsettled view of the war, 
and have not successfully come to terms with their past. This can be seen from 
the simple fact that even in the 1990s major newspapers conducted opinion polls 
asking the nation questions like `whether Japan's war was aggressive or not' and 
that the result showed a number of people responded `do not know'. This reflects 
the nation's ambivalent attitude towards their past. In the midst of the confusion 
and despair after the defeat, the Japanese were given a judgement on their war by 
an international tribunal, which they were prepared to accept, albeit, 
unenthusiastically, instead of re-examining the painful event by themselves, at the 
time or later on. In this sense, the international military tribunal deprived the 
Japanese of the will and opportunity to face the past. This led to a general 
indifference to the war and war crimes. 
At the same time, the Tokyo Trial has left fertile ground for emotional 
debates over the interpretation of the war. This can be seen from the fact that the 
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historical account of the past is debated by some by referring to the Tokyo Trial. 
The `authoritativeness' of the Trial's account of the war has been severely attacked 
by revisionists and nationalists, not only on the content of the account but also on 
the fact that such an account was the creation of `victor's justice'. What is more, 
as ongoing arguments over textbooks and the Yasukuni shrine show, the Tokyo 
Trial itself is embedded in the `history problem' between Japan and its 
neighbouring countries. Instead of establishing a history in the eyes of the 
Japanese, the Tokyo Trial has cast a shadow whenever the nation turns its face to 
the past. 
The Tokyo Trial's verdict is strongly associated with how one views 
present-day Japan and the war and recognises one's own national identity, which 
makes the Trial a highly political, ideological and emotional topic. As interviews 
and focus groups clearly showed, these ideological and emotional debates 
surrounding the Tokyo Trial deter the majority of Japanese people from thinking 
and talking about the Trial and war crimes in a casual and frank manner. Above 
all, the issues that were judged by the Tokyo Trial as well as the Trial itself are 
traumatic events for the Japanese. In sum, the Tokyo Trial itself came to be 
perceived as a national taboo. This is an important element, together with 
indifference and cynicism, that constitutes the national silence, or `historical 
amnesia' as perceived from the outside. 
It can be concluded that the Tokyo Trial has stimulated nationalist and 
revisionist zeal on the one hand, and contributed, unintentionally, to the majority's 
`apathy' on the other, both of which anger and irritate China and Korea and hinder 
Japan's reconciliation with them. This unsettled past and lack of reconciliation 
are serious obstacles to the true social transformation of Japan, which is 
frustratedly held back by the past even after half a century. These points raise a 
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question over whether the historical record of the Tokyo Trial is a help or a 
hindrance for reconciliation and the social transformation of post-war Japan, and 
thus questions the contemporary understanding of the `Nuremberg legacy', that is, 
whether and how the historical record of an international trial contributes to the 
difficult processes of transformation that post-war society has to go through. 
This ambivalent Japanese historical view of the past directly relates to 
the ambivalence shown towards the issue of war responsibility. Utsumi Aiko 
argues that the fact that there is still no consensus among the Japanese on how to 
call the past war synchronises with the Japanese omission to examine the war and 
its responsibility. 178 Indeed, reconciliation as well as `coming to terms with the 
past' consists not merely of how the nation perceives the past war. It needs to be 
accompanied by `how people become aware of their war responsibility and how 
they fulfil that responsibility'. 179 The following chapter analyses in what way 
the Tokyo Trial influenced the Japanese sense of war guilt and responsibility, 
focusing on another device of the Tribunal: individualisation of war responsibility. 
178 Utsumi, Toinaosu, p. 5. 




THE TOKYO TRIAL AND INDIVIDUALISATION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 
According to current understanding of the `Nuremberg legacy', individual 
criminal punishment in the aftermath of mass atrocities is necessary for the 
decollectivisation of responsibility, which contributes to the detachment of the 
leaders most responsible from the majority of the population, the 
decollectivisation of hatred felt by the victim, and the endorsement of social 
transformation of the nation by freeing them from the burden of guilt and the 
traumatic past. The aim of this chapter is to examine whether this applies to 
the case of the Tokyo Trial, by focusing on the perception and understanding 
of the Japanese, both at the time and at present, regarding responsibility for the 
war. The chapter does not analyse the Japanese sense of war responsibility 
per se, which has been examined, discussed, and mentioned in academic and 
other literature. With regard to the aim of this thesis, the chapter limits the 
examination of the people's sense of war responsibility to its relationship to 
the Tokyo Trial; that is, whether, and to what extent, people's sense of war 
guilt is affected by their leaders having been prosecuted under the international 
war crimes trial. 
The chapter first examines the way the Japanese understood through 
the Tokyo Trial the individual responsibility of their leaders, then moves on to 
examine how people perceived their own responsibility for the war. The 
chapter also examines, through intensive interviews and focus groups, how the 
current generation perceives `collective guilt' for the war. People's 
perception of war responsibility and guilt is an important barometer for 
grasping the impact of individualised criminal punishment and its effect on and 
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limitations with regard to decollectivising responsibility and guilt. Finally, 
the chapter analyses how the current Japanese sense of war responsibility 
influences Japan's reconciliation with its victims as well as its own past. 
1. Individual Responsibility Pursued: the Effects of Individual Criminal 
Punishment 
The Tokyo Trial was embedded in the Allies' policy to demilitarise and 
democratise post-war Japan. By pursuing the individual responsibility of its 
wartime leaders through a legal process, the Trial aimed to detach the military 
from the majority of the nation both practically and psychologically. ' This 
itself was not a very difficult task for the Allies, as in the aftermath of the war, 
the Japanese felt shock, frustration, and anger towards their wartime leaders 
for defeat in the war that the nation had been told to win. 2 
The United States, for its part, had been well-aware of this national 
sentiment, and had tried to take advantage of it in conducting war crimes 
prosecutions. Pointing out the general mood among the Japanese `of fixing 
war responsibility on the major suspects' and the probability of changes in that 
mood in the coming months, George Atcheson, Jr., the Acting Political Adviser 
in Japan, noted in December 1945: 
it accordingly seems to me highly desirable to start the trials and 
get them over with as soon as possible during this period when 
the prosecution will, as regards the majority of those listed, 
receive popular support. 3 
' See Chapter 3. 
2 See Chapter 4. 
3 The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, Telegram, 
December 17,1945, in The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. VI, p. 984. 
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While negative sentiments against their military leaders enabled the Japanese 
to accept, albeit passively, the Trial, the Tokyo Trial, for its part, attempted to 
strengthen such sentiments among the people. 
Towards Demilitarisation and Demarcation 
By prosecuting and punishing individual wartime leaders, the Tokyo 
Trial clarified whom to blame for national suffering, pointing a finger at the 
military clique. At the same time, the Trial strengthened people's `victim 
consciousness' by labelling the Japanese as victims of a military clique. 4 
Joseph Keenan, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal, stated in his opening 
statement: `We must reach the conclusion that the Japanese people themselves 
were utterly within the power and forces of these accused, and to such extent 
were its victims. ' 5A sense of `having been deceived' by wartime leaders, 
which was widely shared in the aftermath of the war, was consolidated by the 
Tokyo Trial's account of the aggressive aspects of Japan's war and various 
atrocities conducted by the Japanese Imperial Army, of which the nation had 
4 During the occupation, the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not yet known to 
the public in detail. Japanese victim consciousness at this stage, therefore, is slightly 
different from the victim consciousness based on the icon of Hiroshima, which came to be 
widely shared later on. For Japanese victim consciousness and Hiroshima, see Ian Buruma, 
The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan, paperback edition (London: 
Phoenix, 2002), pp. 92-111. 
5 Prosecution Opening Statement presented by Joseph Keenan, 4 June 1946, in R John 
Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds. ), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete 
Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 
Twenty-two Volumes (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1981) [as Transcripts 
hereafter], Vol-1, p. 468. 
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not been informed. 6 
A sense of `having been deceived' and `victim consciousness' 
strengthened the nation's shock and anger towards their wartime leaders, 
especially the military.? The Trial's impact on detaching the military and 
people can be seen from the fact that many ex-servicemen, who had been sent 
off with great support, came back home after the war to find that they were 
regarded by society as `war criminals'. 8 Nakajö Takanori reflects his 
experience as a student of a military academy, who, after the war, was jeered at 
as 4a war criminal' when he was wearing a school uniform. 9 
Through individual criminal punishment, the Tokyo Trial also sent the 
message of demarcation from the past: the era of militarism. On the day of 
the judgement of the Trial, the editorial of Asahi Shimbun emphasised: 
What we need to bear in mind is that this trial demands the 
complete burial of the past Japan coloured with the militarism 
which was cultivated by the defendants. The Trial also clearly 
prescribes that the country we, the nation, should construct in 
future is a peaceful nation. 10 
6 See Chapter 5. The Allies' intention to appeal to the Japanese sense of `having been 
deceived' can be observed also from Article 6 of the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945, 
which stated that those leaders to be eliminated `have deceived and misled the people of 
Japan into embarking on world conquest. ' 
7 See Yoshimi Yoshiaki, `Senry6-ki Nihon no Minshü-Ishiki: Sens6 Sekinin-ron wo Megutte', 
Shisö, No. 811 (January 1992), pp. 76-78. This research on the Japanese people's perception 
during the occupation regarding war responsibility contains analysis on people's reaction 
towards the Tokyo Trial. 
8 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War 11 (Penguin Books, 
2000), p. 60. 
9 Nakajö Takanori, Ojichan Sensö no Koto wo Oshiete: Mago-Musume karano Shitsumon-J5 
(Tokyo: Chichi Shuppansha, 1998), pp. 76-77. 
10 The editorial, Asahi Shimbun, 13 November 1948, emphasis added. 
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Mainichi Shimbun's editorial also echoed: 
The whole Japanese nation should support the zeal for peace and 
the spirit of democracy expressed in the judgment. Our focus on 
this point would be a big driving force in moving Japan on from a 
past sealed `aggression' towards a new peaceful nation. ll 
Tokyo was regarded as a trial that eradicated the militarist past while 
providing Japan with a future based on new ideas: peace and democracy. The 
message of demarcation was firmly received by the Japanese who themselves 
were strongly hoping to start all over again. 12 
The Tokyo Trial had a symbolic effect: the Japanese were not only 
detached from their wartime leaders but also given a setting in which to bury 
the militarist past. The Trial impressed upon the Japanese that they were the 
victims of the military clique who had deceived the nation and conducted 
aggression, and the people accepted the Tokyo Trial as punishing `the bad 
fellows' on their behalf, What is more, people recognised in the Trial an 
opportunity to start from scratch as a peace-loving democratic nation, 
concentrating on the restoration of society without looking back on its 
militarist past. The Tokyo Trial's pursuit of individual responsibility 
succeeded in this sense. However, individual criminal punishment left an 
ambiguous `legacy' in the Japanese understanding of war guilt and 
responsibility. 
" The editorial, Mainichi Shimbun, 5 November 1948, emphasis added. 
12 For the Japanese sense of demarcation from the past, see Carol Gluck, `The Past is the 
Present' in Andrew Gordon (ed. ), Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), pp. 64-95. 
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The Side-effects of the Individualisation of Responsibility 
The individualisation of responsibility means the decollectivisation of 
responsibility. However, in cases of war, there are responsibilities that cannot 
be decollectivised; the responsibility of leaders for having decided to wage war 
and the responsibility of the nation for having supported the leaders should be 
differentiated. This point was raised by the Japanese media at the time. The 
editorial of Mainichi Shimbun wrote after the judgment in Tokyo: 
What matters for all Japanese people is how they as a whole reflect 
on the end of the Tokyo Trial and its judgment. It is a big mistake 
to think that everything is completed and that the Japanese as a 
whole were purified by the punishment of several people in certain 
official positions having conducted certain actions. It is also a big 
mistake to assume that the matter is only relevant to the defendants. 
The defendants were punished for their own crimes and were not 
sacrificed for the crimes of the Japanese. Every Japanese person 
has to reflect deeply on `crimes against peace'. 13 
Mainichi Shimbun also wrote on the day of execution of seven defendants: 
Nobody can assert that they are the only criminals and that all other 
Japanese people opposed the war .... the responsibility of 
having 
caused the tragedy should be shared by the whole nation. Facing 
their executions, the Japanese should think over this point 
solemnly. 14 
On the part of the Japanese government, Prime Minister Higashikuninomiya 
Naruhiko announced, as early as late August 1945, the so-called `collective 
13 The editorial, Mainichi Shimbun, 13 November 1948. 
14 The editorial, Mainichi Shimbun, 23 December 1948. 
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repentance of the hundred million (Ichioku Sözange)', claiming that the whole 
Japanese nation should be repentant to the Emperor for the defeat in the war. 
This claim indicated equal responsibility of the leaders and the nation and, in 
fact, meant that `responsibility rested with nobody and pursued by nobody'. 15 
The argument that the nation as a whole should embrace collective 
responsibility, however, did not appeal to the Japanese at the time. This is not 
merely because of their shock and anger towards wartime leaders but also 
because of the symbolic impact of the Tokyo Trial. The Trial's punishment of 
the wartime leaders sent the majority of the nation messages, which led to its 
self-immunisation from war responsibility, the limited understanding of war 
responsibility, the symbolic effect of the Emperor's immunity, and the hasty 
closure of war crimes issues. 
First, the decollectivisation of responsibility enabled the majority of 
Japanese people to protect themselves from personal responsibility for the war 
their country had fought. This self-immunisation was a result of a sense of 
`having been deceived' by the leaders and `victim consciousness', which were, 
as seen above, reinforced by the way the Tokyo Trial was conducted. A sense 
of `having been deceived' prevented the Japanese from taking war crimes 
examined under the Trial as their own business. It also allowed people to 
rationalise their own wartime cooperation. This is well-expressed in the 
following comment by a political cartoonist at the time: `All of us people were 
deceived and used by them, and cooperated in the war without knowing the 
true facts. Looking back now, this was because of ignorance and being 
15 Yoshimi, `Senryö-ki', p. 74. For this reason, Ichioku Sözange is criticised as the 
government's `self-serving' campaign to extract from the leaders the burden of responsibility. 
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deceived. ' 16 The result is self-justification and self-immunisation of one's 
own responsibility for the war that the whole nation supported. 17 
People's victim consciousness, that they were the `victims' of the war 
recklessly fought by the military, also facilitated self-immunisation and 
prevented the Japanese from facing their role as the victimiser. While the 
Japanese people were shocked and appalled by the Tokyo Trial's account of the 
Nanjing Massacre, such a reaction did not, at least during the occupation, 
encourage the people further to reflect on the suffering that their military had 
inflicted on other nations. Some point out that the Trial's failure to focus to 
any great extent on the Asian victims enabled the Japanese to recognise 
themselves as the victims of the war, not the victimisers. 18 
With `victim consciousness' and a sense of `having been deceived', 
the Japanese at the time could detach themselves from the Tokyo Trial's 
verdict. In other words, people could and did, consciously or unconsciously, 
put the burden of all their war guilt and responsibility on the shoulders of the 
defendants at the Trial. Not only the defendants but also the crimes examined 
under the Trial were seen with a sense of detachment by the nation. In other 
words, the Japanese remained as `bystanders' to the Tokyo Trial and did not 
16 Quoted in Dower, Embracing, p. 490, emphasis added. The same comment is also quoted 
in Chapter 5. 
" Ara Takashi, `Tokyo Saiban: Sens6 Sekininron no Genryü - Tokyo Saiban to Senry6-ka no 
Yoron', Rekishi Hyöron, No. 408 (April, 1984), p. 5. 
18 Önuma Yasuaki, Tokyo Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisö he, 4`h ed. (Tokyo: Töshindo, 
1997), p. 56. Yoshimi raised the following as the reasons why the Japanese, at the time, did 
not develop a sense of responsibility vis-ä-vis Asian peoples: people's memory of their 
passionate devotion to the war; a sense of superiority over other Asian nations; and the fact 
that Class B/C war crimes trials were under way, which prevented people from discussing 
war crimes. Yoshimi, `Senry6-ki', pp. 86-89. 
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take it actively and personally. 19 They could remain as such because the 
Tokyo Trial was not a stage on which the war responsibility of the Japanese 
nation was examined. 
During the occupation, several Japanese scholars debated the Tokyo 
Trial from the perspective of war responsibility, including responsibility 
towards the Asian countries and the collective responsibility of the Japanese 
nation. 20 Some were even aware of responsibility for their having been 
deceived, and showed self-criticism on their having supported the 
government. 21 Although these arguments were elaborated in various forms, 
debates on the nation's war responsibility could not develop fully, during this 
period. Yoshida Yutaka, an historian, indicates that there were very strong 
warnings among academics and commentators that to bring up the issue of the 
collective war responsibility of the nation might nullify the Tokyo Trial that 
had pursued its leaders' individual responsibility. Arai Shinichi points out 
that the Allies' strategic purpose in pursuing the leaders' responsibility, that is, 
the transformation of Japan, and argues that this is why 
it was very difficult at that point to talk about the nation's 
responsibility. It may have led to the total negation of the Tokyo 
Trial, the result of which might not have been positive at that 
time. 22 
19 Önuma, Tökyö, p. 90. 
20 For a detailed analysis of debates among intellectuals during the occupation over Japanese 
war responsibility and the Tokyo Trial, see Yoshida Yutaka, `Senryö-ki no Sens6 Sekininron' 
in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai (ed), Toinaosu Tökyb Saiban (Tokyo: Ryokufü Shuppan, 
1995), pp. 209-261. 
2` Ara, `Tokyo', p. 6; Dower, Embracing, p. 505. 
22 Quoted in Yoshida, `Senryö-ki', pp. 256-257. 
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Accordingly, collective responsibility was pushed below individual 
responsibility pursued under the Tokyo Trial agenda. 23 This is ironic 
considering the fact that the GHQ had implicitly expected to `educate' the 
Japanese to accept a sense of national responsibility for the war. 
Second, the pursuit of its leaders' responsibility made people focus on 
`responsibility for defeat' in the war, which could be taken only by 
high-ranking individuals. `Responsibility for defeat' was easily perceived by 
the Japanese who had been suffering from the war and its aftermath and were 
conscious of being victims. A view of `victor's justice' also reinforced the 
impression that what mattered in the Trial was the defeat, not the waging of the 
war. 24 This `limited' responsibility was expressed also by the defendants at 
the Trial. In his affidavit read on 30 December 1947, Töjö Hideki stated that 
there was a clear difference between the issue of whether the war was just or 
not and that of the responsibility for the defeat: 
I believe firmly and will contend to the last that it was a war of 
self-defense.... As to ... the responsibility for defeat, I feel that it 
devolves upon myself as Premier. The responsibility in that sense 
I am not only willing but sincerely desire to accept fully. 25 
The problem with the `responsibility for defeat' was that it diminished 
23 Yoshida also pointed out the risk that the pursuit of collective responsibility of the nation 
may have led to a nationalist approach to the issue or to `the collective repentance of the 
hundred million' that obscured war responsibility as a whole. The fact that academics and 
commentators at the time, especially of the left, were aware of these points, Yoshida argues, 
was another reason why the debate on the nation's war responsibility did not develop during 
the occupation. Ibid., pp. 238-239, pp. 256-257. 
24 Gushima Kanesaburö, `Tokyo Saiban no Rekishiteki Igi', Rekishi Hyöron, Vol. 3, No. 6 
(1948), p. 26- 
21 Transcripts, Vo1.15, p. 36,488. 
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the understanding of war responsibility - who is guilty for war crimes against 
whom - as it focuses on the responsibility of leaders towards their nation, but 
not towards other nations. 26 In addition, `responsibility for defeat' was a 
concept that related closely to the Japanese people's identification of 
themselves as victims of the war and the defeat. However, the `responsibility 
for defeat' might have had an extra positive effect regarding the Allied powers. 
In the eyes of the Japanese public, the `primary victimiser' for their suffering 
was no longer the enemy but their `irresponsible leaders' who had been in 
charge of the war. Whether intended or not, this re-direction of their hatred 
was vital for the United States to transform Japan into a friendly ally. 
The third issue that had an important impact on the Japanese sense of 
war responsibility is the Tokyo Tribunal's treatment of the Emperor. The 
Tribunal's individual criminal punishment was not applied to the Emperor, the 
Supreme Commander of the war. The extent to which the Emperor played an 
actual and vital role in planning and waging the wars of aggression has been 
fiercely debated. However, it is undeniable that the Japanese fought the war 
in the name of the Emperor, and all orders followed by soldiers during the war 
were given in his name. Many of those tried under Class B/C war crimes 
trials were soldiers from the battlefield who had followed orders from an 
immediate superior, which were taken as orders from the divine Emperor. 
27 
On the part of the Japanese in the aftermath of the war, many voices 
longed for the Emperor to admit his war responsibility in some form. 
However, this was soon overtaken by their acceptance of the new face of the 
26 Yoshida, `Senryö-ki', p. 218. 
27 See Chapter 4 for Class B/C war crimes trials. 
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Emperor as a `human being' and a `symbol of democracy' . 
28 The Tokyo 
Trial's granting of immunity to the Emperor was welcomed by the Japanese 
people: `The absence of the Emperor at the War Crimes Trial was a relief to 
most Japanese', Tsurumi Shunsuke reflects. 29 However, he continues: `At the 
same time, it was considered a denial of the very logic of the trial for war 
crimes. This ambiguity is the most important aspect of the Japanese 
reaction. ' 30 By means of the silence of the Tokyo Trial, the Emperor was 
seen to be innocent. By extension, the Emperor's innocence symbolised the 
innocence of the Japanese people who had waged the war in his name: `like 
their emperor, they had been "deceived" by the military leaders. ' 31 
The immunity of the Emperor given by the Tokyo Trial made the 
Japanese perception of war responsibility and war guilt ambivalent. John 
Dower frankly states what the Japanese themselves hesitate to say: 
If the man in whose name imperial Japan had conducted foreign and 
military policy for twenty years was not held accountable for the 
initiation or conduct of the war, why should anyone expect ordinary 
people to dwell on such matters, or to think seriously about their 
own personal responsibility? 32 
28 Yoshimi, `Senry6-ki', pp. 89-97. In parallel with this `humanised Emperor', in post-war 
Japan there was the other conflicting view of the Emperor: `authoritarian and inhumane' 
aspects of the Emperor and the absolute emperor system. As Kiyoko Takeda points out, this 
`dual' image of the wartime Emperor remains `part of the Japanese "mental structure" even 
today. ' Kiyoko Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1988), p. 152. 
29 Tsurumi Shunsuke, A Cultural History of Postwar Japan: 1945-1980 (London and New 
York: KPI Limited, 1987), p. 16. 
30 Ibid., emphasis added. 
31 Buruma, Wages, p. 259. 
32 Dower, Embracing, p. 28. 
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By immunising the Emperor, the Tokyo Trial obscured Japanese war 
responsibility in a rather distorted way. `The result is that responsibility for 
the Pacific War came to rest with "everybody and nobody", ' Dower argues: 
`the issue accordingly became terribly complex. ' 33 
Japanese perceptions of the Tokyo Trial and the issue of war 
responsibility cannot be detached from the responsibility of the Emperor. 
This could be observed from intensive interviews conducted for this thesis. 
During these interviews, many people referred to the fact that the Emperor was 
not prosecuted at the Tokyo Trial. 34 A man in his 40s stated: `Even if he were 
utilised by the military, something should have been done about the Emperor's 
responsibility, in order to promote reflection on Japan's war conduct. ' 35 
Indeed, examination of the Emperor's responsibility - not necessarily criminal, 
but political, or moral - is a vital exercise for examining the Japanese nation's 
war responsibility. However, this itself has not been an easy topic to talk 
about, especially for the wartime generation. An opinion poll conducted by 
Asahi Shimbun soon after the death of the wartime Emperor in 1989 revealed 
this. Regarding the question as to `whether the Emperor has some kind of 
war responsibility, ' among male respondents, while those who answered `yes' 
exceeded those who answered `no' among generations between 20s and 40s, 
the ratio reversed among those over 50.36 `In the end, it all comes down to 
the Emperor, ' said an interviewee in his mid-60s: 
33 John Dower, "`Böryoku no Rensa" wo Tachikirutameni', Ushio (February 2004), p. 75. 
34 Interviewees D, H, I, K and L 
group. 
35 Interviewee E. 
36 Asahi Shimbun, 8 February 1989 
See Appendix A for details of each interview and focus 
Among female respondents, in every generation those 
who thought the Emperor was not responsible for the war exceeded those who thought he was. 
See also Chapter 5. 
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But I think, in an emotional sense, this should not be touched. 
Even in Britain, prosecuting the Royal Family may be a problem. 
Whether right or wrong, this is a different matter from 
prosecuting Milosevic. 37 
The immunity of the Emperor surely added, in the eyes of the Japanese, an 
element of taboo to the Tokyo Trial that itself, already a very delicate issue. 38 
Awaya Kentarö, a scholar of the Tokyo Trial, suggests: 
Granting of immunity to the Emperor is not only significant in 
itself but also became an obstacle for the Japanese to develop a 
sense of war responsibility actively, in other words, to `come to 
terms with the past'. 39 
This point was expressed by a woman in her 50s: 
There are many Japanese people who think about the Emperor's 
war responsibility, but they don't express it in public. This is 
problematic for us to reflect on where the responsibility for the 
40 war lies. 
Fourth, there is the issue of `rush to closure'. According to Ara 
Takashi, an historian, `the Tokyo Trial was the pursuit of legal responsibility, 
of the leaders, for objective criminal acts under international law, and the 
37 Interviewee D. 
38 See Chapter 5. 
39 Awaya Kentarö, `Tokyo Saiban ni miru Sengoshori' in Awaya Kentarö et. al, Sensö Sekinin, 
Sengo Sekinin: Nihon to Doitsu ha Dö Chigauka (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1994), p. 93. 
ao Interviewee H. 
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subject of the pursuit was the Allies'. 41 He pointed out that what the Tokyo 
Trial did not, and could not, pursue was political responsibility, which required 
the participation of the Japanese people, who were absent from the 
international trial. Given that the leaders were being prosecuted and punished 
under an international military tribunal, it may have been possible to prosecute 
others under domestic law, in which the Japanese themselves could be more 
actively involved in the process of examining the nation's war crimes. 
Political and moral responsibility can be pursued also by means other than 
criminal punishment. 42 In any form, what is required is a people's serious 
inner reflection on their and others' war responsibility. 
However, the Tokyo Trial, whether intended or not, worked towards 
closure, in the eyes of the Japanese, of the entire issue of war crimes and 
responsibility. The GHQ's prevention of war crimes prosecutions by the 
Japanese government in 1946 deprived the nation of a chance, for the time 
being, to prosecute war crimes by themselves. This, however, was merely a 
practical matter. What is even more significant was the psychological closure. 
For the Japanese, the issue of war crimes was settled with the execution of 
seven defendants, in December 1948, in spite of issues remaining regarding 
responsibility of other types and of other people, including that of the whole 
4' Ara, `Tokyo', pp. 3-4, emphasis added. 
42 Karl Jaspers raises four different concepts of guilt: criminal, political, moral and 
metaphysical. Crime meets with punishment and political guilt with liability, both of which 
are pursued `without'. Moral guilt requires inner development and the jurisdiction of 
metaphysical guilt rests with God, both of which are charged from `within'. Although these 
four overlap and inter-relate, Jaspers sees it as important to differentiate them in order to 
avoid `the superficiality of talk about guilt that flattens everything out on a single plane'. 
Karl Jaspers, translated by E. B. Ashton, The Question of German Guilt (New York: The Dial 
Press, 1947), p. 33. 
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nation. 43 The Tokyo Trial, for its part, gave the impression that issues that 
were not examined in the Tribunal were guilt-free. 44 In this way, individual 
criminal punishment not only freed the Japanese from war responsibility but 
also deprived them of the will to reflect further on their personal war guilt. 
At the international trial, not only were different concepts of guilt and 
responsibility - criminal, political, moral and ethical - blurred and obscured, 
but the opportunity to examine different types of responsibility in different 
ways was also lost. 
The Japanese accepted the Tokyo Trial as part of the American 
occupation, the result of being defeated. Thus, it may be natural that people 
regarded the Trial as something that had to be gone through in order for Japan 
to re-enter the international community, but not as something for deep inner 
reflection. Symbolic demarcation from the past as set out by the Tokyo Trial 
also enabled the people to evade a re-examination of the dark events of the past. 
Instead of sincere self-reflection on war crimes, Yoshida points out, there was 
a sense that the pursuit of democratisation would cancel out responsibility for 
the war: 
In the minds of the Japanese, war responsibility could be negated 
by post-war acceptance of democracy. This led logically to the 
conclusion that war responsibility was automatically cancelled by 
accepting democracy, even without reflectively facing the nation's 
war cooperation and responsibility. 45 
This intention to `actively bury the past', Yoshimi Yoshiaki suggests, matched 
' Yoshimi, `Senryö-ki', p. 84. 
44 Önuma, Tökyö. 
45 Yoshida, `Senryö-ki', p. 219-220. 
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the mood of post-war Japan that embarked on rapid reconstruction and 
development. At the same time, he points out that the Japanese people's will 
to move forward as `a peaceful and democratic nation' reflected their 
awareness of the nation's war responsibility. The problem, Yoshimi argues, 
was that `it was pursued without facing the past sincerely. ' 46 
It should be emphasised that the Tokyo Trial alone is not the cause of 
the four `side-effects' noted above. The Trial strengthened the consciousness 
of the people as victims and a sense of `having being deceived', and detached 
them from war crimes and responsibility. However, the Trial was accepted by 
the Japanese because it appealed to national sentiment at the time. While the 
United States took advantage of the Japanese people's sentiment, the Japanese, 
for their part, consciously, or unconsciously, took advantage of the Tokyo Trial 
in order to blame their wartime leaders for their misery and to free themselves 
from war guilt. In other words, the Tokyo Trial gave the Japanese an excuse 
for not taking personal responsibility for the war that brought devastation to 
the country as well as its neighbours seriously. 
In any event, all these `side-effects', which were not necessarily 
expected by the organisers of the Tokyo Trial, led to public disinterest and 
silence regarding the Trial, as well as war crimes and responsibility, which 
remained as such until the 1980s, when the issue came to be raised by the 
Asian victims of the Japanese Imperial Army. 47 
46 Yoshimi, `Senryö-ki', p. 99. 
47 For details of Japanese `apathy' towards the Tokyo Trial, see also Chapters 4 and 5. 
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2. Collective Responsibility Perceived (I): the Limitations of 
Individualising Responsibility 
If the Allies' intention to pursue individual responsibility under the Tokyo 
Trial was to free the Japanese from collective responsibility of war crimes, as 
well as from an epoch of militarism, the analysis above then illustrates that the 
goal was achieved, perhaps too well. However, war responsibility and a sense 
of collective guilt are not so simple as to be brushed away by individual 
criminal punishment. Instead of freeing the Japanese nation from the issue, 
the Allies' prosecution and punishment of a handful of wartime leaders twisted 
Japanese perceptions of war responsibility and sense of war guilt, and even 
made them perceive collective responsibility. The rest of this chapter 
examines this point: the limitations of decollectivising war guilt and 
responsibility through individual criminal punishment, and the long-term 
significance of this. Analysis of decollectivisation is divided into two 
aspects: `horizontal' decollectivisation and `vertical' decollectivisation. The 
former denotes an attempt to avoid war responsibility from being borne by the 
whole Japanese people at the end of the war; the latter indicates an attempt to 
avoid collectivised war responsibility being passed on to future generations. 
This section examines `horizontal' decollectivisation and its 
limitations based on two points: whether, and to what extent, the limitation can 
be attributed to the idea and measure of individualisation of war responsibility; 
and whether, and to what extent, the limitation can be attributed to the fact that 
the Trial was conducted by the `victor'. Before moving on to an examination 
of `vertical' decollectivisation, the section examines whether domestic trials 




The Limitations of `Horizontal' Decollectivisation 
Pointing out the unpopular death sentence of the civilian leader, 
Hirota Köki, Bernard V. A. Röling, Dutch Justice at the Tokyo Tribunal, states 
that the effect of the Tokyo judgment `might have been more positive if a 
clearer distinction had been made between those civilians who aimed at the 
greatness of Japan by peaceful means, and the military who were bent on direct 
military conquest. ' 48 However, in the eyes of the Japanese, making a clear 
distinction and pursuing individual responsibility for the war by means of the 
trial are themselves dubious. 
Practically, there is a question of whom to punish. In the Tokyo 
Trial, compared to Nuremberg, the selection of the defendants was not 
straightforward; individuals were selected, or eliminated, according to the 
political calculation of the Allied Powers, especially of the United States. 49 
Dubious selection of defendants was, and is, clear in the eyes of the Japanese 
because some key figures were missing and some `unexpected' names were 
included. 50 Many interviewees raised the question of which leaders' 
responsibility should be pursued at the trial, and whether the defendants at 
Tokyo were those leaders, or all of them. The absence of the Emperor, not 
merely as a defendant, but from the overall trial procedures, has stuck in the 
Japanese mind when considering the Tokyo Trial as well as Japan's war crimes. 
In addition to the Emperor, it was clear that certain individuals and groups 
48 B. V. A. Röling, edited and with an introduction by Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and 
Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger (London: Polity Press, 1993), p. 91. 
49 See Chapter 3. 
so 'War Criminal List Creates Sensation: Unexpected Names Included Puzzle Japanese; 
Konoye Remains Free', Stars and Stripes, 5 December 1945. 
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were absent from the Trial in spite of their active role in the war: industrialists 
(zaibatsu), leaders of the ultra nationalistic secret society and the military 
police. Unclear criteria for the selection of defendants gave the impression 
that `the accused were selected as scapegoats' or were merely `unlucky men', 
and thus even aroused sympathy towards the defendants. 51 What is more, it 
left an impression that the pursuit of war crimes was not done properly. The 
dubious selection of defendants, together with the immediate release, soon 
after the execution of Töjö and other major war criminals, of remaining 
Class-A war crimes suspects, made the Japanese reflect on the Trial with the 
question: `What was the Tokyo Trial after all? ' 52 
In spite of the Allies' intention to avoid the collectivisation of 
responsibility, the `abrupt' selection of defendants made it unclear to the 
Japanese whom, and what, the Tokyo Tribunal was targeting. This lack of 
clarity not only diluted the impact that the Allies expected through individual 
criminal punishment, but also sent a contradictory message that the Trial was 
prosecuting the Japanese collectively. `Sometimes it seemed that the Tokyo 
Trial was punishing the state, and at other times individuals', wrote the 
research group of Asahi Shimbun in 1953.53 Criticising the Tokyo Trial soon 
after the occupation, Takigawa Masajirö, a member of the Defence Counsel at 
the Tokyo Tribunal, claimed: `As long as the idea that "we are international 
criminals who have waged aggressive war" is indoctrinated in our minds, the 
51 Tsurumi argues that the absence of the Emperor at the Tribunal gave `the War Crimes Trial 
the character of an offering of scapegoats to the altar of the conquerors in the view of the 
Japanese people both at the time and today. ' Tsurumi, Cultural, p. 16. This point is raised 
also by several interviewees. 
52 Interviewee K. 
53 Asahi Shimbunsha Chösa Kenkyüshitsu (ed), Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kiroku: 
Mokuroku oyobi Sakuin (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Chösa Kenkyü-shitsu, 1953), p. 5. 
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Japanese nation will never prosper. ' 54 The tone of his claim is totally 
different from those made by the media and leftist commentators on Japanese 
collective responsibility . Takigawa emphasised the collectivity to indicate 
the injustice of the Tokyo Trial. An emphasis on `the collective 
responsibility pursued under the Tokyo Trial' is a common feature of the 
anti-Tokyo Trial criticism made by the conservatives and the nationalists 
thereafter. 
In addition to the dubious selection criteria, there is strong scepticism 
over whether war responsibility and guilt can be targeted at individuals. The 
people, as a nation, supported the war that was accompanied by various war 
crimes committed by soldiers at the front. A man born in 1938 stated: 
The Nazis and non-Nazis can be differentiated. But in the case 
of Japan, were people in the military all guilty? It can be said 
that they did their best to protect our country, and in that sense, 
they become our fellow countrymen. So, clear demarcation is 
not possible. 55 
`In the case of Japan, things do not end by executing some leaders, ' an 
interviewee in his late 30s echoed: `The Japanese nation was not as clearly 
demarcated from the military as the Germans were from the Nazis. ' 56 Indeed, 
the fact that the nation has cooperated in the war with a belief, up to a point, in 
the good causes of their war will never be erased from the memory of the 
wartime generation. 57 For them, it is difficult completely to detach 
54 Takigawa Masajirö, Tokyo Saiban wo Sabaku, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Töwasha, 1952-1953), pp. 3-4, 
emphasis added. 
ss Interviewee D. 
56 Interviewee G. 
57 See Chapter 5. 
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themselves from the Tokyo Trial deep down. An interviewee born in 1965 
sees a sense of `collective humiliation' in the right-wing criticism on the 
Tokyo Trial: 
If everybody is clear within themselves about the division 
between individual and collective responsibility, or the role 
played by the military and other nationals, there would be no 
backlash regarding the Tokyo Trial. If they think they were 
detached from the military, they can blame everything on the 
military. But that is not the case. Those right-wingers are 
claiming that our grandparents had done well. It shows that 
older generations are aware that they have cooperated with 
those executed as a result of the Trial. 58 
As examined earlier, people found an excuse in the Tokyo Trial for not facing 
their personal war responsibility. The point here, however, is that they were 
well-aware of this. As the previous chapter found, a sense of guilt in the 
wartime generation is linked to the taboo of the Tokyo Trial and prevents 
people from facing the event directly and sincerely. This is sensed by 
post-war generations. A man in his early 40s stated: `For me, the Tokyo Trial 
is an historical event. Those of the wartime generation who take the Trial 
personally may feel guilty that they were also thinking and acting in the same 
way. But for those who were against the war, the Trial may have been a 
matter of course. ' 59 
The silence over the Tokyo Trial becomes significant if it is a sense of 
`collective humiliation', or `collective guilt', that prevents the wartime 
58 Interviewee G. 
s9 Interviewee E. 
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generation from talking about it. 60 Japan, in the summer of 1945, 
experienced a radical change from an Imperial state to a democracy introduced 
by the GHQ, which engendered either voluntarily or forcefully various 
conversions at a personal level, from strong support of imperial Japan to 
support for peace-loving democracy. A man in his late 60s reflected: `I was 
astonished to see how completely and immediately teachers at school changed 
their stance and opinion after the War. ' 61 
While the Japanese could not free themselves from a sense of 
collective responsibility, the form of international prosecution itself could not 
help giving the impression that the Tokyo Trial was trying the Japanese 
collectively. In the operation of international trials which excluded the 
Japanese from the process, Dower sees the Allies' logic assuming that 
`virtually all Japanese bore some measure of responsibility for the war, and so 
none could be trusted to pursue the issue of war responsibility impartially 
where their compatriots were concerned. ' 62 This logic of collective 
responsibility contradicts the Trial's tactic to individualise responsibility. 
Whether the Allies themselves were conscious of this contradiction or not, the 
logic was, and has been, sensed by the Japanese because the Trial was 
conducted externally. 63 Kiyose Ichirö, Töjö's defence counsel, expressed his 
60 See Chapter 5. 
61 Interviewee M. This was echoed by another interviewees of the wartime generation. 
62 Dower, Embracing, p. 475. 
63 In early 1946, there existed among the Allies the view of appointing a Japanese prosecutor 
and judge to the international tribunal. This in part was to show the Japanese people that 
the Trial was not the victor's revenge towards the vanquished. However, the idea was 
opposed by an American member of the Prosecution Counsel who claimed that the Japanese 
government had not officially shown a wish to participate in an international trial and that the 
vanquished's participation in the prosecutions would have set a confusing precedent for the 
future. Joseph Keenan also suggested that Japan might participate in the prosecution of the 
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ambivalent feeling as a defence lawyer in 1946: 
The Trial is entirely international in its character and therefore 
we have to explain to the world that those incidents and wars 
were not conducted with aggressive intentions and were not 
against the spirit of various treaties. .... If the trial was to 
pursue responsibility against the national, the attitude of we, 
the Defence Counsel, might have been different from what it 
is now. However, because the Trial is international in its 
character, I do my best to express to the world our country's 
past position. 64 
Sugahara Yutaka, another member of the Defence Counsel, also wrote: `Let us 
remember that we are here as lawyers for the defence of Japan as well as for 
the twenty-eight defendants. ' 65 These comments indicate recognition that 
what was on trial were not individual leaders but Japan herself. This 
sentiment is rather ironic given the Allies' intention, but nonetheless has been 
shared by many Japanese. This is well-expressed by the fact that the majority 
of the Japanese felt, and still feel, that the Tokyo Trial was `victor's justice' 
against the `vanquished'. 
Japanese war criminals. This, according to Awaya, was based on an intention to prepare an 
attorney to protect the Emperor. Awaya, `Tokyo', pp. 82-84. Keenan's suggestion, 
however, was greeted in Allied circles with `consternation' and never became a serious 
prospect. R John Pritchard, An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War 
Trial, Nissan Occasional Paper Series No. 5 (Oxford: Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, 
1987), p. 28. Ruling, with the benefit of hindsight, states: `the presence of a Japanese judge 
could have prevented many errors. ' Röling and Cassese, Tokyo, p. 87. 
6a Quoted in Yoshida, `Senryö-ki', p. 240 
65 Quoted in Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: the Demilitarisation of Japan 
(London: Hamilton, 1987), p. 156. 
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The Scar of `Victor's Justice' 
As seen in previous chapters, the immediate reaction of the Japanese 
regarding the Tokyo Trial now and then is that it was `victor's justice'. It is 
natural that this reaction is accompanied by frustration and a question: `why 
was it that only Japanese leaders were prosecuted? ' Yui Daizaburö, an 
historian, points out that at the root of the unsettled assessment of the Tokyo 
Trial among the Japanese lies a sense of unfairness, still existing after more 
than half a century. This sense, he concludes, prevents people from accepting 
the Trial unambiguously. 66 
`Victor's justice' has been picked up enthusiastically by nationalists 
and revisionists to challenge the authenticity of the Tokyo Trial and deny its 
verdict. Interestingly, most of them claim that it is the Japanese nation as a 
whole that was the direct target of the Trial: the victim of `victor's justice'. 
Maeno Töru argues: `the Nuremberg Trial was targeting Nazi Germany but not 
Germans. In the case of the Tokyo Trial, it was a trial to judge Japan as well 
as the Japanese. ' 67 Itö Shunya, the director of the film Puraido, which 
depicts Töjö as a hero at the Tokyo Tribunal, claims: `Although it gave 
immunity to the Emperor and the Japanese people and put the blame on a 
handful of military men, the aim of the Trial was to convict the Japanese 
completely. ' 68 
Nationalists and right-wingers often depict the defeat and the 
66 Yui Daizaburö, `Komento' in Igarashi Takeshi and Kitaoka Shinichi (eds. ), `Söron' Tökyö 
Saiban toha Nandattanoka (Tokyo: Chikijishokan, 1997), p. 44. 
67 Maeno Töru, Sengo Rekishi no Shinjitsu (Tokyo: Keizaikai, 2000), pp. 36-37. 
68 An interview by Kyoto Shimbun, http: //www. kyoto-np. co. ip/kp/event/geino/pride02. htmi, 
10 September 2002. 
278 
Chapter 6 
occupation as `an overwhelmingly humiliating epoch when genuinely free 
choice was repressed and alien models were imposed. ' 69 This is a 
`disgraceful' moment, and the Tokyo Trial for them is a symbol of disgrace and 
humiliation that unjustly branded the Japanese nation as `war criminals'. 
Many of these arguments claim that the aim of the Tokyo Trial was to destroy 
the culture, philosophy, and national spirit of Japan, in order to achieve the 
mental remodelling of the vanquished nation. 70 Tanaka Masaaki, an 
anti-Tokyo Trial polemicist, has been vocal on this point: 
People become servile once they become conscious that they have 
committed a crime. The Tokyo Trial has deliberately instigated 
this consciousness and concluded, by distorting the facts, that 
Japan's whole past was a crime. Indeed, it was one of the main 
aims of American occupation policy to weaken the Japanese 
people ... and, with the stern appearance of a military trial, it 
completely succeeded in weakening the Japanese nation. 7' 
For the nationalist, the Trial is a disgrace not only because an external 
trial was dishonourably imposed on Japan but also because the Japanese people 
themselves accepted and continue to accept such dishonour blindly. Some 
attribute the current `moral decay' of the Japanese to the Tokyo Trial. Kase 
Toshikazu, the first Japanese ambassador to the UN, argues: `Our nation was 
brainwashed by the victor's manipulation and still does not understand the 
69 Dower, Embracing, p. 30. 
'° See for example, Nakajö, Ojichan, pp. 164-165; Shüsen Gojusshünen Kokumin Iinkai (ed. ), 
Sekai-ga Sabaku T5ky5 Saiban: 85-ninno Gaikoku Shikisha-ga Kataru Rengökoku Saiban 
(Tokyo: Jupita Shuppan, 1996), p. 284. 
7' Tanaka Masaaki, Paru Hakase no Nihon Muzai-ron (Tokyo: Keibunsha, 1963), p. 199. 
279 
Chapter 6 
truth of the Trial. Without rectifying this, it is not possible to recover the 
mental independence of our people. ' 72 
Not to share the nationalist and conservative view of the Tokyo Trial, 
the Japanese in general sense some significance, be it positive, negative, or the 
mixture of both, in the Tokyo Trial and the intention of its principal organiser, 
the United States, for having conducted such a trial. In other words, it is 
commonly perceived that the Tokyo Trial was not an ordinary trial but a 
`political trial, ' pursuing ends other than simple justice. Intensive interviews 
and focus groups showed that the Trial is now generally regarded by the 
Japanese as a necessary means for the post-war settlement; more specifically, it 
is seen within the context of the post-war American occupation policy and the 
transformation of Japan. 
Among present-day Japanese, the Tokyo Trial is often associated with 
Töjö Hideki, who was the only person recognised by most interviewees. Töjö 
being the icon of past Japanese militarism, and the military and militarism 
having been given a bad name in Japan since the end of the war, it is 
understood, even if only vaguely, that the Trial worked to eliminate the 
military and militarism, which itself was good for a Japan in transition. `In 
the case of the Tokyo Trial, bad things were judged, ' stated an interviewee 
born in 1978: `On building a new society, things that could have been an 
obstacle to the new era were eliminated. I see the Tokyo Trial as such a 
'Z Kase Toshikazu in Shüsen Gojusshünen Kokumin Iinkai (ed. ), Sekai-ga, p. 1. These 
arguments are exemplified in the title of the book written by Kobori Keiichirö, a vocal 
anti-Tokyo Trial academic: Re-examining the Tokyo Trial: the Starting Point that Ruined 




thing. ' 73 This is echoed by many others. 74 
However, it is difficult to find unreserved praise for the Tokyo Trial. 
This is partly because the Trial's contribution to the post-war transformation of 
Japan is often not very clear, mingled with the impact of other occupation 
policies. In the eyes of the Japanese, it is not the Tokyo Trial that symbolises 
the demilitarisation of Japan; it is the 1947 Constitution, which contains 
Article 9 renouncing war as a Japanese sovereign right, that symbolises the 
new era of a peaceful Japan. The Tokyo Trial's role in demilitarisation is 
overshadowed by the impact of the new constitution. People's low evaluation 
of the Trial, however, is more to do with its negative aspects, which are more 
easily picked up than the positive ones. A student in a focus group stated: 
Whether Japan was right or not is another matter; what it did 
was wrong. But the victor has done similar things against 
Japan and Germany. There is no great difference in the nature 
of their conduct. 75 
`Japan at the time became too extreme and it was good that we were defeated. 
I have no feeling of remorse', stated an interviewee in his late 20s: `But I 
cannot agree with the idea that only Japan should have been tried. The Tokyo 
Trial seems very hypocritical. ' 76 
Kitaoka Shinichi, a scholar of Japanese diplomatic history, describes 
the politics of the Tokyo Trial as a way of reaching a settlement and a ritual for 
reconciliation. He argues that there is no point in seriously questioning its 
73 Interviewee C. 
74 Interviewees E and G. The view is also raised by several participants in Focus Groups B 
and E. 
75 Focus Group C. 
76 Interviewee 0. 
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legality and ethics: `The nature of the Tokyo Trial will never be understood 
without examining its effect on the big political turning point after the war. ' 77 
However, in general, it is not perceived as such. After all, the Tokyo Trial 
was a `political trial' based only on the victor ' politics; this is a view shared 
by many in contemporary Japan. Students in a focus group stated that the 
victor used the Tokyo Trial to eliminate the military because it was an obstacle 
to the US occupation policy: `They wanted to make the occupation easier. ' 78 
Some others in the same group argued that Japan was stripped of its military 
power because the United States wished to subordinate Japan, or weaken it 
psychologically.. 9 
Several interviewees saw that through the Tokyo Trial the victors 
imposed their own values and ideas. `Perhaps the United States wanted to 
make Japan in its own image', a woman in her early 30s stated: `And the Trial 
was to transform Japan in a favourable way for the United States during its 
occupation. ' 80 Another interviewee commented: `The United States led the 
Trial and imposed it on Japan with their own idea of building a new country. 
Japan was forced to change. ' 81 There were even comments pointing to a 
racist element in the conduct of the Tokyo Trial. This is most `moderately' 
expressed as follows: `I know there was also a similar trial in the case of 
Germany. But I feel in Tokyo something more oppressive and forceful in the 
intention of the victor. ' 82 No matter how good the intentions of the organiser 
" Okazaki Hisahiko, Kitaoka Shinichi, Sakamoto Takao, `Kingendaishi kara Miru 21-seiki 
"Nihonmaru" no Kökaizu', Shokun! (July 2002), p. 205. 
78 Focus Group B. 
79 Focus Group B. 
80 Interviewee L. 
81 Interviewee I. 
82 Interviewee L. Several participants in Focus Group B, comprising undergraduate 
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or how positive the nature of the transformation, the fact that the Trial was 
imposed externally and unilaterally harms its positive significance. 
Despite all these views, most interviewees did not necessarily express 
specific resentment or hostility towards the Tokyo Trial and its organisers. 
Of course, there is the passage of time, through which the Tokyo Trial is 
regarded by some merely as one event in history. More importantly, a 
common attitude of the majority of Japanese now and then, as seen in the 
previous chapters, is passive acceptance, which is based on the understanding 
that the Tokyo Trial was `inevitable'. 83 A sense of inevitability shared by the 
Japanese at the time is still widely shared by the current generations; the term 
`inevitable [shikata ga nai]' was repeatedly used by many interviewees when 
talking about the Trial. The interviews clarified that this sense of 
inevitability consists of different elements. A number of interviewees 
commented that the Trial was inevitable because what Japan had done was 
wrong and deserved a judgement: `It was Japan who started the war and did 
bad things during it. I think it was a matter of course that the trial was held, ' 
stated an interviewee in his 40s. 84 This commonly-held view connotes two 
things. First, it is perceived as necessary to seek where the responsibility for 
students, commented on racism as follows: 
a: `When it comes to the war with Asians, they conducted a unilateral trial and treated us 
harshly. I think there was a racist element. ' 
b: `I don't think so, because there was Nuremberg. ' 
c: `But what about the complete demilitarisation, which was not done in the case of 
Germany? I feel that they wanted the Asians to remain weak. ' 
83 Tsurumi relates this sense of inevitability to Japanese tradition and mentality: `The trials 
were accepted like some unavoidable physical calamity. This does not mean, however, that 
the criterion of justice asserted in the trials was fully accepted. ' Tsurumi, Cultural, p. 19. 
84 Interviewee E. This point is also raised by Interviewees 0 and R. 
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the war lies; the responsibility for such a grave event needed to be pursued. 85 
Second, there is an understanding that those defendants at the Tokyo Trial 
represented by Töjö were `bad guys' who deserved judgement. 86 
The inevitability of the Tokyo Trial, however, is more generally 
attributed to the defeat in the war: it was inevitable because Japan lost the 
war. 87 The Trial, in other words, was regarded as the result of defeat. 
`Victor's justice' has been accepted with the logic of might is right, which has 
been strongly embraced by the Japanese. `After all, that is war', a man in his 
60s said: `The Trial itself, as well as the way it was conducted, was based on 
the logic of the victor.... War trials after all are of such a nature. ' 88 The fact 
that no examination has been conducted of the America's dropping of atomic 
bombs was also understood in this context. `The Trial was never intended to 
try Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the beginning, ' said a woman from 
Hiroshima. 89 `Being unilateral was a prerequisite, and there is no point in 
complaining about it. That was understood right from the beginning, ' stated 
another interviewee. 90 
A sense of inevitability based on `victor's justice' leads to cynicism, 
and thus, hinders people's contemplation of the significance of the prosecution 
and punishment of war crimes. 91 This attitude was already of concern to 
some academics and commentators at the time of the Tokyo Trial. Gushima 
Kanesaburö lamented soon after the Tokyo judgment that many people 
85 Interviewees H, M and participants in Focus Group B. 
86 Interviewees F, R and participants in Focus Groups B and C. 
87 Interviewees M, 0 and participants in Focus Group E. See also Chapters 4 and 5. 
$$ Interviewee D. 
89 Interviewee C. A similar view was also expressed by Interviewee I. 
9o Interviewee G. 
91 On cynicism, see also Chapter 5. 
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recognised the Trial with `might is right' logic and that their understanding of 
the Trial's legal basis and jurisdiction and of what it was judging was 
insufficient. 92 
No matter how much the Trial itself was good in intention, and 
whether prosecuted leaders were popular or not, `victor's justice' leaves in the 
mind of the people some ambivalence: the vague sense of war guilt at best, 
cynicism in general, and reactionary nationalistic attitudes at worst. `Victor's 
justice, ' although it has been accepted as inevitable, remains as a scar in the 
Japanese mind. This was well-observed through an interview with a man in 
his late 30s, who was one of a few who tried to see positive and constructive 
aspects of the Tokyo Trial and its strategic purpose for current Japan. After 
having argued the positive aspects of the Trial, he nonetheless expressed his 
ambivalent feeling regarding the Trial: `Having said that, as a Japanese person, 
I feel discomfort. I think people were convicted unilaterally by the victor. I 
have an image that it was not a fair but political trial, similar to a witch 
hunt. ' 93 This is presumably shared by many Japanese, especially the wartime 
generation. Other interviewees, who had shown some understanding of the 
Tokyo Trial, also said that `as a Japanese, ' they had a negative feeling about 
the Tokyo Trial. 94 The fact that the Trial was imposed externally and 
unilaterally evokes national, or nationalistic, pride, which leads to a sense of 
distaste, if not revulsion. A businessman saw the Tokyo Trial as 30% positive 
but 70% negative: `In the short term, the Tokyo Trial was not necessarily bad; 
it worked to eliminate militarism. But in the long run, it was not good 
92 Gushima, `Tökyö', p. 30. 
93 Interviewee G. 
94 Interviewees C and L. 
285 
Chapter 6 
because it negated the good of old Japan. ' 95 It is ironic that an international 
attempt to decollectivise guilt and responsibility resulted in emphasising 
collective guilt and, in some cases, being taken as collective humiliation. 
Ara Takashi states that there could have been areas of agreement 
between those conducting the Tokyo Trial and the nation, through the people's 
sense of war responsibility, at the time. However, he argues that because 
responsibility for the war was pursued forcibly by the Allies, the two came to 
be connected in an unnatural form. 96 Önuma Yasuaki states: 
The Tokyo Trial was the judgement by the Allies, as outsiders, 
and it was conducted with some unfairness that was maintained 
by the authority of the occupation army. This is why the Trial 
could not obtain universality and morality. In that sense, the 
Tokyo Trial may have been an obstacle to dealing with the issue 
of war responsibility without any distortion. 97 
These academic's comments were echoed by the businessman noted above, 
who concluded as follows: `The problem was that the Japanese could not do it 
by themselves. ' 98 
The Desirability and Feasibility of Domestic Trials 
Regarding criticisms that Tokyo was `victor's justice' and an 
internationally-imposed trial, it can be argued that domestic rather than 
international trials might have been a better way to prosecute and punish 
Japan's war criminals. Domestic trials are also said to have endorsed the 
95 Interviewee S. 
96 Ara, `Tökyö', p. 7. 
9' Onuma, Tökyö, P. 160. 
98 Interviewee S. 
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more active participation of the Japanese in war crimes prosecutions and thus 
`strengthened popular acceptance of the idea that the Japanese, more than 
anyone else, had to take responsibility for their crimes. ' 99 
Whether a legal procedure originating from the West is the best way 
for the Japanese to pursue responsibility is one of the points made regarding 
the pros and cons of the Tokyo Trial. Many non-Japanese as well as Japanese 
point this out. A number of interviewees wondered if the clarification of right 
and wrong was a suitable way to solve the problem for the Japanese, who 
prefer to leave things vague. 100 However, people were not necessarily 
against trials per se. The Japanese government was not silent over 
prosecuting war crimes by themselves. When MacArthur's first order for the 
arrest of war criminals was issued on 11 September 1945, the Higashikuni 
cabinet hastily discussed a basic policy for conducting `voluntary trial' (jishu 
saiban). 101 Reflecting people's strong resentment towards their leaders, the 
media and commentators also raised, soon after the war, the idea of war crimes 
99 Dower, Embracing, p. 475. 
100 Interviewees B, C, D and E. 
101 The government policy noted that even if trials were to be conducted only by the Allies, 
Japan would conduct voluntary trials and send their results to the Allies in order to make the 
Allies' judgement fair and to treat defendants compassionately. Köseishö (ed. ), Zoku 
Hikiageengo no Kiroku, Fukkoku-ban (Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 2000), p. 127. Within a 
week, Prime Minister Higashikuninomiya told foreign correspondents that the government 
intended to investigate and punish those who had committed atrocities against POWs and 
other war crimes. Although the plan was not accepted by the GHQ, the Japanese government 
tried, under court-martial, eight individuals for war crimes conducted in Taiwan, Saigon and 
elsewhere. The voluntary trials continued until March 1946, when the GHQ ordered a 
prohibition on the Japanese government to conduct further investigations and trials. This 




trials conducted by the Japanese people. 102 Interestingly, many of those who 
criticised the Tokyo Trial did not deny the necessity of pursuing war crimes 
prosecutions. 103 
The Japanese now as then see a war crimes trial after the war as 
necessary, appropriate, or as a better option than others, including summary 
execution or doing nothing at all. What is not at all proper in their eyes is the 
fact of the victors conducting the trial. Having been asked about whether 
there should have been domestic trials conducted by the Japanese themselves, 
there was very little opposition to the idea among the interviewees. Domestic 
trials were regarded as desirable if they were conducted fairly and properly. 104 
Interestingly, however, almost all the interviewees immediately 
102 Asahi Shimbun stated that Japan should prepare its own list of war criminals and many 
readers agreed. The idea of domestic trials was enthusiastically endorsed especially by 
left-wing intellectuals, who were most resistant to the wartime government and had thus 
suffered most from the previous regime. Dower, Embracing, p. 475-476. The Japanese 
communist party published a pamphlet, Prosecuting War Criminals by the Hand of People, 
emphasising the inseparable relationship between the aggressive war and the Emperor system. 
Gushima wrote: `it is a grave mistake to think that having not been tried under the Tokyo 
Trial means innocence. If the Japanese truly want to achieve the aim of the Tokyo Trial, the 
prevention of war, they by themselves should thoroughly pursue those who were doubtfully 
immunised by Tokyo. ' He claimed that for Japan to achieve true democratisation and 
transformation as a peaceful nation, the rapid prosecution of war criminals was indispensable. 
Gushima, `Tokyo', p. 32. 
'0' Sugahara Yutaka argues: `On establishing an international tribunal, judges should have 
been selected from third-party countries. And if the nationals of the victor nation were to 
participate, the nationals of the vanquished nation should have also been allowed to be 
involved. ' Sugahara Yutaka, Tokyo Saiban no Shötai (Tokyo: Jiji Tsüshinsha, 1961), p. 318. 
He also claimed that `The war trials should have been conducted with a cool mind after 
several years had passed from the end of the war, when the peace treaty had been concluded. ' 
Ibid., p. 322. 
104 During interviews, several people questioned whether there had been, at the time, any 
international organisation, like the United Nations, or a third party that could have conducted 
the trial instead. Interviewees I, J and M; Focus Group B. 
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expressed strong scepticism about the feasibility of such trials. Japan soon 
after the war, many thought, lacked the necessary infrastructure, organisation, 
and ability to conduct trials by themselves. The moral and ethical 
appropriateness of domestic trial was also seriously questioned. `Who could 
stand on the side of the judge' was a frequently-raised point. `The nation as a 
whole supported the movement towards the war. The negation of that war 
cannot be done except from outside, ' an interviewee argued: `The external 
judgement is undoubtedly harsher, but you cannot judge your own past, can 
you? ' 105 For this reason, another interviewee opposed domestic trials: `If 
some people should be judged after the war, those who press for judgement 
should have raised their voice during the war. Everyone was involved in the 
war to some extent. ' 106 Students majoring in the history of 
American-Japanese relations expressed even stronger scepticism about 
domestic trials: 
If there had been a revolution and a new government had been 
built, a domestic trial would have been reasonable. But without 
this, such a trial might have ended up in putting all the blame on 
the military or have resulted in mutual recrimination within the 
military. Domestic trials could have become even more flawed 
than the Tokyo Trial. 107 
Another stated: `The Tokyo Trial was more of a symbolic settlement of the war. 
If it had been done by the Japanese, it would not have become a settlement; it 
might have become something completely different. ' 108 
pos Interviewee G. 
106 Interviewee J. 
107 Focus Group D. 




non-feasibility of domestic trials soon after the war, some commented that the 
Allies' conducting the Tokyo Trial might have been appropriate. 109 
Whether domestic trials could have been conducted `fairly' and 
`properly', or whether such trials would have diminished the complex and 
ambiguous sense of war guilt and responsibility is not known. Yet, the public 
discourse and historical documents of the late 1940s suggest that domestic 
trials at the time would not necessarily have been an ideal form of war crimes 
prosecution, especially with regard to fostering a better understanding of war 
responsibility on the part of the Japanese. Examining the policy of the 
Japanese government in the 1940s on war crimes issues, Dower concludes that 
trials by the Japanese would not have been significantly different from what 
actually took place under the Tokyo Tribunal: 
Loser's justice, like victor's justice, ultimately would have 
entailed arguing that Japan had been led into `aggressive 
militarism' by a small cabal of irresponsible militaristic leaders. 
Indeed, it would have involved a home-grown conspiracy 
theory. 110 
This is understandable given the public anger towards the military in the 
aftermath of the war. What is more, the government's intention behind 
`voluntary trials' was to evade, through double jeopardy, the expected damage 
to be inflicted on ex-leaders by the Allies' future trials. The judgments of the 
earlier trials under the Japanese court martial also suggested that punishments 
meted out by domestic court would have been too lenient. 
"' And, 
'09 Interviewees A, D and L. 
110 Dower, Embracing, p. 480. 
111 Ibid., p. 477. 
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undoubtedly, the Emperor would never have been prosecuted under a domestic 
legal procedure. 
Kobayashi Shunzö, a member of Defence Counsel at Tokyo, looked 
back on the Tokyo Trial and stated: 
the responsibility of our leaders for having blindly headed 
towards defeat should be judged by their own nations. 
However, because we had no such autonomy and power, we had 
to accept submissively the victor's punishment, which was 
masked as a trial. 112 
This comment implies that what Kobayashi meant by `domestic trial' is the 
pursuit of the `responsibility for defeat' for one's own nation, not for waging 
aggressive wars and committing war crimes against other nations. This 
completely misses the logic of war crimes prosecutions. This comment is 
also symbolic in that it regards the Japanese as the victim of the war, not the 
victimiser. 
A leftist academic, Inoue Kiyoshi, claimed during the occupation that, 
in order to break with the past, it was necessary to uproot the basis of the old 
militarist powers: `The most important way of doing this is that the Japanese 
themselves thoroughly try those criminals who imposed this suffering on the 
nation. ' 113 Again, this comment is based on the idea that people were the 
victim of the military, and implies that a domestic trial could have become a 
stage for quasi-revenge. Claims made by leftist intellectuals at the time had a 
112 Kobayashi Shunzö, `Takigawa Masajirö cho "Tokyo Saiban wo Sabaku" no Saikan 
nisaishite Töji wo Kaisö-suru' in Takigawa Masajirö, Tökyö Saiban wo Sabaku, Shinpan, 
Vo1.2 (Tokyo: Sötakusha, 1978), p. 240. 




serious limitation in that they failed to refer to the nation's war 
responsibility. 114 Mochida Yukio remembers having heard liberal scholars 
vocally denouncing the Emperor, the military clique, and zaibatsu for their war 
responsibility: `But those commentators rarely pointed out that each Japanese 
person should bear war responsibility and war guilt. ' 115 
In any case, calls for `a people's court' and domestic trials could not 
attract the wider interest of the public. This is partly because of strict 
censorship by the GHQ, which suppressed and deleted academics' comments 
on the domestic trial for war crimes, such comments being regarded as 
anti-Tokyo Trial. 116 However, it was more to do with a lack of will on the 
part of the people, who were suffering terribly from post-war poverty and were 
preoccupied with their everyday life. At the same time, the Tokyo Trial's 
prosecution and punishment of Tojö and other leaders was symbolic in itself. 
It strongly underlined the belief that all war crimes prosecutions ended with 
the Trial. Accordingly, there was little effort made afterwards to reflect on 
the responsibility of the nation. Kinoshita Junji, who wrote in 1970 a 
well-known play focusing on war crimes prosecutions and responsibility for 
the war, reflects: `Soon after the war, I myself could not think about our 
pursuing Japanese war criminals by ourselves. ' 117 
114 Yoshida, `Senryö-ki', pp. 229-230. 
"s Mochida Yukio, ' "Sensö Sekinin, Sengo Sekinin": Mondai no Suiiki' in Awaya (et. al), 
Sens 5, p. 10. 
116 Yoshida, `Senryö-ki', p. 245. Yoshida argues that the way censorship was conducted has 
distorted the Japanese view on war responsibility because it prevented people during the 
occupation from talking about the issue freely. 
117 Kinoshita Junji, `Tokyo Saiban ga Kangaesasete Kuretamono', Ajia Minshü Hötei 
Junbikai (ed. ), Jikö naki Sensö Sekinin: Sabakareru Tennö to Nihon, Zöho-ban (Tokyo: 
Ryokufü Shuppan, 1998), p. 13. 
292 
Chapter 6 
3. Collective Responsibility Perceived (II): the Limitation of `Vertical' 
Demarcation 
While the Tokyo Trial could not successfully decollectivise war responsibility 
and a sense of war guilt in a real sense `horizontally', it also failed to 
decollectivise them `vertically'; the issue of war responsibility and a sense of 
war guilt were passed on to future generations. 
not attain complete closure. 
Buried Responsibility 
In other words, the Trial did 
`Every Japanese sensed the issue of war responsibility vaguely, ' 
Funabashi Yöichi, the chief diplomatic correspondent for Asahi Shimbun, 
states: `But they continued not to take it seriously and personally until around 
the 1980s. ' 118 One of the reasons for this Japanese attitude is the 
development of the Cold War following the end of the Second World War. 
The relationship between Japan and the United States took an unexpectedly 
favourable turn during the occupation, as the latter came to regard the former 
as an important ally for the new era. As for the Asian countries who had 
suffered under Japanese colonial rule, many of them were too occupied, with 
their domestic turmoil and civil and independent wars, to pursue Japan's war 
responsibility. China, for example, had demanded extradition of several 
major war crimes suspects at the beginning but pulled out of the whole issue 
later on as its civil war became intense. 119 In addition, Japan's neighbouring 
states were in the process of development and thus still had very little say 
118 Funabashi Yöichi in "`Sensö Sekinin" no Chakuchiten wo Motomete', Chüököron 
(February 2003), p. 50. 
19 Awaya Kentarö, `Tokyo Saiban wo Kangaeru' in Ajia Minshü-hötei Junbi-kai (ed. ), 
Toinaosu, pp. 42-43. 
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within the international community, especially against the United States, who 
was unwilling to react harshly towards Japan regarding war responsibility, 
especially after 1948.120 Japan herself did not feel an immediate need to 
achieve reconciliation and create a friendly relationship with other Asian 
countries, especially China. China, turning itself into a communist country, 
became the enemy of the United States, with whom Japan was strengthening its 
strategic ties. 
This is a critical difference between Japan and Germany; the latter had 
to renounce its past in order to survive the post-war world, coexisting with 
other fellow Europeans, who were former enemies and victims but who 
immediately became important political and economic partners in the new 
security environment in the region. But Japan did not sense such `immediate' 
pressure from its neighbouring countries to solve the issue of war 
responsibility and reconciliation. This lack of pressure enabled the Japanese 
to leave the past behind, at least for a while. At the same time, an 
already-existing Japanese victim consciousness was further strengthened by 
the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the details of which became 
widely known to the public after the US occupation. Ever since, Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki have been the symbol of Japan's war experience, as the victim. 
Japan's past war crimes against its Asian neighbours became known to 
the Japanese public in the 1980s, through the textbook row with China and 
research on the issue conducted by the Japanese. 121 It is also during this 
120 See Chapter 3. 
121 Morimura Seiichi's bestseller in 1982 highlighted the notorious Unit 731 conducting 
human-body experiments in China. Morimura Seiichi, Akuma no Hbshoku: 'Kanton-gun 
Saikinsen-butai' Kyöfu no Zenbö! Chöhen Dokyumento (Tokyo: Köbunsha, 1981). The 
research of Honda Katsuichi, a well-known journalist who has been conducting detailed 
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period that schools, endorsing the so-called `peace education' centring around 
the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, started to teach children about the 
devastation inflicted not only on the Japanese but also by the Japanese Army 
during the war. However, Japanese consciousness towards their past war 
crimes, especially those conducted under colonial rule, was still low during the 
1980s. A joint opinion survey conducted by Japanese and Korean newspapers 
pointed this out. While about 40% of Koreans raised the issue of `36-years of 
colonial rule' as an image of Japan, only 4% of the Japanese raised colonial 
rule, including aggression and torture, in their images of Korea; instead, for 
most, food and culture reminded them of that country. 122 
The Tokyo Trial and `Post-War Responsibility' 
In the 1990s, it became clear that the decollectivisation of 
responsibility and the closure of the issue of war and war crimes were illusory; 
the voices of the long-silent victims in Asia became louder, stimulated by the 
end of the Cold War, the death of the wartime Emperor, and the further 
development and democratisation of Asian countries. Among those voices, 
the coming-out of the former `comfort women' shocked the Japanese public, 
who had not known anything about their existence. 
While many of the Japanese felt sorry for those victims and showed 
some sympathy, they also expressed dismay and uneasiness towards the 
situation of the 1990s. Their ambivalence can be seen from the fact that 
while an opinion poll in 1994 showed that more than 70% thought that the 
investigation on the Nanjing Massacre, was first released on Asahi Shimbun in the 1970s and 
also in the 1980s in the Asahi's magazine. 
122 Asahi Shimbun, 26 November 1984. Little change can be observed in the result of 
another joint survey in 1988. Asahi Shimbun, 16 June 1988. 
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government `has not adequately compensated the people of countries Japan 
invaded or colonised', 123 some 5 million signatures were gathered for a 
petition against a 1995 parliamentary resolution of apology. 124 The 
commonly-held view, which was observed through interviews, was that the 
issue of war responsibility could and should have been settled earlier, but that 
closure had not been and still was not completed. `I thought the issue of war 
responsibility was all settled with the Tokyo Trial, ' said a businessman: `But it 
may be different regarding individual victims. ' 125 
The current generation regards the Tokyo Trial as a way of war 
settlement, the `ritual for demarcation'. `With the Tokyo Trial, Japan's war 
crimes were judged and Japan could start as a new country without being 
bound by the war', stated a woman in her 50s: 
Without the Tokyo Trial, we would not have been able to 
undertake a precise summary of the war, being left unsure whether 
we were victims or aggressors. ... With the benefit of hindsight, 
it was victor's justice and may not have been fair. But I think 
there were some positive meanings in the Trial for Japan to start 
its new life after the war. 126 
It is seen that the Trial worked as a watershed with regard to an era of 
militarism not only in a practical sense but also in a psychological sense, that 
is, in terms of war guilt and responsibility. This was suggested by many 
people during interviews through their usage of terms, such as purification 
123 Asahi Shimbun, 23 August 1994. 
124 Quoted in Mark J. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, 
N. J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 189, footnote74. 
Chapter 5. 
125 Focus Group E. 
126 Interviewee H, emphasis added. 
For the 1995 resolution, see 
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(misogi), settlement (atoshimatsu, kejime), closure (shimekukuri, kugiri), in 
describing their perception and image of the Tokyo Trial. `I guess the 
post-war settlement was achieved by the Tokyo Trial, ' said an interviewee born 
in 1959: `It was meant to be a clearing up after the war, or a final settlement 
about who was bad and who was OK. ' 127 
What is not well-known among the Japanese, however, is the fact that 
the Tokyo Trial did not examine most of the war crimes committed against 
Asian civilians under Japanese colonial rule. 128 Issues brought up in the 
1990s are exactly those that were ignored by the Tokyo Trial and left 
untouched ever since. By not having examined Japanese colonial rules and 
associated war crimes, the Trial failed to become a forum of closure for Asian 
victims, even though Japan has `officially' settled reparation through 
state-to-state bilateral negotiations. Takahashi Tetsuya argues that the fact 
that adequate punishment and compensation have not been exacted for the war 
crimes committed by the past Japanese Empire causes the current awareness of 
Japan's `post-war responsibility [Sengo Sekinin]', which includes the Japanese 
people's political responsibility to respond to the victims' claims and to make 
the government fulfil its responsibility. ' 29 Rather than to detach the current 
generation from collective responsibility and guilt over the country's past, the 
Tokyo Trial, he pointed out, enabled `post-war responsibility' to be carried 
over to the present-day. 130 
The general reaction to the concept of post-war responsibility is 
"' Interviewee J. 
128 For the gap between the general knowledge of the Japanese and the facts of the Tokyo 
Trial, see Chapter 5. 
129 Takahashi Tetsuya, Sengo Sekinin-ron (Tokyo: Ködansha, 1999), pp. 31-32,39-51. 
130 Ibid., p. 21. 
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ambivalent. First, there are `temporal' questions regarding war crimes of the 
past: `How long are we to take the blame for the past deeds? ' A man in his 
mid-60s stated: `I want this matter to be settled. It is painful to hear these 
issues of war and responsibility indefinitely from our fellow Asian 
countries. ' 131 An undergraduate student stated: `For me, they are events that 
occurred long before I was born and it is not we who waged the war. I 
wonder how long the Chinese and Koreans will talk about the issues of the 
distant past. ' 132 Several interviewees of the post-war generation said that 
economic and current affairs were more important than the issue of past war 
crimes. 
133 
For many of the post-war generation, who have little awareness of 
their country's past, an immediate reaction is `why now'? 134 For them, the 
issue seems to have been brought up `suddenly' more than half a century after 
the war. However, reactions to a `why now' question differ from person to 
person. The diversity in views and emotions was observed in a focus-group 
interview with undergraduate students. One student claimed, `If they are 
talking about compensation, they should have brought it up earlier. There is 
no need to bring it up now. ' Another one responded: `I understand what they 
are talking about, considering Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We still talk about 
them. In that sense, a complaint "why now" does not make sense. ' 135 
Each person finds a different answer to these `how long' and `why 
now' questions. Some blame the government for not having acknowledged 
13' Interviewee D. 
132 Focus Group B. 
133 Interviewees 0, P and participants in Focus Group A. 
131 Interviewees G and I. 
13 5 Focus Group B. 
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past crimes and compensated for them much earlier. An interviewee in her 
mid-20s stated: `For my generation, there is no doubt that inhumane deeds 
were committed. So, we ask why were they committed, first of all, and why 
did the government not admit its responsibility earlier. ' As a result, she said, 
`the future generation is burdened with responsibility for the conduct of the 
past. ' 136 Others complained that the victims, as well as the governments of 
China and Korea, are too persistent. Indeed, issues over war crimes and 
responsibility, after more than half a century, are attached to various issues - 
the economic and domestic politics of victim countries - and thus, have 
become very complicated and delicate. An interviewee born in 1974, who 
claimed that the government has to compensate victims, still thought that the 
issue was used by China and Korea as a diplomatic card. 137 A man who 
expressed sympathy towards the victims' voice at the same time pointed out an 
economic element involving reconciliation: `If we were poorer than they are, 
we would not have been blamed this much. Japan has become a big power 
and they may be feeling that this is based on their sacrifice. ' 138 
Many interviewees sensed that the issue of war crimes and 
responsibility was highly politicised, pointing out the fact that the Japanese 
government has already apologised several times, that Japan has been paying 
China, since 1978, Official Development Aid, as a gesture of reconciliation, 
and that history is used by the Chinese and South Korean governments as a 
tool for domestic politics. 139 Regarding the issue as political and also 
136 Interviewee C. 
137 Interviewee F. 
138 Interviewee D. 
139 See Daqing Yang, `Reconciliation between Japan and China: Problems and Prospects' in 
Yoichi Funabashi (ed. ), Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific (Washington: United States 
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looking at it in terms of compensation, some interviewees believed this was a 
matter for the government, not for individuals. 140 
The `temporal' question may be reconciled within the Japanese mind 
through a sense of guilt that they had been ignorant about the suffering of the 
victims for such a long time. 141 What is more difficult and serious, however, 
is the second type of question: `why me'? Japanese people are dismayed and 
frustrated by the fact that they are blamed `collectively' for past events, in 
which most of the current generation were not directly involved. A woman in 
her late 20s said: `I do understand the feelings of the victims. For them 
things are not yet settled. But, it has nothing to do with what I have done. ' 142 
`I as a Japanese person shoulder a historical responsibility, ' a man in his late 
30s stated. However, he also poured out `pent-up' feelings: `I don't want to 
shoulder such a thing. But we cannot help it because I cannot stop being 
Japanese, and I should shoulder it. But it is unpleasant. What have our 
ancestors done! ' 143 
The frustration of the current Japanese young generation was 
expressed publicly in parliament by Takaichi Sanae, an MP of the conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party: `Regarding self-reflection of the Japanese nation as 
Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pp. 66-73 for an analysis of the sources of the `history 
problem' between Japan and China. He identified three major areas of explanation: `China 
plays the history card'; `Japan has not faced the past'; and bilateral dynamics and the 
international setting that has been influencing the problem. 
140 Interviewees N and P. 
141 As seen in the previous chapter, many Japanese people are aware of their ignorance of 
their past war crimes, and even their being `in debt' in that connection. An interviewee 
responded: `If apology is called for, I want to apologise for having left the issue unsettled for 
such a long time, rather than for the conduct itself. ' Interviewee Q. 
142 Interviewee B. 
143 Interviewee G. 
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a whole, because I myself am not of the generation directly involved, I am not 
self-reflecting, and I see no reason to be asked to be so. ' 144 Her comment 
received criticism as well as sympathy. It is to this kind of frustration that the 
nationalists' anti-Tokyo Trial arguments appeal. The nationalists as well as 
the revisionists claim that the view that Japan conducted aggressive war as 
well as the `Nanjing Massacre' is a fabrication of the Tokyo Trial that targeted 
the Japanese nation as a whole, branded the nation collectively as a war 
criminal, and burdened them with responsibility and a sense of guilt. Such an 
argument is even more appealing when people know very little about the Tokyo 
Trial. 145 
Although neo-nationalist and revisionist claims are not necessarily 
supported literally by the majority of the population, several interviewees 
expressed their understanding of the underlying emotion of such claims. 146 
After all, those claims are the magnification of a `pent-up feeling' within the 
Japanese, who, after more than half a century, seek a positive national identity 
and active contribution to international peace, but are nonetheless dismayed 
and frustrated by the outcry for apology and compensation, which drags the 
current generation back to the dark past. 147 
144 The editorial of Asahi Shimbun, 17 March 1995. 
145 During interviews, there are a few who, right from the beginning, expressed an interest in 
the Tokyo Trial. Interestingly, all of them stated that they had started to take an interest in 
the Trial after having read neo-nationalist publications; and it may not be surprising that they 
were all very critical about the Tokyo Trial, echoing the neo-nationalist logic. See Chapter 
5 for the neo-nationalist movement. 
146 Interviewee G, and several students in Focus Group C. 
147 Gavan McCormack, `The Japanese Movement to "Correct" History' in Laura Hein and 
Mark Selden (eds. ), Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the 




The interesting combination of the current Japanese people's 
`ignorance' and `frustration' regarding the Tokyo Trial and the issue of war 
crimes can be observed in the row over the Prime Minister's visit to the 
Yasukuni shrine, where the spirits of 14 convicted Class-A war criminals are 
enshrined, together with about 2.5 millions Japanese war dead since the 19th 
century. 148 `I don't think the Yasukuni problem is difficult at all', an 
interviewee stated. 
It is not a bad thing to enshrine the spirit of the war dead. But 
the problem is that there are also the spirits of Töj ö and others 
who are war criminals. The Tokyo Trial, in that sense, 
demarcated those who dragged others into the war and those 
who were dragged into it. I think it is a problem that the Prime 
Minister visits the place where both of them are held. 149 
This is exactly the point that the Chinese and Korean governments are furious 
about. In the eyes of China, it is a total contradiction to express atonement 
for aggressive war on the one hand, and to visit the shrine where wartime 
leaders are enshrined on the other. The Prime Minister's act not only 
questions the sincerity of Japan's atonement; it is also seen as a challenge by 
the Japanese government to the Tokyo judgment, which the government 
officially accepted through the Peace Treaty. 
However, the demarcation between war criminals and other war dead 
is not necessarily clear in the minds of many Japanese. `What's wrong with 
visiting Yasukuni to pray for the war dead' was expressed by several 
148 For the Yasukuni row, see also Chapters 4 and 5. 
149 Interviewee H. 
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interviewees, who felt that it was unreasonable that the shrine is criticised this 
much, even to the extent of neighbouring countries `interfering' in domestic 
affairs of Japan. 150 According to an opinion poll conducted by Asahi 
Shimbun in May 2005,51% answered they `cannot understand the fact that 
China problematise Yasukuni to this extent. ' 151 To some, this reaction is 
based on a lack of awareness that the spirit of Class-A war criminals are also 
held at the shrine. 152 Some students felt that the problem lies in the Shrine's 
connection with the war: war-dead. 153 This reaction reflects the Japanese 
tendency to regard all things to do with the war and the military negatively and 
to take the defensive stance that Japan will be criticised by China and South 
Korea whenever they find connections between present-day Japan and their 
past war. 
Even for those with a knowledge of the Tokyo Trial, a clear 
differentiation between war criminals and other war-dead in Yasukuni is still 
difficult to maintain. This may be related to the Japanese culture and custom 
of regarding `death [as] absolve[ing] all traces of guilt', which contrasts with 
the Chinese view that death is `a symbol of eternal evil'. 154 Yasukuni 
becomes an even more delicate and complex matter because it entails issues 
not only of international and domestic politics but also legal, social, cultural, 
150 Interviewees L, P and participants in Focus Groups B and C. 
151 Asahi. com, 31 May 2005, 
http: //www. asahi. com/politics/naikaku/TKY200505300363. html. 
152 Focus Group A. 
153 Taken from a conversation on Yasukuni, which was held at a coffee shop in Tokyo, on 28 
December 2003, between two students, who were sitting next to the author. 
154 Yang, `Reconciliation', p. 73. For details of the difference in two views, see Akira Chiba 
and Lanxin Xiang, `Traumatic Legacies in China and Japan: An Exchange', Survival, Vol. 47, 
No. 2 (2005), pp. 215-232. 
303 
Chapter 6 
ethical and religious concerns and matters of custom. 155 For some, Yasukuni 
is a symbol of wartime militarism that encouraged the idea of dying for the 
Emperor and the glorification of the war. For others, the shrine is rather a 
symbol of the reverence with which those who gave their lives for their 
country and future generation of their countrymen are held. It is here that the 
pros and cons of Yasukuni are caught in an `unproductive' kind of dualism that 
has been surrounding the Tokyo Trial: whether Class-A war criminals were 
villains or patriotic war-dead. 156 
The removal from the shrine of the spirit of Tojö and other convicted 
Class-A war criminals has been debated in the Diet; however, a decision in 
favour has been blocked by the conservative faction in the Diet as well as the 
shrine itself. Building a new memorial has also been discussed by the 
government; however, this idea has also faced challenges. Hata Ikuhiko, an 
historian, argues that if those war criminals had been tried by a domestic court 
and found guilty, the spirit of the defendants would not have ended up being 
enshrined at Yasukuni. According to him, the Tokyo Trial `purified the 
"crimes" of the accused and turned them into martyrs. ' 157 
The complexity and delicacy of the issue can be seen from the fact 
that public opinion has been completely divided regarding the Prime Minister 
Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni. On his first visit to the shrine in the summer of 
155 One problematic aspect of the Prime Minister's `official visit' to Yasukuni is that it may 
be against the Japanese constitution that upholds the principle of the separation of 
government and religion. This issue has been brought to court a number of times by several 
groups. 
156 Ushimura Kei points out that what is missing in the current debate on Yasukuni is a 
recognition of who those enshrined Class-A war criminals actually were and what role each 
of them actually played in the war. Ushimura Kei, `Shösha no Sabaki' ni Mukiatte: Tökyö 
Saiban wo Yominaosu (Tokyo: Chikuma Shob6,2004), p. 44. 
157 Quoted in Buruma, Wages, p. 163. 
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2001, Asahi Shimbun's opinion poll shows that 41% supported his plan for the 
visit and 42% had expected him to be 'cautious'. 158 In late November 2004, 
38% thought the Prime Minster `should continue his visit', while 39% thought 
`he should stop'. 159 The opinion shifted towards opposition after a mass 
demonstration took place in China and diplomatic relation between the two 
countries worsened in spring 2005. An opinion poll of late June 2005 showed 
that 52% answered that Koizumi `should stop his visit', while 36% supported 
the visit. 
160 
4. Re-Examining the `Nuremberg Legacy': Individualisation of 
Responsibility and Post-War Japan's Reconciliation and 
Transformation 
This last section analyses how the Japanese sense of war responsibility, 
examined above in relation to the Tokyo Trial, affects Japan's reconciliation 
with the victims and its own past. Reconciliation is not a unilateral process 
but requires a joint effort by both sides. 161 For reconciliation, especially for 
the victim, it is necessary that the victimiser acknowledge the crimes they have 
committed against the victim as well as certain responsibilities arising from 
those crimes. This is crucial for the victim to achieve `closure' and move 
forward. The victim, for their part, needs to refrain from demonising and 
blaming their adversaries collectively. According to the `Nuremberg legacy', 
trials are expected to facilitate such a delicate and difficult process through 
158 Asahi. com, http: //www. asahi. com/special/shiiiritsu/TKY200404190343. htmi, 1 July 
2005. 
159 Asahi. com, http: //www. asahi. com/special/shiiiritsu/TKY200411290310. litmi, 1 July 
2005. 
160 Asahi. com, http: //www. asahi. com/special/050410/TKY200506270317. html, 1 July 2005. 
161 Yoichi Funabashi, `Introduction' in Funabashi (ed. ), Reconciliation, p. 17. 
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individual criminal punishment. The Nuremberg legacy also suggests that 
trials are expected to decollectivise war responsibility in such a way as to free 
the majority of the nation, or group, from the burden of the past and thus 
facilitate the transformation of the given society. This last section of the 
chapter examines if this applies to the Tokyo Trial and post-war Japan. 
The opinion poll in 1991 conducted by Asahi Shimbun both in Japan 
and the United States showed that 48% of Americans still had `a feeling of 
antagonism (wadakamari)' towards Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor half a 
century before, and 59% of the Japanese sensed that the event remained as `a 
source of bad feeling' between the two countries. ' 62 Nonetheless, these 
national feelings do not come to the surface in such a way as to become an 
obstacle to friendly relations between Japan and the United States. Regarding 
the relationship between Japan and the United States, the Tokyo Trial may 
have worked as a formal `ritual for a settlement'. 163 The Tokyo Trial, 
however, was not a stage for reconciliation for Japan and its biggest victims, 
i. e. Asian civilians. The Trial, in the first place, focused very little on Japan's 
war crimes against Asian countries and did not examine war crimes conducted 
by the Japanese Imperial Army against civilians under colonial rule; it was 
silent over wartime forced labour and immigration. The Japanese had 
remained uninterested in, or ignorant of, the issues, until they were brought up 
in the 1980s and became a cause of tension between Japan and its neighbours 
in the 1990s. Some may draw from this the conclusion that Japan has not been 
162 Asahi Shimbun, 18 November 1991. 
163 Asada Sadao, a scholar of diplomatic history, points out that the Tokyo Trial had a 
symbolic effect that made the Americans recognise that Japan was no longer a militarist 
nation and, thus, it worked in a cathartic way, which opened the way for reconciliation. 
Interview with Asada Sadao, 15 January 2004, Kyoto Japan. See also Chapter 3. 
306 
Chapter 6 
able to achieve reconciliation with its Asian victims because the Tokyo Trial 
did not examine these victims' sufferings, thus, affirming the Nuremberg 
legacy. However, analysis undertaken in this chapter indicates that this is too 
simplistic a conclusion. 
What this chapter has observed is the paradoxical attitude and 
perception expressed by the Japanese who faced the Tokyo Trial at the time. 
The Japanese felt frustrated that they were being blamed at the Tokyo Trial as a 
nation, which nonetheless did not compel them to examine their personal war 
cooperation and the significance of the Trial because it did not directly target 
each one individually. This trend was observed also in contemporary Japan 
through the scar of `victor's justice'. These paradoxical attitudes regarding 
the Trial are problematic because they both relate to the ambivalent sense of 
war responsibility. 
How the Japanese perceive their own war responsibility is crucial for 
their reconciliation with other nations. For the victims asking for official 
acknowledgement of past war crimes, an ambivalent sense of responsibility 
held not only by the Japanese government but also by the Japanese people is as 
infuriating as the minor but vehement voices that deny any war crimes. The 
gap in perception between the people in Japan and its neighbouring countries 
about the past was recognised by several interviewees from the younger 
generation, who have gone abroad and have heard the victims' voice directly. 
One student met a man in Malaysia who claimed that his father had been killed 
by the Japanese army. 
I was so surprised to know that there was a generation that had 
lost their relatives in the war and that such a memory was still so 
central for them as to tell that to a person who came from Japan. 
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I was surprised to know there are people outside Japan who 
remember so vividly. I recognised a psychological difference 
between them and us. I was merely 19 and it was shocking 
because I had never thought about the war. 164 
A woman in her early 30s also recognised the difference for the first time while 
she was studying abroad: 
Both Americans and other Asians were very curious about how 
the Japanese think about war responsibility and past aggression. 
But as a Japanese person, I could not respond to them well. I 
had nothing to tell them because I had not really been conscious 
of these issues. 165 
The Japanese sense of collective war guilt is not merely cultivated 
within but also imposed externally. This can be examined through the 
Japanese reaction to the Yasukuni row. A number of interviewees stated that 
they regarded politicians' visit to the Yasukuni shrine as not right because it 
caused anger and criticism from China and South Korea. A student at a 
focus-group stated: `It is not that we ourselves care about the issue. 
Because foreign countries interfere, we care. ' Another student in the same 
group agreed: 
It is the same with the textbook row. We have been studying 
with our textbook but suddenly China and Korea started to 
criticise, and that has been taken up strongly by the media. 
then came to realise that there are problems with this issue. 166 
164 Focus Group C. 
165 Interviewee L. 
166 Focus Group C. 
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While the first student expressed frustration against the submissive and 
apologetic attitude that the Japanese are forced to adopt against outside 
criticism, the second student expressed dismay about her ignorance of Japan's 
unsettled past, which she came to know through voices from outside. These 
attitudes are well-reflected in an opinion poll conducted in late June 2005, in 
which 52% opposed the Prime Minister's visit to the shrine and 36% supported 
it. Seventy-two per cent of those who opposed held their view out of 
`consideration for neighbouring countries', while 13% related it to the issue of 
Class-A war criminals. At the same time, 39% of those who supported the 
visit gave as their reason that they thought it `wrong to stop the visit according 
to what outside people say', followed by 36% who regarded Yasukuni `as an 
appropriate place for expressing remorse '. 167 
Japanese ignorance and ambivalence towards past war crimes tend to 
be exaggerated in China and South Korea, and add to the already-existing 
antagonism towards Japan in both societies. An overly-emotional pursuit of 
war responsibility on the part of the victim, however, is counter-productive for 
reconciliation. While the victims' claims elicit certain sympathy in Japan, the 
persistent voice of accusation stirs up the Japanese people's `pent-up' feelings 
and frustration that they have been collectively targeted with excessive blame. 
There even emerges a sense that they are victimised for being overly accused 
of having been the victimiser. The problem here is a twisted sense of 
collective guilt, which is not merely internal but also imposed externally. 
The perception of collective guilt frames the identity of the nation; 
this is why people's sense of collective guilt has been attacked not only 
externally but also internally, both from leftist and rightist commentators: the 
167 Asahi. com, http: //www. asahi. com/special/050410/TKY200506270317. htmi, 1 July 2005. 
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former criticises people for being too little aware of Japan's responsibility for 
the past; and the latter for being too aware. Ironically, the right-wing cannot 
claim that the issue of war responsibility and compensation was laid to rest 
with the Tokyo Trial because of their absolute denial of the Trial, which, 
according to them, has imposed an excess sense of guilt that is still haunting 
Japanese society. As for the left, which is eager to pursue responsibility for 
Japanese war crimes and to criticise the militarist past, it is not easy to accept 
the Tokyo Trial wholeheartedly because of the Trial's failure to examine the 
war responsibility of the Emperor and Japan's alleged war crimes committed 
against Asian civilians under colonial rule. Both the right and left are critical 
about the Tokyo Trial in different ways. Being stuck in the middle, the 
majority of Japanese people remain silent. 168 They do not talk about the war 
crimes and responsibility and the Tokyo Trial, not necessarily because they do 
not care about them but because they are conscious, sometimes too conscious, 
about discomforting issues. Businessmen in one focus group said that they 
didn't want to touch the issue. `I don't want to feel the war directly, ' one 
stated: `I don't want to talk about it because it is still raw. ' Another stated 
that during his business with a Chinese counterpart, the topic of the war was 
not raised: `If it had been raised, I would have tried to change the subject. ' 
This comment is intriguing as it was made by the same person who stated that 
the issue of war responsibility was already settled and that there was nothing 
specific to talk about regarding the Tokyo Trial. 169 
According to psychoanalytic studies of post-war Germans, `societal 
self-analysis, however difficult to induce, is essential to restoring a nation's 
16s See Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of the `silence' of the Japanese. 
169 Focus Group E. 
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mental health and solidarity in the aftermath of administrative massacre. ' 
What is indicated is the problem of an `unmastered past'. 170 In that sense, 
the Japanese people's ambivalent attitude towards war crimes and 
responsibility, observed from their paradoxical attitudes towards the Tokyo 
Trial, are problematic, because either way - apathy and lack of interest by 
detachment from war crimes, and frustration deriving from a sense of 
collective guilt imposed externally - active `societal self-analysis' will not be 
achieved. This chapter, as well as the previous one, shows that Japanese 
society is still struggling to `master the past', for which the Tokyo Trial is 
rather an unhelpful national experience. 
Conclusion 
By selecting a handful of symbolic figures for criminal punishment and 
appealing to people's strong anger and frustration towards their wartime 
leaders, the Tokyo Trial successfully cut off the rest of the population from the 
military clique, who were labelled as war criminals. What is more, the Trial 
also cut off the Japanese nation from its war responsibility and past militarism, 
giving the impression that what was examined under the Trial was all that 
mattered and allowing them to move forward as a peace-loving nation. In this 
sense, the Tokyo Trial contributed to the Allies' strategic purpose to 
demilitarise and democratise post-war Japan. 
Yves Beigbeder states: 
One of the purposes of both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo trials 
170 Osiel, Mass, p. 176. 
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was to individualize punishment in order to avoid German or 
Japanese collective criminal responsibility. Has this aim 
succeeded too well in the case of the Japanese? 171 
An underlying assumption here is that, in the case of Japan, the 
individualisation of criminal responsibility worked so well that it detached the 
Japanese from the overall issue of war and responsibility; the result has been 
national apathy and a self-righteousness attitude towards their past war crimes. 
Indeed, people in Japan now as then consider that the Tokyo Trial has settled 
the issue of war responsibility, and, until the late 1980s, remained apathetic 
regarding their own past. However, as this chapter examined, this is only half 
of the story. 
Close examination of Japanese perception as well as national apathy 
towards the Tokyo Trial reveal that the Japanese have never been freed from a 
sense of collective responsibility, which has been not merely cultivated from 
within but also imposed from outside. Such a sense has been present ever 
since and has become a part of the society In spite of the Allies' intention to 
avoid pursuing collective responsibility, a number of Japanese felt, and still 
feel, that it was their nation as a whole that was judged under the Tokyo 
Tribunal. This impression is inevitable when their own leaders were 
prosecuted externally and unilaterally and the people were excluded from that 
process. `Victor's justice' left the Japanese with a vague sense of war guilt at 
best, frustration in general, and repellent nationalistic attitude at worst. What 
is more, regarding the war that was conducted in the name of the nation, people 
themselves are well aware that the responsibility of the nation cannot be 
171 Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals: the Politics of International Justice 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 75. 
312 
Chapter 6 
decollectivised totally. These reflections remain in the society as a `pent-up' 
feeling, or scar. 
The examination in this chapter has revealed paradoxical trends: while 
the Japanese at the time, because of passive acceptance and cynicism, 
remained as bystanders at the Tokyo Trial and did not take its significance 
actively and personally so as to cause them to reflect on their own 
responsibility for war cooperation, they, nonetheless, felt frustrated that the 
Trial blamed them collectively as a nation. This Japanese perception 
indicates the complexity and delicacy of the issue of war responsibility and 
war crimes prosecutions, which the `Nuremberg legacy' does not illustrate. 
The chapter set out the paradoxical combination of `individual responsibility 
pursued' and `collective responsibility perceived', which left the Japanese with 
an ambiguous and distorted sense of war responsibility and guilt, which is 
problematic not only in itself but also in terms of achieving reconciliation with 
their neighbours and a healthy social transformation in the long term. 
A complex relationship between war crimes prosecution and post-war 
society was also observed from the fact that while many interviewees would 
have favoured domestic trials after the war, they nonetheless felt, with the 
benefit of hindsight, that such trials would not have been feasible. This 
chapter has questioned what is assumed by promoters of international criminal 
justice as desirable and feasible for the society in the aftermath of armed 
conflicts. 
Through the people's perception of the Tokyo Trial, it was observed 
that lack of interest, cynicism, dismay, and frustration are all keys to 
understanding the Japanese people's sense of war guilt and responsibility, and 
that they have been embraced by the Japanese in a very complex form. The 
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current generation is struggling with the fact that responsibility over past war 
crimes has stretched out vertically and horizontally, growing into a timeless 
collective responsibility. This is creating a rather distorted sense of 
collective guilt within the society. This is what the advocates of international 
criminal justice maintain ought to be avoided. It is ironic that the Tokyo Trial 
not only failed in this but also came to be attacked by some as the source of 
such over-arching collective guilt. The experience of the Tokyo Trial 
illustrates that international war crimes prosecution can make the issue of war 
crime responsibility complex, especially in the long term; it can even distort 
people's sense of war guilt. 
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The creation of the UN ad hoc international criminal tribunals (ICTs) in the early 1990s 
was set against a background of developing approaches to international and 
transnational justice, and in particular, the notion that lasting peace, based on an agreed 
history, and processes of reconciliation could be fostered by judicial means. Peace 
through justice was the theme. This notion was largely based on the experience of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg and the impact and effect this international 
war crimes tribunal was said to have had on post-conflict German society. This 
constitutes the so-called `Nuremburg legacy. ' The creation of the international ad hoc 
tribunals was much discussed and generated great debate, about their very existence, 
their nature and their purpose. Aside from mostly received notions about Nuremburg 
and its impact, however, this extensive body research and writing in the field of 
transitional justice has not examined empirically exactly what is achieved by 
prosecuting war crimes - the arguments have remained at a theoretical, or preference 
level. The strategic purpose of international war crimes tribunals was not addressed. 
This thesis has sought to remedy this important lacuna in the literature on transitional 
justice by reference to the `other' international military tribunal at the end of the Second 
World War, in Tokyo, which has not received significant attention compared with 
Nuremburg and which, as I have argued in the course of this dissertation, leads to less 
idealistic and clear-cut conclusions than the Nuremburg legacy would suggest. Tokyo, 
where considered in the discussion on the effects of transitional justice and international 
prosecution, is assumed to be part of the same story as Nuremburg. This is not the case. 
As a consequence, the overall understanding of what can be achieved by these judicial 
processes needs to be reappraised. 
The contemporary ICTs' ultimate aim is not war crimes prosecution per se. 
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They are judicial bodies created by the UN Security Council as an enforcement measure 
to respond to threats to international peace, and their strategic purpose is to `restore' and 
`maintain' international peace. This point is vital for understanding and assessing the 
ICTs' strategy and effectiveness. As Chapter 1 confirmed, the ICTs were established in 
response to, and as part of, the new security environment that emerged after the end of 
the Cold War, in which the `non-military' sources of instability existing `within' a state 
came to be a matter of international concern. This new situation made the establishment 
of the ICTs both possible and necessary. The ICTs were given a mission to contribute to 
the transformation of conflicts and post-conflict societies, where peace should not only 
be restored, but also maintained, once it had been established. Justice was expected to 
consolidate fragile peace. 
The idea of `peace through justice', a key concept underpinning the ICTs' 
strategic purpose, and the establishment of an international war crimes tribunal were not 
new. What was significant about the ICTs, however, was that they were established half 
a century after the two international military tribunals (IMTs), Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
which had been created in the aftermath of WWII. The experience of Nuremberg, 
especially, was closely borne in mind by those building the ICTY and the ICTR, in their 
early days. The IMTs were clearly significant in the context of the post-Cold War 
international relations. Chapter 2 examined that in spite of states' affirmation of the 
Charter and judgement of Nuremberg and the remarkable development of international 
law thereafter, states were reluctant to resort to the Nuremberg precedent after the IMTs, 
which prevented any subsequent international tribunal from being established - 
primarily because there was a lack of political will, unsurprisingly in the Cold War 
context. However, as the definition of what constituted a `threat to international peace' 
changed with the end of the Cold War, the Nuremberg experience came to be seen as a 
key instrument in international peace and security. Based on the experience of 
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Nuremberg and its impact on post-war West Germany, promoters of the ICTs believe 
strongly in the positive impact of international war crimes tribunals on post-conflict 
society, especially in terms of social transformation and reconciliation in the context of 
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and other post-conflict societies. However, as noted, 
the experience of the Tokyo Trial and post-war Japan can tell a different story about the 
impact and effect of international war crimes tribunal. 
Through empirical research, including interviews and focus groups, I have 
analysed this impact, both in the short- and the long-term, by examining how people in 
Japan have reacted to the Tokyo Trial over time. That `the Tokyo Trial was "`victor's 
justice"' was a view widely held by the Japanese at the time, and one that remained sixty 
years later. The creation and operation of the Tokyo Trial served the strategic purposes 
of the Allies, really the United States, to demilitarise and democratise the vanquished 
nation: Japan. Although the unfairness and political nature of the Trial were felt strongly, 
the Japanese accepted, and ever since have continued to accept, the Tokyo Trial with the 
understanding that it was `an inevitable consequence of defeat'. Their passive 
acceptance, in fact, is close to apathy. Considering Japanese attitudes towards the 
Second World War, war crimes, and the issue of responsibility, revealed in the present 
research, it is evident that the Tokyo Trial had little `visible' effect, or no `positive' 
impact, on Japan. However, the silence of the Japanese is highly vocal, in a sense. 
The Japanese view of the Tokyo Trial consists of a complex mixture of lack of 
interest, cynicism, sense of `collective guilt', or `collective humiliation', and frustration. 
These complex and ambivalent perceptions are not irrelevant to the `unique' nature of 
the Tokyo Trial. As seen in Chapter 3, in spite of the fact that the Tokyo Trial was 
modelled on the Nuremberg Tribunal, with a similar impact expected by the organisers, 
there are several critical differences between the two tribunals, related to differences in 
the background and context of the defeat of the two countries, as well as to the different 
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degree of initiative taken by the United States. The disputes over the Emperor's 
responsibility and unsettled responsibility, as well as compensation for the victims in 
Asia, notably the issue of `comfort women', are problems of kinds that were absent in 
the case of Nuremberg and post-war West Germany, and can be attributed to the unique 
nature of or specific `shortcomings' of the Tokyo Trial. Some commentators have 
argued that the Japanese reaction is due to the unique character of Japan, its people, and 
cultural and historical background. However, while cultural context will always be an 
important factor in particular situations, a factor relevant to the general understanding of 
strategic purpose in international war crimes prosecutions, it is the application and 
operation of the judicial instrument - and its limitations - that must be addressed, and 
that informs understanding not only of what happened in Japan, but of the general utility 
of international judicial mechanisms, and what can be expected of them. 
Rather than focus on the peculiarity of the case, therefore, I have examined 
Japanese perceptions and reactions in terms of the Tribunal's two key devices: the 
creation and presentation of an uncontested record of the event; and the pursuit of 
individual responsibility. These devices are key because the `Nuremberg legacy', 
reiterated in the context of the ICTs, suggests that they determine the utility of war 
crimes tribunals. The historical record created through legal procedures, the advocates 
of transitional justice emphasise, is `authoritative' and contributes not only to 
discrediting leaders responsible for mass atrocities, but also to cultivating collective 
memory and national identity. Individual criminal punishment is regarded as vital for 
the de-collectivisation of responsibility, which promotes the detachment of those leaders 
most responsible from the majority of the population, the decollectivisation of hatred 
held by the victims, and the endorsement of social transformation of the nation by 
freeing them from the burden of guilt and the traumatic past. In these ways, international 
war crimes tribunals are expected to contribute to the social transformation of a war-torn 
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society and to reconciliation within it. This understanding of international war crimes 
tribunals, however, cannot be treated as universal, or realistically achievable, as my 
examination of the impact of the Tokyo Trial on post-war Japan reveals. 
Chapter 5 examined the Tokyo Trial's record concerning the first principal 
device of international prosecution - the historical record and its impact on post-war 
Japan. The Tokyo Trial's account of the war had a significant impact on the Japanese, at 
the time, by telling them the facts and judging the criminality of the war. Importantly, the 
account of the Tribunal was accepted by the nation, at the time. In one aspect, this is 
natural, regarding the fact that the Tokyo Trial itself was accepted as inevitable, 
following the logic of `might is right'. What is more, the Trial's account of the war was 
`comfortable' for the people at the time. By focusing on the role of a military clique, the 
Tokyo Trial pointed the finger at who should be blamed for war, defeat and misery, and 
by doing so, it freed the majority of the population from the burden of war guilt. The 
Tokyo Trial had a symbolic effect. Not only did it detach the wartime leaders from their 
angry and frustrated people, but it also gave people a setting in which to bury the 
militarist past and start from scratch as a peace-loving nation. Overall, this was an initial 
response not incompatible with the peace and justice theory embraced by advocates of 
the Nuremburg approach. 
The view that Japan conducted aggressive wars recklessly led by the military 
and militarists is still held by the majority in Japan. However, it is difficult to point out 
the explicit impact of the Tokyo Trial on this Japanese historical view. The positive 
impact of the `authoritative' account of the Tribunal, at least, is not appreciated in society. 
The results of intensive interviews and focus groups showed that people's general 
attitude to the Tokyo Trial is characterised by ignorance and indifference. At the same 
time, the `authoritativeness' of the Trial's account of the war has been severely attacked 
by nationalists and conservatives, and, recently, by revisionists, who put forward the 
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`affirmative view' of the war. Criticisms are made regarding both the content of the 
account and the fact that such an account was the outcome of `victor's justice'. They 
further claim that the current Japanese view of history and war is the result of the verdict 
of the Tokyo Trial, which imposed a `wrong' historical view. How to perceive the nature 
of the war is an issue that is still unsettled among the Japanese and had been debated 
politically, ideologically and emotionally. The Tokyo Trial is involved in this because it 
offered a specific account of the war. These ideological and emotional debates 
surrounding the Trial scare the majority of the population away from thinking and 
talking in a casual and frank manner about the Trial and war crimes. 
The very problem of the Tokyo Trial and the Japanese is that the Trial is either 
talked about emotionally and ideologically within a limited circle, or simply ignored by 
the majority of the population. This is strongly related to the general perception that the 
Tokyo Trial is a national taboo. Interviews and focus groups strongly confirmed this 
perception. A sense of taboo is an important element, together with indifference and 
cynicism, that constitutes a national silence, or `historical amnesia'. Chapter 5 showed 
that the Tokyo Trial's authoritative historical record did not contribute to settling the 
history of a traumatic experience and a controversial period in Japan's past. The 
present-day Japanese still hold an ambiguous and unsettled view of the war, and have not 
successfully come to terms with their past. What is worse, regarding the historical 
perspective, the Tokyo Trial's verdict can be said to have stimulated nationalist and 
revisionist zeal, on the one hand, and contributed, unintentionally, to the majority's 
`apathy' on the other. This passive attitude of the Japanese regarding the past is an 
obstacle to reconciliation not only with its victims but also with its own past, because it 
angers and irritates the Chinese and Koreans, and harms the cultivation of healthy 
national identity and the true social transformation of Japan. Even after half a century, 
like F. Scott Fitzgerald's boats against the current, the Japanese are borne back 
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ceaselessly into the past. This all suggests that the Tokyo Trial's account of the war has 
been rather counter-productive in terms of reconciliation and social transformation. 
Chapter 6 illustrated that the Tokyo Trial's individualisation of responsibility 
has also left an ambivalent perception and understanding of war guilt and responsibility 
within the Japanese. The criminal punishment of wartime leaders had a symbolic impact, 
at the time, because it successfully detached the Japanese people from the defendants, 
who were labelled as war criminals, as well as from war crimes and responsibility. This 
gave the nation a setting in which to start from a scratch. The side effect of this, however, 
was that the Japanese became bystanders to the Tokyo Trial. They did not examine the 
Trial and its verdict actively and personally, so as to reflect on their own responsibility as 
a people. The Tokyo Trial facilitated self-justification, as well as self-immunisation 
from responsibility by putting blame solely on the defendants at the Trial. 
At the same time, however, many of the Japanese felt, and still feel, 
paradoxically, frustration that it was their nation, as a whole, that was judged collectively 
by the Tokyo Trial. The view that the Tokyo Trial was `victor's justice' imposed on the 
vanquished nation continues to be widely shared among the Japanese, with a bitter 
feeling. In spite of the Allies' intention to avoid pursuing collective responsibility, this 
impression is inevitable when their own leaders were prosecuted externally and 
unilaterally, and when people were excluded from that process. This point has been 
especially emphasised by nationalist and right-wingers, who question the fairness and 
justice of the Trial. 
Japanese acceptance of the Tokyo Trial's pursuit of responsibility of individual 
leaders, on the one hand, and their perception deep down of collective responsibility 
pursued under the Trial, on the other, are paradoxical trends. Nonetheless, each of them, 
or a mixture of them, is an important indication of the differential, delicate and complex 
impact of the individual criminal punishment in the aftermath of war and conflict. What 
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is more, regarding the war, as well as the large-scale atrocity that was conducted in the 
name of the nation or a social group, people themselves are well aware that their 
responsibility cannot be de-collectivised totally. The Tokyo Trial could not erase senses 
of `collective guilt' and `collective humiliation' in the Japanese. In other words, 
individual criminal punishment under the Tokyo Trial left the Japanese with an 
ambiguous and ambivalent sense of war responsibility and guilt, which has been 
embedded in them ever since and remains repressed in society as a `pent-up' feeling. 
Intensive interviews and focus groups showed that the current generation is 
struggling to recognise and understand the meaning of contemporary Japan's 
responsibility for the war and for war crimes. While recognising a sense of collective 
guilt, the post-war generation is dismayed and frustrated by the fact that responsibility 
for the past has grown into a timeless collective responsibility. A sense of collective 
responsibility has been not merely cultivated within, but also imposed without. This fact 
gives some Japanese a sense of frustration. It is based on this frustration that nationalist 
and conservative claims that the Tokyo Trial instigated the Japanese with a sense of guilt 
appeal. After all, their claim is a magnified version of a pent-up feeling suppressed by 
the Japanese, who hold a rather distorted sense of collective guilt, or even a feeling of 
being victimised by enduring accusations of having been the victimiser. Excessive 
collective responsibility is what the advocates of international criminal justice believe 
that a war crimes tribunal should help to avoid. It is ironic, therefore, that the Tokyo Trial 
not only failed to achieve this, but also came to be attacked by some as the source of an 
over-arching collective guilt. 
Through analysis of Japanese perception and values, I have argued that the 
Tokyo Trial left mixed legacy in Japanese society. It played an important role in Japan's 
immediate demilitarisation and democratisation process, which was the Allies' original 
strategic purpose for conducting the Tokyo Trial. However, from the perspective of 
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social transformation and reconciliation, which are the perceived (or received) strategic 
purposes of international war crimes tribunals, the impact of the Tokyo Trial on post-war 
Japan is rather problematic. The Tokyo Trial, ironically, resulted in helping to twist and 
distort the Japanese people's understanding of the war and sense of war responsibility. 
The historical perception of the war and a sense of war responsibility are very 
important issues for post-war reconciliation and social transformation. In this thesis, I 
have shown through the case of the Tokyo Trial and post-war Japan that international 
war crimes tribunals can cause a significant impact on historical perception and the 
sense of war responsibility in a society, but possibly in ways that are different from, or 
even opposite to, those proposed by advocates of the Nuremberg legacy. In the worst 
cases, they can complicate the issue of war crimes responsibility, and even distort a 
people's sense of war guilt in the long run. As rows over textbooks and the Yasukuni 
shrine show, the Tokyo Trial casts a shadow over Japanese reconciliation with their 
Asian neighbours, as well as with their own past. Accordingly, it is appropriate to revise 
understanding of whether an international tribunal's account of war and atrocity is a 
useful means of encouraging peace, or a hindrance to the difficult processes of 
reconciliation and transformation that a post-war society has to go through. 
I would not wish to maintain that the findings here are the real legacy of war 
crimes tribunals. Just as the experience of Tokyo and Nuremberg show, a `one size fits 
all' is a simplistic approach, with which the present analysis has engaged critically 
throughout. Each international war crimes tribunal is different in its appearance, 
procedures and, thus, impact, based on the way an armed conflict ends and on the 
strategic purpose underpinning the tribunal. This is clear from the continuing 
international war crimes tribunals in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the hybrid 
court in Sierra Leone. However, in some respects, the `Tokyo legacy' seems more 
relevant to the experience of other international tribunals and societies than its 
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Nuremburg counterpart. Some of the limitations and side effects of the Trial's account of 
events, described and analysed in the present study, have also been noted by others, 
particularly some legal scholars, with regard to the ICTs and cases in Latin America, as 
note in early parts of the dissertation. Some reports of the Serbian reaction to the 
Milosevic trial at the ICTY note views and frustrations that the international tribunal is 
an `anti-Serb' institution or a political court that tries Serbia as a whole, confusion 
whether the Hague tribunal strictly distinguishes between the individual and the 
collective, and a pragmatic perception that the Tribunal is a condition the country has to 
meet in order to gain financial and political support from the international community. ' 
This ambivalent, or paradoxical, trend, if correct and confirmed by research, is in line 
with the findings and thesis presented in the present study regarding the Tokyo Trial and 
Japan. 
The Japanese people's attitude towards the war crimes tribunal and war 
responsibility has been influenced by the fact that the Tokyo Trial was an internationally 
`imposed' institution. The scar of `victor's justice' remains in the Japanese collective 
memory, which leads to a vague sense of war guilt, at best, a repellent nationalistic 
attitude at worst, and frustration in general. The fact that the Trial was `victor's justice' 
degraded any positive significance that the Trial might have had. What is more, the 
passive Japanese attitude towards, or `silence' over, the issue of facing up to and 
reflecting on the war and the war crimes legacy can be attributed to the fact that it was an 
international tribunal that passed judgement. The Japanese could cling to this notion of 
internationally imposed judgement, rather than re-examining the painful events and 
experiences themselves. In this sense, the international tribunal deprived the Japanese 
the opportunity directly to confront the past. This leads to general indifference about the 
1 Biljana Kovacevic-Vuco, `Comment: Milosevic on Trial - the Serb View', Tribunal Update No. 348,15 
March 2004, http: //www. iwpr. net/index. pl? archive/tri/tri 348 4 eng txt, 20 March 2004. 
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war, war crimes and the Tokyo Trial. All these question the perceived positive impact of 
international tribunals. Interestingly, however, the result of intensive interviews and 
focus groups showed that, although many Japanese think - with the benefit of the 
hindsight - that domestic trials after the war would have been ideal, in theory, most of 
them are very sceptical about the feasibility of such trials. They pointed out the lack of 
necessary infrastructure so soon after the war and, more importantly, showed awareness 
of an ethical question about who could serve as a judge to try an event in which the 
whole nation had been involved. 
Half a century from the Nuremberg Trial, the ICTs became a new part of its 
legacy. In their turn, they too became the catalyst for a further development in the 
domain of international criminal justice, the emergence of the International Criminal 
Court. It is in this context, that the Tokyo Trial becomes an important case to research, 
because the experience of the Nuremberg Tribunal has been emphatically invoked with 
certain key assumptions about its impact on the subsequent peace and security. The 
Tokyo Trial has been little researched and appreciated, in comparison, but it remains the 
only public international war crimes tribunal, other than Nuremberg, that has operated 
and completed its cases. This fact alone shows that greater attention should be paid on 
the significance as well as impact of the Tokyo Trial on post-war Japan, both in the short- 
and the long-term. 
The case of the Tokyo Trial and post-war Japan brings into question prominent 
and popular beliefs among proponents of international and transitional justice about the 
positive impact of war crimes prosecutions, especially concerning individual criminal 
punishment and the creation of an authoritative account of the war. This dissertation has 
offered significant empirical research with which to examine the short-term and 
long-term impact of the two principal devices creating the historical record and 
individualising responsibility, which were considered and applied both at Tokyo and 
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Nuremberg, and are currently regarded as important and effective tools by ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals and other post-Cold War international war crimes 
tribunals to promote reconciliation and truth-telling. Strictly speaking, the strategic 
purposes of the post-Second World War international military tribunals and the 
post-Cold War international criminal tribunals are not precisely the same, as the former 
aimed at the de-Nazification/demilitarisation and democratisation of post-war Germany 
and the demilitarisation and democratisation Japan, whereas the post-Cold War tribunals 
have broader purposes. Nonetheless, the positive impact of international prosecution in 
the context of post-conflict nation-building and transitional justice in the 1940s was 
emphasised in the subsequent discussion of the topic and was a key part of the discourse 
surrounding the more recent international judicial bodies, based on the experience of 
Nuremberg. Moreover, certain assumptions about Nuremburg's impact on the 
subsequent peace and security crucially informed the creation of the ad hoc courts. 
The experience of the Tokyo Trial and post-war Japan, as shown above, 
demonstrates that the impact and effect of international war crimes tribunals and their 
two principal devices - individualisation of responsibility and the creation of an 
authoritative historical record - are not necessarily wholly positive, nor are they 
straightforward. They may not only be complex, subtle and multifaceted, but also 
counter-productive and harmful by distorting the perpetrator people's sense of 
responsibility, guilt and historical perception - which are necessary when the strategic 
purpose of international war crimes tribunal is to promote the healthy social 
transformation and true reconciliation, which are vital for the achievement of 
long-lasing peace in post-conflict society. The critical assessment I have undertaken in 
this dissertation of the Nuremberg legacy based on empirical research about the Tokyo 
Trial and its impact on post-war Japan suggests a need to re-examine the strategy of the 
ICTs and to question the understanding held by advocates of international tribunals 
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regarding what international criminal justice can achieve and what outsiders can and 
cannot do to transform a war-torn society and promote reconciliation within it. 
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APPENDIX A. 
Details of Intensive Interviews and Focus Groups 
Intensive Interviews 
Ando, Nisuke Professor of International Law, Doshisha University 
13 November 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
Asada, Sadao Professor of International History, Doshisha University 
15 January 2004 Kyoto Japan 
Born Date of interview Place of interview 
Interviewee A 1959 Male 10 August 2003 London, UK. 
B 1974 Female 8 October 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
C 1978 Female 17 November 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
D 1938 Male 19 November 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
E 1961 Male 21 November 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
F 1974 Female 25 November 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
G 1965 Male 2 December 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
H 1949 Female 3 December 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
I 1972 Female 6 December 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
J 1959 Female 6 December 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
K 1945 Female 13 December 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
L 1972 Female 21 December 2003 Tokyo, Japan. 
M 1935 Male 12 January 2004 Kyoto, Japan. 
N 1935 Female 12 January 2004 Kyoto, Japan. 
0 1975 Male 10 July 2003 London, U. K. 
P 1944 Female 17 November 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
Q 1974 Female 9 July 2003 London, U. K. 
R 1979 Female 12 August 2003 London, U. K. 
S 1955 Male 15 October 2003 Kyoto, Japan. 
Focus Groups 
A Undergraduate students at the 3 males and I female 8 December 2003, 
Department of Commerce, (early 20s) Kyoto, Japan. 
Doshisha University. 
B Undergraduate students at the 8 males (early 20s) 25 November 2003, 
Department of Commerce, Kyoto Japan. 
Doshisha University. 
C Postgraduate students at the 1 male and 2 females 18 November 2003, 
Department of Literature, (mid-20s) Kyoto Japan. 
Doshisha University. 
D Postgraduate students at the 3 males and 1 female 10 December 2003, 
Department of Law (majoring (mid to late 20s) Kyoto Japan 
US-Japanese diplomatic 
history), Doshisha University 
E Businessmen, graduated from 3 males (late 40s) 15 October 2003, 
Doshisha University. Kyoto Japan. 
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Defendants at International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial) 
Araki Sadao (1877) General; Minister of War; Minister of Education. 
Doihara Kenji (1883) General; Commander, Kwantaung Army; Supreme War Council. 
Hahimoto Kingorö (1890) Colonel; various commander of artillery regiments 
Hata Shunroku (1879) Field Marshal; Commander, China Expeditionary Force; Minister 
of War. 
Hiranuma Kiichirö (1867) Privy Council; Prime Minister. 
Hirota Köki (1878) Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Foreign Minister; Prime 
Minister. 
Hoshino Naoki (1892) Director of General Affairs (chief civilian officer), Manchukuo; 
Minister without portfolio. 
Itagaki Seishirö (1885) General; Chief of staff, Kwantung Army; Minister of War. 
Kaya Okinori (1889) Minister of Finance; President of North China Development 
Company. 
Kido Köichi (1889) Minister of Education; Minister of Welfare; Minister of Home 
Affairs. 
Kimura Heitarö (1888) General; Vice Minister of War; Supreme War Council; Army 
Commander in Burma. 
Koiso Kuniaki (1880) General; Governor-general, Korea; Prime Minister. 
Matsui Iwane (1878) General; Commander, China Expeditionary Force. 
Matsuoka Yösuke (1880) Japan's chief delegate, League of Nations; Foreign Minister. 
Minami Jirö (1874) General; Minister of War; Commander, Kwantung Army; 
Governor-general, Korea. 
Mutö Akira (1892) Vice Chief of staff, China Expeditionary Force; Director, Military 
Affairs Bureau. 
Nagano Osami (1880) Admiral; Navy Minister; Navy Chief of Staff. 
Oka Takasumi (1890) Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau; Vice Minister of the Navy. 
Ökawa Shtunei (1886) Intellectual behind the rise of the Japanese militarists in the 1930s. 
Öshima Hiroshi (1886) Military attache in Germany; Ambassador to Germany. 
Sato Kenryö (1895) Chief, Military Affairs Bureau. 
Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887) Career Diplomat; Ambassador to China; to the Soviet Union; to 
Great Britain; Foreign Minister. 
Shimada Shigetarö (1883) Admiral; Navy Minister; Supreme War Council. 
Shiratori Toshio (1887) Ambassador to Italy; adviser to the foreign mister. 
Suzuki Teiichi (1888-) President, Cabinet Planning Board; adviser to the cabinet. 
Tögö Shigenori (1882) Career Diplomat; Ambassador to Germany; to the Soviet Union; 
Foreign Minister. 
Töjö Hideki (1884) General; Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army; Minister of War; Prime 
Minister. 
Umezu Yoshijirö (1882) General; Commander, Kwantung Army; Army chief of staff. 
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Verdicts and Sentences at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(The Tokyo Trial) 
COUNT 1 27 29 31 32 33 35 36 54 55 
Araki G G X X X X X X X X Life sentence 
Doihara G G G G G X G G G 0 Hanging 
Hahimoto G G X X X X X Life sentence 
Hata G G G G G X X X G Life sentence 
Hiranuma G G G G G X X G X X Life sentence 
Hirota G G x x x x x X G Hanging 
Hoshino G G G G G X X X X Life sentence 
Itagaki G G G G G X G G G 0 Hanging 
Kaya G G G G G X X Life sentence 
Kido G G G G G X X X X X Life sentence 
Kimura G G G G G G G Hanging 
Koiso G G G G G X X G Life sentence 
Matsui x X X X X X X X G Hanging 
Minami G G X X X X X Life sentence 
Muto G G G G G X X G G Hanging 
Oka G G G G G X X Life sentence 
Oshima G X X X X X X Life sentence 
Sato G G G G G X X Life sentence 
Shi emitsu X G G G G G X X G 7 Years 
Shimada G G G G G X X Life sentence 
Shiratori G X X X X Life sentence 
Suzuki G G G G G X X X X Life sentence 
Togo G G G G G X X X 20 Years 
Tojo G G G G G G X G 0 Hanging 
Umezu G G G G G X X X Life sentence 
Count 1: The overall Conspiracy. 
27: Waging war against China. 
29: Waging war against the US. 
31: Waging war against the British Commonwealth. 
32: Waging war against the Netherlands. 
33: Waging war against France. 
35: Waging war against the USSR at Lake Khassan. 
36: Waging war against the USSR at Nomonhan. 
54: Ordering, authorising or permitting atrocities. 
55: Disregard of duty to secure observance of and prevent breaches of Laws of War. 
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ii) Official documents 
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- Resolution 161 (1961), 21 February 1961, S/4741. 
- Resolution 217 (1965), 20 November 1965. 
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International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals, The Trial of 
the Major German War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
14 November 1945 - 30 November1945, vol. 2 (Nuremberg: [s. n. ], 1947). 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals, Judgment of 
the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals: (with the 
dissenting opinion of the Soviet member), Nuremberg, 30th September and Ist October, 
1946 (London: H. M. S. O., 1946). 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saibansho (ed. ), Kyokutö Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku [The 
Stenographic Record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East], 10 volumes 
(Tokyo: Yushodo Shoten, 1968). 
- B. V. A. Röling and 
C. F. Röter (eds. ), The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military 
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Publishing Inc., 1981). 
Pritchard, R. J. and Zaide, S. M. (eds. ) and Project Director: Donald Cameron Watt, The 
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